entire academic career as Professor of Moral Philosophy and Logic at
Marischal College in Aberdeen. His best known philosophical work, An
Essay on The Nature and Immutability of Truth In Opposition to
Sophistry and Scepticism (1770), is a rhetorical tour de force which
affirmed the sovereignty of common sense while attacking David Hume
(1711-1776). A smash bestseller in its day, this Essay on Truth made
Beattie very famous and Hume very angry. The work´s fame proved
fleeting, as did Beattie's philosophical reputation.
While the Essay on Truth is little read today, it is well worth
reading. First, it is an important document in the history of the
Scottish common sense school of philosophy inaugurated by Beattie´s
colleague, Thomas Reid (1710-1796). Second, Beattie´s style– lively,
polished, pure, and lucid–still has the power to please and charm.
Finally, Beattie is an abler philosopher than his vociferous
detractors were willing to allow. Though by no means an original or
profound thinker, he can and should be given credit for presenting a
systematic and accessible defense of a simple-sounding thesis – that
philosophy cannot afford to despise the plain dictates of common
sense.
This article (1) outlines Beattie´s life and career, (2) reviews the
basic argument of the Essay on Truth, (3) summarizes the Essay´s
neglected critique of Hume´s racism, (4) briefly describes Beattie´s
later Elements of Moral Science, and (5) reflects on Beattie´s place
in the Scottish common sense school.
1. Life and Career
James Beattie was born October 25, 1735 in Laurencekirk,
Kincardineshire, where his father was a farmer and shopkeeper. In 1749
Beattie began his studies at Marischal College, Aberdeen. In 1753, he
was awarded the MA degree. He then spent several years as a
schoolteacher and briefly contemplated becoming a minister. During
this period he also secured the friendship of several influential
personages. One of Beattie´s early patrons was James Burnett
(1714-1799), better known to posterity as Lord Monboddo (which name
Burnett assumed when appointed to the Court of Session in 1767).
In 1760, at the tender age of 25, Beattie was installed as Professor
of Moral Philosophy and Logic at Marischal College. Shortly thereafter
he was elected to the Aberdeen Philosophical Society, known to waggish
locals as "the Wise Club." Founded in 1758 by Thomas Reid (1710-1796)
and John Gregory (1724-1773), the Society continued to hold meetings
until 1773, nine years after Reid left for Glasgow to fill the Chair
of Moral Philosophy vacated by Adam Smith (1723-1790). Much of
Beattie´s later work had its origin in compositions read to his fellow
Aberdonian "wise men" in the 1760s.
A decade after taking up his Professorship at Aberdeen, Beattie
published the philosophical work for which he was (and is still) best
known: An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth In Opposition
to Sophistry and Scepticism (1770) (hereinafter "Essay on Truth"). The
honors piled up thick and fast: a doctorate of laws from Oxford; an
audience with King George III; a Crown pension of 200 pounds a year;
the approbation of discerning literati such as Edmund Burke and Samuel
Johnson; and the opportunity to pose for Sir Joshua Reynolds.
(Incidentally, Reynold´s portrait of Beattie – "The Triumph of Truth,
with the Portrait of a Gentleman"- was hung in Marischal College.) Nor
was enthusiasm for Beattie´s anti-skeptical treatise confined to the
British Isles. The Essay was soon translated into French, German, and
Dutch and discussed on the Continent. Beattie´s fame spread to the New
World as well. In 1784 he was made a member of the American
Philosophical Society.
Not all citizens of the Republic of Letters, however, were impressed
by the Essay on Truth. The book´s target, the amiable and good-humored
Hume, was incensed. "Truth!" he fumed, "there is no truth in it; it is
a horrible large lie in Octavo." Yet Hume, who had a policy of not
answering critics, never deigned to reply directly to the cavils of
"that bigoted silly fellow Beattie." Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), too,
had harsh words for Beattie. In Kant´s Prolegomena to Any Future
Metaphysics (1783), the Scottish prophet of common sense is portrayed
as a superficial, obtuse dogmatist: "I should think that Hume might
fairly have laid as much claim to common sense as Beattie, and in
addition to a critical reason (such as the latter did not possess)."
(For the record, however, it should be noted that Kant (unlike Hume)
had an equally low opinion of Reid.)
Beattie wrote no philosophical work equal to the Essay in appeal or
influence, although he continued to publish throughout the 1770s and
1780s. Many of these ostensibly "later" works (several of which
actually date from the 1760s) are devoted to issues in aesthetics,
rhetoric, and literary theory. They include An Essay on Poetry and
Music (1776), On the Utility of Classical Learning (1776), An Essay on
Laughter, and Ludicrous Composition (1779), and Dissertations Moral
and Critical (1783). In addition, he compiled a lexicon entitled
Scotticisms, arranged in Alphabetical Order (1787), in which he urged
his educated compatriots to improve their English by "purifying" it of
Scots expressions.
Beattie also earned plaudits as a poet, largely on the strength of The
Minstrel; or, The Progress of Genius, written in Spenserian stanzas.
The first part of The Minstrel appeared anonymously in 1771 (a year
which also saw two editions of the Essay printed). The second part, to
which the author put his name, followed in 1774. Replete with
reflections upon Nature and the character of poetic genius, The
Minstrel anticipates some of the central preoccupations of the
Romantic movement.
Despite his apparent "aesthetic turn" in the post-Essay period,
Beattie remained interested in the broader philosophical, moral, and
religious questions that had originally prompted him to compose the
Essay on Truth in the 1760s. 1786 saw the publication of Evidences of
the Christian Religion Briefly and Plainly Stated, a two volume work
of popular apologetics. This was followed by his final book, Elements
of Moral Science (1790-1793). A lengthy collection of lectures
delivered at Marischal College, the Elements deal with a wide range of
topics in the philosophy of mind, epistemology, metaphysics, logic,
ethics, political philosophy, economics, and natural theology.
Beattie´s later years were filled with affliction. His wife, Mary
Beattie (née Dunn), went mad and was eventually committed to an
asylum. Both of his children died, the elder son in 1790 and the
younger in 1796. Weakened by grief, ill health, and a series of
strokes, Beattie died in Aberdeen on August 18, 1803.
2. The Essay on Truth (1770)
The Essay on Truth begins predictably enough, with a definition of –
what else?- truth. Truth, Beattie avows, is identified with what "the
constitution of our nature determines us to believe"; falsehood is
identified with what "the constitution of our nature determines us to
disbelieve." (Part I. i). The distinction between common sense and
reason is drawn in terms of the way that distinct classes of truths
are apprehended. Common sense is identified as "that faculty by which
we perceive self-evident truth," whereas reason is "that power by
which we perceive truth in consequence of a proof." (I. i). With these
definitions securely in place, Beattie advances the Essay's principal
thesis — "common sense is the ultimate judge of truth," (I. i) and
reason must be subordinated to it. All sound reasoning, we are told,
depends upon the principles of common sense:
In a word, the dictates of common sense are, in respect to human
knowledge in general, what the axioms of geometry are in respect to
mathematics: on the supposition that those axioms are false or
dubious, all mathematical reasoning falls to the ground; and on the
supposition that the dictates of common sense are erroneous and
deceitful, all science, truth, and virtue, are vain. (I. ii. 9)
What are these axioms of common sense, these foundational principles
on which all sound reasoning rests? It is not necessary to discuss all
the principles listed in Beattie´s catalogue of common sense. For the
purpose of illustration, a representative sample of four "principles
of common sense" should suffice: (i) the evidence of perception (or
"external sense") is not fallacious, but fundamentally reliable; (ii)
whatever begins to exist, proceeds from some cause; (iii) Nature is
uniform; and (iv) human testimony is basically trustworthy. Armed with
this arsenal of principles, Beattie can now confidently enter the
lists against an assortment of formidable philosophical foes. Beattie
wielded principle (i) against skeptics (be they Cartesian or Humean),
as well as against Berkeleyan idealists; principle (ii) against
atheist critics of cosmological arguments; principle (iii) against
Humean skeptics about induction; and principle (iv) against Humean
scoffers at miracles.
If Beattie is right about common sense, much (if not all) of modern
philosophy is wrong. The basic mistake of the moderns lies in their
tendency to make reason, not common-sense, the ultimate judge or
arbiter of truth. Reason is a shameless upstart who, ignorant of its
proper station, disgraces itself by refusing to submit to authority
(in the form of common sense). Such insubordination can only lead to
chaos, catastrophe, and confusion:
When Reason invades the rights of Common Sense, and presumes to
arraign that authority by which she herself acts, nonsense and
confusion must of necessity ensue; science will soon come to have
neither head nor tail, beginning nor end; philosophy will grow
contemptible; and its adherents, far from being treated, as in former
times, upon the footing of conjurers, will be thought by the vulgar,
and by every man of sense, to be little better than downright fools.
(I. ii. 9)
Philosophers therefore despise common sense at their peril. But how
are we to distinguish genuine principles of common sense from the
pretenders? Is Beattie suggesting that any cherished conviction or
idée fixe that I am unable to prove automatically qualifies as a
dictate of common sense? He endeavours to supply us with criteria or
marks by which authentic principles of common sense can be identified.
(1) We are irresistibly inclined by nature to believe the principles
of common sense. Our powerful attachment to them, being spontaneous
and quasi-instinctive, cannot be destroyed by philosophical argument –
no matter how ingenious. (2) The principles of common sense are
universally accepted. Far from being prejudices peculiar to a given
time, place, culture, sect, or class, they have been believed by
virtually all people in all ages. (3) The principles of common sense
cannot be proven because they are epistemologically foundational or
basic. They cannot be justified by reference to some more evident
proposition(s), because none exist. (4) The principles of common sense
are indispensable presuppositions of our conduct and practice. We
cannot live or act prudently unless we assume that our senses are
reliable, that human testimony can be a source of knowledge, that past
will resemble the future, and so on. Anyone who actually doubted or
denied such principles would put himself on par with the lunatic or
the fool.
Here it may be asked: In what way does Beattie´s Essay on Truth
improve upon Thomas Reid's earlier Inquiry into the Human Mind on the
Principles of Common Sense (1764)? The short answer is that it does
not. Beattie freely admits that he is heavily indebted to Reid.
However, the Essay differs from the Inquiry in one obvious respect:
Beattie´s tract is infinitely more hard-hitting and caustic than
anything ever penned by Reid. Where Reid writes respectfully of his
opponents, Beattie tends to denounce and vilify them. Where Reid wraps
up his subtle thoughts in restrained professorial prose, Beattie´s
simple arguments are presented with the spleen and verve of the born
orator. These contrasts reflect a more basic difference between our
two defenders of common sense. Unlike Reid, Beattie is first and
foremost a moralist and an apologist. He is not interested in
defending a subtle or nuanced philosophical thesis. Rather, Beattie is
defending a lofty (albeit vaguely defined) cause – to wit, "the cause
of truth, virtue, and mankind." Translated into more prosaic (but
precise) terms, Beattie´s "cause" is that of deflecting philosophical
opposition to a broadly Judeo-Christian understanding of human nature.
According to this understanding, human beings are free but finite
creatures made in the image of a good God or Creator. Neither brutes
nor divinities, we occupy an intermediate place in creation and are
better suited for action than for speculation. Inasmuch as our
cognitive faculties are God-given, we may trust their deliverances –
provided we acknowledge their limitations and exercise them under
conditions that define our humble "middle state" (to quote Alexander
Pope). Beattie´s bold strategy in the Essay was to argue that these
familiar ideas about human nature are unassailable because they rest
on the solid and irrefragable foundation of "common sense" (rather
than philosophic demonstrability). Here was a book apt to reassure the
devout but timorous Christian reader, for it confidently announced
that Humean scepticism – and the bulk of modern philosophy – was
infinitely more suited to be ridiculed than to be feared.
3. Beattie Contra Hume on Racism
Although the Essay on Truth is largely devoted to re-instating the
rights of common sense in the spheres of epistemology and metaphysics,
it includes a forceful critique of Hume´s racism.
Hume´s racism? To some, this phrase may have a strange and novel
sound. After all, Hume is usually portrayed as a patron saint of the
Enlightenment: a genial cosmopolitan, sweetly reasonable, unfailingly
courteous and amiable, "as approaching as nearly to the idea of a
perfectly wise and virtuous man, as perhaps the nature of human
frailty will permit" (in the oft-cited words of his friend, Adam
Smith). Yet in Hume's essay "Of National Characters," we catch a
glimpse of a different side of le bon David. For there, in an infamous
footnote, Hume writes:
I am apt to suspect the negroes to be naturally inferior to the
whites. There scarcely ever was a civilized nation of that complexion,
nor any individual, eminent either in action or speculation. No
ingenious manufactures amongst them, no arts, no sciences … [T]here
are Negroe slaves dispersed all over Europe, of whom none ever
discovered any symptoms of ingenuity.
In the Essay on Truth, Beattie condemns these sentiments: "These
assertions are strong; but I know not whether they have anything else
to recommend them." (III. ii). Beattie does not stop there. Beattie
does not merely fulminate against Hume's racism with a self-serving
show of conspicuous indignation; instead he rolls up his sleeves and
adroitly dissects Hume's pro-racist arguments. (1) Beattie disputes
Hume's basic assertions about the achievements (or alleged lack
thereof) of non-European societies: "[W]e know that these assertions
are not true … The Africans and Americans are known to have many
ingenious manufactures and arts among them, which even Europeans would
find it no easy matter to imitate." (III. ii). (2) Moreover, Beattie
says, Hume´s reasoning is invalid. For even if Hume's claims were
correct, his conclusion would not follow. "[O]ne may as well say of an
infant, that he can never become a man, as of a nation now barbarous,
that it never can be civilized." (III. Ii). Should anyone doubt this,
he need only recall that "[t]hat the inhabitants of Great Britain and
France were as savage two thousand years ago, as those of Africa and
America are at this day." (III. ii). (3) Beattie is unimpressed by
Hume's argument that "there are Negroe slaves dispersed all over
Europe, of whom none ever discovered any symptoms of ingenuity."
Beattie insists that this claim is unwarranted as well as false. But
even if it were true, it would not justify belief in Hume´s natural
inferiority thesis, for "the condition of a slave is not favourable to
genius of any kind." (III. ii). (4) While Beattie does not downgrade
European achievements in the arts and sciences, he denies that they
can be used to prove that European nations or "races" are superior. He
stresses the extent that the achievements on which European nations
pride themselves were either discovered by accident or the inventions
of a gifted few, to whom alone all credit must go.
Beattie caps his rebuttal with two observations. First, his critique
of Hume´s natural inferiority thesis indirectly supports the cause of
religion because such racism cannot be reconciled neatly with a true
Judeo-Christian understanding of human nature. Second, Beattie
stresses that his disagreement with Hume on the subject of racism is
not merely theoretical or speculative. On the contrary, the dispute is
intensely practical, for the natural inferiority thesis can (and
frequently was) invoked to justify slavery – an institution that
Beattie, a committed abolitionist, decried as "a barbarous piece of
policy."
4. Elements of Moral Science (1790-1793)
There is considerable overlap between the Essay on Truth and Beattie´s
later Elements of Moral Science (1790-1793). The creed of common sense
is again soberly recited. We are told that consciousness, memory, and
testimony must be taken as trustworthy, that we can assume that Nature
is uniform, that we are free moral agents, and that whatever begins to
exist must proceed from some cause.
Despite these and other doctrinal similarities, the Elements differs
from the Essay in at least four respects. First, stylistically the
Essay was full of sarcasm, scorn and splendid invective, while the
Elements is comparatively tame, subdued, and dry. Second, the Elements
is more philosophically constructive than the Essay, as Beattie now
appears more interested in building and inhabiting his own modest
system than in laying siege to the systems of foes and rivals. Third,
the Elements offers a more in-depth exploration of several topics only
lightly touched upon in the Essay (for example, perception, natural
theology, and immortality). Finally, the Elements offers sustained
coverage of several areas, such as political philosophy and economics,
that are not meaningfully discussed in the Essay.
5. Beattie and Scottish Common Sense Philosophy
Historians of Scottish philosophy frequently describe Beattie´s Essay
as a simplified version of the philosophy of common sense expounded by
Reid in his Inquiry of 1764. While there is much truth in this
judgment, it need not be construed as a reproach. Popularization can
be done well or badly. Beattie did it well.
Nevertheless, it is undeniable that Reid´s views on matters
philosophical evolved in a way that Beattie´s never did. After
retiring from teaching in 1781, Reid published two major works, Essays
on the Intellectual Powers of Man (1785) and Essays on the Active
Powers of Man (1788). More sophisticated and constructive than
anything Beattie ever produced, these two books, along with Reid´s
earlier Inquiry, became the founding documents of the Scottish common
sense school of philosophy. The Reidian gospel was soon propagated
with aplomb by Edinburgh Chair-holder Dugald Stewart (1753-1828), who
had listened to Reid´s lectures in Glasgow. An elegant stylist,
Stewart championed common sense both in his well-attended lectures and
in his edifying books, the first pair of which – Elements of the
Philosophy of the Human Mind (1792) and Outlines of Moral Philosophy
(1793) – appeared around the same time as Beattie´s Elements of Moral
Science. Stewart's interest in Reid was shared by another renowned
Edinburgh professor, the erudite but preternaturally verbose Sir
William Hamilton (1788-1856). No slavish disciple, Hamilton sought to
"improve" on Reid's philosophy in various ways, often by drawing on
Kantian doctrines. A singular philosophical beast, the resulting
hybrid was slain, stuffed, and mounted by John Stuart Mill (1806-1873)
in An Examination of Sir William Hamilton´s Philosophy (1865).
Nevertheless, Hamilton´s extensively (or, as some might say,
obsessively) annotated edition of Reid's Collected Works did much to
make them more widely available.
With Reid cast thus as the heroic founder of the emerging Scotch
school, Beattie was relegated to the supporting role of ardent and
skilful propagandist. This, at any rate, was how Dugald Stewart
portrays Beattie in a letter to Sir William Forbes, Beattie's friend
and biographer. Stewart declares that the Essay on Truth is effective
as "a popular antidote against the illusions of metaphysical
scepticism," but, he is quick to add, Beattie's polemic lacks the
subtlety, patience, and precision we find in Reid. Nevertheless,
Stewart avers that Beattie's achievement is not negligible:
These critical remarks on the "Essay on Truth" (I must request you
to observe) do not in the least affect the essential merits of that
very valuable performance; and I have stated them with the greater
freedom, because your late excellent friend possessed so many other
unquestionable claims to high distinction – as a moralist, as a
critic, as a grammarian, as a pure and classical writer, and, above
all, as the author of the "Minstrel." In any one of the different
paths to which his ambition has led him, it would not perhaps be
difficult to name some of his contemporaries by whom he has been
surpassed; but where is the individual to be found, who has aspired
with greater success to an equal variety of literary honours?
Stewart´s verdict still seems a just one. Beattie was a talented,
ambitious, and multi-faceted man of letters, but his gifts and merits
as a philosopher were not the greatest. If philosophy is indeed "a
series of footnotes to Plato" (Whitehead), then Beattie can be read as
a dramatic footnote to Reid and – ironically – to the abhorred Hume.
6. References and Further Reading
Cloyd, E. L. (1972) James Burnett, Lord Monboddo. Oxford: Clarendon
Press. Touches on Monboddo's relationship with Beattie; indicates why
their friendship did not last.
Fieser, J. (1994) "Beattie's Lost Letter to the London Review," Hume
Studies 20: 1-12. Reconstructs a controversy between Beattie and a
pro-Humean literary faction.
Fieser, J. (2000) "Introduction" to James Beattie's Essay on the
Nature and Immutability of Truth in Opposition to Sophistry and
Scepticism. Volume 2 of the 5 volume set, Scottish Common Sense
Philosophy: Sources and Origins. (ed. J. Fieser) Bristol, UK: Thoemmes
Press. Thorough presentation of Beattie's defence of common sense in
the Essay on Truth.
Fieser, J. (ed.) (2000) Early Responses to Reid, Oswald, Beattie, and
Stewart: I. Volume 3 of the 5 volume set, Scottish Common Sense
Philosophy: Sources and Origins. Bristol, UK: Thoemmes Press. Contains
early reviews of the Essay (including Edmund Burke's positive notice
of the second edition of 1771).
Grave, S.A. (1960) The Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense. Oxford:
Clarendon Press. Beattie's epistemological and metaphysical views are
portrayed as vulgarized versions of Reid's.
Harris, J. A. (2002) "James Beattie, The Doctrine of Liberty, and the
Science of the Mind," Reid Studies (5): 16-29. Acknowledges Beattie's
shortcomings as a philosopher, but credits him with a commitment to
understanding the human mind scientifically. Sheds light on the
Essay's critique of necessitarianism.
King, E.H. (1971) "A Scottish "Philosophical" Club in the Eighteenth
Century," Dalhousie Review (50): 201-214. Describes the inner workings
of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society, and discusses Beattie's
participation.
King, E.H. (1972) "James Beattie's Essay on Truth (1770): An
Enlightenment "Bestseller"," Dalhousie Review (51): 390-403. An
account of the Essay's popularity.
Kuehn, M. (1987) Scottish Common Sense in Germany, 1768-1800: A
Contribution to the History of the Critical Philosophy. Kingston and
Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press. Discusses the influence of
Reid and, to a lesser extent, Beattie and Oswald upon Kant and his
German contemporaries. A clear-headed, fair assessment of Beattie´s
strengths and weaknesses.
McCosh, J. (1875) The Scottish Philosophy. London: Macmillan. Chapter
XXIX contains a biographical sketch and an outline of the Essay.
Depicts Beattie as an eloquent popularizer of the philosophy of common
sense.
Mossner, E.C. (1980) The Life of David Hume. 2nd edition. Oxford:
Clarendon Press. Briefly describes the reaction of Hume and his
Edinburgh circle to the Essay's success.
Popkin, R.H. (1980) The High Road to Pyrrhonism. San Diego: Austin
Hill Press. Contains an article entitled "Hume´s Racism" (pp.
251-266), in which Popkin helpfully puts Beattie´s critique of Hume´s
racism in historical context.
Priestley, J. (1774) An Examination of Dr. Reid's Inquiry into the
Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense, Dr. Beattie's Essay on
the Nature and Immutability of Truth, and Dr. Oswald's Appeal to
Common Sense in Behalf of Religion.
London: J. Johnson. Includes an extended critique of Beattie, composed
shortly after the Essay's publication. Priestley complains that the
Essay´s author is (among other things) an incorrigible dogmatist who
relies too heavily on ad hominem arguments. The Appendix includes some
correspondence between Beattie and Priestley.
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