to a modest and self-critical rationalism. He contrasted this view
with "uncritical or comprehensive rationalism," the received
justificationist view that only what can be proved by reason and/or
experience should be accepted. Popper argued that comprehensive
rationalism cannot explain how proof is possible and that it leads to
inconsistencies. Critical rationalism today is the project of
extending Popper's approach to all areas of thought and action. In
each field the central task of critical rationalism is to replace
allegedly justificatory methods with critical ones.
Section 2 explains how critical rationalism arose out of the breakdown
of Popper's first justificationist attempt to account for scientific
progress. Section 2 also presents Popper's first application of his
non-justificationist perspective to new fields in his The Open Society
and Its Enemies. Section 3 first explains Joseph Agassi's view of the
critical appraisal of metaphysical theories in scientific contexts as
well as his view of piecemeal rationality, and secondly portrays
William Bartley's more comprehensive view of non-justificationism.
Section 4 discusses Imré Lakatos's extension of critical rationalism
to mathematics. Section 5 portrays Hans Albert's systematic version of
critical rationalism. His perspective incorporated results of Popper,
Agassi and Bartley and extended them to social and political theory.
Section 6 suggests that Mario Bunge's fallibilism ─ which he developed
independently of critical rationalists ─ is sufficiently close to
their views to count here: he develops critical tools for achieving
progress without justification in virtually all areas of thought.
Section 7 discusses attempts to develop critical rationalism in new
and simpler ways. These views seek to do without frameworks and
methodological rules; their originators are Jagdish Hattiangadi,
Gunnar Andersson, and David Miller. These theories deprive rational
thought of needed steering mechanisms. Section 8 presents the
reintroduction of forms of justification designed to be compatible
with Popper's criticism of induction. These have been developed by
Alan Musgrave, Volker Gadenne and John Watkins. Section 9 explains how
Popper's emphasis on the importance of methodological rules in science
has led to a critical rationalist sociology of science. The main task
of this sociology of science is to examine existing rules and methods
as furthering or hindering research. Section 10 calls attention to the
alternative philosophical anthropology which Agassi has proposed as a
framework for critical rationalism. Whereas Popper saw rationality as
contrary to human nature's craving for security, Agassi sees
rationality as natural, but partial and improvable. Section 11
describes how Popper's original political manifesto in The Open
Society and Its Enemies has led to attempts to use his arguments to
defend both right-leaning and left-leaning political theories. Section
12 returns to Popper's early researches in educational theory. His
philosophy led to concerted efforts to develop a new pedagogy which
emphasizes active problem solving as the best learning method. This
pedagogy should promote autonomy and critical thinking. Section 13
concludes with the suggestion that the success or the failure of the
project of substituting critical for allegedly justificatory methods
has still to be judged.
1. Introduction
Critical rationalism emerged from research by the Würzburg school of
psychology. This school sought to develop a deductivist philosophy of
science to complement their deductivist psychology. While working on
this program, Karl Popper stumbled onto a non-justificationist theory
of scientific knowledge: he explained the growth of knowledge without
proof. Non-justificationism, that is, the theory that no theory can be
proven, is at least as old as Socrates, but Popper's version of it is
the first that also purports to explain the growth of knowledge.
Popper and other critical rationalists took on the project of
explaining the growth of knowledge without justification. This project
has produced various competing theories of rationality and has been
extended to many fields. This article will concentrate on the internal
logic and problems involved in the development of critical methods
capable of producing the growth of knowledge.
Of the numerous justificationist predecessors let only this be said.
The overwhelming majority of those who comment on critical rationalism
claim that critical rationalism is somehow incoherent and that
inductivism is better. A major exception was Bertrand Russell. He
appreciated the logical strength of critical rationalism and knew the
logical weakness of induction. Nevertheless he clung to induction. He
thought that critical rationalism was a philosophy of despair. Whether
his judgment of critical rationalism was correct depends on whether
its development can bring progress. To show this progress, new
critical rationalist ideas are described and presented below. This
should provide an answer to Russell that he amply deserves.
2. Popper and Non-Justificationism
Inductive inferences have observations as premises and theories as
conclusions. They are notoriously invalid but often are deemed
unavoidable. Critical rationalism views them as unnecessary. This
point of view grew gradually out of Karl Popper's attempt to describe
science without their use in Die beiden Grundprobleme der
Erkenntnistheorie (1932-33 ), where he still operated within the
framework of justificationism, that is, while viewing the aim of
scientific method as the proper (justified) assessment of the truth
value of certain sentences. He hoped to build a theory of the proper
assessment of sentences, that is, of the possibility of proving the
truth or falsity of some sentences. He began with the fact that a
theory is false if it contradicts a singular sentence describing some
observation reports. Popper then said that such singular sentences
were veridical, that is, truthful as opposed to illusory, so they may
be used to produce final proofs of the falsity of some universal
sentences. For example, the singular sentence, "That swan is black,"
if it is a true report of some observation, can be used to produce a
final proof of the falsity of the universal sentence, "All swans are
white." But, he argued, proof of universal sentences or the
demonstration that they are probable requires inductive inferences. As
a consequence no such putative proof can be valid.
Popper himself found the theory he presented in Die beiden
Grundprobleme der Erkenntnistheorie without chapter 5 inadequate for
three reasons. The first reason is that singular statements are not
veridical. He began work on this problem in chapter 5 of Die beiden
Grundprobleme. This chapter contains a theory of science which differs
on important points from the theory found in the rest of that volume.
The second reason that Popper's first attempt broke down is that one
can circumvent refutations by ad hoc stratagems, as Hans Reichenbach
quickly pointed out in a note which responded to Popper's first
publication of his view in Erkenntnis. The third reason was Popper's
inability to handle the problem of the demarcation of science from
non-science with his idea that we show how science properly assigns
truth values to sentences with no inductive inference. On a
justificationist theory of the task of the philosophy of science such
as Reichenbach's, which was identical to Popper's theory as he wrote
Die beiden Grundprobleme without chapter 5, science should be
demarcated by the proper assignment of truth values: science is the
set of sentences with justifiably assigned truth values. The task of
the philosophy of science is to explain how these assignments are
properly made. (Reichenbach said the calculus of probabilities serves
that purpose.) Popper argued that it is not possible to properly
assign either the truth value True or some degree of probability to
universal sentences. He called such sentences "fictions", which is a
term he had earlier taken over from Hans Vaihinger. On the theory
presented in Die beiden Grundprobleme without chapter 5, after science
had done its job, there were still, on the one hand, some fictions
which ought to be deemed scientific such as the theories of the
Würzburg school in psychology and, perhaps, as he said later,
Einstein's physics, and, on the other hand, other fictions which
should be deemed unscientific, such as the psychologies of Freud and
Adler. He could not distinguish between these two sets of theories
within his justificationist framework, since, on this view, only
proofs or refutations of these theories could do that. He asserted,
however, that no proof was possible and refutations could establish
only the falsity of universal propositions.
As a consequence of these three difficulties Popper developed an
entirely different theory of science in chapter 5, then in Logik der
Forschung. In order to overcome the problems his first view faced, he
adopted two central strategies. First, he reformulated the task of the
philosophy of science. Rather than presenting scientific method as a
tool for properly assigning truth values to sentences, he presented
rules of scientific method as conducive to the growth of knowledge.
Apparently he still held that only proven or refuted sentences could
take truth values. But this view is incompatible with his new
philosophy of science as it appears in his Logik der Forschung: there
he had to presume that some non-refuted theories took truth values,
that is, that they are true or false as the case may be, even though
they have been neither proved nor refuted. It is the job of scientists
to discover their falsity when they can. So, he worked around the
difficulty posed by the fact that, on the one hand, he had to assume
that theories were refutable and thus had truth values, whereas, on
the other hand, he thought that only proven or refuted theories had
truth values at all. He argued that his view could be interpreted as
realist or as antirealist. He hedged his bets as best he could and
appealed to Mach, who had stipulated that one should avoid
participation in any metaphysical dispute.
In Logik der Forschung Popper solved his three initial difficulties in
the following ways. First, instead of claiming that singular sentences
were veridical, he said that basic statements are only provisionally
accepted, provided that they were repeatable and so testable. He
thereby introduced the following rule: consider only repeatable basic
statements. He claimed that the provisional acceptance of basic
statements does not disqualify them as refutations of theories—no
longer simply universal sentences—because for the most part we can
agree on which basic sentences we provisionally assume to be true.
Second, he proposed the rule that one should always replace some
theory which is contradicted by a basic statement by whichever new
alternative has the highest degree of falsifiability. This rule should
guarantee that refutations lead to progress. Reichenbach had declared
that there was no logic of scientific method, that is, no proof or
refutation. The basis for his claim that there could be no refutation
was that any theory could be protected from a putative refutation with
some ad hoc maneuver. Popper responded to Reichenbach with his Logik
der Forschung (Logic of Research) and by introducing methodology into
his deliberations. The methodological rule enabled him to avoid ad hoc
protection of theories and thus enabled him to show how theories could
be refuted. Third, he introduced the rule: only refutable theories—the
term "fiction" no longer appears in his work—are scientific and may be
deemed scientific.
This view was no longer justificationist, that is, it no longer
claimed properly to assign truth values to sentences. All
"assignments" are conjectural. But Popper had at that point no
non-justificationist theory of rationality in general; his theory
applied to science alone. He did not at that point notice problems
which his theory raised for the broader framework of rationality which
all philosophers of science had used since antiquity, the framework
that identified the rational with the proven.
The conflict between Popper's new theory of science and his older
theory that only proven or refuted sentences can take truth values was
removed by Tarski. Tarski's definition of truth, as Tarski explained
to Popper, allows for non-proven but still true sentences. Tarski
thereby did away with the theory of truth that had given Popper so
much trouble. Tarski did not necessarily offer Popper an adequate
theory of truth for his philosophy of science. But Tarski did free him
from a false theory which was a great impediment to the construction
of a truly fallibilist, realist theory of science. Popper never
clearly explained the importance that Tarski had for him at the time.
This failure to explain how the logic of his problem changed as a
result of Tarski's theory was part of his repression of the fact that
he had held a justificationist theory of truth for a long time, even
after he began writing a fallibilist book. After his meeting with
Tarski, he was free to develop his fallibilist theory of science in
new ways, because he could claim that theories could be true even
though there was no proof of them. During his earlier years in London,
during 1946-1965 or so, he returned to the possibilities this fact
opened up.
In Logik der Forschung Popper developed a theory of the growth of
scientific knowledge without justification. But he had no general
theory of rationality without justification. Indeed, he still limited
rationality to science and methodology. However, at least three
problems arose for this limited view of rationality.
Popper maintained at that point that scientists gain knowledge not by
proofs but by refutations of good conjectures and by replacing them
with new and better ones. These new conjectures avoid earlier
mistakes, explain more, and invite new tests. He originally thought of
this theory as eo ipso a theory of rationality: outside of science and
methodology he made no allowance for rationality. He identified
research, science and methodology, as the title of his book indicates.
Difficulties piled up fast. First, if rationality is limited to
science, how is methodology rational? Methodology can only be rational
if methodology is the empirical study of science—as Whewell said—or if
non-empirical research can be rational. Popper could not view
methodology as a science of science because he held that it is not
merely descriptive but also prescriptive. Yet it should be rational.
The second problem arose as Popper tried to apply his methodology of
the physical sciences to the social sciences. The Poverty of
Historicism and The Open Society and Its Enemies defend the open
society on the grounds that only open societies preserve reason, that
is, criticism, and as a consequence only open societies can be
civilized. But why is a choice for the open society rational? He had
no answer. He merely said that the acceptance of reason was a
consequence of sympathy for others. Nothing can be said to convince
those to change their minds who accept the barbaric consequences of
fascism or communism.
The third problem concerns metaphysics. Before he had ever developed
his own philosophy of science, he had defended in his doctoral
dissertation the view that metaphysical hypotheses can serve as
working hypotheses in the construction of scientific theories. His
discussion there merely concerned the use of physicalist metaphysics
as a guide for psychological research. He said that this was fine, but
one should not decide a priori that a view of psychological processes
as physical is needed or even possible. Scientific research—he was not
clear then what that meant—should decide this. He was later pressed,
however, to decide between competing metaphysical theories with which
to interpret science, even in the absence of a scientific answer. Was
the world determined or not? Questions such as this raised the
question as to whether one metaphysical theory can be better or worse
than another and whether one could find out which one is better. He
gave up his earlier view of rationality as limited to scientific
research and methodology, but he still insisted that for science some
metaphysical theories are merely heuristic, and no more than that.
To extend his theory that rationality consisted of scientific research
and methodology alone, Popper loosened his standard of rationality.
Rejecting the older standard of rationality — proof – - as too high,
he began to view the standard for science, refutability, as too high
for the rationality that obtains outside science. Whereas earlier he
had replaced justification with refutation, he now replaced refutation
with criticism. Popper thereby created a new philosophical perspective
by generalizing his theory of scientific research. The name he gave to
this extension is "critical rationalism." Popper introduced it in the
introduction to his Conjectures and Refutations, where he
characterized it briefly as the critical attitude. He used it also to
describe views he developed earlier, in The Open Society and Its
Enemies.
Could his critical rationalism apply to other fields? Could various
fields also not only do without (epistemological) justification but
also raise their levels of rationality with the use of critical
methods? Critical rationalism became a project to employ critical
methods as a substitute for epistemological justification in all areas
of life.
3. Joseph Agassi and William Bartley
Outside of Popper's own efforts to develop this project, the first two
most significant endeavors were undertaken by Joseph Agassi and
William Bartley. Although Agassi's efforts began somewhat earlier than
Bartley's, their development overlaps considerably; the two were in
conversation with each other for much of the time that they were
working out their ideas as Popper's students. I begin with Agassi, who
developed Popper's philosophy piecemeal and then turn to Bartley who
attempted to give critical rationalism a comprehensive statement, that
is, a version of it which would explain how a critical rationalist
could adopt a critical stance toward any idea whatsoever, including
its own claims.
Agassi began with his dissertation, in which he posed the question,
How can metaphysics be used to guide scientific research without
making science subordinate to it? Duhem had warned that, were science
to concern itself with metaphysics, it would be subordinate to it.
Encouraging scientists to engage in metaphysical debates would cause
dissent and lead them away from science's main task of constructing
empirical theories.
Agassi's project was to show how metaphysical research could
facilitate empirical progress without tyrannizing science. He did this
by extending Popper's theory of the methods of scientific practice to
include the critical, and thereby progressive, use of metaphysical
theories to guide scientific research. On his view metaphysics need
not be a mere heuristic, that is, a source of ideas, but rather a
systematic guide to scientific research and a provisional standard for
desirable theories. Metaphysics can be useful in advancing science by
giving guidelines for the search for empirical explanations and by
deepening the understanding of the world offered by science. But, he
also said, it can help achieve these aims only when used critically. A
critical stance toward metaphysics is possible when two or more
metaphysical research programs compete with each other to construct
empirically refutable theories. This, he argued, is just what happened
when Faraday used his metaphysical field theory as the framework
within which he constructed physical (field) theories. His competitors
tried to explain the same phenomena under the Newtonian assumption
that all forces act at a distance. Faraday's theory of
electro-magnetic events eventually had an enormous impact, because his
metaphysics enabled him to construct better physical theories than his
competitors.
Bartley developed a comprehensive version of critical rationalism. He
argued that there were two problems that showed Popper's original
version was too limited. Popper encountered the first of these as he
wrote The Open Society and Its Enemies where he discussed the problem:
Why should one be rational? He conceded that rationality is limited,
as its choice is pre-rational, a decision based on feelings. Bartley
viewed Popper's problem of the limits of the ability to argue
rationally in favor of rationality as parallel to a problem he
(Bartley) had earlier encountered in religious philosophy: defenders
of religion claim that commitment to some religion is just as rational
as commitment to rationality: each individual has to choose some
starting point, and each starting point must be arbitrary. Each
starting point then is just as pre-rational as the other, since each
choice is beyond the limits of reason.
Bartley viewed the inability to defend rationality rationally as
amounting to the inability to show the superiority of rational methods
to solve problems over any other method. Bartley saw this limitation
as an important defect. But in Popper's approach to rationality as
critical rather than justificatory, he found a way to overcome it.
For, he argued, on the one hand, the theory of rationality as proof
should itself be proven, but in fact it is not provable, whereas, on
the other hand, the theory of rationality as readiness to appraise
theories critically should itself be open to criticism, and this is
quite possible. It is then no longer the case that the adoption of a
rational approach to problems is no more rational than commitments to
belief systems, such as those of some religion: the theory that
rational practice means holding all theories open to criticism, may
itself be held open to criticism. This also means that the use of
rational methods to solve problems may be rationally defended, that
is, we may use rationality to answer objections to the use of
rationality.
Could this theory allow one to hold religious beliefs rationally by
holding them open to criticism? Bartley never answered this question
explicitly. He hinted that he did believe this was the case, and some
have understood him as adopting this position. Some critical
rationalists are believers and some are not. Standards here remain
vague. The winner of the Popper essay prize argued that Christians
were also critical rationalists, because they discussed, for example,
the theological significance of their religious experiences and have
developed their views at Church councils. (Elliot 2004) Agassi has
pointed out that the Talmudic tradition is highly critical within
certain bounds, yet cannot be said to have a high degree of
rationality. If all critical discussions, even those within sects,
qualify their practitioners as critical rationalists, then critical
rationalism itself dissolves. To take seriously the replacement of
justification with criticism, Agassi suggests, requires demarcation
between effective and ineffective critical methods.
Bartley called his view "comprehensively critical rationalism" to
distinguish it from Popper's critical rationalism. It should not
merely explain how one can conduct rational inquires in specific
fields, but it should apply to the theory of rationality itself.
Bartley added a list of critical standards one may use to evaluate
ideas in any area whatsoever: a proposed idea should be a solution to
an important problem, internally consistent, not refuted, and
consistent with science. The first three are incorporated into
virtually all critical rationalist theories. The fourth has been
treated with more caution: science might also be mistaken, especially
when it contains competing theories. A new metaphysical alternative
may be inconsistent with established physical theory, as Faraday's
was, yet be quite important for progress.
John Watkins considered Bartley's theory a reinforced dogmatism with a
"Heads I win, tails you lose" strategy: If comprehensive critical
rationalism faces no effective criticism it wins, but if it does, it
thereby shows that it can meet its own standards and then again it
wins. This criticism overlooks the fact that, if it faces effective
criticism, it is shown to be wrong. Bartley's standard is a necessary
condition of rationality, but meeting it is no reason for clinging to
an effectively criticized theory.
Bartley's ideal of holding all ideas open to criticism has been an
important part of critical rationalism. But it soon became apparent
that the problems of how to develop critical rationalism were more
important than demonstrating just how comprehensive it could be or of
maintaining this comprehensive position. In order to see how and why
this realization came about it is useful to return to Agassi.
Agassi deems the focus of Bartley's of approach to be misplaced: it
unduly emphasizes the defense of rationality as rationally defensible.
Rationality does not need defense; it needs improvement, Agassi says.
And we may try to improve it piecemeal. We are all rational to some
degree and are all interested from time to time in using reason more
effectively than we now do. We cannot help but be rational, since
thinking is, like seeing, innate to some extent. No one is always
rational or perfectly rational any time. Our best hope, then, is to
use rationality to improve the partial and limited rationality which
we all use to one degree or another. We use a bootstrap process in
that we use the rational methods we now have at hand to develop better
methods, whereby the methods we use may very well be corrected or even
discarded.
Agassi also applied Popper's non-justificationism to the
historiography of science. Like many, Popper wanted the theory of
science to describe science, but he hardly tried to apply his view to
the history of science. Agassi developed a far wider picture of the
history of science from Popper's viewpoint, contrasting the
traditional inductivist and conventionalist historiographies with a
non-justificationist one. Inductivism distorts the history of science
as it is the view of innovations as either completely right or quite
useless; conventionalism distorts the history of science because it
explains away radical changes. John Wettersten extended this
application to the historiography of psychology, explaining how a
non-justificationist approach was needed to remove peculiar
distortions there.
4. Critical Rationalism in Mathematics
In Proofs and Refutations Imré Lakatos extended the range of critical
rationalism into mathematics. This area is just where one would expect
that it would be the most difficult to develop a theory of the growth
of knowledge by criticism rather than by proof, or, as Lakatos put it,
by proofs and refutations. Putative counter-examples, he illustrated
historically, often refute "proofs" and thus require improvements.
Lakatos did not provide for the use of frameworks to formulate
problems in mathematics, nor did he discuss the rules which
mathematicians should follow in formulating and criticizing proofs. He
forcefully argued against premature formalization, but he did not
allow for the modern method of introducing a field axiomatically from
the start. His theory of response to criticism only shows that varying
ways of responding to problematical cases are available.
As a beginning this is fine. But caring for the central task of
critical rationalism, that is, for the development of critical methods
(in mathematics) as an alternative to the quest for justifications,
requires the replacement of justificationist methods with critical
ones. Is this at all possible? Answers to this question might
enlighten us about the rationality of mathematical research. They
might supplement and/or improve Lakatos's portrayal of mathematical
research by accounts of the ways it proceeds, and explain how
decisions about the direction of research are made rationally.
Several thinkers have taken up this question; but with only one
exception, they have sought to use Lakatos's justificationist
methodology of scientific research programs. The exception is Peggy
Marchi who broke off her research before she had constructed any
developed view. Three thinkers, however, have made attempts to take
Lakatos' methodology of research programs in a critical spirit and
then apply it to the history of mathematics.
D.D. Spalt (Spalt 1981) argues that Lakatos' methodology of research
programs is inapplicable to the history of mathematics as
mathematicians are more open skeptical and critical than Lakatos'
methodology describes. This confirms Lakatos's turn away from a
critical approach, but does not help us further since it does not go
on to ask if a genuinely critical approach, say, to the use of
research programs such as Agassi's would help us. But Spalt also finds
no mathematicians who follow any clear research program at all. He
defends a view of mathematics which has great similarity to
Feyerabend's view of science: there is no methodology which can
describe all mathematical research.
G. Giorello (Giorello 1981) argues that Lakatos' theory of scientific
research programs is better applicable to mathematical research than
Popper's or Kuhn's. Teun Koetsier in turn found Giorello's argument
inadequate (Koetsier 1991 pp. 145ff.). This is not surprising, since
Lakatos' methodology of research programs is sketchy.
Koetsier was not satisfied with Giorello's vague results nor with
Spalt's negative ones. He proposed a revision of Lakatos' theory which
would enable him to describe how mathematical research proceeds. His
revised version is closer to Agassi's theory of research programs,
which, Agassi suggested, might be used to explain how mathematical
problems were chosen and how mathematical research was coordinated.
Lakatos's historical reconstructions of mathematical developments are
Popperian in that they portray not only mathematical theorems and
their proofs, but also their refutations, and their replacement by new
ones. Koetsier criticizes this portrayal. He finds instead that the
aim of mathematical research has been directed at refining
mathematical theorems. The refined theorems are then by and large
accepted and entered into the body of mathematical knowledge, where
they then stay, subject only to further refinements. Koetsier agrees,
however, that Lakatos's theory does show how mathematicians work when
solving problems within some narrowly defined areas of research. This
research is fallible, he agrees, and this allows it to progress by the
discovery of difficulties with previous theories which are overcome by
succeeding ones.
Koetsier discusses clusters of mathematical theories that are part of
identifiable research traditions. These traditions pose their own
problems and are identifiable by their offerings of clusters of
mathematical theorems. Each tradition, however, is not replaced by
some competing one as in the case of science, where one explanation is
superseded by another leading to the rejection of the former. In this
respect the theories of science of Popper and/or Lakatos cannot be
applied to the history of mathematics. Rather, each theory progresses
in its domain and the results it produces are largely cumulative.
In order to explain how progress is made in such research traditions,
Koetsier employs the suggestion made by Marchi that theorems should be
taken as analogous to facts. (Marchi 1976) Whereas scientists seek to
explain facts, mathematicians seek to prove theorems. Theorems are,
just as facts, accepted provisionally. Instead of seeking to explain
them as in science, mathematicians seek to prove them. Mathematics
grows as new theorems are discovered and proved.
This theory leads back to the problem posed by Agassi and Marchi: How
is research coordinated? Koetsier finds that Lakatos's theory of
mathematics describes "local" mathematical research rather well. It
describes how they solve problems within some cluster of theories
and/or methods. He finds various research traditions, which have been
used to set problems. But, he does not explain how such traditions
arise nor why they are chosen. Mathematical research is, then,
coordinated by interests in particular kinds of mathematical objects
and/or particular methods. But, how are these chosen? Why do they
change?
Koetsier also faces the question: Which theorems should mathematicians
prove and why? He notes that some are central and others that seem
simply too ad hoc to bother with. But, how does one decide? He offers
a list of measures by which to judge the importance of theorems. His
list of methods for appraising the ad hoc nature of theorems is
interesting but still rather ad hoc. (Koetsier p. 170-171)
Agassi's theory of metaphysical research programs might have helped
him here. Unlike Lakatos' inferior and subsequent theory, Agassi's was
designed to solve the problems of "How is scientific research
coordinated?" or "How do scientists choose their problems?" and "How
can we explain simultaneous discoveries?" His answer is that problems
in science are often chosen for their relevance to metaphysical
problems. He developed at some length and in some depth the conflict
between Faraday's field theory and Newton's atomic theory to show how
problems were chosen which bore on this controversy and how the two
metaphysical research programs could compete against each other.
How much of the choice of problems in the history of mathematics can
be explained by Agassi's conjecture that they are regularly chosen due
to their relevance to metaphysical problems? This is still an open
question. But some problems clearly were. Among them are problems
concerning irrational numbers, whether numbers exist in a Platonic
world, problems concerning the nature of infinitesimals or irrational
numbers or the square root of minus one or the nature of transfinite
numbers as well as questions concerning the possibilities of
non-Euclidean geometries. A history of mathematics written from this
point of view might be enlightening, if it could portray underlying
metaphysical concerns as focusing mathematical research on certain
kinds of problems and the development of methods to deal with them.
It should be noted that J. O. Wisdom had portrayed the development of
the calculus as a response to the criticisms of Berkeley before
Lakatos began his research (Wisdom 1939; 1941). His view is less
radical than Lakatos's however, since Lakatos, but not Wisdom, said
that the growth of mathematical knowledge by proofs and refutations
continues even after the introduction of new formal methods of logic.
The formal proofs in the logical language are indeed, Lakatos says,
immune from refutations, but the translations from the mathematical
into the logical language are always open to question.
5. Hans Albert
In the 1960s, Hans Albert began to apply critical rationalism to
social and political theory. His writings have become the standard
statement of critical rationalism in the German-speaking world, if not
elsewhere. He argues that any attempt at justification faces a
three-pronged difficulty that is traceable to Agrippa: One alternative
leads to an infinite regress as one seeks to prove one assumption but
then needs to assume some new one; a second alternative lands in a
circular argument as one assumes what one seeks to prove; a third
alternative takes some arbitrary starting point and holds to it
dogmatically. Outside of these three unacceptable moves,
justificationism offers no other alternative. Since none of these
three alternatives provide any justification at all, we should abandon
the quest for justification. Instead we should hold all theories open
to criticism, as Popper and Bartley have proposed. He takes over
Agassi's theory of research programs, but, due to his emphasis on the
comprehensive nature of critical rationalism, tends to side with
Bartley more than Agassi on questions of rationality. He has never,
however, had any open dispute with Popper, Bartley or Agassi even
though the three thinkers disagree on various significant points. He
builds what he can from their points of view into his own version and
avoids controversial issues among critical rationalists, while
developing polemics against its detractors.
His major project is to explain how the theory of rationality proposed
by Popper, Bartley and Agassi is, or can be made to be, applicable to
virtually all areas of human endeavor—ethics, politics, social
science, science, and so forth. He has from time to time presented
this as an alternative to the so-called Frankfurt School that was
especially influential in Germany in the late 60s and 70s. Its members
thought themselves capable of deep analyses of society to show what
went wrong in German history—why, for example, Germany was
authoritarian. Members of this school berated alternatives such as
Albert's as "positivist," by which they seemed to have meant that it
did not take into account the human dimensions of imperfect
institutions. Because it looked at them too narrowly from an
empirical, technical perspective it passed over too quickly the
unhappy consequences they have. Albert countered that the failure to
separate descriptive and prescriptive questions leads to the failure
of the Frankfurt School to draw a realistic picture of society and
such a picture is the necessary foundation for any adequate theory of
social reform, which critical rationalism by no means opposes. It
attempts rather to make it realistic. The political ideas of critical
rationalism as presented by Popper and by Albert were the most popular
in Germany next to those of the Frankfurt School. Albert also
presented critical rationalism as superior to the hermeneutic theories
of Hans-Otto Apel and Hans Georg Gadamer.
Albert has dealt extensively with methodology in economics,
criticizing neo-classical economics for its unrealistic assumptions
about the rationality of human actions, and its presumptions that
there can be a measure of the social welfare of society. But he views
the tradition of neoclassical economics as the best that the social
sciences have to offer. He hopes to reform it by making its
psychological assumptions more realistic. Here he decidedly parts
company with Popper, who is far more skeptical about the use of
theories of human nature, especially psychological ones. Albert
rejects what he consider to be the exaggerated assumptions of
rational-choice economics, and he suggests Popper's methodological
individualism is not the same as the one that economists often use.
But he has not constructed any systematic alternative.
6. Mario Bunge and Fallibilism
The researches mentioned so far grew directly out of Popper's
non-justificationist theory of science. Mario Bunge developed a
non-justificationist theory of science, especially of physics, before
he had ever heard of Popper, and he does not view his work a part of
the project known as critical rationalism. It nevertheless can count
as a version of critical rationalism: it is a non-justificationist
effort to improve standards of criticism. Bunge describes the crucial
event in the later development of his philosophy as the realization
that frameworks—he calls them systems–were crucial for the growth of
knowledge. Bunge's "systems" differ from the "frameworks," whose
usefulness is emphasized by some critical rationalists, if they differ
at all, in taking as the best critical methods and most progressive
research the formal, precise wording of theories. Bunge apparently
feels more affinity with those thinkers who emphasize the use of
formal methods and who futilely seek justification, than with those
who deny the possibility of justification and deem the use of formal
methods more limited than he does. This is understandable, since he
holds that the attainment of precision is crucial for rationality and,
on his view precision is best obtained with formal methods, and
sometimes can be obtained only in this way. As a corollary of this
attitude, he proposes to respond to difficulties first with small
changes that preserve systems, and move to larger ones when these
prove inadequate. This is the exact opposite of what Popper said, as
he advocated that one should always prefer that theory which has the
highest degree of falsifiability. These thinkers, however, do not
disagree about the aim of the philosophy of science, which is to
improve critical standards so that the best possible theories are
created and honed, but rather about the best means for doing that. In
the wake of Einstein, Agassi resolves this conflict by proposing that
both approaches can be used simultaneously. [##HEADER]7. Critical
Rationalism without Frameworks of Methodological Rules[/HEADER##] In
contrast to critical rationalists who emphasize the need for both
theoretical frameworks and methodological rules, there are also
critical rationalists who dispense with both. Jagdish Hattiangadi,
Gunnar Andersson and David Miller are examples. Hattiangadi says that
all problems are contradictions encountered in attempts to master
everyday problems of survival. Theoretical frameworks play no role in
the formulation of problems, though traditions apparently do. It is
hard to see the difference. One of the difficulties that his view
encounters is that it makes it impossible to define problems well.
For, the problem posed by the assumptions {p, ~p, a, b, c} turns out
to be the same as the problem posed by the assumptions {p, ~p, x, y,
z}. Another difficulty the theory faces is that it should, but does
not, present a contradiction to earlier versions of critical
rationalism that it allegedly improves upon. Moreover, some problems
are due to gaps in our knowledge that are not contradictions.
Formulations of good problems thus require frameworks that include
some selection rules.
Posing problems of knowledge in terms of the identification of
methodological rules for gaining knowledge was the crucial
breakthrough that enabled Popper to move beyond his early Die beiden
Grundprobleme. When one dispenses with them, one has an ad hoc
approach to critical methods. They grow of themselves, Hattiangadi
suggests, as attempts to solve practical problems. No other special
critical activity is needed or useful. He explains the growth of
critical methods as part of the struggle for survival: those who use
the best methods to solve practical problems survive and reproduce
themselves best. This view runs the danger of relapsing into
Hegelianism, since it judges as best any intellectual development
which is successful. Should fundamentalist Hinduism or Islam or
Christianity (or all of them together) win the day, will they then be
the best expression of rationality?
Gunnar Andersson views Popper's introduction of methodological rules
as quite unnecessary: all contradictions between theories and
observations pose problems and all responses to them should be prima
facie acceptable. He takes off the table the most crucial aspect of
the project of critical rationalism: how can we best improve our
critical methods and our capacity to learn from mistakes? Even without
any appeal to an evolutionary process such as that used by
Hattiangadi, Andersson assumes that science will do just fine without
critical studies of its methods. He does not discuss his optimism or
the fears of those who do not share it. He says virtually nothing
about non-scientific inquiry and rational action.
David Miller's critical rationalism is the third example of attempts
to characterize rationality without explaining how the use of
theoretical frameworks or methodological rules furthers it or hinders
it. He concentrates on improving criticism of the logic of
justification; he ignores Popper's crucial move from the mere
portrayal of the logic of research to the formulation of
methodological rules. He agrees that science is better off because it
handles theories critically, but does not bother with the details. He
ignores the question: How is the use that science makes of criticism
distinct, if at all, from other uses of it? However, he apparently
sides with Bartley's comprehensively critical rationalism. He has
effectively bolstered Popper's arguments against attempts to use
induction to establish any degree of probability of any theory and
effectively criticized Popper's theory of verisimilitude. Having
concluded that there is no evidence which can increase the probability
that a theory is true, he concludes that there can be no good reasons
whatsoever for any theory or any course of action. All we can ask, he
suggests, is: Why not? We only have reasons for the rejection of
theories, never for their endorsement.
But it does not follow from his correct observation that we can have
no evidence which increases the probability that a theory is true,
that there are no good reasons to consider any theory true. Miller
suggests that in the interest of truth we should not make fanciful
claims. But he says nothing about reasons for preferring, say, highly
explanatory theories over less explanatory ones, or ones that solve
problems better than others, or that we can improve our methods of
elimination of theories beyond the mere random quest for
contradictions. On a commonsense understanding of good reasons, all
these possibilities may constitute good reasons for preferring some
theories over others, even if they do not increase the probability
that any theory is true.
On Miller's view it seems a person can declare true any unrefuted
theory, say a minimal astrological theory, or Descartes' theory that
souls have no extension, without violating any rationalist precept. He
does not offer any selection procedure. He relies entirely on the
interest in the truth, which, he claims, prevents arbitrariness. This
is hardly enough: arbitrariness is not obvious. He rejects the
possibility of taking advantage of our ability to assign truth values
as we fancy, as it is frivolous; he does not tell us how to spot the
frivolous. Talmudists and scholastics certainly have an interest in
truth, are hardly frivolous, and use arguments extensively, yet they
are hardly rational in any way comparable to the rationality of
scientists. Popper's mature philosophy began as he specified rules
that should prevent frivolity. He saw the need for methodological
rules to make criticism effective.
Some critics say Miller's version of critical rationalism seems to
have lost its way. By limiting himself so severely to logical analysis
and neglecting the methodological aspects of rationality, Miller gives
his philosophy a characteristic typical of positivism; by limiting his
considerations to logic, he suggests that almost anything goes.
Theoretical frameworks are needed to direct rational thought and
conduct, and methodological rules are needed to improve criticism and
to maintain critical standards. Popper took over from the psychology
of Otto Selz the idea that rational thought is directed because it is
problem-oriented: without problems to direct thought it becomes a
random process. And without frameworks we cannot formulate and choose
problems well.
Miller can defend his view by explaining that he, too, recommends
procedures to select theories to consider true. This takes us back to
the problems of social standards of rationality, of problem-solving,
of desiderata and of methods of critique which other critical
rationalists are engaged in solving. About all this he remains silent.
Yet his view that there are no good reasons for considering some
statements true seems to render these redundant. If they are
redundant, he should explain how we can do without them; if not, he is
saying what most critical rationalists agree about.
8. Critical Rationalism, Truth and Best Theories
Alan Musgrave, Volker Gadenne and John Watkins all came out of
Popper's circle. But Musgrave and Gadenne nevertheless focus on the
search for some assurance that the theories they trust really are
trustworthy; Watkins wants some empirical standard to determine which
theory is now the best. Their peculiarity is that they seek methods of
selecting credible theories or the best theories, while recognizing
the validity of the criticisms of methods of justification launched by
critical rationalists.
Musgrave endorses Popper's arguments that show the impossibility of
sensible assignments to theories of some measure of probability. But
he finds wanting Popper's way of avoiding skepticism, because Popper
fails to offer reasons for beliefs. Only if it does that can Popper
respond to the charge that his view is too skeptical. Musgrave regards
his effort, then, as a vital defense of critical rationalism. In order
to provide the needed defense, he seeks a standard for reasonable
belief. He says that Popper has such a solution: we should believe
that that theory which has best withstood criticism is true. He adds
that Popper should have said so more clearly.
Skepticism is the theory that no theory is any better than any other.
Critical rationalism offers tentative rules for the choice of theories
to examine, not to believe in. Musgrave endorses Popper's criticism of
all attempts to specify the probability of any theory being true. He
considers his position fallibilist and critical rationalist, because
he accepts evidence to justify belief in a theory only if the evidence
results from attempts to refute it. And, he claims, no evidence
justifies claims that a theory is true, but only belief in a theory.
Belief in a theory that has withstood criticism is justified, then,
but not the claim that it is true. It is not clear why Musgrave
suggests that the task of justifying beliefs is less insoluble and
less superfluous than that of justifying theories.
Volker Gadenne resembles Musgrave somewhat. He agrees with Popper that
theoretical science may very well do without evidence for belief, but
he disagrees with him about actions: these require decisions as to
which hypothesis is best. He suggests, then, that confirmed theories
are preferable as a pragmatic ground for belief. Unlike Musgrave, he
realizes that Popper's theory of corroboration cannot serve this
purpose, as it allots the least probable theories, the ones that take
the most risks, the highest degree of corroboration. But acting on
them is still most risky. He therefore has a different theory of
corroboration. He separates content from degree of corroboration in
order to justify choosing the most highly corroborated theories to
guide actions.
Admittedly we do need standards to limit the risk of the application
of theories, as Agassi has pointed out. As a matter of principle,
Agassi notes, we may demand that theories be tested in severe ways in
order to reduce risk. But this procedure is not designed to increase
belief or confidence in hypotheses or likelihood of theories. (It is
not clear what Gadenne claims for corroboration.) For example, two
theories might be equally applicable to some practical situation, one
of which may by more risky, because it has more consequences than its
competitor. We may still prefer it as a basis for action, even though
we have, according to Gadenne's theory, more reason to believe the
weaker theory. The stronger theory may enable us to do more. We have,
for example, introduced nuclear energy even though we have far less
reason, on Gadenne's standards for belief, to believe that using
nuclear power is less risky than using coal. We use gene-technology
for various purposes, even though Gadenne's theory of belief offers
reasons to refrain from using it. We thus have standards for
application of theories in technology and other areas of life which
are quite independent of belief, thus apparently refuting Gadenne's
theory.
Gadenne might respond by contending that the belief in question is not
belief in a theory but belief in the success of its application. So,
before applying it, we try to increase our belief that the application
will succeed. But this is also not the case. We seek to anticipate
problems and to test, as well as we can, whether some given
application will lead to success or not. We try to apply risky
theories because they promise more. When we know we are taking
considerable risks, we anticipate them as best we can, and prepare to
change course quickly. When we do not anticipate risks, but hope for
great success, we simply act to test our hopes. The realization that
these always may be frustrated may lead to total paralysis on the
basis of Gadenne's theory of the need for corroboration as a means of
choice of theories that enable us to act. Planning to solve our
problems and realize our hopes employs theories with explanatory
power. It also takes into account criticism of possible courses of
action, and requires decisions. Belief or reassurance or corroboration
are not required. Gadenne's theory, just like Musgrave's, leads us
back to numerous insoluble and superfluous problems in the search for
justification: How much corroboration must we seek before we act?
Judges must justify the sentences they impose on criminals. Proposals
to take risks with the environment or to defend it should be justified
too─on a case by case basis. Social standards have to be sufficiently
agreed upon to allow for a consensus. On the core doctrine of critical
rationalism, such standards cannot have epistemological justification;
they are based on conjectures as to how we can avoid mistakes, and
when there are different candidates, they are all subject to
criticism. More cannot be done, and so all decisions are unjustified
and so they all incur risks.
John Watkins intended his theory to go beyond Popper's suggestion that
we should choose the theory that has the highest degree of explanatory
power. He wished to explain why the theory corroborated to the highest
degree is the best now available. But it is hard to see why one theory
has to be identified as the best. It is often the case that one theory
will be better in one respect and another in some other respect. Such
a situation poses problems for both theories. It is reasonable to
attempt to solve problems facing each theory quite independently of
which theory is now the best on available evidence—if indeed, such a
judgment can be made in any sensible way. The attempt to reduce all
the good qualities to one quality which is fundamental or the most
important is quixotic, as Popper's failed attempt to reduce all good
qualities of theory to high degree of testability illustrates. (In the
development of his theory of metaphysical research programs Agassi
first pointed out that explanatory power can vary independently from
testability.) The refined theory of corroboration which Watkins offers
is quite irrelevant to practice, where what counts is adequacy for the
task at hand and not some abstract measure of current success. Also,
in practice we do not want to know which theory is the best, but how
various serious alternatives may be improved. Furthermore, there is no
point in trying to say which theory is the best at any given time with
such a difficult procedure as Watkins has offered: before we have
determined which of two alternatives is the best, both alternatives
will very likely have been modified and we will have to start all over
again.
Theories should have good qualities before we set about criticizing
them, if we are not to waste our time in a random search. These good
qualities are methodological: What does the theory explain? What
problems does it solve? How can it be criticized? They are not
epistemological: What evidence do we have for its truth? How can we be
reassured we are on the right track? How do we know it corresponds to
what the truth is like? Watkins views himself as a critical
rationalist even though he stresses corroboration, because he does not
relate corroboration to appraisals of the truth or probability of
theories, but rather to other good qualities of theories. But he
changes the project of critical rationalism from substituting methods
of criticism for methods of justification to the quixotic project of
determining which theory is best at any given time on the basis of its
corroboration.
9. Critical Rationalist Sociology of Science
A crucial feature of critical rationalism is the theory that social
norms determine the degree of rationality which individuals are able
to exercise. This is a direct outgrowth of Popper's use of
methodological rules to explain the growth of science. Because science
is a social activity, Popper argued, Robinson Crusoe could not do
science. One individual, he suggested, cannot both put forth and
criticize theories adequately. Rationality comes from cooperation. To
be effective in bringing about the growth of knowledge, criticism
should follow social rules.
This feature of critical rationalism has led to a critical rationalist
sociology of science and technology. The task of this sociology is the
appraisal of the rules of science and technology. Do they encourage or
hinder the formulation and circulation of bold conjectures and their
effective critical appraisal? This effort began with Agassi's
criticisms of Popper's rule to always prefer the theory with the
highest degree of testability: Sometimes a testable theory has a
higher explanatory power than some competitor, he argued, but also has
a lower degree of testability than this competitor. We may, then,
prefer it. The same holds for Popper's rule that all basic statements
used in science should be repeatable: an independently testable
explanation of a basic statement is sufficient. From these studies he
moved on to inquiries into science as an open society. Even in the
face of the traditional association of science with openness of debate
and discussion, a variety of modern thinkers such as Michael Polanyi
and Thomas Kuhn have opposed this view.
John Wettersten has continued critical rationalist studies in the
sociology of science with examinations of how adventurous and
conservative styles of research complement and compete with each
other, how stylistic standards can hinder research, how a
problem-oriented approach may improve standards in science and
technology, and how critical rationalism may be used to guide
sociological research. Wettersten has developed critical studies of
alternative approaches to the sociology of science: a critical
rationalist approach aims at minimizing the idealization of science,
but without explaining scientific knowledge away.
I.C. Jarvie has recently studied how and when Popper added a theory of
the institutions of science to his theory of the logic of science
(Jarvie 2001) . In The Open Society and Its Enemies Popper explicitly
added a social dimension to his view of science which was only
implicit in Logik der Forschung. Popper did not, however, move on to
sociological studies of science. He was so concerned not to explain
away scientific knowledge as a mere social phenomena that he did not
engage in the social studies of science even though his view called
for such studies. He did not see that the effort to minimize idealized
versions of science by describing how science encourages and hinders
research poses no temptation to explain away scientific knowledge.
10. Philosophical Anthropology and Critical Rationality
As rationality is never perfect, and as idealization is to be
minimized, Jarvie and Agassi tried to solve a number of central issues
in the social sciences under the assumption that rationality is a
matter of degree. This invites a new philosophical anthropology. In
order to understand human nature it is desirable to desist from
seeking all-or-nothing theories of humanity as, for example, a mere
machine or of rationality as perfect. Human rationality cannot be
understood apart from its mechanical or biological or social or
rational aspects; human mechanism and biology and society cannot be
understood apart from their rational aspects.
11. Critical Rationalism and Political Society
In addition to being a study of the methodology of the social sciences
Popper's The Open Society and Its Enemies is a political manifesto. It
sets minimal conditions for democratic politics: it must avoid utopian
social engineering. The exclusive use of piecemeal social engineering
requires that societies be open and that critical appraisal of
government policies be carried out. Governments must set abstract
conditions for how a society functions, but they should leave
individuals free to act as they choose. This freedom includes the
right of individuals to build their own social groups.
John Watkins and Bryan Magee have added significant observations about
Popper's contribution. Watkins pointed out that Popper's theory
offered a basis for a pluralistic society which traditional theories
of rationality cannot: justificationist theories allow only one view
to be justified given the evidence at any time, whereas critical
rationalism allows for a range of defensible theories which may
democratically compete in the political arena. Magee (1995) has argued
that Popper's philosophy offered a good antidote for those who would
reject existing society as no good on the basis of utopian standards
and demand radical reform. It explained why all societies have grave
defects, that they could be corrected to some degree piecemeal, but
that no radical change of society had any hope of making the situation
any better.
Popper's abstract demarcation of closed and open societies does not
touch most political controversies today, which concern disagreements
among defenders of the open society. As a consequence, critical
rationalists such as Jeremy Shearmur and Gerard Radnitzky have
attempted to pull Popper's theory toward Hayek and laissez-faire
economics, whereas others, such Malachi Hacohen, Agassi and Helmut
Schmidt have found in his theory a framework for theories of active
social reform. Popper said very little about competing democratic
forms of government and what he has said is not necessarily connected
to his philosophical deliberations in any obvious way.
Popper's observation that reform has unintended and unknown
consequences which may then require further adjustments or
backtracking has been read as a support for Hayek's demand that all
government should be severely limited. Popper's observation that no
society is perfect and his demand that social reform should eliminate
some of its worst aspects have been read as support of a moderate
socialism.
12. Popper and Education Theory
Popper began his research as a student of the Pedagogical Institute of
the University of Vienna. Members of the Würzburg School such as Karl
Bühler and Otto Selz were closely associated with the school reform
movement led by Eduard Burger. Selz explained how learning could be
improved when it centred on active problem solving. Popper adopted his
view and argued that the memorization of important material by
repetition would be replaced with a Selzian, problem-orientated
approach. Wettersten has explained this as a beginning of integrated
psychology and pedagogy that Popper has further developed by adding to
it his methodological insights. Other critical rationalists followed
this lead stressing the import of active problem solving, and adding
the formation of conjectures and exercises in criticism and
improvement of them. Also, emphasizing Popper's insight that science
only makes advances in social settings, they have added the demand not
to ignore the fact that learning involves social interaction, whereby
autonomy, as the needed prerequisite for critical thinking, is also
deemed a prime goal of any good pedagogy.
13. Conclusion
The salient points of critical rationalism open new possibilities in
ethics, which until now has been merely couched in terms of the need
to be critical and open. A problem-oriented ethics may replace
traditional rule and consequence oriented ones. The use of critical
standards of debate to appraise the history of philosophy opens up new
perspectives as illustrated in the work of Curtis on Darwin's
reception (Curtis 1987) and Wettersten's study of the reception to
Whewell. It offers new paths for the study of related fields such as
economics, where Kurt Klappholz and Lawrence Boland have led the way,
for the study of methods and historiography of psychology as
mentioned, and the possibility of a new theory of institutions as
structures which individuals use to solve problems and appraise
alternatives.
Various efforts such as these are still too fresh to be appraised and
various defenders of critical rationalism differ on crucial issues.
Just what, if any, its long-term impact will be is still quite open;
debates among its exponents and between them and opponents are still
on-going. The crucial issue is whether and to what degree methods of
criticism can be substituted for epistemological methods of
justification in all areas of life. This is the way we can face the
stimulating criticism of Russell, who viewed critical rationalism as
defeatist. Only the exhibition of bold, fruitful thinking may answer
it. There is ongoing research to develop a critical theory of the
history of philosophy, of the sociology of science, of political
philosophy, of ethical theory, and of social and political
institutions. If critical rationalism is merely a theory of weak
justification as Musgrave, Gadenne and Watkins would have it, or if it
ignores problems of the direction of research and intellectual
standards as perhaps Hattiangadi, Andersson and Miller do, then it may
deservedly be forgotten.
14. References and Further Reading
The literature on critical rationalism is enormous. Manfred Lubbe in
his Karl R. Popper, Bibliographie 1925-2004 lists over four thousand
publications on Popper. And his list omits many publications. The
following bibliography is slanted to give background to the above
portrayal of critical rationalism, on the one hand, and to contain a
sampling of some of the most important literature, on the other. It is
unavoidable that some publications which might not be so very
important are listed as background, while others which may be of some
significance are omitted in order to keep the list relatively short.
Agassi, Joseph, Towards an Historiography of Science, History and
Theory, Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Beiheft 2, (1963).
Agassi, Joseph, Science in Flux (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publ. Co., 1975).
Agassi, Joseph , Towards a Rational Philosophical Anthropology (The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977).
Agassi, Joseph, Science and Society (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publ. Co., 1981).
Agassi, Joseph, Technology: Philosophical and Social Aspects
(Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publ. Co., 1985).
Agassi, Joseph, A Philosopher's Apprentice: In Karl Popper's Workshop
(Amsterdam and Atlanta: Rodopi, 1993).
Agassi, Joseph and Jarvie, I.C. (eds) Rationality: The Critical View
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987).
Albert, Hans, Traktat über kritscher Vernunft (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck
Verlag, 1968).
Albert, Hans, Plädoyer für kritischen Rationalismus (München: Piper
Verlag, 1971).
Albert, Hans, Konstruktion und Kritik (Hoffmann und Campe Verlag, 1972).
Albert, Hans, Traktat über rationale Praxis (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck
Verlag, 1978).
Albert, Hans, Kritischer Vernunft und menschlicher Praxis (Stuttgart:
Philipp Verlag jun. Verlag, 1984).
Albert, Hans, Treatise on Critical Reason (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1985).
Albert, Hans, Marktsoziologie und Entscheidungslogik (Tübingen: Mohr
Siebeck Verlag, 1998).
Bartley, William Bartley, The Retreat to Commitment (London: Chatto
and Windus, 1964).
Berkson, William and Wettersten, John, Lernen aus dem Irrtum, Forward
by Hans Albert (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe Verlag, l982).
Berkson, William and Wettersten, John, Learning from Error, English
edition of Berkson and Wettersten l982 (La Salle: Open Court
Publishing Co., l984).
Boland, Lawrence A, The Foundations of Economic Method (London: George
Allen & Unwin, 1982).
Bunge, Mario (ed.) The Critical Approach to Science and Philosophy
(Glencoe: The Free Press, 1964).
Bunge, Mario, "Instant Autobiography", Studies on Mario Bunge's
Treatise, eds. Paul Weigartner and Georg J.W. Dorn, Amsterdam and
Atlanta: Rodopi, 1990, 677-684
Curtis, Ron, Darwin as an Epistemologist. Annals of Science 44, 379-408.
Elliot, Benjamin, Falsifiable Statements in Theology: Karl Popper and
Christian Thought, Karl Popper Essay Prize, 2004.
Gadenne, Volker, ed. Kritischer Rationalismus und Pragmatismus,
Amsterdam and Atlanta: Rodopi, 1998.
Fried, Yehuda, and Agassi, Joseph, Paranoia: A Study in Diagnosis
(Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publ. Co., 1976).
Hattiangadi, Jagdish, "Methodology without methodological rules," in:
R.S. Cohen and M.W. Wartofsky (eds), Language logic and method, Boston
Studies in the Philosophy of Science (Dordrecht: Kluwer 1982), pp.
103-51.
Jarvie, I.C., The Revolution in Anthropology (London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1964).
Jarvie, I.C., The Republic of Science (Amsterdam and Atlanta: Rodopi, 2001)
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