West as Averroes, lived during a unique period in Western intellectual
history, in which interest in philosophy and theology was waning in
the Muslim world and just beginning to flourish in Latin Christendom.
Just fifteen years before his birth, the great critic of Islamic
philosophy, al-Ghazzali (1058-1111), had died after striking a blow
against Muslim Neoplatonic philosophy, particularly the work of the
philosopher Ibn Sina (980-1037). From such bleak circumstances emerged
the Spanish-Muslim philosophers, of which the jurist and physician Ibn
Rushd came to be regarded as the final and most influential Muslim
philosopher, especially to those who inherited the tradition of Muslim
philosophy in the West.
1. Biography
Ibn Rushd was born in Cordova, Spain, to a family with a long and
well-respected tradition of legal and public service. His grandfather,
the influential Abdul-Walid Muhammad (d. 1126), was the chief judge of
Cordova, under the Almoravid dynasty, establishing himself as a
specialist in legal methodology and in the teachings of the various
legal schools. Ibn Rushd's father, Abdul-Qasim Ahmad, although not as
venerated as his grandfather, held the same position until the
Almoravids were ousted by the Almohad dynasty in 1146.
Ibn Rushd's education followed a traditional path, beginning with
studies in hadith, linguistics, jurisprudence and scholastic theology.
The earliest biographers and Muslim chroniclers speak little about his
education in science and philosophy, where most interest from Western
scholarship in him lies, but note his propensity towards the law and
his life as a jurist. It is generally believed that Ibn Rushd was
influenced by the philosophy of Ibn Bajjah (Avempace), and perhaps was
once tutored by him. His medical education was directed under Abu
Jafar ibn Harun of Trujillo. His aptitude for medicine was noted by
his contemporaries and can be seen in his major enduring work Kitab
al-Kulyat fi al-Tibb (Generalities) This book, together with Kitab
al-Taisir fi al-Mudawat wa al-Tadbir (Particularities) written by Abu
Marwan Ibn Zuhr, became the main medical textbooks for physicians in
the Jewish, Christian and Muslim worlds for centuries to come.
Ibn Rushd traveled to Marrakesh and came under the patronage of the
caliph 'Abd al-Mu'min, likely involved in educational reform for the
dynasty. The Almohads, like the Almoravids they had supplanted, were a
Northwest African Kharijite-influenced Berber reform movement. Founded
in the theology of Ibn Tumart (1078-1139), who emphasized divine unity
and the idea of divine promise and threat, he believed that a positive
system of law could co-exist with a rational and practical theology.
This led to the concept that law needed to be primarily based on
revelation instead of the traditions of the jurists. Ibn Talmart's
theology affirmed that the existence and essence of God could be
established through reason alone, and used that to posit an ethical
legal theory that depended on a divine transcendence.
Ibn Rushd's relationship with the Almohad was not merely
opportunistic, (considering the support his father and grandfather had
given to the Almoravids) for it influenced his work significantly;
notably his ability to unite philosophy and religion. Sometime between
1159 and 1169, during one of his periods of residence in Marrakesh,
Ibn Rushd befriended Ibn Tufayl (Abubacer), a philosopher who was the
official physician and counselor to Caliph Abu Yaqub Yusuf, son of
'Abd al-Mu'min. It was Ibn Tufayl who introduced Ibn Rushd to the
ruler. The prince was impressed by the young philosopher and employed
him first as chief judge and later as chief physician. Ibn Rushd's
legacy as the commentator of Aristotle was also due to Abu Yaqub
Yusuf. Although well-versed in ancient philosophy, the prince
complained about the challenge posed by the Greek philosopher's texts
and commissioned Ibn Rushd to write a series of commentaries on them.
Through most of Ibn Rushd's service, the Almohads grew more liberal,
leading eventually to their formal rejection of Ibn Talmart's theology
and adoption of Malikite law in 1229. Despite this tendency, public
pressure against perceived liberalizing tendencies in the government
led to the formal rejection of Ibn Rushd and his writings in 1195. He
was exiled to Lucena, a largely Jewish village outside of Cordoba, his
writings were banned and his books burned. This period of disgrace did
not last long, however, and Ibn Rushd returned to Cordoba two years
later, but died the following year. Doubts about Ibn Rushd's orthodoxy
persisted, but as Islamic interest in his philosophy waned, his
writings found new audiences in the Christian and Jewish worlds.
2. Note on Commentaries
While this article focuses on Ibn Rushd's own philosophical writings,
a word about the significant number of commentaries he wrote is
important. Ibn Rushd wrote on many subjects, including law and
medicine. In law he outshone all his predecessors, writing on legal
methodology, legal pronouncements, sacrifices and land taxes. He
discussed topics as diverse as cleanliness, marriage, jihad and the
government's role with non-Muslims. As for medicine, in addition to
his medical encyclopedia mentioned above, Ibn Rushd wrote a commentary
on Avicenna's medical work and a number of summaries on the works of
Galen. Besides his own philosophical and theological work, Ibn Rushd
wrote extensive commentaries on the texts of a wide range of thinkers.
These commentaries provide interesting insights into how Ibn Rushd
arrived at certain positions and how much he was authentically
Aristotelian. Commissioned to explain Aristotle Ibn Rushd spent three
decades producing multiple commentaries on all of Aristotle's works,
save his Politics, covering every subject from aesthetics and ethics
to logic and zoology. He also wrote about Plato's Republic,
Alexander's De Intellectu, the Metaphysics of Nicolaus of Damascus,
the Isagoge of Porphyry, and the Almajest of Ptolemy. Ibn Rushd would
often write more than one commentary on Aristotle's texts; for many he
wrote a short or paraphrase version, a middle version and a long
version. Each expanded his examination of the originals and their
interpretations by other commentators, such as Alexander of
Aphrodisias, Themistius and Ibn Bajjah, The various versions were
meant for readers with different levels of understanding.
Ibn Rushd's desire was to shed the prevalent Neoplatonic
interpretations of Aristotle, and get back to what the Greek thinker
originally had intended to communicate. Of course, Ibn Rushd did not
shy away from inserting his own thoughts into his commentaries, and
his short paraphrase commentaries were often flexible interpretations.
At times, in an effort to explain complex ideas in Aristotle, Ibn
Rushd would rationalize the philosopher in directions that would not
seem authentic to contemporary interpreters of Aristotle.
Nevertheless, Ibn Rushd's commentaries came to renew Western
intellectual interest in Aristotle, whose works had been largely
ignored or lost since the sixth century.
3. Philosophy and Religion
Until the eighth century, and the rise of the Mutazilite theology,
Greek philosophy was viewed with suspicion. Despite the political
support given to philosophy because of the Mutazilites and the early
philosophers, a strong anti-philosophical movement rose through
theological schools like the Hanbalites and the Asharites. These
groups, particular the latter, gained public and political influence
throughout the tenth and eleventh century Islamic world. These
appealed to more conservative elements within society, to those who
disliked what appeared to be non-Muslim influences. Ibn Rushd, who
served a political dynasty that had come into power under a banner of
orthodox reform while privately encouraging the study of philosophy,
was likely sensitive to the increasing tensions that eventually led to
his banishment. Though written before his exile his Decisive Treatise
provides an apologetic for those theologians who charged philosophers
with unbelief.
Ibn Rushd begins with the contention that Law commands the study of
philosophy. Many Quranic verses, such as "Reflect, you have a vision"
(59.2) and "they give thought to the creation of heaven and earth"
(3:191), command human intellectual reflection upon God and his
creation. This is best done by demonstration, drawing inferences from
accepted premises, which is what both lawyers and philosophers do.
Since, therefore, such obligation exists in religion, then a person
who has the capacity of "natural intelligence" and "religious
integrity" must begin to study philosophy. If someone else has
examined these subjects in the past, the believer should build upon
their work, even if they did not share the same religion. For, just as
in any subject of study, the creation of knowledge is built
successively from one scholar to the next. This does not mean that the
ancients' teachings should be accepted uncritically, but if what is
found within their teachings is true, then it should not be rejected
because of religion. (Ibn Rushd illustrated this point by citing that
when a sacrifice is performed with the prescribed instrument, it does
not matter if the owner of the instrument shares the same religion as
the one performing the sacrifice.)
The philosopher, when following the proper order of education, should
not be harmed by his studies, hence it is wrong to forbid the study of
philosophy. Any harm that may occur is accidental, like that of the
side effects of medicine, or from choking on water when thirsty. If
serious harm comes from philosophical study, Ibn Rushd suggests that
this is because the student was dominated by their passions, had a bad
teacher or suffered some natural deficiency. Ibn Rushd illustrates
this by quoting a saying of the Prophet Muhammad, when asked by a man
about his brother's diarrhea. The Prophet suggested that the brother
should drink honey. When the man returned to say that his brother's
diarrhea had worsened, the Prophet replied, "Allah has said the truth,
but your brother's abdomen has told a lie" (Bukhari 7.71.588).
Not all people are able to find truth through philosophy, which is why
the Law speaks of three ways for humans to discover truth and
interpret scripture: the demonstrative, the dialectical and the
rhetorical. These, for Ibn Rushd, divide humanity into philosophers,
theologians and the common masses. The simple truth is that Islam is
the best of all religions, in that, consistent with the goal of
Aristotelian ethics, it produces the most happiness, which is
comprised of the knowledge of God. As such, one way is appointed to
every person, consistent with their natural disposition, so that they
can acquire this truth.
For Ibn Rushd, demonstrative truth cannot conflict with scripture
(i.e. Qur'an), since Islam is ultimate truth and the nature of
philosophy is the search for truth. If scripture does conflict with
demonstrative truth, such conflict must be only apparent. If
philosophy and scripture disagree on the existence of any particular
being, scripture should be interpreted allegorically. Ibn Rushd
contends that allegorical interpretation of scripture is common among
the lawyers, theologians and the philosophers, and has been long
accepted by all Muslims; Muslims only disagree on the extent and
propriety of its use. God has given various meanings and
interpretations, both apparent and hidden, to numerous scriptures so
as to inspire study and to suit diverse intelligences. The early
Muslim community, according to Ibn Rushd, affirmed that scripture had
both an apparent meaning and an inner meaning. If the Muslim community
has come to a consensus regarding the meaning of any particular
passage, whether allegorical or apparent, no one can contradict that
interpretation. If there is no consensus about a particular passage,
then its meaning is free for interpretation. The problem is that, with
the international diversity and long history of Islam, it is all but
impossible to establish a consensus on most verses. For no one can be
sure to have gathered all the opinions of all scholars from all times.
With this in mind, according to Ibn Rushd, scholars like al-Ghazzali
should not charge philosophers with unbelief over their doctrines of
the eternity of the universe, the denial of God's knowledge of
particulars, or denial of bodily resurrection. Since the early Muslims
accepted the existence of apparent and allegorical meanings of texts,
and since there is no consensus on these doctrines, such a charge can
only be tentative. Philosophers have been divinely endowed with unique
methods of learning, acquiring their beliefs through demonstrative
arguments and securing them with allegorical interpretation.
Therefore, the theologians and philosophers are not so greatly
different, that either should label the other as irreligious. And,
like the philosophers, the theologians interpret certain texts
allegorically, and such interpretations should not be infallible. For
instance, he contends that even the apparent meaning of scripture
fails to support the theologian's doctrine of creation ex nihilo. He
highlights texts like 11:7, 41:11 and 65:48, which imply that objects
such as a throne, water and smoke pre-existed the formation of the
world and that something will exist after the End of Days.
A teacher, then, must communicate the interpretation of scripture
proper for his respective audiences. To the masses, Ibn Rushd
cautions, a teacher must teach the apparent meaning of all texts.
Higher categories of interpretations should only be taught to those
who are qualified through education. To teach the masses a dialectical
or demonstrative interpretation, as Ibn Rushd contends Ghazzali did in
his Incoherence, is to hurt the faith of the believers. The same
applies to teaching a theologian philosophical interpretations.
4. Existence and Attributes of God
Ibn Rushd, shortly after writing his Decisive Treatise, wrote a
treatise on the doctrine of God known as Al-Kashf 'an Manahij
al-Adilla fi 'Aqaid al-Milla (the Exposition of the Methods of Proof
Concerning the Beliefs of the Community). His goal was to examine the
religious doctrines that are held by the public and determine if any
of the many doctrines expounded by the different sects were the
intention of the "lawgiver." In particular he identifies four key
sects as the targets of his polemic, the Asharites, Mutazilites, the
Sufis and the "literalists," claiming that they all have distorted the
scriptures and developed innovative doctrines not compatible with
Islam. Ibn Rushd's polemic, then, becomes a clear expression of his
doctrine on God. He begins with examining the arguments for the
existence of God given by the different sects, dismissing each one as
erroneous and harmful to the public. Ibn Rushd contends that there are
only two arguments worthy of adherence, both of which are found in the
"Precious Book;" for example, surahs 25:61, 78:6-16 and 80:24-33. The
first is the argument of "providence," in which one can observe that
everything in the universe serves the purpose of humanity. Ibn Rushd
speaks of the sun, the moon, the earth and the weather as examples of
how the universe is conditioned for humans. If the universe is, then,
so finely-tuned, then it bespeaks of a fine tuner – God. The second is
the argument of "invention," stemming from the observation that
everything in the world appears to have been invented. Plants and
animals have a construction that appears to have been designed; as
such a designer must have been involved, and that is God.
From establishing the existence of God, Ibn Rushd turns to explaining
the nature and attributes of God. Beginning with the doctrine of
divine unity, Ibn Rushd challenges the Asharite argument that there
cannot, by definition, be two gods for any disagreement between them
would entail that one or both cannot be God. This, of course, means
that, in the case of two gods, at least one's will would be thwarted
in some fashion at some time by the other; and such an event would
mean that they are not omnipotent, which is a essential trait of
deity. Ibn Rushd's critique turns the apologetic on its head,
contending that if there were two gods, there is an equal possibility
of both gods working together, which would mean that both of their
wills were fulfilled. Furthermore, Ibn Rushd adds, even disagreement
would not thwart divine will, for alternatives could occur giving each
god its desire. Such arguments lead to absurdity and are not fit for
the masses. The simple fact is that reason affirms divine unity,
which, by definition, is a confession of God's existence and the
denial of any other deity.
Ibn Rushd maintains, as did most of his theologian contemporaries that
there are seven divine attributes, analogous to the human attributes.
These attributes are: knowledge, life, power, will, hearing, vision
and speech. For the philosopher, the attribute of knowledge occupied
much space in his writing on the attributes of God. He contends,
especially in his Epistle Dedicatory and his Decisive Treatise that
divine knowledge is analogous to human knowledge only in name, human
knowledge is the product of effect and divine knowledge is a product
of cause. God, being the cause of the universe, has knowledge based on
being its cause; while humans have knowledge based on the effects of
such causes.
The implication of this distinction is important, since Ibn Rushd
believes that philosophers who deny God's knowledge of particulars are
in error. God knows particulars because he is the cause of such
things. But this raises an important question: does God's knowledge
change with knowledge of particulars? That is, when events or
existents move from non-existence to existence, does God's knowledge
change with this motion? Change in divine knowledge would imply divine
change, and for medieval thinkers it was absurd to think that God was
not immutable.
Ghazzali answered this dilemma by saying that God's knowledge does not
change, only his relationship with the object. Just like a person
sitting with a glass of water on their left side does not
fundamentally change when that same glass is moved to their right
side. Ibn Rushd felt that Ghazzali's answer did not solve the dilemma,
stating that a change in relationship is still change. For Ibn Rushd,
then, the solution came in his contention that divine knowledge is
rooted in God being the eternal prime mover; meaning that God
eternally knows every action that will be caused by him. God,
therefore, does not know that event when it occurs, as humans would,
because he has always known it.
As for the other traits, Ibn Rushd next turns to the attribute of
life, simply stating that life necessarily flows from the attribute of
knowledge, as evidenced in the world around us. Divine will and power
are defined as essential characteristics of God, characteristics that
define God as God. This is because the existence of any created being
implies the existence of an agent that willed its existence and had
the power to do so. (The implication of this, Ibn Rushd notes, is that
the Asharite concept that God had eternally willed the existence of
the world, but created it at some particular point in time, is
illogical.)
In regards to divine speech, Ibn Rushd is aware of the great
theological debate in Islam about whether the Qur'an, the embodiment
of God's speech, is temporally created or eternal. Ibn Rushd contends
that the attribute of divine speech is affirmed because it necessarily
flows from the attributes of knowledge and power, and speech is
nothing more than these. Divine speech, Ibn Rushd notes, is expressed
through intermediaries, whether the work of the angels or the
revelations given to the prophets. As such, "the Qur'an…is eternal but
the words denoting it are created by God Almighty, not by men." The
Qur'an, therefore, differs from words found elsewhere, in that the
words of the Qur'an are directly created by God, while human words are
our own work given by God's permission.
Ibn Rushd concludes by discussing divine hearing and vision, and notes
that scripture relates these attributes to God in the sense that he
perceives things in existing things that are not apprehended by the
intellect. An artisan would know everything in an artifact he had
created, and two means of this knowledge would be sight and sound.
God, being God, would apprehend all things in creation through all
modes of apprehension, and as such would have vision and hearing.
5. Origin of the World
Turning from the attributes of God to the actions of God, where he
delineates his view of creation, Ibn Rushd in his Tahafut al-Tahafut
clearly deals with the charge against the philosopher's doctrine on
the eternity of the physical universe in his polemic against
al-Ghazzali. Ghazzali perceived that the philosophers had
misunderstood the relationship between God and the world, especially
since the Qur'an is clear on divine creation. Ghazzali, sustaining the
Asharite emphasis on divine power, questioned why God, being the
ultimate agent, could not simply create the world ex nihilo and then
destroy it in some future point in time? Why did there need to be some
obstacle to explain a delay in God's creative action? In response to
this, Ghazzali offered a number of lengthy proofs to challenge the
philosopher's assertions.
Ibn Rushd, who often labeled Ghazzali's arguments dialectical,
sophistical or feeble, merely replied that the eternal works
differently than the temporal. As humans, we can willfully decide to
perform some action and then wait a period of time before completing
it. For God, on the other hand, there can be no gap between decision
and action; for what differentiates one time from another in God's
mind? Also, what physical limits can restrict God from acting? Ibn
Rushd, in the first discussion, writes about how Ghazzali confused the
definition of eternal and human will, making them univocal. For
humans, the will is the faculty to choose between two options, and it
is desire that compels the will to choose. For God, however, this
definition of will is meaningless. God cannot have desire because that
would entail change within the eternal when the object of desire was
fulfilled. Furthermore, the creation of the world is not simply the
choice between two equal alternatives, but a choice of existence or
non-existence. Finally, if all the conditions for action were
fulfilled, there would not be any reason for God not to act. God,
therefore, being omniscient and omnipotent would have known from the
eternal past what he had planned to create, and without limit to his
power, there would no condition to stop the creation from occurring.
Ghazzali's argument follows the typical Asharite kalam cosmological
argument, in that he argues the scientific evidence for the temporal
origin of the world, and reasons from that to the existence of a
creator. Ghazzali's first proof contends that the idea of the infinite
number of planetary revolutions as an assumption of the eternity of
the world is erroneous since one can determine their revolution rates
and how much they differ when compared one to another. Ibn Rushd
weakly maintains that the concept of numbered planetary revolutions
and their division does not apply to eternal beings. To say that the
eternal can be divided is absurd since there can be no degrees to the
infinite. Oliver Leaman explains how Ibn Rushd accepted accidental but
not essential infinite series of existents. There can be an infinite
chain of human sexual generation, but those beings that are
essentially infinite have neither beginning nor end and thus cannot be
divided.
In his Decisive Treatise Ibn Rushd summarily reduces the argument
between the Asharite theologians and the ancient philosophers to one
of semantics. Both groups agree that there are three classes of being,
two extremes and one intermediate being. They agree about the name of
the extremes, but disagree about the intermediate class. One extreme
is those beings that are brought into existence by something (matter),
from something other than itself (efficient cause) and originate in
time. The second, and opposite, class is that which is composed of
nothing, caused by nothing and whose existence is eternal; this class
of being is demonstratively known as God. The third class, is that
which is comprised of anything or is not preceded by time, but is
brought into existence by an agent; this is what is known as the
world. Theologians affirm that time did not exist before the existence
of the world, since time is related to the motion of physical bodies.
They also affirm that the world exists infinitely into the future. As
such, since the philosophers accept these two contentions, the two
groups only disagree on the existence of the world in the eternal
past.
Since the third class relates to both the first and second classes,
the dispute between the philosophers and the theologians is merely how
close the third class is to one of the other two classes. If closer to
the first class, it would resemble originated beings; if closer to the
second class, it would resemble more the eternal being. For Ibn Rushd,
the world can neither be labeled pre-eternal nor originated, since the
former would imply that the world is uncaused and the latter would
imply that the world is perishable.
Ibn Rushd finds pre-existing material forms in Quranic texts such as
11:9, where he maintains that one finds a throne and water
pre-existing the current forms of the universe; he contends that the
theologians' interpretation of such passages are arbitrary. This is
because nowhere in the Qur'an is the idea of God existing as pure
being before the creation of the world to be found.
The debate for Ibn Rushd and Ghazzali centers, ultimately, upon the
idea of causation. Ghazzali, the dedicated Asharite, wants to support
the position that God is the ultimate cause of all actions; that no
being in the universe is the autonomous cause of anything. For
instance, a spark put on a piece of wood does not cause fire; rather
God causes the fire and has allowed the occasion of spark and wood to
be the method by which he creates fire. God, if he so desired, could
simply will fire not to occur when a spark and wood meet. For
Ghazzali, this is the explanation of the occurrence of miracles:
divine creative actions that suspend laws habitually accepted by
humans. Ghazzali, in his Tahafut, speaks of the decapitated man
continuing to live because God willed it so.
Ibn Rushd, the consummate Aristotelian, maintains in his Tahafut
Aristotle's contention that a full explanation of any event or
existence needs to involve a discussion of the material, formal,
efficient and final cause. Ibn Rushd, then, insists that Ghazzali's
view would be counter-productive to scientific knowledge and contrary
to common-sense. The universe, according to the human mind, works
along certain causal principles and the beings existing within the
universe contain particular natures that define their existence; if
these natures, principles and characteristics were not definitive,
then this would lead to nihilism (i.e. the atheistic materialists
found in the Greek and Arab worlds). As for the idea of cause and
effect being a product of habitual observation, Ibn Rushd asks if such
observations are a product of God's habit or our own observations. It
cannot, he asserts, be the former, since the Qur'an speaks of God's
actions as unalterable. If the latter, the idea of habit applies only
to animate beings, for the habitual actions of inanimate objects are
tantamount to physical laws of motion.
6. Metaphysics
Metaphysics, for Ibn Rushd, does not simply deal with God or theology;
rather it concerns itself with different classes of being and the
analogical idea of being. It is, thus, a science that distinguishes
inferior classes of being from real being. Ibn Rushd, the adamant
Aristotelian, puts his own slant on Aristotle's metaphysics. Ibn
Rushd's classification of being begins with accidental substances,
which are physical beings, then moves to being of the soul / mind and
finally discusses whether the substance existing outside the soul,
such as the sphere of the fixed stars, is material or immaterial. This
hierarchy, notes Charles Genequand, differs from Aristotle's hierarchy
of material beings, beings of the soul / mind and unchangeable
entities. The first and third categories of both thinkers are somewhat
similar in that they encompass a straight demarcation between material
and immaterial being. Ibn Rushd's second class of being, however,
includes both universals and mathematical beings; and as such cannot
be the bridge between physics and metaphysics as it is in Aristotle.
Rather, he contended that all autonomous beings, whether material or
not, constitute a single category. This was likely a response to the
more materialistic interpretations of Aristotle, such as that of
Alexander of Aphrodisias, for Ibn Rushd did not see physics and the
metaphysical at opposite sides of the spectrum.
Substance, not beings of the mind, was the common link between physics
and metaphysics for Ibn Rushd. Substance, therefore, has an
ontological, though not necessarily temporal, priority over other
parts of being. Since, then, metaphysics covers both sensible and
eternal substances, its subject matter overlaps with that of physics.
In the cosmos, then, there are two classes of eternal things, the
essentially eternal and the numerically eternal. This division
represents the separation between the celestial realm and the physical
universe, where the living beings in the latter are bound to an
eternal cycle of generation and corruption, while the former are
immortal animals. Ibn Rushd does not contend that celestial bodies
cause the world, rather the motion of these bodies are the "principle"
of what occurs on earth.
This point is more fully developed in Ibn Rushd's discussion regarding
spontaneous generation: the idea that certain beings are created by
external agents without being subject to the cycle of generation and
corruption. This was a common subject of debate throughout later Greek
and medieval philosophy. If beings like insects spontaneously
generated from rotting food are externally generated, therein lies
proof for a created universe and Asharite occasionalism, neither of
which Ibn Rushd maintains. His solution is the Aristotelian doctrine
of emanation, which states that no being is created but merely is the
principle that unites matter and form. Since Ibn Rushd asserts that
physical generation is the product of both seed, which contains forms
in potentiality, and solar heat, the sun being a heavenly being;
spontaneous generation, in which the seed is absent, is merely the
effect of solar heat upon the basic elements (i.e. earth and water).
In the cosmological sphere, according to physics, one finds things
that are both moving and moved at once and things that are only moved.
Therefore, there must be something that imparts motion but is never
moved; this is the Prime Mover (i.e. God). Physics, thus, provides the
proof for the existence of a prime mover and metaphysics is concerned
with the action of this mover. The Prime Mover is the ultimate agent
for Ibn Rushd and it must be eternal and pure actuality. It did not
merely push the universe into existence and remain idle thereafter,
for the universe would slip into chaos. Ibn Rushd acknowledges that
the idea of actuality being essentially prior to potentiality counters
common sense, but to accept the opposite would entail the possibility
of spontaneous movement or negation of movement within the universe.
How, then, is the prime mover the principle of motion and causation in
the cosmos without being moved itself? Ibn Rushd contends that the
prime mover moves the cosmos, particularly the celestial bodies, by
being the object of desire. Celestial beings have souls, which possess
the higher power of intellect and desire, and these beings desire the
perfection of God, thereby they move accordingly. Desire in the
celestial beings, according to Ibn Rushd, is not the real faculty it
is in humans. Since these beings have no sense perception, desire is
united with intellect causing a desire for what rationally is
perfection – the Prime Mover.
Ibn Rushd rejects the Arab Neoplatonic doctrine of emanation because
it simply implies a temporal succession of one being producing
another, which is impossible for eternal beings. By this rejection,
however, Ibn Rushd recognizes a problem within his system. If God is
intellectually present within the celestial bodies, there is no need
for them to move in an effort to acquire this perfection. Ibn Rushd
responds with an analogy of a cabinet-maker, who has the idea of a
cabinet existing in his mind, but his body needs to move in order to
imprint this idea upon matter. Celestial beings move in likewise
matter, in order to obtain perfection, which produces the physical
universe. Furthermore, this effort to obtain perfection in the
celestial bodies, which is in imitation of God, effects the order of
the universe.
With the Prime Mover, the celestial bodies and the physical world, Ibn
Rushd has a three level cosmological view. He illustrates his
cosmological order by using the analogy of the state, where everyone
obeys and imitates the king. All smaller social units in the kingdom,
like the family, are subordinate to the head, which is ultimately
under the authority of the king. There is a hierarchy among the
spheres of celestial beings, based on their "nobility" (sharaf) and
not, as Avicenna held, on their order in emanation. Of course, the
order of nobility parallels emanation's order, for the hierarchical
order is that which we see in the universe, the fixed stars, the
planets, the moon and the earth. Like a king, the Prime Mover imparts
motion only to the First Body (the sphere of the fixed stars), which
becomes the intermediary for the other bodies. This leads to the other
spheres (i.e. planets) to desire both the Prime Mover and the First
Body, which, according to Ibn Rushd, explains how the celestial bodies
move from east to west at one time and from west to east at another
time. It is the desire of one that moves the planets in one way, and
the desire of the other that moves them in the opposite direction.
Ultimately, as H. Davidson notes, Ibn Rushd has a cosmos in which the
earth is its physical center. Surrounding the earth, at different
levels, are the celestial spheres, which contain celestial bodies
(e.g. the sun, moon, stars and planets), which all revolve around the
earth. The motion of these spheres is attributed to immortal
intelligences, governed by a primary immutable and impersonal cause.
Each sphere exists in its own right, though somehow the intelligence
is caused by the Prime Mover, and it is through their contemplation of
the Prime Mover they receive perfection equivalent to the position
they hold in the cosmological hierarchy. As such, God no longer is
restricted to being a cause of one thing. The active intellect is the
last sphere in the hierarchy, but is not the product of another, and
like the other intelligences its cognition is fixed on God. This idea
has significant influence on Ibn Rushd's doctrine of the human soul
and intellect.
7. Psychology
Like Aristotle, Ibn Rushd views the study of the psyche as a part of
physics, since it is related specifically to the generable and
corruptible union of form and matter found in the physical world and
passed from generation to generation through the seed and natural
heat. Ibn Rushd's views on psychology are most fully discussed in his
Talkbis Kitab al-Nafs (Aristotle on the Soul). Here Ibn Rushd, as M.
Fakhry comments, divided the soul into five faculties: the nutritive,
the sensitive, the imaginative, the appetitive and the rational. The
primary psychological faculty of all plants and animals is the
nutritive or vegetative faculty, passed on through sexual generation,
as noted above. The remaining four higher faculties are dependent on
the nutritive faculty and are really perfections of this faculty, the
product of a nature urging to move higher and higher.
The nutritive faculty uses natural heat to convert nutrients from
potentiality to actuality, which are essential for basic survival,
growth and reproduction of the living organism. , This faculty is an
active power which is moved by the heavenly body (Active Intellect).
Meanwhile, the sensitive faculty is a passive power divided into two
aspects, the proximate and the ultimate, in which the former is moved
within the embryo by the heavenly body and the latter is moved by
sensible objects. The sensitive faculty in finite, in that it is
passive, mutable, related to sensible forms and dependent upon the
animal's physical senses (e.g. touch or vision). A part of these
senses, notes Fakhry, is the sensus communis, a sort of sixth sense
that perceives common sensibles (i.e. objects that require more than
one sense to observe), discriminates among these sensibles, and
comprehends that it perceives. Benmakhlouf notes that the imaginative
faculty is dependent on the sensitive faculty, in that its forms
result from the sensible forms, which Fakhry contends are stored in
sensus communis. It differs from the sensitive faculty, however, by
the fact that it "apprehends objects which are no longer present…its
apprehensions are often false or fictitious," and it can unite
individual images of objects perceived separately. Imagination is not
opinion or reasoning, since it can conceive of unfalsified things and
its objects are particular not universal, and may be finite because it
is mutable (moving from potentiality to actuality by the forms stored
in the sensus communis). The imaginative faculty stimulates the
appetitive faculty, which is understood as desire, since it imagines
desirable objects. Fakhry adds that the imaginative and appetitive
faculties are essentially related, in that it is the former that moves
the latter to desire or reject any pleasurable or repulsive object.
The rational faculty, seen as the capstone of Ibn Rushd's psychology
by Fakhry, is unlike the imaginative faculty, in that it apprehends
motion in a universal way and separate from matter. It has two
divisions, the practical and theoretical, given to humans alone for
their ultimate moral and intellectual perfection. The rational faculty
is the power that allows humanity to create, understand and be
ethical. The practical is derived from the sensual and imaginative
faculties, in that it is rooted in sensibles and related to moral
virtues like friendship and love. The theoretical apprehends universal
intelligibles and does not need an external agent for
intellectualization, contrary to the doctrine of the Active Intellect
in Neoplatonism.
In its effort to achieve perfection, the rational faculty moves from
potentiality to actuality. In doing so it goes through a number of
stages, know as the process of intellectation. Ibn Rushd had
discerned, as seen in his Long Commentary on De Anima, five distinct
meanings of the Aristotelian intellect. They were, first and foremost,
the material (potential) and the active (agent) intellects.
There is evidence of some evolution in Ibn Rushd's thought on the
intellect, notably in his Middle Commentary on De Anima where he
combines the positions of Alexander and Themistius for his doctrine on
the material intellect and in his Long Commentary and the Tahafut
where Ibn Rushd rejected Alexander and endorsed Themistius' position
that "material intellect is a single incorporeal eternal substance
that becomes attached to the imaginative faculties of individual
humans." Thus, the human soul is a separate substance ontologically
identical with the active intellect; and when this active intellect is
embodied in an individual human it is the material intellect. The
material intellect is analogous to prime matter, in that it is pure
potentiality able to receive universal forms. As such, the human mind
is a composite of the material intellect and the passive intellect,
which is the third element of the intellect. The passive intellect is
identified with the imagination, which, as noted above, is the
sense-connected finite and passive faculty that receives particular
sensual forms. When the material intellect is actualized by
information received, it is described as the speculative (habitual)
intellect. As the speculative intellect moves towards perfection,
having the active intellect as an object of thought, it becomes the
acquired intellect. In that, it is aided by the active intellect,
perceived in the way Aristotle had taught, to acquire intelligible
thoughts. The idea of the soul's perfection occurring through having
the active intellect as a greater object of thought is introduced
elsewhere, and its application to religious doctrine is seen. In the
Tahafut, Ibn Rushd speaks of the soul as a faculty that comes to
resemble the focus of its intention, and when its attention focuses
more upon eternal and universal knowledge, it become more like the
eternal and universal. As such, when the soul perfects itself, it
becomes like our intellect. This, of course, has impact on Ibn Rushd's
doctrine of the afterlife. Leaman contends that Ibn Rushd understands
the process of knowing as a progression of detachment from the
material and individual to become a sort of generalized species, in
which the soul may survive death. This contradicts traditional
religious views of the afterlife, which Ibn Rushd determines to be
valuable in a political sense, in that it compels citizens to ethical
behaviour.
Elsewhere, Ibn Rushd maintains that it is the Muslim doctrine of the
afterlife that best motivates people to an ethical life. The Christian
and Jewish doctrines, he notes, are too focused upon the spiritual
elements of the afterlife, while the Muslim description of the
physical pleasures are more enticing. Of course, Ibn Rushd does not
ultimately reject the idea of a physical afterlife, but for him it is
unlikely.
A number of other problems remain in Ibn Rushd's doctrine of the soul
and intellect. For instance, if the material intellect is one and
eternal for all humans, how is it divided and individualized? His
immediate reply was that division can only occur within material
forms, thus it is the human body that divides and individualizes the
material intellect. Nevertheless, aside from this and other problems
raised, on some of which Aquinas takes him to task, Ibn Rushd
succeeded in providing an explanation of the human soul and intellect
that did not involve an immediate transcendent agent. This opposed the
explanations found among the Neoplatonists, allowing a further
argument for rejecting of Neoplatonic emanation theories. Even so,
notes Davidson, Ibn Rushd's theory of the material intellect was
something foreign to Aristotle.
8. Conclusion
The events surrounding Ibn Rushd towards the end of his life,
including his banishment, signaled a broader cultural shift in the
Islamic world. Interest in philosophy was primarily among the elite:
scholars, royal patrons and civil servants. Nevertheless, its presence
among the ruling elite spoke of the diversity of what it meant to be
"Muslim." As interest in philosophy waned in the Muslim world after
Ibn Rushd, his writings found new existence and intellectual vigor in
the work of Christian and Jewish philosophers. The twelfth and
thirteenth centuries saw an intellectual revival in the Latin West,
with the first great universities being established in Italy, France
and England. Within the walls of the University of Paris, a group of
philosophers came to identify themselves with the Aristotelian
philosophy presented by Ibn Rushd, particularly certain elements of
its relation to religion. Later known as the "Averroists," these
Christian philosophers sparked a controversy within the Roman Catholic
Church about the involvement of philosophy with theology. Averroists,
their accusers charged, had promoted the doctrines of one intellect
for all humans, denial of the immortality of the soul, claimed that
happiness can be found in this life and promoted the innovative
doctrine of "double truth". Double truth, the idea that there are two
kinds of truth, religious and philosophical, was not held by Ibn Rushd
himself but was an innovation of the Averroists.
Among Jewish thinkers, however, Ibn Rushd had a more positive impact.
His thoughts on Aristotle and the relationship between philosophy and
religion, particularly revelation, inspired a renewed interest in the
interpretation of scripture and the Jewish religion. Key Jewish
philosophers, such as Maimonides, Moses Narboni and Abraham ibn Ezra,
became associated with Ibn Rushd in the West, even though they took
Ibn Rushd's doctrines into novel directions. As such, Leaman notes,
the category of a Jewish "Averroist" cannot be given to these
philosophers, for their relationship with Ibn Rushd's thought was one
of critique and integration into their own philosophical systems.
Nevertheless, without the work of the Spanish-Muslim philosopher, much
of what occurred in medieval philosophy would have not existed. He
became an example of how religions are dynamic and evolving
traditions, often shaped by epistemological influences from other
traditions.
9. References and Further Reading
a. Primary Sources
* Ibn Rushd, with Commentary by Moses Narboni, The Epistle on the
Possibility of Conjunction with the Active Intellect. K. Bland
(trans.). (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1982).
* Ibn Rushd, Decisive Treatise & Epistle Dedicatory. C.
Butterworth (trans.). (Provo: Brigham Young University Press, 2001).
* Ibn Rushd, Faith and Reason in Islam [al-Kashf]. I. Najjar
(trans.). (Oxford: Oneworld, 2001).
* Ibn Rushd, Long Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima. A. Hyman
(trans.), Philosophy in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Hackett, 1973).
* Ibn Rushd, Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Categories and De
Interpretatione. C. Butterworth (trans.). (South Bend: St. Augustine's
Press, 1998).
* Ibn Rushd, Tahafut al-Tahafut. S. Van Den Bergh (trans.).
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954).
* Ibn Rushd, Treatise Concerning the Substance of the Celestial
Sphere. A. Hyman (trans.), Philosophy in the Middle Ages (Cambridge:
Hackett, 1973).
b. Secondary Sources
* J. Al-Alawi, "The Philosophy of Ibn Rushd: the Evolution of the
Problem of the Intellect in the works of Ibn Rushd." Jayyusi, Salma
Khadra (ed.), The Legacy of Muslim Spain, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994).
* R. Arnaldez, Ibn Rushd: A Rationalist in Islam (Notre Dame, IN:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1998)
* A. Benmakhlour, Ibn Rushd (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2000)
* D. Black, "Ibn Rushd, the Incoherence of the Incoherence." The
Classics of Western Philosophy: a Reader's Guide. Eds. Jorge Gracia,
Gregory Reichberg and Bernard Schumacher (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003).
* D. Black "Consciousness and Self-Knowledge in Aquinas's Critique
of Ibn Rushd's Psychology." Journal of the History of Philosophy 31.3
(July 1993): 23-59.
* D. Black, "Memory, Time and Individuals in Ibn Rushd's
Psychology." Medieval Theology and Philosophy 5 (1996): 161-187
* H. Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Ibn Rushd, on Intellect:
Their Cosmologies, Theories of the Active Intellect and Theories of
Human Intellect (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
* C. Genequand, "Metaphysics." History of Islamic Philosophy. S.
Nasr and O. Leaman (eds.). (New York: Routledge, 2001).
* M. Hayoun et A. de Libera, Ibn Rushd et l'Averroisme (Paris:
Presses Universitaries de France, 1991).
* A. Hughes, The Texture of the Divine: Imagination in Medieval
Islamic and Jewish Thought (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
2003)
* M. Fakhry, A History of Islamic Philosophy (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1983)
* M. Fakhry, Ibn Rushd (Ibn Rushd) (Oxford: Oneworld, 2001)
* M. Fakhry, Islamic Occasionalism: and its Critique by Ibn Rushd
and Aquinas (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1958).
* I. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1988)
* O. Leaman, Ibn Rushd and His Philosophy (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1988)
* O. Leaman, An Introduction to Classical Islamic Philosophy
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002)
* O. Leaman, "Ibn Rushd" Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Vol.
4. E. Craig (gen. ed.) (London: Routledge, 1998).
* O. Mohammed, Ibn Rushd's Doctrine of Immortality: a Matter of
Controversy (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier Press, 1984).
* D. Urvoy, "Ibn Rushd." History of Islamic Philosophy. S. Nasr
and O. Leaman (eds.). (New York: Routledge, 2001).
* D. Urvoy, Ibn Rushd (Ibn Rushd) (London: Routledge, 1991).
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