Babylonian (and to a lesser extent Egyptian) astrological traditions,
and developed their theoretical and technical doctrines using a
combination of Stoic, Middle Platonic and Neopythagorean thought.
Astrology offered fulfillment of a desire to systematically know where
an individual stands in relation to the cosmos in a time of rapid
political and social changes. Various philosophers of the time took up
polemics against astrology while accepting some astral theories. The
Stoic philosopher Posidonius was alleged to embrace astrology and
write works on it (Augustine, De civitate dei, 5.2). Other Stoics such
as Panaetius and (late) Diogenes of Babylon were primarily adverse to
astrological determinism. For some philosophers such as Plotinus,
horoscopic astrology was absurd for reasons such that the planets
could never bear ill will toward human beings whose souls were exalted
above the cosmos. For others, such as the early Church Fathers,
ethical implications of astrological fatalism were the main point of
contention, as it was contrary to the emerging Christian doctrine of
free will. The Gnostics, who for the most part believed the cosmos is
the product of an evil and enslaving creator, thought of the planets
as participants in this material entrapment. Prominent Neoplatonists
such as Porphyry, Iamblichus, and Proclus found some aspects of
astrology compatible with their versions of Neoplatonic philosophy.
The cultural importance of astrology is attested to by the strong
reactions to and involvement with astrology by various philosophers in
late antiquity. The adaptability of astrology to various philosophical
schools as well as the borrowing on the part of astrologers from
diverse philosophies provides dynamic examples of the rich
"electicism" or "syncretism" that characterized the Hellenistic world.
1. Introduction
a. Babylonian Astrology in the Hellenized World
Astrology, loosely defined as a method of correspondences between
celestial events and activity in the human realm, has played a role in
nearly every civilization. Its role in the late-Hellenistic era is of
special concern, particularly due to its complex interaction with
Greek philosophy, as well as its claims on the life of an individual.
A horoscopic chart (also "birth chart," "natal chart," or "horoscope")
is a list of planetary positions against a backdrop of zodiac signs,
divided into regions of the sky (with reference to the rising and
setting stars on the horizon) on the basis of one's exact time and
place of birth. Such charts form the basis of "natal astrology" or
"genethlialogy," which started in Babylon but was later developed in
Hellenized Greek speaking regions.
The earliest surviving horoscopic chart pertaining to an individual is
dated 410 B.C.E. in Babylon. Babylonian astrology flourished from the
seventh century to the Seleucid era (late fourth century). However,
astral religion and divination based on star omens have a much longer
history in Mesopotamia. Stars were considered to be representations of
gods whose favors could be courted through prayers, magical
incantations and amulets. The triad of Anu, Enlil, and Ea corresponded
not with individual stars or planets but to three bands of
constellations. Traces of the basic characters of the planetary gods,
such as the malevolent nature of Mars/Nergal (the god of destruction
and plagues) and Venus/Ištar (the goddess of love), can be found in
Hellenistic astrology. Given the small available sample of Late
Babylonian horoscopic tablets containing planetary placements and
laconic predictions (around 28 extant), it is very difficult to come
to solid conclusions about the theoretical ground for the practice of
the earliest horoscopic astrologers. The case will be different in the
Hellenistic culture in which theoretical grounding was important for
the development of the practice, and in which there is more extensive
textual evidence.
Given the dynamic tension resulting from Greek philosophy meeting
Egyptian, Babylonian, Persian and Jewish religions and ideologies, and
the "syncretism" of cross-cultural influences, the Hellenistic era
provided fruitful soil for the cultivation of what began primarily as
a Mesopotamian system of celestial omens. Before Alexander's conquest,
the practice of astronomy and astrology in Babylon flourished but was
not yet of much interest to the Greek thinkers. Babylonian
priests/astrologers, notably Berossus, who settled on the island of
Cos, are thought to be responsible for introducing astrology to Greece
and the surrounding area. Plato mentions those who seek celestial
portents in the Timaeus (40c-d), while the student of Plato who
authored the Epinomis paved the way for application of astronomical
studies to astral piety.
As the intellectual center in Egypt, Alexandria is a likely location
for major developments in Hellenistic astrology. A portion of what
Garth Fowden (in Egyptian Hermes) classified as "technical Hermetica,"
material typically earlier than the "philosophical Hermetica,"
represents a part of the early Hellenistic astrological corpus.
Surviving Greek astrological writings, catalogued over a period of
fifty years in a work called the Catalogus Codicum Astrologorum
Graecorum (CCAG), reveal that for the sake of credibility, many of the
Hellenistic astrologers attributed the earliest astrological works to
historical or mythologized figures such as the pharaoh Nechepso, an
Egyptian priest associated with Petosiris. Hermes is a legendary
figure credited with the invention of astrology. Some fragments
attributed to Hermes survive while some of the Nechepso/Petosiris work
from the mid-second century B.C.E. survives in quotes by later
authors. Asclepius, Anubio, Zoroaster, Abraham, Pythagoras, and
Orpheus are additional figures having astrological works penned in
their names. There are late Hellenistic references to three Babylonian
astronomers/astrologers, Kidinnu (Kidenas), Soudines (the source of
some material for second century C.E. astrologer, Vettius Valens), and
Naburianos. The rivalry between the Seleucid and Ptolemaic kingdoms
may be reflected in the astrologers' varying attributions of the
origins of astrology to Egyptians or Babylonians (called the
Chaldaeans). Various astrological techniques and tables are either
attributed to Egyptians or Chaldaeans, but by late antiquity, the
source for specific techniques and approaches were often wrongly
attributed. By the second century B.C.E., Babylonian astrology
techniques were combined with Egyptian calendars and religious
practices, Hermeticism, the Pythagorean sacred mathematics, and the
philosophies of the Stoics and middle Platonists.
b. Hellenistic Theorization and Systemization of Astrology
Hellenistic astrology displays the influence of a variety of
philosophical sources. However, given the divergent and ever
multiplying streams of thought in the Hellenized world, practical
astrology did not necessarily conform to one particular philosophical
model offered by the major philosophical schools. However, as outlined
below, the Neopythagoreans, Platonists and Stoics provided the
foundational influence on the development of the art.
After a system or systems of Hellenistic astrology quickly developed,
the later practitioners and writers did not follow any one
philosophical influence as a whole. In fact, the surviving
instructional texts only scantily betray the philosophical positions
of the authors. Vettius Valens, whose Anthologiarum is one of the most
valuable sources for historians of this subject, indicates Stoic
leanings. The astrologer, astronomer, and geographer whose work
greatly influenced later development of astrology, Claudius Ptolemy
(fl. 130-150 C.E.), using Aristotelian influenced manners of
argumentation that had been absorbed by other Hellenistic schools such
as the Middle Platonists and the Academic Skeptics, sought to portray
astrology as a natural science, while dismissing a good portion of
doctrine due to lack of systematic rigor. The later Platonic Academy
had its fair share of astrological interest – head of the academy in
the first century C.E., Thrasyllus, for example, acted as an
astrologer to Emperor Tiberius and is credited for works on astrology
and numerology. Neoplatonists Porphyry, Iamblichus and Proclus all
practiced or accepted some form of astrology conforming to their
unique contributions to Neoplatonism. It is difficult to imagine that
the practice of astrology would have been divorced from philosophy by
philosophers who were also astrologers. The idea of astrology, as a
systematic account of fate, had a pervasive impact on the influential
thinkers of the time who helped to shape the theoretical and
cosmological understanding of the practice. Thinkers in the skeptical
Academy and Pyrrhonic schools sought to attack the theoretical
underpinnings of the practice of astrology, using a variety of
arguments centering around freedom, the ontological status of the
stars and planets, and the logical or practical limitations of
astrological claims.
We now turn to the philosophies and philosophical schools of the
Hellenic and Hellenized world that made the spread and acceptance of
Babylonian astrology possible.
2. Early Greek Thinking
a. Fate, Fortune, Chance, Necessity
The role of Fate was often interchangeable with that of the gods in
early Greek thinking. Fate implied foreknowledge, which was divine and
sometimes dispensed by the gods. The intervention of the gods in human
affairs also presented the possibility of two paths of fate, based on
a moral choice. A decision that pleased or displeased the gods (such
as the choice Odysseus must make regarding the Oxen of the Sun
(Odyssey, Book XII) could set one off on a road of inexorable
circumstances to follow.
For the pre-Socratic philosophers, personified powers – such as Moira
(Fate or Destiny) Anankê(Necessity), Nemesis, Heimarmenê (Fate),
Sumphora (Chance) and Tukhê (Fortune or Chance) – took on both
metaphysical significances and personifications that blurred any
distinction between the theological and the ontological. In thinkers
such as Anaximander, Moira and Tukhê play a part in cosmology that
exceeds and is possibly even prior to the gods. While the Olympian
gods may be given foresight into the workings of Moira, they were
often left without the power to transgress this transcendental
dispensation of justice. Nature and the gods were both encompassed by
Moira. At this time in Greek thinking, Fate and Fortune, and Zeus as
its capricious dispenser, fell outside the pale of human
understanding, for leading a virtuous life was no insurance of
protection from material ruin. This sense of futility resulted in the
pessimism of Ionian thinkers such as Mimnermus and Semonides. The
attitude toward Moira and Tukhê by Archilochus is wholly pessimistic,
for Moira and Tukhê were the sole dispensers of good and evil, with no
possibility of mediation. We see the emergence of the question of the
role of human responsibility in justice and injustice in early Greek
thinking (that is, Solon), but it is unusual to see sharp distinctions
between circumstantial Fate that dispenses good or evil and the human
response to fate through virtue that was to later develop in
Hellenistic thinking (such as found in the later Stoic position that
happiness is self-control in spite of an immutable Fate). Theognis,
however, offers a proto-Stoic forebearance of Fate and triumph of
human character, while he expresses the frustration of apparent
injustice in the dispensation of good to the wicked and bad to the
innocent. Democritus reacted to skepticism based on the whims of
Chance by favoring a causal determinism ruled by necessity (anankê).
Attribution of events to Chance, he claimed, was an excuse for one's
lack of vigilance of the chain of causality (Fr. 119, Diels-Kranz).
While not claiming such a thing as absolute chance, Democritus
retained chance to indicate an obscure cause or causes.
We find in pre-Socratic thinking a stage set for the overcoming of the
limitations of knowledge about the laws of the cosmos, not simply on a
universal scale, but on the level of individual fortune as well.
Hellenistic astrologers, in part, attempted to provide a complex
astral logic to explain the apparent injustices of Fate. They
attempted to fill this gap of knowledge and turn Chance and Fate into
a predictable science for the initiated.
b. Greek Medicine
The development of Greek medical theory brought about a distinction
between a basic "human nature" (koinê phusis) and an "individual
nature" (idiê phusis). Greek medicine was motivated by the idea that
nature has a unity and lawfulness. In the manner of Democritian
Atomism, even Tukhê is causal, but not necessarily predictable. A
Hippocratean would classify an individual's psychophysical nature into
one of four types based on the qualities of hot, cold, moist, and dry.
Astrologers borrowed and elaborated upon the psychology and character
typology found in early medical theory (cf. Manilius, Astronomica,
2.453-465; Ptolemy, Tetrabiblos, 3.12.148). In turn, astrology in the
Hellenistic era was to in turn inform medical theory with 1) zodiacal
and planetary melothesia (the association of astral phenomenon at
birth with physical type), 2) iatromathematics (which included
consideration of auspicious and inauspicious times), 3) sympathies and
antipathies between healing plants and celestial bodies, and 4)
prognostication of the course of an illness, of life expectancy or
recovery, based on the moment a person fell ill. Melothesia and
iatromathematics are found in the works of astrologers Manilius,
Teucer (Teukros) of Babylon, Ptolemy, and Firmicus Maternus, as well
as a variety of anonymous and pseudepigraphal works. (cf. Serapion,
CCAG, 1.101-102; Pythagoras, CCAG, 11.2.124-138).
Galen's own position on astrology was nuanced, for he rejected some
aspects of astrological doctrine as it had been applied to medicine
(particularly the Pythagorean numerology used in critical days, and
the association of thirty-six healing plants with the Egyptian
decans), while he supported other astrological considerations such as
the Moon phases and relationship to planets for prognosis. Two of his
works pertaining directly to this topic, On the Critical Days and
Prognostication of Disease by Astrology. InOn the Critical Days Galen
claimed an empirical basis for his selective acceptance, favoring
astronomical accuracy (with fractional measures) over the Pythagorean
doctrines in astrology (such as seven days per quarter cycle of the
Moon). A passage in On the Natural Faculties (1.12.29) also alludes to
his support of astrology in general and to a lost work on the
physician Asclepiades where he dealt with the topics of omen, dreams
and astrology. The context of the passage reveals that his theoretical
acceptance of astrology is due to his Vitalist view of Nature (that
the natural world is a living organism) as opposed to the Atomistic
view of Nature (that all things are composed of inanimate atoms).
Nature, for Galen (drawing upon the Vitalist position of Hippocrates)
possesses faculties of attraction and assimilation of that which is
appropriate (e.g., for an organism) and of expulsion of that which is
foreign. Nature also provides the soul with innate ideas such as the
virtues of courage, wisdom, temperance, etc. Omens and astrology are
signs of Nature's providence and artistry of the principles of
assimilation and expulsion. The Atomist (Epicurean) school rejected
astrology and divination by dreams and omens because they believed
there is no causality and purpose in Nature, so there is no means of
producing these "signs" or correspondences and no means of prediction
by way of them.
c. Plato and Divination
Babylonian astrology was not wholly unknown to the Greeks prior to
Alexander's campaign. Plato, for instance, demonstrates an awareness
of divination by the stars in the Timaeus dialogue, in which the
protagonist criticizes divination by the stars without the means of
astronomical calculation (logizethai) and a model (mimêmaton) of the
heavens:
To describe the dancing movements of these gods, their
juxtapositions and the back-circlings and advances of their circular
courses on themselves; to tell which of the gods come into line with
one another at their conjunctions and how many of them are in
opposition, and in what order and at which times they pass in front of
or behind one another, so that some are occluded from our view to
reappear once again, thereby bring terrors and portents of things to
come to those who cannot reason – to tell all this without the use of
visible models would be labor spend in vain. 40c-d, Donald J. Zeyl
translation, emphasis mine).
Each astronomical consideration listed in this passage, the
conjunctions and oppositions, the occlusion or heliacal settings of
planets and stars, the retrogradation are basic considerations in
Babylonian (and subsequently Greek) astronomy. This passage may allude
to early exposure of the Greeks to astrological methods more akin to
numerology rather than based on astronomical observation, for the use
of visible models can more accurately measure celestial phenomena. It
may also be taken as evidence that Plato is at least aware of the
Babylonian practice of omenic astrology or the horoscopy that emerged
in the fifth century B.C.E. Also in the Timaeus, Plato mentions the
"young gods" whose job it is to steer souls. The identity of these
gods would become a problem in later Platonism, but they are
established, at least by the first century as planetary god (Philo, De
opificio mundi, 46-47). As this dialogue was treated with great
importance in Platonism during the formative period of Hellenistic
astrology, this passage could have been used by those looking for
philosophical justification for the practice. Plato further expresses
in the Laws(7.821a-822c; 10.986e) the value of studying astronomy for
the sake of astral piety. He points out that the name planetos (from
"to wander") is a misnomer, for the Sun, Moon and planets display a
cyclical regularity in their course that can be more accurately
understood by astronomical research. We can suspect, in this regard,
the influence of contemporary astronomers and students in the academy
such as Eudoxus. Astral piety, however, is to be contrasted with
"astrology" proper that originated with the attempt to apply reason,
order, and predictability to phenomena that had been previously
considered to be merely astral omens.
Plato held in low regard the divinatory arts that are not prophetic,
i.e., a madness (manic/mantic) directly inspired by the gods (cf.
Ion). He expressed an attitude of ambiguity toward divination revealed
in the double-edged characterization of Theuth (cf. Phaedo, 274a), the
inventor of number, calculation, geometry, astronomy, games and
writing. Just as writing results in a soul's forgetfulness through the
mediation of symbols, semiotic or sign-based prediction, as astrology
was often considered, is inferior to directly inspired prophecy
(Phaedo, 244c).
d. Ages, Cycles, and Rational Heavens
As early as Hesiod, the Greeks mythologized ages of civilization. The
Golden Age, in which the gods walked upon the earth, gave way to
Silver, then Bronze, then Iron Age. Empedocles taught of a natural
cycle of the interplay of Love and Strife: Love and harmony dominated
one Age, then Strife in the next Age. Plato also expresses world ages,
particularly in the Statesman or Politicus (269d-274d). Throughout the
myths in this dialogue and others, he introduced the notion of a
"cosmos" or a rational order and ontological hierarchy of the spheres
of heavenly beings, elements, daimons, and earthly inhabitants. The
cosmologies in Plato's dialogues marked the emergence of a rational
cosmic order in place of earlier cosmogonies. His Timaeus dialogue,
with its detailed story of the creation of the world, was to become,
perhaps the most influential book along with the Septuagint in the
late Hellenistic era). Babylonian astronomical cycles would, soon
after Plato, fuse with Greek cosmologies. In the Myth of Er in the
Republic, Plato describes the cosmos as held together by the Spindle
of Necessity, such that the spheres of the fixed stars and the planets
are held together by an axis of a spindle. Sirens sing to move the
spheres (or whorls) while the Three Moirai participate in turning the
wheel. Each whorl has its own speed, with the sphere of the fixed
stars moving the fastest and in the direction opposite those of the
planets. In the Phaedrus (245c-248c) dialogue, he further illustrates
the Law of Destiny that governs souls who accompany the procession of
the gods in a heavenly circuit for a period of 1000 years. If the
souls remember the Good (those of the philosophers) they will regain
lost wings of immortality in three circuits or 3000 years. Otherwise
they fall to the earth and continue a cycle of rebirths for 10,000
years. Immortal souls dwell in the rim of the heavens among the stars.
This leads to another significant development introduced by Plato, one
that would become critical for the Hellenistic spread of astrology and
astral piety – the ensouled nature of celestial bodies. Plato gives
the planets and stars a divine ontological status absent in the
writings of the pre-Socratics, many of whom took the planets and stars
to be material bodies of one substance or another. (for example,
Anaxagoras [Plato,Apology, 26d]; Xenophanes [Aetius, De placitis
reliquiae, 347.1]; Anaximander [Aristotle De caelo, 295b10]; Leucippus
and Democritus [Diogenes Laertius, Lives, 9.30-32]). In the Laws
(10.893b-899d; 12.966e-967d), Plato posits that Soul is older than
created things and an immanent governor of the world of changing
matter. Secondly, the motion of the stars and other heavenly bodies
are under the systematic governance of Nous. That the circuits of the
planets and stars have an ordered regularity or rationality, and that
they are always in motion, indicates that they are immortal and
ensouled (cf. Phaedrus, 245c). While leaving open the question of
whether the Sun, Moon and planets create their own physical bodies or
inhabit them as vehicles, Plato includes in the Athenian's argument
that celestial beings are in fact gods, and (unlike the thought of the
Atomists) are engaged in the affairs of human beings (Laws,
10.899a-d). Pre-Socratic philosophers such as Anaxagoras who believed
that mind (Nous) governs the cosmos, failed in their cosmological
account by not also recognizing the priority of soul over body (Laws,
12.967b-d). The conception of mind moving soulless bodies, noted the
Athenian, led to common accusations that studying astronomy promotes
impiety.
As Babylonian astronomical cycles met with a rational and ensouled
Greek cosmos, the basis for both Stoic eternal recurrence and
technical Hellenistic astrology was formed.
3. Philosophical Foundation of Hellenistic Astrology
a. Astral Piety in Plato's Academy
The Platonic dialogue Epinomis, most likely written by Phillip of
Opus, demonstrates a transformation of the view of the heaven that
soon paved the "western way" for astrology. This dialogue shows the
transformation of the planets into visible representations of the
Olympian gods, just as the Babylonian planets were images of their
pantheon. The older names of the planets encountered in Homer and
Hesiod (and in Plato's Republic) designated their appearance rather
than divine personification. Jupiter was shining (Phaithon), Mercury
was twinkling (Stilbôn), Mars was fiery (Pureos) and Venus was the
bright morning star and evening star (Phosphoros and Vesperos). In the
Epinomis, the planets are given proper names for Greek gods, though
the author leaves open the question of whether the celestial beings
are the gods themselves or likenesses fashioned by the gods (theous
autous tauta humnêteon orthotata, ê gar theous eikonas hôs agalmata
hupolabein gegonenai, theôn autôn ergasamenon, 983e). The new names of
planets as Greek gods corresponded loosely with the astral deities of
Babylonian astrology, such as the identification of ruling Olympian,
Zeus, with the planet Jupiter, replacing the principle Babylonian god
Marduk. Ištar (female as evening star, male as morning star) became
Aphroditê/Venus, Nergal (god of destruction) Ares/Mars, Nabu
Hermes/Mercury, Ninib Kronos/Saturn, and Sin became the female lunar
deity Selênê.
The author of Epinomis extends the sentiment of astral piety evident
in the Laws, and goes so far as to say that the highest virtue is
piety, and that astronomy is the art/science that leads to this virtue
(989b-990a) – for it teaches the orderliness of the celestial gods,
harmony, and number. While Plato himself would never place the
heavenly gods in direct control of a person's destiny, the distinction
between the fatalism of such a control measured by astrology and an
astral piety that permitted some intervention of gods in human affairs
was not sharply drawn. Does the care of the gods for "all things great
and small" (epimeloumenoi pantôn, smikrôn kai meizonôn, 980d) mean
that it is through their activities or motions they control, guide or
occasionally intervene in human matters? While we do not yet see a
clear distinction between astral piety and practical astrology, later
texts on mystery cults, Gnosticism, Hermeticism, and magic demonstrate
that someone who either worships stars, or is concerned with their
ontological status, need not be technically proficient in astronomy.
Nor must they believe that life is fated by astrally determined
necessity. Likewise, the technical Hellenistic astrologers who
calculated birth charts and made predictions did not necessarily
practice rituals in reverence to planetary gods. While there is no
clear evidence for a unified school in which technical astrologers
were indoctrinated into both technique and theory of the craft, the
fact that the Hellenistic techniques (barring the basic foundation of
Babylonian astrology) had developed in a variety of conflicting ways
speaks to the possibility of several schools of thought in theory,
practice, and perhaps geographic distance. As each astrologer
contributed their own techniques or variations on techniques, the
technical material quickly multiplied, and students of astrology had
many authoritative writers to follow. The most likely scenario is that
the practicing astrologers possessed a variety of viewpoints about the
life and "influence" of the planets and stars, based on available
cosmological views in religion and philosophy. While borrowing freely
from Stoic, Pythagorean and Platonic thought, the astrologers who
would soon emerge varied theoretically on issues such as which aspects
of earthly existence may or may not be subject to Fate and the
influence of the stars, and whether or not the soul is affected by
celestial motions and relationships.
b. Stoic Cosmic Determinism
Although the founder of Stoicism, Zeno of Citium, integrated fate into
the system of physics, the first Stoic to write a treatise On Fate
(Peri heimarmenês) is Chrysippus of Soli (280-207 B.C.E.). Xenocrates
and Epicurus both penned lost works of the same title prior to his
(Diog. Laert., 4.12; 10.28). Given the influence of Xenocrates on the
Stoa on matters as important as oikeôisis, there is no reason to think
that all of the issues of fate and freedom discussed by Chrysippus
originate with him. Later Stoics such as Boethus, Posidonius and
Philopator, dedicated works to fate, a topic that would become a
critical issue for all Hellenistic schools of thought. The development
of Hellenistic astrology is placed in the context of these theories.
i. Fate and Necessity
Stoic theory of fate involves the law of cause and effect, but unlike
Epicurean atomism, it is not a purely mechanistic determinism because
at the helm is divine reason. Logos, for the Stoics, was the causal
principle of fate or destiny. This principle is not simply external to
human beings, for it is disseminated through the cosmos as logos
spermatikos (seminal reason) which is particularly concentrated in
humans who are subordinate partners of the gods. Individual logoi are
related to the cosmic logos through living in harmony with nature and
the universe. This provided the basis of Stoic ethics, for which there
is the goal of eupoia biou or smooth living rather than fighting with
the natural and fated order of things. Chrysippus makes a distinction
between fate (heimarmenê) and necessity (anankê) in which the former
is a totality of antecedent causes to an event, while the latter is
the internal nature of a thing, or internal causes. By its nature, a
pot made of clay can be shattered, but the actual events of the
shattering of a specific pot are due to the sum total of external
causes and inner constraints. Fate, in general, encompasses the
internal causes, though to be fated does not exclude the autonomy of
individuals because particular actions are based on internal
considerations such as will and character. Some events are considered
to be co-fated by both external circumstances and conscious acts of
choice. Diogenianus gives examples of co-fatedness, e.g., the
preservation of a coat is co-fated with the owner's care for it, and
the act of having children is co-fated with a willingness to have
intercourse (Stoicorum veterum fragmenta, 2.998). Character or
disposition also plays a part in determining virtue and vice.
Polemical writers such as Alexander of Aphrodisias characterize the
Stoic position as maintaining that virtue and vice are innate.
However, it is more accurate to say that for the Stoics an individual
is born morally neutral, though with a natural inclination towards
virtue (virtue associated with reason/logos) that can be enhanced
through training or corrupted through neglect. Though morally neutral
at birth, a human being is not a tabula rasa, but has potentialities
which make him more or less receptive to good and bad influences from
the environment. An individual cannot act contrary to his or her
character, which is a combination of innate and external factors, but
there is the possibility of acquiring a different character, as a
sudden conversion. Since character determines action the ethical
responsibility rests with the most immediate causes. An often cited
example is that of a cylinder placed on a hill – the initial and
external cause of being pushed down the hill represents the rational
order of fate, while its naturally rollable shape represents will and
character of the mind (Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae, 7.2.11).
Cultivation of character through knowledge and training was thought to
result in "harmonious acceptance of events" (which are governed by the
rational plan of the cosmos), whereas lack of culture results in the
errors of pitting oneself against fate (Gellius, 7.2.6).
ii. Stoic-Babylonian Eternal Recurrence
Berossus, a Babylonian priest who settled on the island of Cos and the
author of Babuloniakos, is often credited for bringing Babylonian
astrology to the Greek-speaking world. Because he is thought to have
flourished around 280 B.C.E., he is not the first to expose Greek
speakers to this art, but he is known for founding an astronomical and
astrological school. Kidinnu and Soudines, two Babylonian astronomers
mentioned by second century C.E. Vettius Valens, also contributed to
Hellenistic astronomy and astrology. Although many of the technical
and theoretical details of pre-Hellenistic Babylonian astrology in
Greece are lost in all but a few tablets, the doctrine of
apokatastasis or eternal recurrence is attributed to Berossus by
Seneca (Quaest. nat., 3.2.1). One scholar of the history of astronomy
(P. Schnabel,Berossus und die babylonisch-hellenistische Literatur,
Leipzig 1923) argued that Kidinnu possessed a theory of "precession of
the equinox" prior to Hipparchus. Precession occurs due to a slight
rotation of the earth's axis resulting in a cyclical slippage of the
vernal point in reference to the stars. (See section on Ptolemy for
more on precession) From this was concluded an eternal recurrence
based on the precession of the vernal point through the
constellations. Schnabel's theory, however, had been refuted by
Neugebauer. Whatever the case may be, it is likely that Babylonian
cosmological theories influenced the founding Stoics, particularly
Chrysippus.
The early Stoic version of the eternal recurrence is that a great
conflagration (ekpurôsis) marks a stage in the cycle of the
reconstitution of the cosmos (apokatastasis). One cycle, a Great Year
(SVF, 2.599), would last until the planets align in their original
position or zodiac sign in the cosmos (SVF, 2.625). Each age would end
in Fire, the purest of elements and the irreducible cosmic substance,
and would be followed by a restoration of all things. This fire, for
the Stoics, was a "craftsmanly fire" (pur tekhnikonidentified with
Zeus and of a different nature than the material fire that was one of
the four elements. In the reconstitution of the world, the fiery
element would interact with air to create moisture, which then
condenses into earth. The four elements would then organize in their
proper measures to create living beings (SVF, 1.102). By Necessity,
the principle cohesive power of the cosmos, the same souls which
existed in one cycle would then be reconstituted in the cosmos and
would play the same part in the same way, with perhaps an
insignificant variation or two. This concept from the early Stoa is
sometimes known as the "eternal recurrence." Because human souls are
rational seeds of God (Logos, Zeus, Creative Fire), the conflagration
is an event in which all souls return to the pure substance of
creative fire (pur technikon), Zeus. This is not to be understood as
an "afterlife" of human souls, as one would find in Christianity, for
example. God, then restored in his own completion, assesses the lives
of the previous cycle and fashions the next great age of the world
that will contain an identical sequence of events. Heraclitus, whom
the Stoics claimed as a precursor, possessed an earlier doctrine of
conflagration, though it is not to be assumed that his generation and
decay of the cosmos was measured by the planetary circuits, for its
movement, to him, is a pathway up and down rather than circular (Diog.
Laert., 9. 6). As reported by Philo, the only Stoics to have rejected
the eternal recurrence include Boethus of Sidon, Panaetius, and a
mature Diogenes of Babylon (De aeternitate mundi, 76-7).
Astrological configurations were specified as part of the
Stoic-Babylonian theory of eternal recurrence. According to Nemesius,
The Stoics say that when the planets return to the same celestial
sign [sêmeion], in length and breadth [mêkos kai platos], where each
was originally when the world was first formed, at the set periods of
time they cause conflagration and destruction of existing things. Once
again the world returns anew to the same condition as before; and when
the stars are moving again in the same way, each thing that occurred
in the previous period will come to pass indiscernibly. (SVF, 2.625,
tr. Long and Sedley, Hellenistic Philosophers V. 1, p. 309).
The word sêmeion used by Nemesius could represent any celestial
indicator, though the typical word for "sign of the zodiac" was
zôidion. The celestial position of "length and breath" (latitude and
longitude) is more specifically identified by second century C.E.
astrologer Antiochus as the last degree of the zodiac sign of Cancer
or the first degree of Leo. A variation of this theory of
apokatastasis includes anantapokatastatis, which is an additional
destruction by water which occurs when the planets align in the
opposing sign, Capricorn. Such destruction by a Great Flood during
this alignment was also attributed to Berossus by Seneca. Fourth
century astrologer turned Christian, Firmicus Maternus,
associatedapokatastasis with the Thema Mundi (or Genesis Cosmos),
which is a "birth chart" for the world consisting of each planet in
the 15th degree of its own sign. For the sake of consistency with the
Stoic eternal cosmos, Firmicus claimed this chart does not indicate
that the world had any original birth in the sense of creation,
particularly one that could be conceived of by human reason or
empirical observation. The Great Year contains all possible
configurations and events. Because it exceeds the span of human
records of observation, there is no way of determining the birth of
the world. He claimed that the schema had been invented by the
Hermetic astrologers to serve as an instructional tool often employed
as allegory (Mathesis, 3.1). A more common Genesis Cosmos mentioned in
astrological texts is a configuration of all planets in their own
signs and degrees of exaltation hupsoma), special regions that had
been established in Babylonian astrology.
iii. Divination and Cosmic Sympathy
The eternal recurrence doctrine in Stoicism entails justification of
divination and belief in the predictability of events. The Sun, Moon
and planets, as gods, possess the pur technikon and are not destroyed
in theekpurôsis (SVF, 1.120). While their physical substance is
destroyed, they maintain an existence as thoughts in the mind of Zeus.
Because the gods are indestructible, they maintain memory of events
that take place within a Great Year and know everything that will
happen in the following cycles (SVF, 2.625). Divination, for Stoicism,
is therefore possible, and even a divine gift. Stoics who accepted
divination include Chrysippus, Diogenes of Babylon, and Antipater
(SVF, 2.1192). The presupposition that divination is a legitimate
science was also used by Chrysippus as an argument in favor of fate.
Cicero, however, argued for the incompatibility of divination and
Stoicism (De fato, 11-14), particularly the incompatibility between
Chryssipus' modal logical (which allows for non-necessary future
truths) and the necessary future claimed by divination's power of
prediction. These non-necessary future truths include all things that
happen "according to us" (eph' hêmin). The example argument presented
by Cicero, "If someone is born at the rising of the Dogstar, he will
not die at sea," would not, by his account, fall under the category of
non-necessary truths since the antecedent truth is necessary (as a
past true condition). Therefore the conclusion would also be necessary
according to Chrysippus' logic. Cicero mentions Chrysippus' defense
against charges of such contradictions, but regardless of the success
or failure of Chysippus' defense against them, the issue for the
possibility of divination, for the Stoics, was not considered a
logical contradiction between fate and free will. The eph hêmin in
Stoicism was based on a disposition of character that, while not a
causal necessity, would lead one to make decisions between the good,
bad, and indifferent in accordance with nature. Because human beings
are by nature the rational seeds (logoi spermatikoi) of the Godhead,
their choices will correspond to the cosmic fate inherent in the
eternal recurrence, and would not alter that which is divined. For
Chrysippus, at least, the laws of divination are accepted as
empirically factual (or proto-science) and not as a matter of
logicalconnectivity between past, present, and future. Since
divination occurs as a matter of revelation thoughsigns, the idea that
there can be knowledge of a necessary causal antecedent leading to a
future effect is not the principle behind it (cf. Bobzein, p.
161-170). The Stoic argument for divination through signs would be as
follows: if there are gods, they must both be aware of future events
and must love human beings while holding only good intentions toward
them. Because of their care for human beings, signs are then given by
the gods for potential knowledge of future events. These events are
known by the gods, though not alterable by them. If signs are given,
then the proper means to interpret them must also be given. If they
are not interpreted correctly, the fault does not lie with the gods or
with divination itself, but with an error of judgment on the part of
the interpreter (Cicero, De divinatione, 1.82-3; 1.117-18).
Another theory in support of divination and by extension astral
divination, is that of cosmic sympathy. Cosmic sympathy was already
prevalent in Hipparchean medical theory, though Posidonius is credited
for its development in the Stoic school. Posidonius, though, claimed
to have drawn this notion from Democritus, Xenophanes, Pythagoras and
Socrates. Stoic physical theory holds that all things in the universe
are connected and held together in their interactions through tension.
The active and passive principles move pneuma, the substance that
penetrates and unifies all things. In fact, this tension holds bodies
together, and every coherent thing would collapse without it. Pneuma
as the commanding substance of the soul penetrates the cosmos. This
cosmos, for the Stoics, is both a rational and sensate living being
(Diog. Laert., 7.143). The Stoics thought that the cosmos is ensouled
and has impulses or desires (hormai). Whereas in Platonism these
impulses are conflicting and need the rational part of the soul to
govern them, in Stoicism desires of the cosmic soul are harmoniously
drawn toward a rational (though not entirely accessible to human
beings) end, which is Logos, or Zeus' return to himself through the
cosmic cycle of apokatastasis. So the idea of cosmic sympathy supports
divination, because knowledge of one part of the cosmos (such as a
sign) is, by way of the cohesive substance of pneuma, access to the
whole. In contrast to Plato's disparaging view of divination that it
is not divinely inspired but based on the artless fumbling of human
error, the Stoic view, for the most part, is that rational means of
divination can be developed. The push to develop a scientific (meaning
systematic and empirical) knowledge-based divination finds its natural
progression in mathematically based astrology.
Stoic-influenced astrologers went a step further than Stoic
philosophers to define innate potentials of character by assigning
them to the zodiac and planets. Virtuous and corrupt characteristics
are identified as determined by the potential of the natal chart,
while external circumstances are indicated by the combination of this
chart with transits of planets through time and certain periods of
life set in motion by the configurations in the natal chart. For
instance, in his list of personality characteristics for individuals
born with certain zodiac signs on the horizon, Teukros of Babylon
(near Cairo) includes character traits that are not morally neutral.
For example, those born when the first decan of Libra is ascending are
"virtuous" (enaretous), while those born when the third decan of
Scorpio is ascending "do many wrongs" or are "law-breakers" (pollous
adikountas).
iv. The Attitude of Stoic Philosophers Towards Astrology
While it is clear that Stoic philosophy influenced the development of
astrology, the attitude of the Stoa towards astrology, however, varied
on the basis of the individual philosophers. Cicero stated that
Diogenes of Babylon believed astrologers are capable of predicting
disposition and praxis (one's life activity), but not much else.
Diogenes, though, is said to have calculated a "Great Year" in his
earlier years (Aetius, De placitis reliquiae, 364.7-10). His turn to
skepticism changed his view on Stoic ekpurosisand likely modified his
view on astrology. Middle Stoic Panaetius is said to have rejected
astrology altogether. That an astrological example is used by Cicero
to illustrate a contradiction in Chrysippus' logic and divination does
not necessarily mean that Chrysippus himself had much exposure to or
took an interest in astrology. (Cicero's example is, "If someone is
born at the rising of the Dogstar, he will not die at sea." Si quis
(verbi causa) oriente Canicula natus est, is in mari non morietur. De
fato, 12). In Chrysippus' time, Hellenistic astrology had not yet been
formulated systematically. However, given that the example is based on
a consideration of importance to Babylonian astrology, the rising of
the fixed star Sirius, the possibility exists that Chrysippus or one
of his contemporaries discussed astrology in the context of logic and
divination.
Posidonius was alleged by Augustine to have been "much given to
astrology" (multum astrologiae deditus) and "an assertor fatal
influence of the stars" (De civitate dei 5.2). His actual relationship
to astrology, however, is more complicated, but there are several
reasons to think that he supported astrology. For one, in his belief
that the world is a living animal, he followed Chrysippus in
identifying the commanding faculty of the world soul as the heavens
(Diog. Laert., 7.138-9. Cleanthes considered it to be the Sun).
Secondly, Posidonius had a strong research interest in astronomy and
meteorology. He was the first to systematically research the
connection between ocean tides and the phases of the Moon. His
research in this area possibly led him to his doctrine of cosmic
sympathy, as he considered natural affinities among things of the
earth. Cosmic sympathy allows for an association between signs (within
nature that can extend to planets and stars) and future events without
direct causality. If the higher faculty of the cosmos is located in
the heavens, then it is more likely that these signs would carry
weight for Posidonius. Thirdly, Cicero, who can be given more
credibility than Augustine by having attended Posidonius' lectures,
mentions him in connection with astrology in De divinatione (1.130).
Fourthly, Posidonius (as a Platonic-influenced thinker) believed idea
that the signs of the zodiac (zôdia) are ensouled bodies – living
beings (Fr. 149, Edelstein-Kidd / Fr. 400a, Theiler). However, given
that Posidonius is flourishing at the same time as the earliest
textual evidence for Hellenistic astrology (first century B.C.E.; some
"technical" Hermetic fragments about Solar and Lunar observations may
be earlier), it is difficult to say what type of astrology he would
have had an interest in – whether it had been remnants of the
Babylonian omen-based astrology, or the beginning formulation of a
systematic Greco-Roman astrology. Because he was widely traveled, he
may have gained exposure to one or more astrologers or schools of
astrologers. With his observations of the connection between seasonal
fluctuations of the tides and the Solar/Lunar cycles, he apparently
refuted Seleucus, a Babylonian astronomer who believed that the tides
also fluctuation according to the zodiac sign in which the Moon would
fall; he claimed the tides were regular when the Moon would be in the
equinoctial signs of Aries or Libra and irregular in the solstitial
signs of Capricorn, Cancer (Fr. 218, Edelstein-Kidd / Fr. 26,
Theiler). This observation would not have necessarily been considered
an astrological one, though it is schematized according to
characteristics of the zodiac rather than lunations and seasons, and
such schematizations were quite common in Hellenistic astrology. It
cannot be said with certainty whether Posidonius' advocacy of cosmic
sympathy lent support to the development of astrology or if this
development itself reinforced Posidonius' own theories of cosmic
sympathy and fate.
The importance of astrology in politics of first century Rome was
aided by its alignment with Stoic fatalism and cosmic sympathy.
Balbillus, son of Thrasyllus and astrologer to Nero, Seneca, and a
certain Alexandrian Stoic, Chaeremon, were all appointed tutors to L.
Domitius. Chaeremon (who Cramer, p. 116, identifies with the Egyptian
priest/astrology in Porphyry's Letter to Anebo and in
Eusebius'Praeparatio evang., 4.1) wrote a work on comets (peri komêtôn
suggramma) that cast these typically foreboding signs in a favorable
light. Seneca, too, wrote a work on comets (Book 7 of Quaestiones
naturales), in which he portrays some as good omens for the Empire
(cf. Cramer, p. 116-118).
c. Middle Platonic and Neopythagorean Developments
So far in this account of the theoretical development of Hellenistic
astrology, the pre-Socratic thinkers contributed a deep concern for
fate and justice. Plato contributed an orderly and rational cosmos,
while those in the early Academy displayed an astral piety that
recognized the planets as gods or representations of gods. The Stoics
contributed theories of fate and divination, that already had an
astrological component with the Babylonian contribution to the Eternal
Recurrence. Cosmic sympathy, present in Greek medicine and popularized
by the middle Stoic Posidonius, provided astrologers with a
theoretical grounding for the associations among planets, zodiac
signs, and all other things. One notable Stoic contribution to
Hellenistic astrology which distinguishes it from the Babylonian is
the incorporation of Chryssipus' principle of two forces, active and
passive, manifest in the activities of the four elements. Fire and air
were active, earth and water passive. The astrologers later assigned
these elements and dynamic qualities to each sign of the zodiac.
Further philosophical developments by the Middle Platonists and the
Neopythagoreans would then lead to astrology as a system of knowledge
due to its systematic and mathematical nature. The systematic nature
would make it plausible to some and a worthy or dangerous foe to
others. These developments set astrology apart, epistemologically
speaking, from other manners of divination such as haruspicy (study of
the liver of animals), or dream interpretation.
The union between Pythagorean theory and Platonism should come as no
surprise given Plato's late interest in Pythagoreanism. From the early
academy onward, elements of Pythagorean theory became part and parcel
of Platonism. Speusippus wrote a work on Pythagorean numbers (Fr. 4),
and he would become influential in this regard, if not as directly on
subsequent Academy members as on Neopythagorean circles. He and
Xenocrates both offered cosmic hierarchies formed from the One and the
Dyad. The One, or Monad, is a principle of order and unity, while the
Dyad is the principle of change, motion, and division. The manner in
which these principles are related was a critical issue inherited from
the early Academy. Xenocrates (Fr. 15) believed that stars are fiery
Olympian Gods and in the existence of sublunary daimons and elemental
spirits. We see in Xenocrates both the identification of Gods with
stars (as we saw in Phillip of Opus) and the notion that Gods are
forces of Nature, thereby creating an important theoretical issue for
astrology, namely what is the domain of influence of the planetary
gods, as the Olympians are identified with the planets. He also
believed that the world soul is formed from Monad and Dyad, and that
it served as a boundary between the supralunary and sublunary places.
Xenocrates' cosmology would be highly influential on Plutarch, who
elaborated on the roles of the world soul, the daimons, the planets
and fixed stars.
The middle Platonists, many of whom believed themselves to be true
expounders of Plato, were influenced by other schools of thought. The
physical theories of Antiochus of Ascalon are very Stoic in nature.
For example, he incorporated the Stoic "qualities" (poiotêtes), which
were moving vibrations that act upon infinitely divisible matter, into
his cosmology. The unity of things is held together by the world soul
(much as it is held together in Stoic theory by pneuma). Antiochus
equated the Stoic Logos/Zeus with the Platonic World Soul, and this
soul of the cosmos governs both the heavenly bodies and things on
earth that affect humankind. He also accepted the Stoic Pur Tekhnikon
(Creative Fire) as the substance composing the stars, gods, and
everything else. There is little to indicate that Antiochus held in
his cosmology the notion common to some other Platonists of
transcendent immateriality; his universe, like the Stoics, is
material. On the subject of fate and free will, he argues against
Chrysippus (if he is in fact the philosopher identified as doing so in
Cicero's De fato and Topica) by accepting the reality of free will
rather than the illusion of free will created simply by the
limitations of human knowledge in grasping fated future events.
Antiochus' view on other beings in the cosmos, particularly the
ontological status of stars and planets, may be found in his Roman
student Varro who stated that the heavens, populated by souls (the
immortal occupying aether and air), are divided by elements in this
order from top to bottom: aether, air, water, earth.
From the highest circle of heaven to the circle of the Moon are
aetherial souls, the stars and planets, and these are not only known
by our intelligence to exist, but are also visible to our eyes as
heavenly gods." (from Natural Theology, tr. Dillon, Middle Platonists,
p. 90).
Daimons and heroes, then, were thought to occupy the aerial sphere.
The importance of Antiochus for the development of Hellenistic
astrology may be his break with the skepticism of the New Academy, one
which allowed the Middle Platonists to espouse more theological and
speculative views about the soul and the cosmos while anticipating
Neoplatonic theories. In Alexandria, which, not by coincidence would
become a hotbed for astrological theory and practice, Platonism
incorporated strong Neopythagorean elements. Eudorus of Alexandria,
who wrote a commentary on Plato's Timaeus, contributed to the
importance of Timaean cosmology in middle and Neoplatonic thought.
References to Eudorus' are found in Achilles' work, Introduction to
Aratus' Phenemona. Achille used Eudorus as a source for this work that
also contains references to Pythagorean theories of planetary
harmonies. We know from Achilles that Eudorus followed the Platonic
and Stoic belief that the stars are ensouled living beings (Isagoga,
13). This intellectual climate is likely the immediate context for the
development of systematic astrology – with its complex classifications
of the signs, planets, and their placements in a horoscope, and the
numerological calculations used for predicting all sorts of events in
one's life.
i. Ocellus Lucanus
The revival of Pythagoreanism by the mid-first century B.C.E. brought
about the acceptance of pythagorica of "Timaeus of Locri" and Ocellus
Lucanus as genuinely "early" Pre-Platonic Pythagorean texts, though
both mostly like date around the second century B.C.E., or at latest,
the first half of the first century B.C.E. The Neopythagorean texts
just mentioned are significant for the development of Hellenistic
astrology. They represent cosmological theories that likely were used
as justification for astrology.
In On the Nature of the Universe (peri tês tou pantos phuseôs),
Ocellus argues for a perfectly ordered harmonious universe that is
immutable and unbegotten. By appealing to the empirical rationale that
we cannot perceive the universe coming to be and passing away, but
only its self-identity, he concludes the eternity of the whole,
including its part. This whole though is divided into two worlds, the
supralunary and the sublunary. The heavens down to the Moon comprise a
world of unchanging harmony that governs the sublunary realm of all
changing and corruptible activity. In Platonic manner, the unchanging
(the Monad) governs and generates the changing (the Dyad). In
Pythagorean manner, the divine beings in the unchanging realm are in
perfect harmony with one another through their regular motions.
Visible signs for the unchanging harmony and self-subsistence of the
universe are found in the harmonious movements of things in relation
to one another. Based on the nature of the relations listed – "order,
symmetry, figurations (skhêmatismoi), positions (theseis), intervals
(diastaseis), powers, swiftness and slowness with respect to others,
their numbers and temporal periods" (1.6) – he clearly means the
movements of planets and stars. This list comprises the primary
factors by which astrologers would assess the strength and qualities
of planets in a given horoscope as the basis for the formulation of
predictive techniques and statements. For instance, swiftness of
planets was thought to make them stronger while slowness (which occurs
close to the retrogradation motion) weakens the planet, while
"figurations" (skhêmatismoi) is a word used for aspects, or the
geometrical figures planets make to one another and the ascending sign
(horoskopos). Temporal periods were assigned by astrologers in a
variety of ways, though usually based on the "lesser years" of the
planets, the time it took for one planet to complete its revolution
with respect to a starting point in the zodiac. "Intervals"
(diastaseis) were measures that were calculated either between planets
or between planets and the horizon or culminating points in a
horoscope; in the case of the latter, the intervals were used in
astrology to determine strong and weak areas in the horoscope. The
former notion of intervals was used for determining various time
periods of one's life assigned to each planet (cf. Valens,
Anthologiarum, 3.3). "Numbers" was a term used to indicate a planet's
motion (as appearing from earth) as direct or retrograde. "Powers"
(dunameis) of the planets are combinations of heating, cooling,
drying, moistening – these powers made planets benevolent or
malevolent (cf. Ptolemy, Tetrabiblos, 1.4). Ocellus goes on to name
these powers as hot, cold, wet, and dry, and he contrasts them with
the "substances" (ousiai) or elements of fire, earth, water and air.
The powers and substances, or "qualities" and "elements" as they are
more commonly called, were used in horoscopic astrology to describe
the natures of the planets and zodiac signs. In Ocellus' explanation
of astral causality, the powers are immortal forms that affect changes
on the sublunary substances (2.4-5).
Whether or not Ocellus and other Neopythagoreans are at the forefront
of formulating these particular astrological rules, he provides a
metaphysical basis for the notion that the planets and stars effect
changes on earth. He is further described as saying that the Moon is
the locus where immortality (above) and mortality (below) meet. He
also says the obliquity of the zodiac, the pathway of the Sun, is the
inclining place at which the supralunary generates activity in the
sublunary realm. The Sun's seasonal motion conforms to the powers
(hot, cold, wet, and dry) that bring about changes in the substances
(elements); the ecliptic path inclines these powers into the realm of
strife and nature.
In his discussion on the generation of men, Ocellus argues, in more of
an Aristotelian than Platonic sense (as found in On Generation and
Corruption, that the only participation of men in immortality is
through the gift by divinities of the power of reproduction. Following
rules of morality in connubial relations results in living in harmony
with the universe. Immoral transgressions, though, are punished by the
production of ignoble offspring. A manner of cosmic sympathy (as found
in Greek medicine) plays a role in determining that the circumstances
of conception (such as a tranquil state of mind) will reflect upon the
nature of the offspring. This notion is in keeping with the fact that
astrologers studied charts not only for the moment of birth, but for
conception as well. The only major difference is that for the
astrologers, the circumstances of the birth appear to be reflected
universally at a given time and not the direct result of moral or
immoral actions as it is for Ocellus. The moment of birth or
conception for the astrologers is reflected in all things of nature
and in any activities initiated at that particular moment, as
reflected in the positions of the planets and signs. The technical
astrologers typically did not include reflections on moral
retributions in their manuals of astral fate. They were primarily
concerned with detailing knowledge of fate for its own sake, though
speculation about such matters as retribution and rebirth is not
excluded by astrological theory.
ii. Timaeus Locrus
The Hellenistic text attributed to Timaeus Locrus, On the Nature of
the World and the Soul, purports to be the original upon which Plato
drew for his dialogue of his name. For the most part, it consists of a
summary of the material by Plato. The circles of the Same and the
Different carry the fixed stars and the planets respectively. The
sphere of the fixed stars containing the cosmos is granted the
Pythagorean perfect figure of the dodecahedron. One addition of note
for the theory of astrology is the doctrine of the creation of souls.
The four elements are made by the demiurge in equal measure and power,
and Soul of man is made in the same proportion and power. Individual
souls of human beings are fashioned by Nature (who has been handed the
task by the demiurge of creating mortal beings) from the Sun, Moon,
and planets, from the circle of Difference with a measure of the
circle of the Same that she (Nature being hypostasized as the female
principle) mixes in the rational part of the soul. There appears in
this to be a difference in individual souls reflecting different fates
based on the composition. While this merely reiterates what is found
in Plato's Timaeus (42d-e), the supposition that one could read this
account straight from Timaeus Locrus gave authority to these notions.
It is likely that these ideas filtered to the astrologers, who would
devise methods for seeking out the ruling planet (oikodespotês) for an
individual (see section on Porphyry). Perhaps what they were seeking
in the horoscope was one of the "young gods" whose task it was to
fashion the mortal body of each soul and to steer their course away
from evils. As mentioned above, some philosophers associated the young
gods with the planets.
Astrological fragments of a writer "Timaeus Praxidas" date to the same
period (early to middle first century B.C.E.), but there is little
textual evidence to indicate that these are one and the same writer.
What it at least indicates is that the legend of Timaeus lent
authority to the astrological writers.
iii. Thrasyllus
Thrasyllus (d. 36 C.E.), a native of Alexandria, was not only the
court astrologer to Tiberius, but a grammarian and self-professed
Pythagorean who studied in Rhodes. Given that he published an edition
of Plato's works (and is known for the arrangement of the dialogues
into tetralogies), and that he wrote a work on Platonic and
Pythagorean philosophy, we can assume that his astrological theory
represents Middle Platonism of the early first century C.E. However, a
summary of his astrological work "Pinax" (tables), indicates that he
is drawing upon earlier sources, particularly the pseudepigrapha of
"Nechepso and Petosiris" and Hermes Trismegistus. A numerological
table, perhaps containing zodiac associations to numbers as that found
in Teukros of Babylon, is also attributed to Thrasyllus. It appears
that his own philosophy contains a mixture of Hermetic and Pythagorean
elements.
A search for exact origins of astrology's development into a complex
system remains inconclusive, but the following can be surmised. The
combination of Pythagorean theory, such as the supralunary realm
influencing the sublunar, Platonic ensouled planets moving on the
circle of the Different, Stoic determinism and cosmic sympathy, and
the emergence of a Hermetic tradition, comprised the intellectual
context for the systematic structuring of astrology, its
classifications of the signs, planets, and their placements in a
horoscope, and the numerological calculations used for predicting all
sorts of events in one's life.
iv. Plutarch
Besides being a prolific writer on a variety of subjects, Plutarch
was, philosophically speaking, a Platonist, as defined by his era,
that is, one influenced by Aristotelian, Stoic, and Neopythagorean
notions. In Plutarch's case this includes ideas culled from his study
of Persian and Egyptian traditions. By his time (late first century
C.E.), astrology had been systematized and appropriated by Greek
language and thinking, and in Rome, the political implications of
astrological theory were made evident in the relationships between
astrologers and emperors (such as Thrasyllus and his son Balbillus)
and in the edicts against predictions about emperors (cf. Cramer, 99
ff). Plutarch's own form of Platonism did not then directly contribute
to the technical development of astrology, but it does add a Middle
Platonic contribution to an explanation of how astrology gained some
credibility and much popularity in the first three centuries of the
common era. He also borrowed some astrological concepts (and
metaphors) for his own philosophy. First of all, as a priest of
Apollo, Plutarch saw all other deities as symbolic aspects of One God
that is invisible and unintelligible. He gained impetus for this from
an etymology of "Apollo," which is explained as an alpha-privative
a-pollos, or "not many" (De E apud Delphos, 393b). He resists a pure
identification of the Sun with Apollo (De pythiae oraculis 400c-d),
because the One God is Invisible, and the Sun an intelligible copy. He
likens the Sun to one aspect, that of the Nous, the heart of the
cosmos. The Moon is then associated with the cosmic Soul (and spleen),
and the earth with the bowels. Taking cue from Plato's suggestion in
the Laws (10.896 ff) of two world souls, beneficent and malevolent (a
concept Numenius would take up later), he believed the malevolent soul
to be responsible for irrational motion in the sublunary world. The
malevolent or irrational soul preexisted the demiurge's creation. It
is not pure evil, but the cause of evil operating in the sublunary
realm, mixing with the good to create cosmic tension. Plutarch
maintains the distinction of Ocellus between the generating
supralunary realm and the generated sublunary realm, but he offers
more detail about operations in the sublunary world of change. He
posits two opposing principles or powers of good and evil that offer a
right-handed straight path and a reversed, backwards path for souls
(De Isis., 369e). Individual souls are microcosms of a world soul
(based on Timaeus, 30b), and the parts of the soul reflect this cosmic
tension. Souls are subject in the sublunary realm to a mixture of fate
(heimarmenê), chance (tukhê), and free choice (eph' hêmin). The "young
gods", the planetary gods in the Timaeus (42d-e) that steer souls,
Plutarch designates as the province of the irrational soul. With the
emphasis of the irrational soul and the mixture of forces in the
sublunary realm, Plutarch's cosmology allows for the possibility of
astrology. Plutarch also posits four principles (arkhê) in the cosmos,
Life, Motion, Generation and Decay (De genio Socratis, 591b). Life is
linked to Motion through the activity of the Invisible, through the
Monad; Motion is linked to Generation through the Mind (Nous); and
Generation is linked to Decay through the Soul. The three Fates
(Moirai) are also linked to this cycle as Clotho seated in the Sun
presided over the first process, Atropo, seated in the Moon, over the
second, and Lachesis over the third on Earth (cf. De facie in orbe
lunae, 945c-d). At death the soul of a person leaves the body and goes
to Moon, the mind leaves the soul and goes to Sun. The reverse process
happens at birth. Plutarch is not rigid with his use of planetary
symbolism, for in another place, he associates the Sun with the
demiurge, and the young gods with the Moon, emphasizing the rational
and irrational souls (De E apud Delphos, 393a).
Plutarch's own opinion about astrology as a practice of prediction is
ambiguous at best. He supported the probability of divination by human
beings, although dimmed by the interference of the body, as evident in
his arguments for it in On the E at Delphi (387) and in De defectu
oraculorum (431e ff). However, he complains about generals who rely
more heavily on divination than on counselors experienced in military
affairs (Marius, 42.8). In his accounts of astrologers, his attitude
appears to be more skeptical. InRomulus (12), he discusses the claims
made by an astrologer named Taroutios, namely, of discovering the
exact birth date and hour of Romulus as well as the time in which he
lay the first stone of his city, by working backwards from his
character to his birth chart. Plutarch considered astrologers' claims
that cities are subject to fate accessible by a chart cast for the
beginning of their foundation to be extravagant. He also wrote about
how Sulla, having consulted Chaldaeans, was able to foretell his own
death in his memoirs (Sulla, 37.1). However, Plutarch finds himself at
a loss at explaining why Marius would be successful in his reliance on
divination while Octavius was not so fortunate accepting the forecasts
of Chaldaeans.
4. The Astrologers
a. The Earliest Hellenistic Astrology: Horoscopic and Katarchic
Cicero's account in On Divination of Eudoxus' rejection of Chaldaean
astrological predictions points to Greek awareness of Babylonian
astrology as early as the third century B.C.E. Another account about
Theophrastus' awareness of Chaldaean horoscopic astrology (predicting
for individuals rather than weather and general events) is given to us
by Proclus (In Platonis Timaeum commentaria, 3.151). Technical manuals
by Greek-speaking astrologers used for casting and interpreting
horoscopic (natal) charts date as early as the late second century
B.C.E. In addition to natal astrology, many of the fragments exemplify
the practice of katarchical astrology, or the selection of the most
auspicious moment for a given activity. Katarkhê was also used to
ascertain events that had already happened, to view the course of an
illness, or track down thieves, lost objects, and runaway slaves.
Fragments attributed to Thrasyllus, the philosopher-astrology include
such methods. This use of astrology implies that the astrologers
themselves did not prescribe to strict fatalism, at least the kind
that dictates that knowledge from signs of the heavens cannot
influence events. Perhaps like Plutarch, they believed in a
combination of fate, chance, and free will. Given the pervasiveness of
cosmic sympathy and a unified cosmic order, astrology pertaining to
proper moments of time and to natural occurrences was less
controversial than that pertaining to the soul of human beings.
However, the texts of the next few centuries focus primarily on natal
rather than katarchic astrology. Methods to ascertain controversial
matters such as one's length of life would proliferate and play a
significant part in Roman politics (cf. Cramer, p. 58 ff). Such
fascination with either the fate or predisposition of individuals
reflects a stronger concern in the late Hellenistic world for the life
of the individual in a period of rapid political and social change.
b. Earliest Fragments and Texts
The earliest Hermetic writings, the technical Hermetica (dated second
century B.C.E. and contrasted with philosophical Hermetica cf. Fowden,
p. 58) include works on astrology. As mentioned by Clement, (Stromata,
6.4.35-7), they include: on the ordering of the fixed stars, on the
Sun, Moon and five planets, on the conjunctions and phases of the Sun
and Moon, and on the times when the stars rise. These topics in the
early Hermetica do not reflect much technical sophistication in
comparison to the complicated techniques of prediction that we find in
the katarchic and natal astrology texts of other astrological writers.
The astronomical measurements that appear to be used for these topics
are most likely for the purpose of katarchic astrology and ritual
because they do not contain the apparatus for casting natal charts. An
exception to the technical sparsity of astrology considered to be in
the lineage of Hermes Trismegistus are the works attributed to
Nechepso and Petosiris (typically dated around 150 B.C.E.), portions
of which survive in quotations. Combined, they are considered a major
source for many later astrologers, and are said by Firmicus Maternus
to be in line with the Hermetic tradition, handed down by way of other
Hermetic figures such as Aesclepius and Anubio, from Hermes himself.
It is impossible to say to what extent the writers of these texts had
organized existing techniques or invented new ones, but based on the
frequency with which Nechepso and Petosiris are quoted by later
authors, we can be certain that they were important conveyers of
technical Hellenistic astrology. More about the astral theories in the
later philosophical Hermeticism and Gnosticism will be discussed
below.
Additional fragments are preserved of real and pseudepigraphical
astrologers of the first centuries B.C.E and C.E. including
Critodemus, Dorotheus of Sidon, Teukros of Babylon, (pseudo-)Eudoxus,
Serapion, Orpheus, Timaeus Praxidas, Anubion, (pseudo-)Erasistratus,
Thrasyllus, and Manilius. Only a few representative writers will be
highlighted below.
c. Manilius
For most of the early astrological writers, we can only speculate
about their theoretical justification for the practice, two exceptions
being first century B.C.E. Roman Stoic Manilius, (from whom we have
the Latin didactic poem, Astronomica), and Thrasyllus, whose work is
described above. Manilius was also associated with the Roman imperial
circle, dedicating his work to either Augustus or Tiberius (see
Cramer, p. 96, for more on this controversy). While his poetic account
of astrology contains much technical material, there is little
evidence to show that he himself practiced astrological prediction.
Some scholars speculated that he intended to avoid the political
dangers of the practice in his day with the poetic writing style and
the exclusion of astrological doctrine about the planets, which is
necessary for the practice (or his work could simply be incomplete).
His Stoic philosophy is one in which Fate is immutable, and astrology
is a means of understanding the cosmic and natural order of all
things, but not of changing events. However fated we are, he says, is
no excuse for bad behavior such as crime, for crime is still wicked
and punishable no matter what its origin in the sequence of causal
determinism (4.110-117). He used the regularity of the rising of the
fixed stars and the courses of the Sun and Moon as proof against the
Epicureans that nothing is left to chance and that the universe is
commanded by a divine will (1.483-531). Nature apportions to the stars
the responsibility over the destinies of individuals (3.47-58). Nature
is not thought to be separate from reason, but is the agent of Fate –
one orchestrated by a material god for reasons not readily accessible
to the mortals who experience apparent injustices and turns of events
that defy normal expectations (4.69-86). The purpose of the deity is
simply to maintain order and harmony in its cosmos (1.250-254).
Astrology demonstrates cosmic sympathy among all things and can be
used to predict events insofar as it grants access to the predestined
order. In addition to the use of astrology for psychological
acceptance of one's fate, Manilius emphasizes the aesthetic and
religious benefits of its study, for he considers it a gift to mortals
from the god Hermes for the sake of inducing reverence and piety of
the cosmic deity.
d. Claudius Ptolemy of Alexandria
Astrology had increased in popularity in the second century C.E., and
two writers of this period operating under different philosophical
influences, Ptolemy (c. 100-170 C.E.) and Vettius Valens (fl. 152-162
C.E.), will next be discussed. Ptolemy is an exception among the
astrological authors because first and foremost he is an empirical
scientist, and one who, like his philosophical and scientific
contemporaries, is concerned with theories of knowledge. His works
include those on astronomy, epistemology, music, geography, optics,
and astrology. He is best known as an astronomer for his work Syntaxis
mathematica (Almagest), but from the middle ages to present day, his
astrological work,Apotelesmatica (or Tetrabiblos as it is more
commonly known), has been considered the key representative of Greek
astrology, primarily due to its prominence in textual transmission.
Scholars have claimed Ptolemy's main philosophical influences to be
either Peripatetic, Middle Stoic (Posidonius), Middle Platonist
(Albinus) or Skeptic (sharing a possible connection with Sextus
Empiricus). Any attempts to tie him to a single school would be
futile. His eclecticism, though, is by no means an arbitrary amalgam
of different schools, but a search for agreements (rather than
disagreements sought by the Pyrrhonian Skeptics) and a scientist's
harmony of rationalism and empiricism (cf. Long in Dillon & Long, p.
206-207). His epistemological criteria (in On the Criterion shows only
superficial differences with the Skeptics, while he often employs
Stoic terminology (such as katalêpsis) without the Stoic technical
meanings. He extends the Stoic notion of oikeiôsis (as the manner of
familiarity that a Stoic Sage achieves with the cosmos) to the
relations of familiarity that planets and zodiac signs share among
themselves.
Because Ptolemy deviates significantly from other astrologers in
theory and technique, some have doubted that he was a practicing
astrologer at all. It is difficult to support this claim when in
theTetrabiblos he makes a long argument in favor of astrology and he
claims to have better methods than offered by the tradition. It seems
best to call him a "revisionist" rather than a "non-astrologer." His
revisions and causal language make his position vulnerable to later
attacks by Plotinus and other philosophers. The methods Ptolemy
rejects include material that can be traced to the Hermetic
Nechepso/Petosiris text, particularly the use of Lots (klêroi) and the
division of the chart into twelve places (topoi) responsible for
topics in life such as siblings, illness, travel, etc. Lots were
points in the chart typically calculated from the positions of two
planets and the degree of the ascending sign. He also rejects various
subdivisions of the zodiac and nearly all numerologically based
methods. He considered these methods to be disreputable and arbitrary
because they are removed from the actual observations of planets and
stars. (It might be noted here that he also rejects Pythagorean
musicology on empirical grounds in his work Harmonica).
Ptolemy says, in the beginning of Book I, that the study of the
relations of the planets and stars to one another (astronomy) can be
used for the less perfect art of prediction based on the changes of
the things they "surround" (tôn emperiekhomenon). He notes that the
difficulty of the art of astrological prediction has made critics
believe it to be useless, and he argues in favor of its helpfulness
and usefulness. He blames bad and false practitioners for the failing
of astrology. The rest of the argument involves the natural cosmic
sympathy popularized by Posidonius. The influence of the Sun, Moon,
and stars on natural phenomena, weather and seasons brings the
possibility than men can likewise be affected in temperament due to
this natural ambience (ton periekhon). The surrounding conditions of
the time and place of birth contribute a factor to character and
temperament (as we find earlier in Ocellus). While the supralunary
movements are perfect and destined, the sublunary are imperfect,
changeable, and subject to additional causes. Natural events such as
weather and seasons are less complicated by additional causes than
events in the lives of human beings. Rearing, custom, and culture are
additional accidental causes that contribute to the destiny of an
individual. He seems to encourage critics to allow astrologers to
start their predictions with knowledge of these factors rather than do
what is called a "cold reading" in modern astrology. The criticism he
counters is that of Skeptics such as Sextus Empiricus, who elaborated
on earlier arguments from the New Academy, and who argue that an
astrologer does not know if they are making predictions for a human or
a pack-ass (Adversus mathematicos, 5.94).
Ptolemy's arguments that astrology is useful and beneficial are the
following: 1) One gains knowledge of things human and divine. This is
knowledge for its own sake rather than for the purpose of gains such
as wealth or fame. 2) Foreknowledge calms the soul. This is a basic
argument from Stoic ethics. 3) One can see through this study that
there are other causes than divine necessity. Bodies in the heavens
are destined and regular, but on earth are changeable in spite of
receiving "first causes" from above. This corresponds again to the
Neopythagorean Platonism found in Ocellus. These first causes can
override secondary causes and can subsume the fate of an individual in
the cases of natural disasters. Ptolemy's attribution of the nature of
planets and stars, which is the basis of their benefic or malefic
nature, is that, like Ocellus before him, of heating, drying,
moistening, and cooling. The stars in each sign have these qualities
too based on their familiarity (oikeiôsis) with the planets.
Geometrical aspects between signs, which are the basis of planetary
relations, are also based on "familiarity" determined by music theory
and the masculine or feminine assignment to the signs. He considers
the sextile and trine aspects to be harmonious, and the quadrangle and
opposition to be disharmonious.
Book 2 of Tetrabiblos includes material on astrological significations
for weather, ethnology and astro-chorography. Ptolemy is not the first
to delineate an astrological chorography (geographical regions
assigned to signs of the zodiac), and his assignments differ
significantly from those found in Dorotheus, Teukros, Manilius, and
Paulus Alexandrinus. Book 3 and 4 consist of methods of prediction of
various topics in natal astrology. Absent in his work is the
katarchical astrology found in earlier writers. Ptolemy is the first
astrologer to employ Hipparchus' zodiac modified to account for the
"precession of the equinox," that is, the changing seasonal reference
point against the background of the stars. This zodiac uses the vernal
equinox as the beginning point rather than the beginning of one of the
twelve constellations. (This "tropical" zodiac would become the
standard in the Western practice of astrology up to present day.
Modern opponents of astrology typically utilize precession – pointing
out the fact that zodiac "signs" no longer match with the star
constellations.) Other astrologers, including those shortly following
Ptolemy, were either not aware of Hipparchus' observation or did not
find it important to make this adjustment. Valens claims to use
another method of Hipparchus, but it is debatable whether or not he
adjusted his zodiac to the vernal point. Ptolemy had no impact on
other astrologers of the second century, likely because his texts were
not yet in circulation.
We do not find in Ptolemy's work the language of signs and astral
divination, but a causal language – the relationships between the
planets cause natural activity on earth, from weather to seasons to
human temperament. However, Ptolemy argues for the fallibility of
prediction, and cannot be considered a strict astral determinist for
this reason, though he believed that astrology as a tool of knowledge
could be made more accurate with improved techniques, closing the gap
of fallibility. The idea that stars are causes is not original with
Ptolemy, being an acceptable idea to Peripatetic thinkers cued by
Aristotle's eternal circular motions of the heavens as the cause of
perpetual generation (On Generation and Corruption (336b15 ff). For
Ptolemy, though, this idea as a justification for the practice of
astrology was probably filtered through the Peripatetic influenced
Neopythagoreans such as Ocellus. Ptolemy's arguments may have been the
target of subsequent attacks by Alexander of Aphrodisias, Plotinus and
early Church Fathers.
e. Vettius Valens
The work Anthologiarum of Vettius Valens the Antiochian (written
between 152-162 C.E.) is important for a number of reasons. It
contains fragments of earlier writers such as Nechepso and Critodemus,
and numerous horoscopes important for the study of the history of
astronomy. He is also an astrological writer who best exemplifies the
details of the practice and the mind of the practitioner. Having
traveled widely in search of teachers, he exhibits techniques
unavailable in other astrological texts, indicating much regional
variety. Among his sources, he mentions the following astrologers and
astronomers (in alphabetical order): Abram, Apollinarius, Aristarchus,
Asclation, Asclepius, Critodemus, Euctemon, Hermeias, Hermes,
Hermippus, Hipparchus, Hypsicles, Kidenas, Meton, Nechepso, Petosiris,
Phillip, Orion, Seuthes and Soudines, Thrasyllus, Timaeus, Zoroaster.
Valens claimed to have tested the methods and to have the advantage of
making judgments about the methods through much toil and experience
(cf. 6.9). He occasionally interjects the technical material with
reflections about his philosophical convictions. His philosophical
leaning is far less complicated than Ptolemy's, for it is primarily
based on Stoic ethics. His association of the Sun with Nous (1.1), for
example, exhibits remnants of the Neopythagorean/Middle Platonic roots
(see Plutarch), but his conscious justification for astrology is based
on Stoicism. That which is in our power (eph' hêmin), according to
Stoic ethics, is how we adapt ourselves to fate and live in harmony
with it. Valens argues that we cannot change immutable fate, but we
can control how we play the role we are given (5.9). He quotes
Cleanthes, Euripides, and Homer on Fate (6.9; 7.3), emphasizing that
one must not stray from the appointed course of Destiny. Valens
maintains a sense of "astral piety," treating astrology as a religious
practice, exemplified in the oath of secrecy upon the Sun, Moon,
planets and signs of the zodiac in his introduction to Book 7. He asks
his reader(s) to swear not to reveal the secrets of astrology to the
uneducated or the uninitiated (tois apaideutois ê amuêtois), and to
pay homage to one's initial instructor, otherwise bad things will
befall them. In Book 5.9, he provides a Stoic argument in favor of
prognostication through astrology. He considers the outcomes that Fate
decrees to be immutable, and the goddesses of Hope (Elpis) and Fortune
(Tukhê) acting as helpers of necessity and enslave men with the
desires created by the turns and expectations of fortune. Those
however who engage with prognostication have "calmness of soul"
(atarakhôn), do not care for fortune or hope, are neither afraid of
death nor prone to flattery, and are "soldiers of fate" (stratiôtai
tês heimarmenês). While other places, Valens gives techniques for
katarchical astrology (5.3; 9.6) he states that no amount of ritual or
sacrifice can alter that which is fated in one's birth chart. He also
considers the time of birth to account for dissimilar natures in two
children born of the same parents. In keeping with his religious
approach to astrology, he treats it as "a sacred and venerable
learning as something handed over to men by god so they may share in
immortality." Like Ptolemy, Valens also blames the imperfections of
predictions on the astrologers – particularly the inattentiveness and
superficiality of some of the learners.
Ptolemy and Valens stand as representatives of astrology in the second
century, but their works were not the most prominent. Astrological
concepts were also used in magic, Hermeticism, Gnosticism, Gnostic
Christian sects such as the Ophites, and by the author of the
Chaldaean Oracles. Other known astrologers of the second century
include Antiochus of Athens and Manetho (not to be confused with the
Egyptian historian). One additional astrologer will be treated for his
philosophical position, Firmicus Maternus. Though because he was
influenced by Neoplatonic theories, he will be included below in the
section on Neoplatonism.
5. The Skeptics
Already mentioned is Pliny's acceptance of some methods of astrology
and rejection of others based on numerology. Similarly mentioned was
Ptolemy's rejection of various methods based on subdivisions of the
zodiac and manipulations based on planetary numbers. Both he and
Valens, as astrologers, criticized other practitioners for either
shoddy methods or deliberate deception, posing their forms of
divination as astrology. Valens went so far as to admonish those who
dress up their "Barbaric" teachings in calculations as though they
were Greek, perhaps in reference to the frequently maligned
"Chaldaeans" (Anthologiarum, 2.35). Geminus of Rhodes, an astronomer
of the mid-first century B.C.E., accepts some tenets of astrology,
particularly the influence of aspects "geometrical relations" of
planets, while rejecting others, such as the causal influence of
emanations from fixed stars. Midde Stoic Panaetius is also known to
have rejected astrology, most likely under the influence of his
astronomer friend Scylax, who like other astronomers of the time,
attempted to set the practice of astrology apart from astronomy.
Arguments against astrology can be grouped into one of two categories
(though there are other ways to classify them): ones that deny the
efficacy of astrology or astrologers; and ones that admit that
astrology "works" but question the morality of the practice. Arguments
of the latter type include those that see astrology as a type of
practice of living that assumes a strict fatalism. Some of the
earliest arguments against astrology were launched by the skeptical
New Academy in the second century B.C.E. Arguments against astrology
on moral or ethical grounds would proliferate in Christian theologians
such as Origen of Alexandria and other Church Fathers. Astrology would
become an important issue for Neoplatonists, with some rejecting it
and others embracing it, though not within a context of strict
fatalism.
a. The New Academy (Carneades)
The earliest arguments against the efficacy of astrology have been
traced to the fourth head of the skeptical New Academy, Carneades (c.
213-129 B.C.E.) (cf. Cramer, p. 52-56). As an advocate of free will,
primarily against Stoic determinism, Carneades is likely to have
influenced other philosophers who have argued against astrology. The
arguments by Carneades, who left no writings, have been reconstructed
as the following:
1. Precise astronomical observations at the moment of birth are
impossible (and astrological techniques depend on such precision).
2. Those born at the same time have different destinies (as
empirically observed)
3. Those born neither at the same time or place often share the
same death time (as in the case of natural disasters)
4. Animals born at the same time as humans (according to strict
astrological fatalism) would share the same fate.
5. The presence of diverse ethnicities, customs and cultural
beliefs is incompatible with astrological fatalism.
Astrologers would respond to the last argument with the incorporation
of astro-geography or astro-chorography (perhaps as early as
Posidonius), indicating an astral typology of a people, and used for
the purpose of "mundane" astrology, predictions for entire nations,
which would also account for the second argument. Astro-chorography
can be found as early as Teukros of Babylon and Manilius, but might be
traced to Posidonius' predecessor Cratos of Mallos.
b. Sextus Empiricus
About three centuries later, Pyrrhonian skeptic Sextus Empiricus would
elaborate upon these arguments in "Against the Astrologers" (Pros
astrologous, Book 5 of Pros mathêmatikous). He first outlines the
procedure of drawing a birth chart, and the basic elements of
astrology, the places (topoi), the benefic and malefic nature of the
planets, and the criteria for determining the power of the planets. He
also notes the disagreements among astrologers, particularly regarding
subdivisions of the signs, a disagreement also noted by Ptolemy.
Sextus first notes typical arguments against astrology: 1) earthly
things do not reallysympathize with celestial. He uses an example from
anatomy, namely, the head and lower parts of body sympathize because
they have unity, and this unity is lacking in celestial/earthly
correspondence; 2) It is held that some events happen by necessity,
some by chance, some according to our actions. If predictions are made
of necessary events, then they are useless; if of chance events, then
they are impossible; if of that according to our will (para hêmas),
then not predetermined at all. If as he says, these are arguments by
the majority, then there was an attack on the theory of cosmic
sympathy and on the use of prediction (any form of divination) on
events determined by any or all of the three causes. This precludes
the possibility that the planets and stars are causes that determine
necessity in the sublunary realm, and it presents astrology as a form
of strict determinism. Sextus continues by offering a more specific
set of criticisms, including the five thought to originate with
Carneades. He especially focuses on the inaccuracy of instruments and
measurements used for determining either the time of birth or
conception. To these criticisms he adds that astrologers associate
shapes and characters of men (tas morphas kai ta êthê) with the
characteristics of the zodiac signs, and questions, for example, why a
Lion could be associated with bravery while an equally masculine
animal, the Bull, is feminine in astrology. He also ridicules
physiognomic descriptions, such that those who have Virgo ascending
are straight-haired, bright-eyed, white-skinned; he wonders if there
are no Ethiopian Virgos. Sextus adds the argument that predictions
from the alignment of planets cannot be based on empirical observation
since the same configurations do not repeat for 9977 years (one
calculation of the Great Year. Many such calculations exist in the
Hellenistic and Late Hellenistic eras, for the exact length of the
cycle was debated).
6. Hermetic and Gnostic Astrological Theories
The "philosophical" Hermetica, texts in the Hermetic tradition that
are typically of later origin than the "technical" astronomical and
magical fragments, share astrological imagery in common with another
heterogeneous group of texts known as "Gnostic." (See more on
Hermeticism and Gnosticism in Middle Platonism and Gnosticism). A
factor present in both collections is the role planets and stars play
in the cosmologies and eschatologies, one in which the planets and
other celestial entities are seen as oppressive forces or binding
powers from which the soul, by nature divine and exalted above the
cosmo, must break free. Fate (Heimarmenê) plays a major role in the
Hermetic texts, and astrology is sometimes taken for granted as
knowledge of the Fate by which the mortal part of a human being is
subjected to at birth (cf.Stobaei Hermetica, Excerpt VII). The planets
are said to be subservient to Fate and Necessity, which are
subordinate powers to God's providence (pronoia). In the Poimandres
text, God made man in his own image, but also made a creator god
(demiurge) who made seven administrators (the planets) whose
government is Fate. Man being two-fold, is both immortal, and above
the celestial government, and mortal, so also a slave within the
system, for he shares a bit of the nature of each of the planets. At
death the soul of the individual who recognizes their immortal,
intellectual, and divine self ascends, while gradually surrendering
the various qualities accumulated during the descent: the body is
given to dissolution; the character (êthos) is yielded to the daimon
(cf. Heraclitus, Fr. 119); and through each the seven planetary zones,
a portion of the incarnated self that is related to the negative
astrological meaning of each planet (e.g., arrogance to the Sun, greed
to Jupiter) is given back to that zone. Arriving at the eighth zone,
the soul is clothed in its own power (perhaps meaning its own astral
body), while it is deified (in God) in the zone above the eighth (some
Gnostic texts also refer to a tenth realm). Astrological fatalism,
then, is modified by the Platonic immortal soul whose proper place is
above the cosmic order. Astrology affects the temperament and life
while in the mortal body, but not ultimately the soul. Another
Hermetic text that incorporates astrology is the Secret Sermon on the
Mount of Hermes to Tat (Corpus Hermeticum, Book XIII). Here the
life-bearing zodiac is responsible for creating twelve torments or
passions that mislead human beings. These twelve are overcome by ten
powers of God, such as self-control, joy and light. In Excerpt XXIII
of the Stobaei Hermetica, the zodiac is again thought responsible for
giving life (to animals) while each planet contributes part of their
nature to human being. In this instance, as well as in Excerpt XXIX,
what the planets contribute is not all vice, but both good and bad in
a way that corresponds with the nature of each planet in astrological
theory. The Discourses from Hermes to Tat is a discussion of the
thirty-six decans, a remnant of Egyptian religion, which was
incorporated into Hellenistic astrology. The decans are guardian gods
who dwell above the zodiac, and added by servants and soldiers that
dwell in the aether, they affect collective events such as
earthquakes, famines and political upheaval. Furthermore, the decans
are said to rule over the planets and to sow good and bad daimons on
earth. Although Fate is an integral part of these Hermetic writings,
it seems that the transmission of the Hermetic knowledge, which
intends to aid the soul to overcome Fate, is for the elect, because
most men, inclining towards evil, would deny their own responsibility
for evil and injustice (Excerpt VI). This is a rehashing of the Lazy
Man Argument used against Stoic determinism, though cast in the light
of astral fatalism.
Hippolytus, being mostly informed by Irenaeus, tells us that the
Christian Marcion and his followers used Pythagorean numerology and
astrology symbolism in their sect, and that they further divided the
world into twelve regions using astro-geography (6.47-48). They may
have used a table of astro-numerology like that found in Teukros of
Babylon. Some Gnostic sects such as the Phibionites, as did the
Christian Marcionites associated each degree of the zodiac with a
particular god or daimon. Single degrees of the zodiac (monomoiria)
were governed by each planets. The astrologers assigned each degree to
a planet by various methods as outlined in the compilation of Paul of
Alexandria. For the Gnostics, the degrees were hypostatized as beings
that did the dirty work of the planets, who themselves are governed by
higher beings on the ontological scale as produced by the Ogdoad, and
Decade, and Dodecade, and ultimately leading to a cosmic ruler or
demiurge, typically called Ialdabaoth, though varying based on the
specific version of the cosmo-mythology of each sect. It is likely
that the astrologers and the Gnostics did not use these divisions in
the zodiac in the same way. Assignment of planets to divisions of the
zodiac is typically used in astrology for determining the relative
strength of the planets, and in the case of Critodemus (cited in
Valens, 8.26), in a technique for determining length of life. The
monomoiria may have been used in the Gnostic and/or Hermetic writers
for the sake of gaining knowledge of the powers that oppress in order
to overcome them.
In the Chaldaean Oracles, a text of the second century and thought to
bear the influence of Numenius, one finds a view of the cosmos similar
to that found in the Hermetic corpus. However, the divine influences
from above are mediated by Hecate, who separates the divine from the
earthly realm and governs Fate. Fate is a force of Nature and the
irrational soul of a human being is bound to it, but the theurgic
practices of bodily and mental purification, utilizing the rational
soul, is preparation for the ascent through the spheres, the dwelling
place of the intelligible soul and the Father God. The Oracles share
with the Gnostic and Hermetic texts a hierarchy of powers including
the zodiac, planets and daimons.
7. Neoplatonism and Astrology
Neoplatonism is typically thought to have originated with Plotinus;
though his philosophy, like every Late Hellenistic philosophy and
religion, did not develop in a vacuum. Plotinus was acquainted with
the Middle Platonists Numenius and Albinus, as well as Aristotelian,
Neopythagorean, Gnostic, and Stoic philosophies. Numenius (fl. 160-180
C.E.) shares with the Hermetic and Gnostic cosmologies the notion that
the soul of human beings descends through the cosmos (through the
Gateway of Cancer), loses memory of its divine life, and acquires its
disposition from the planets. The qualities of the planets are again
astrological, but vary by degree based on the distance from the
intelligible realm – at the highest planetary sphere, Saturn confers
reason and understanding, while at the lowest, the Moon contributes
growth of the physical body. During the ascent, judges are placed at
each planetary sphere; if the soul is found wanting, it returns to
Hades above the waters between the Moon and Earth, then is
reincarnated for ages until it is set right in virtue (based on the
Myth of Er in Plato's Republic 10.614-621).
The cosmological schemes, particularly the ontological hierarchies, in
Middle Platonic, Gnostic and Neopythagorean thinkers typically allows
for the place of astrology, if not in a strictly deterministic way for
the entire human being, for the transcendent soul descends and ascends
through the cosmos and one's own actions determine future ontological
status. This context places Neoplatonic philosophy in a difficult
relationship with astrology and fatalism. Plotinus is unique in that
he reverses the ontological status of the soul and the cosmos, for the
All-Soul (World-Soul, Nous) is the creator and governor of the cosmos,
but not a part of it. His philosophy, which exalts the soul above the
cosmos and above the ordinance of time, forms the basis for some of
his arguments against astrology.
a. Plotinus
Plotinus (204-270 C.E.) takes up the issue of astrology in Ennead 3.1
"On Fate," and in more detail in the later Ennead 2.3, "Are the Stars
Causes?" (chronologically, the 52nd treatise, or third from the last).
In the first text, Plotinus points out that some hold the belief that
the heavenly circuit rules over everything, and the configurations of
the planets and stars determine all events within this whole fated
structure (3.1.2). He then elaborates upon an astrology based on Stoic
cosmic sympathy theory (sumpnoia), in which animals and plants are
also under sympathetic influence of the heavenly bodies, and regions
of the earth are likewise influenced (3.1.5). Many astrologers divided
countries into astrological zones corresponding to zodiac signs (cf.
Manilius Astronomica, 4.744-817). Plotinus briefly presents the
arguments that for one, this strict determinism leaves nothing up to
us, and leaves us to be "rolling stones" (lithous pheromenois – this
recalls the rolling cylinder example in Stoicism). Secondly, he says
the influence of the parents is stronger on disposition and appearance
than the stars. Thirdly, recounting the New Academy argument, he says
that people born at the same time ought to share the same fate (but do
not). Given this, he does argue that planets can be used for
predictive purposes, because they can be used for divination like bird
omens (3.1.6; 3.3.6; 2.3.7-8). The diviner, however, has no place in
calling them causes since it would take a superhuman effort to unravel
the series of concomitant causes in the organism of the living cosmos,
in which each part participates in the whole.
In Ennead 2.3, his arguments can be divided into two types, the first
being a direct assault against the specific doctrines and language
used by astrologers, the second concerning the roles that the stars
have on the individual soul's descent into matter, as he sees in
accordance with Plato's Timaeus and Republic10. In the first set of
arguments, Plotinus displays more intimate familiarity with the
language of technical astrology. He turns around the perspective of
this language from the observer to the view from the planets
themselves. He finds it absurd, for instance, that planets affect one
another when they "see" one another and that a pair of planets could
have opposite affections for one another when in the region of the
other (2.3.4). Another example of the switched perspective is his
criticism of planetary "hairesis" doctrine, such that each planet is
naturally diurnal or nocturnal and rejoices in its chosen domain. He
counters that it is always day for the planets. More pertinent to his
philosophy, Plotinus then poses questions about the ontological status
of the planets and stars. If planets are not ensouled, they could only
affect the bodily nature. If they are ensouled, their effects would be
minor, not simply due to the great distance from earth, but because
their effects would reach the earth as a mixture, for there are many
stars and one earth (2.3.12). Plotinus does think planets are ensouled
because they are gods (3.1.5). Furthermore, there are no bad planets
(as astrologers claim of Mars and Saturn) because they are divine
(2.3.1). They do not have in their nature a cause of evil, and do not
punish human beings because we have no effect on their own happiness
(2.3.2). Countering moral characteristics that astrologers attribute
to the zodiac and planets, Plotinus argues that virtue is a gift from
God, and vice is due to external circumstances that happen as the soul
is immersed in matter (2.3.9; 2.3.14).
Plotinus does concede that just as human beings are double in nature,
possessing the higher soul and the lower bodily nature, so are
planets. The planets in their courses are in a better place than
beings on earth, but they are not themselves completely unchanging,
like beings in the realm of Intellect (2.1). In this regard he
attempts to square the contribution of the stars to one's disposition
in the Spindle of Fate in Plato'sRepublic 10, to his belief in free
will. From the stars we get our character (êthê), characteristic
actions (êthê praxeis) and emotions (pathê). He asks what is left that
is "we" (hêmeis), and answers that nature gave us the power to govern
(kratein) passions (pathôn) (2.3.9). If this double-natured man does
not live in accordance with virtue, the life of the intellect that is
above the cosmos, then "the stars do not only show him signs but he
also becomes himself a part, and follows along with the whole of which
he is a part" (2.3.9, tr. Armstrong).
In summary, Plotinus ridicules astrological technical doctrine for
what he sees as a belief in the direct causality of the planets and
stars on the fate of the individual. He also finds offensive the
attribution of evil or evil-doing to the divine planets. However, he
does believe that planets and stars are suited for divination because
they are part of the whole body of the cosmos, and all parts are
co-breathing (sumpnoia) and contribute to the harmony of the whole
(2.3.7). The planets do not, then, act upon their own whims and
desires.
b. Porphyry
Plotinus' best-known student, Porphyry of Tyre (c. 232/3-304/5), held
quite a different view on astrology. He wrote a lost work on
astrology, Introduction to Astronomy in Three Books (the word
"astronomy" meaning "astrology"), and put together an Introduction to
Ptolemy's Tetrabiblos (Eisagôgê eis tên Apotelesmatikên tou
Ptolemaiou). In this work he heavily draws upon (and in some cases
copies directly from) Antiochus of Athens, an astrologer of the late
second century C.E. Antiochus' influence was considerable, and perhaps
greater than Ptolemy's in the third and fourth centuries, since he was
referenced by several later astrologers such as Firmicus Maternus,
Hephaistion of Thebes, Rhetorius, and the medieval "Palchus." It may
be that Porphyry encountered Antiochus' work when he studied in Athens
under Longinus (another student of Ammonius Saccas) before continuing
his Platonic education under Plotinus. Porphyry attempts to reconcile
his belief in astrology with the Platonic belief in a free an exalted
soul that is separable from the body. As a Pythagorean, Porphyry
promoted abstinence from meat and other methods of detachment from the
body as promoting virtue and a life of Nous. (cf. Launching Points to
the Realm of the Mind; Letter to Marcella;On Abstinence). In an
earlier work of which only fragments exist, Concerning Philosophy from
Oracles, Porphyry asserts that gods and the demons use observations of
the movements of stars to predict events decreed by Fate, a doctrine
originating with the Stoics. He claims astrologers are sometimes
incorrect in their predictions because they make faulty
interpretations (while assuming that the principles of astrology
itself are not false) (cf. Amand, p. 165-166; Eusebius Praeparatio
evangelica, 6.1.2-5). In another fragment (Stobaeus, 2.8.39-42),
Porphyry interprets Plato's Myth of Er (Republic 10.614-621) as
justification for the compatibility of astrology and free choice
(Amand, p. 164-165). Before the souls descend to earth, they are free
to choose their guardian daimon. When on earth, they are subject to
Fate and necessity based on the lot chosen. Porphyry says this is in
agreement with the (Egyptian) astrologers who think that the ascending
zodiac sign (hôroskopos), and the arrangement of the planets in the
zodiac signify the life that was chosen by the soul (Stobaeus,
2.8.39-42). He notes, as does Plotinus (Enn., 2.3.7), that the stars
are scribbling on the heavens that give signs of the future. Both
Porphyry and Plotinus discuss the Myth of Er and the stars as giving
divinatory signs (sêmainô), but Porphyry accepts the astrological
tradition filled with complicated calculations and strange language,
while Plotinus rejects it.
Porphyry's Introduction to Ptolemy's Tetrabiblos contains little
content from Ptolemy, and purports to fill in the terminology and
concepts that Ptolemy had taken for granted. Porphyry says that by
explicating the language in as simple a way as possible, these
concepts will become clear to the uninitiated. His great respect for
Ptolemy is evident by his other work on the study of Ptolemy's
Harmonics, and by statements that he makes of his debt, but he
includes in the compilation numerous techniques that Ptolemy rejected.
The debt he may be paying though, may actually be to readers of
Plotinus. It may be a response to Plotinus' criticism of the language
of astrology and the belief that stars are causes. Porphyry seems to
think that understanding the complicated scientific language will give
back the credence to astrology that the naturalistic model by Ptolemy
took away (at least for his most respected teacher).
In the Letter to Anebo, Porphyry poses a series of questions about the
order of and distinctions between visible and invisible Gods and
daimons, and about the mantic arts. He mentions the ability of some to
judge, but the configurations of the stars, whether or not divinatory
predictions will be true and false, and if theurgic activity will be
fruitful or in vain (Epistula ad Anebonem, 2.6c – in reference to
katarchical astrology). He also asks about the symbolism of the images
of the Sun that change by the hour (these figures are twelve Egyptian
forms that co-rise with the ascending signs of the zodiac. The
dôdekaôrai. These uneven hours were measured by the time it took for
each sign to rise; cf. Greek Magical Papryi, PGM IV 1596-1715). In
this work, though, he complains of Egyptian priest/astrologers such as
Chaeremon, who reduce their gods to forces of nature, do not allow for
incorporeals, and hold to a strict deterministic astral fatalism
(Epist. Aneb., 2.13a). Porphyry concludes with questions about the
practice of astrologers of finding one's own daimon, and what sort of
power it imparts to us (Epist. Aneb., 2.14a-2.16a; cf. Vettius Valens,
Book 3.1; Hephaistion, Apotelesmatica, 13; 20). Again, reconciling his
notions of virtue and free will with astrology, he states that if it
is possible to know one's daimon (indicated by the planet derived
through a set of rules and designated as the oikodespotês) from the
birth chart, then one can be free from Fate. He notes the difficulties
and disagreements among astrologers about how to find this
all-important indicator. In fact, in Introduction to Ptolemy's
Tetrabiblos (30), he includes a lengthy chapter (again, borrowing from
Antiochus of Athens) that explains a method for finding the
oikodespotês) and for differentiating this from other ruling planets
(such as the kurios and theepikratêtôr). As will be explicated,
Iamblichus, who formed his own unique relationship to astrology,
answered these questions in his De mysteriis.
c. Iamblichus
While Iamblichus (c. 240-325 C.E.) believed in the soul's exaltation
above the cosmos, he did not, like Plotinus, think that the embodied
soul of the human being is capable of rising above the cosmos and its
ordering principle of Fate through simple contemplation upon the One,
or the source of all things. Iamblichus responds to Porphyry's
accusation that Egyptian religion is only materialistic: just as the
human being is double-natured, an incorporeal soul immersed in matter,
this duality is replicated at each level of being (5.20). Theurgy, for
most people, should begin with the material gods that have dominion
over generation and corruption of bodies. He does not think the masses
are capable of intellectual means of theurgy (this is reserved for the
few and for a later stage in life), but that a theurgist must start at
their own level of development and individual inclinations. His
complex hierarchy of beings, including celestial gods, visible gods,
angels and daimons, justifies a practice of theurgy in which each of
these beings is sacrificed and prayed to appropriately, in a manner
pleasing to and in sympathy with their individual natures. Material
means, i.e., use of stones, herbs, scents, animals, and places, are
used in theurgy in a manner similar to magical practices common in the
Late Hellenistic era, with the notable difference that they are used
simply to please and harmonize with the order of the higher beings,
rather than to obtain either an earthy or intellectual desire.
Divinity pervades all things, and earthly things receive a portion of
divinity from particular gods.
Answering Porphyry's question about the meaning of the Sun god seated
on the Lotus (an Egyptian astrological motif), Iamblichus responds
that the images that change with the zodiacal hours are symbolic of an
incorporeal (and unchanging) God who is unfolded in the Light through
images representing his multiple gifts. His position above the Lotus
(which, being circular, represents the motion of the Intellect)
indicates his transcendence over all things. Curiously, Iamblichus
also says that the zodiac signs along with all celestial motions,
receive their power from the Sun, placing them ontologically
subordinate to it (De mysteriis, 7.3).
Next addressing Porphyry's question about astral determinism of
Chaeremon (who is thought to be a first century Alexandrian
astrologer/priest versed in Stoic philosophy; cf. Porphyry, De
abstinentia, 4.6; Origen Contra Celsum, 1.59; Cramer, p. 116-118) and
others, Iamblichus indicates that the Hermetic writings pertaining to
natal astrology play a minor role in the scope of Hermetic/Egyptian
philosophy (De myst., 8.4) Iamblichus does not deny the value of natal
astrology, but considers it to be concerned with the lower material
life, hence subordinate to the intellectual. Likewise, not all things
are bound to Necessity because theurgic exercises can elevate the soul
above the cosmos and above Fate (8.7). On Porphyry's question about
finding one's personal daimon through astrological calculation,
Iamblichus responds that the astrological calculations can say nothing
about the guardian daimon. Since the natal chart is a matter
concerning one's fatedness, and the daimon is assigned prior to the
soul's descent (it is more ancient; presbutera) and subjection to
fate, such human and fallible sciences as astrology are useless in
this important matter (9.3-4). In general, Iamblichus does not show
much inclination for use of astrological techniques found in Ptolemy,
Antiochus, and other astrologers, but he does believe that astrology
is in fact a true science, though polluted by human errors (9.4). He
also accepts and uses material correspondences to celestial gods
(including planets), as well as katarchical astrology, observations
used for selecting the proper times (8.4).
d. Firmicus Maternus
Julius Firmicus Maternus was a fourth century Sicilian astrologer who
authored an astrological work in eight books, Matheseos, and about ten
years later, a Christian polemical work, On the Error of Profane
Religions (De errore profanarium religionum). Unlike Augustine (who
studied astrology in his youth), Firmicus did not launch polemics
against astrology after his conversion to Christianity He is mentioned
briefly for his Neoplatonic justification for the practice of
astrology. While he claims only meager knowledge in astrology, his
arguments betray a passionate commitment to a belief in astral
fatalism. He treats astrological knowledge as a mystery religion, and
as Vettius Valens did before him, he asks his reader, Mavortius, to
take an oath of secrecy and responsibility concerning astrological
knowledge. He refers to Porphyry (along with Plato and Pythagoras) as
a likeminded keeper of mysteries (7.1.1). In De errore, however, he
attacks Porphyry for the same reason, that he was a follower of the
Serapis cult of Alexandria (Forbes' translation, p. 72). Firmicus'
oath is upon the creator god (demiurge) who is responsible for the
order of the cosmos and for arranging the planets as stations along
the way of the souls' ascent and descent (7.1.2).
While outlining the arguments of astrology's opponents, (including the
first and second arguments of the New Academy, mentioned above),
Firmicus claims not to have made up his mind concerning the
immortality of the soul (Matheseos, 1.1.5-6), but he shortly betrays a
Platonic belief in an immortal soul separable from the body (1.3.4).
These souls follow the typical Middle Platonic ascent and descent
through the planetary spheres; as a variation on this theme, he holds
the notion that souls descend through the sphere of the Sun and ascend
through the sphere of the Moon (1.5.9). This sovereign soul is capable
of true knowledge, and, by retaining an awareness in spite of its
forgetful and polluted state on Earth, can know Fate imperfectly
through the methods of astrology handed down from Divine Mind (mentis
treated as a Latin equivalent for nous, 1.4.1-5; 1.5.11). In response
to the critics, he suggests that they do not have first hand knowledge
and that if they encountered false predictions, the fault lies with
the fraudulent pretenders to astrology and not with the science itself
(1.3.6-8). For Firmicus, the planets, as administrators of a creator
God, give each individual soul their character and personality
(1.5.6-7).
After offering profuse praise of Plotinus, Firmicus attacks his belief
that everything is in our powers and that superior providence and
reason can overcome fortune. He argues that Plotinus made this claim
in the prime of his health, but that he too accepted the powers of
Fate toward the end of his life, since all efforts to advert poor
health, such as moving to a better climate, failed him (1.7.14-18).
Following this and other examples offered to his reader of fated
events, he argues against the notion held by some, that fate
(heimarmenê) only controls birth and death. This argument may be a
precursor of the definition of fate that Hierocles offered a century
later, which will be discussed next.
e. Hierocles
Hierocles of Alexandria is a fifth century Neoplatonist who argued
against astrology, particularly an astrological theory based on a
Stoic view of Fate and Necessity. He also rejected magical and
theurgical practices prevalent in his time as a way to either escape
or overcome the fate set down in one's birth chart. His argument
against these practices is based on his view of Providence and Fate,
found in his work On Providence, which only survives in later
summaries by ninth century Byzantine Patriarch, Photius. In general,
Hierocles saw himself in line with the thinkers starting with Ammonius
Saccas, who argue for the compatibility between Plato and Aristotle,
while he rejects thinkers who emphasize their differences, such as
Alexander of Aphrodisias. His view of Fate is that it is an immutable
ordering of thinking according to divine Justice. Using, as do
Plotinus and Porphyry, Plato's Myth of Er (Rep., 10), fate is a system
of rewards and punishments the souls choose before reincarnation on
earth. He does not, though, like Porphyry, accept the transmigration
of the soul from human to animal body and vice versa. This view on
reincarnation had already been put forth by Cronius, a contemporary of
Numenius (cf. Dillon, p. 380). He considers astrology to be contrary
to this notion of Fate because it works by a principle of "mindless
necessity" (enepilogiston anagkên). Photius writes of Hierocles:
He does not at all accept the irrational "necessity" spoken of by
the astrologers, nor the Stoic "force," nor even what Alexander of
Aphrodisias supposed it to be, who identifies it with the nature of
Platonic Bodies. Nor does he accept that one' birth can be altered by
incantations and sacrifices. (Codex 214, 172b, tr. Schibli, p. 333)
The astrological theory he is arguing against is supported by Stoic
fate and necessity, which assumes a chain of physical efficient
causes. The astrologers who most closely represent this view are
Manilius and Vettius Valens (link to above sections). There is nothing
in the surviving summary to indicate that Hierocles also argues
against the notion of Plotinus and Porphyry that the stars are signs
rather than causes, because they are part of the rational and divine
order of all things. Since he believed there is nothing outside of
rational Providence, including that which is in our power (to eph'
hêmin), the stars too would be a part of the rational ordering. His
fate, being quite deterministic but based on moral justice, does not
allow for magic and theurgic practices used to exonerate one from his
Fate revealed through astrology (cf. Porphyry's Letter to Anebo; Greek
Magic Papyri, XIII, 632-640). These practices he saw as unlawful
attempts to manipulate or escape the ordering of things by the
Providence of God.
f. Proclus
Proclus (410/11-485) was the director of the Platonic School at
Athens, which called itself the "Academy" in order to maintain lineage
with Plato's fourth century school. In the absence of direct
statements about the astrology, Proclus' position on astral fatalism
can be surmised through his philosophy, particularly his metaphysical
hierarchy of beings. A paraphrase of Ptolemy's astrological work,
Tetrabiblos, is attributed to him, though there is little evidence to
make a substantial claim about the identity of the author/copyist.
Proclus did, however, take a keen interest in astronomy, and critiqued
Ptolemy's astronomical work,Syntaxis (or Almagest) in his Outline of
Astronomical Hypotheses. In this work, he argues against Ptolemy's
theory of precession of the equinox (Hyp. astr., 234.7-22), although
other Plato/Aristotle synthesizers, such as Simplicius, accepted it
along with the additional spheres the theory would entail beyond the
eighth (the fixed stars).
Proclus generally proposed three levels of being – celestial, earthly,
and in-between. The four elements exist at every level of being,
though fire (in the form of light) predominates in the celestial
realm. Celestial beings are independent, self-subsistent, divine, and
have their own will and power. As ensouled beings, celestial bodies
are self-moving (the Platonic notion of soul). In order to maintain a
consistency with Platonic doctrine, he argued against the notion that
celestial spheres are solid paths upon which the planets and stars are
carried along. Rather they are places possessing latitude, longitude,
and depth (bathos – a measure of proximity to earth), which are
projected by the free planets as their potential course. As visible
gods, he thought the planets to be intermediaries between the
intelligible realm and the sensible. In terms of planets being causes,
he accepts the Aristotelian notion that they cause physical changes
below (due to heat and light). However, he also accepted another type
of non-physical causality, more akin to cosmic sympathy, in which
several causes come together to form a single effect at a proper time
and place. Everything lower in the hierarchy is dependent upon the
higher, and is given its proper lot (klêros) and signature (sunthêma)
of the higher beings. The celestial gods also have a ruling power over
lower beings (Institutio theological, 120-122). This notion of
properness (epitêdeiotês) extends from the celestial realm to all
things below, including plants and metals (cf. Siovanes, p. 128-129).
This is much akin to astrological theory, in which each planet and
sign contributes, in varying proportions, to a single effect, the
individual. The planetary gods are not the only actors, for they have
invisible guardians (doruphoroi – not to be confused with the planets
who guard the Sun and the Moon in astrological doctrine) who populate
that the space of the planets' courses, and who act as administrators.
Proclus, though, is not a strict astral determinism, for as a
theurgist, he also thought these allotments can be changed through
theurgic knowledge (In Platonis Timaeum commentaria, 1.145).
8. Astrology and Christianity
Astrology's relationship with early Christianity has a very complex
history. Prior to being established as the official religion of the
Roman Empire, the attitude of Jews and Christians toward astrology
varied greatly. Philo of Alexandria and various Jewish
pseudepigraphical writers condemned the practice of astrology (1
Enoch, Sibylline Oracles), while other texts accept portions of it and
depict biblical figures such as Abraham and Noah as astrologers (cf.
Barton, Ancient Astrology, p. 68-70). As mentioned above, early
Christians such as Marcion and Basilides incorporated some aspects of
astrology into their belief systems. In general, though, for the
earliest Christian polemicists and theologians, astrology was
incompatible with the faith for a number of reasons, mostly pertaining
to the immorality of its fatalism. Some of the Christian arguments
against astrology were borrowed from the skeptical schools. Hippolytus
of Rome (170-236 C.E.) dedicating nearly an entire book (4) of his
Refutations Against All Heresies, closely followed the detailed
arguments from Sextus Empiricus, particularly concerning the lack of
accurate methods for discerning the time of birth, which is required
for establishing the natal chart. He is particularly troubled by the
associations between signs of the zodiac and physiognomical features.
Hippolytus outlines a list very similar to that of Teukros of Babylon
(as contained in the latter's De duodecim signis) containing
correspondences between physiological and psychological
characteristics; and he argues that the constellations were merely
markers for star recognition, bear no resemblance to the animals by
which they are named, and can bear no resemblance to human
characteristics (Refutatio omnium haeresium, 4.15-27).
Bardaisan/Bardesanes (c 154-222 C.E.) was a converted Syriac
Christian, who, like Augustine, studied astrology in his youth. It
appears that in his conversion he did not give up all astrological
thinking, for he accepts the role of the planets and stars as
administrators of God. He wrote against astro-chorography,
particularly the association of regions with planets based on seven
climata or zones, stating that laws and customs of countries are based
on institution of human free will and not on the planets. Along with
free will, though, he accepts a degree of governance of nature and of
chance, indicated by the limit of things in our control. Bardesanes is
thought to be a forerunner of Mani, for he accepted a dualism of two
world forces, dark and light (cf. Rudolf, Gnosis, p. 327-329).
Origen of Alexandria's (185-254 C.E.) relationship to astrology was
equally, if not more, complex than that of Plotinus. In his Commentary
on Genesis he, in a manner similar to Plotinus, offers arguments
against stars as causes, but in favor of stars as signs, divine
writings in the sky. These writings are available for divine powers to
gain knowledge and to participate in the providential aide of human
beings (Philocalia, 23.1-23.21; cf. Barton, Power and Knowledge, p.
63-64). Origen believed that all beings, celestial, human or
in-between, have the role of helping all creatures attain salvation.
Celestial beings play a particular role in this cosmological paideia
of educating creatures toward virtue. These signs, however, are
imperfect at the human level, and cannot give exact knowledge
(Philocalia, 23.6). Elsewhere (De oratione, 7.1), Origen urges us to
pray for the Sun, Moon and stars (rather than to them), for they are
also free beings (so he surmises by interpreting Psalm 148:3) and play
a unique role in the salvation of the cosmos. Quite uniquely, Origen
also appears to have been one of the first philosophers (if not the
first) to use the theory of precession of the equinox as an argument
against astrological prediction (Philocalia, 23.18).
Origen argued against those in antiquity who interpreted the Star of
Bethlehem as an astrological prediction of the birth of Christ made by
the Chaldaeans. He first notes that the Magi (from Persia) are to be
distinguished from Chaldaeans (a word which at the time generally
referred to Babylonian astrologers or simply astrologers). Secondly,
he argues that the star was unlike any other astral phenomenon they
had observed, and they perceived that it represented someone (Christ)
superior to any person known before, not simply by the sign of the
star, but by the fact that their usual sorcery and knowledge from evil
daimons had failed them (Contra Celsum, 59-60). In general, regardless
of the intentions of the gospel writers of including the myth of the
Star of Bethlehem, it was interpreted by Christians not as a
prediction by astrological methods of divination, but as a symbol of
Christ transcending the old cosmic order, particularly fate oppressing
the divinely granted human free will, and replacing it with a new
order (cf. Denzey, "A New Star on the Horizon," in Prayer, Magic, and
the Stars, p. 207-221).
Three fourth century theologians, Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory Nazianzen,
and Basil, known as the Cappadocians, rejected astrology as a part of
an overall rejection of irrational Chance (Tukhê) and deterministic
Necessity (Anankê) (see Pelikan, p. 154-157). Random chance had no
place in the economy of God's universe, while blind necessity denies
human free will. They differentiated astrology from astronomy, which
was an appropriate study for admiration of creation. Unlike Origen and
Plotinus, Gregory Nazianzen rejected the notion of that stars give
signs for reading the future. He feared that those who interpret the
biblical notion that the stars were created for giving signs (Genesis
1:14) would use this as justification for horoscopic astrology
(Pelikan, p. 156).
In the Latin west, Augustine (354-430 C.E.) took up polemics against
astrology in conjunction with his arguments against divination (De
civitate dei, 5.1-7). His distain for astrology is related to his
early exposure to it as a Manichean prior to his conversion to
Christianity. In De civitate dei (City of God), he borrowed freely
from Cicero's arguments against Stoic fate and divination. He
particularly elaborated upon the New Academy argument that people born
at the same time having different destinies (the twin argument). He
includes in his attack on astrology the futility of katarchic
astrology (choosing the proper moments for activities) as well as its
contradiction with deterministic natal astrology. If persons are
predestined by their natal charts, how can they hope to change fate by
choosing the proper time for marriage, planting crops, etc? In
addition, he attributes correct predictions by astrologers to
occasional inspiration of evil daimons rather than the study of
astrological techniques (De civ., 5.7).
As Christianity gained political and cultural ascendancy, decrees
against astrology multiplied. With the closing of the "pagan" schools
in 529, Neoplatonists and the astrology attached to them fled to
Persia. Substantial debate exists about whether or not they set up a
new school in Persia, specifically Harran, and likely, later, in
Baghdad; but one thing that is certain is that astrological texts and
astronomical tables (such as the Pinax of Ptolemy) used for casting
charts were translated into Persian and adjusted for the sixth
century. The astrological writings, particularly of Ptolemy,
Dorotheus, and Vettius Valens, were then translated into Arabic and
would become a part of Islamic philosophy. The Greek texts, in
combination with developments in Persia and the astrology of India,
would form the basis of medieval astrology. Astrology from that point
on would continued its unique history, both combining with and
striving against philosophical and scientific theories, up to the
present day.
9. References and Further Reading
* Amand, David. Fatalisme et Liberté dans L'Antiquité Grecqué
(Lovain: Bibliothèque de L'Université, 1945)
* Barton, Tamsyn. Ancient Astrology (London: Routledge, 1994)
* Barton, Tamsyn. Power and Knowledge: Astrology, Physiognomics,
and Medicine under the Roman Empire (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 1994)
* Bobzien, Susanne. Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy
(Oxford University Press, 1998)
* Catalogus Codicum Astrologorum Graecorum, ed. D. Olivieri, et
al., 12 Volumes (Brussels: Academie Royale, 1898-1953)
* Cramer, Frederick H. Astrology in Roman Law and Politics
(Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1959)
* Denzey, Nicola. "A New Star on the Horizon: Astral Christologies
and Stellar Debates in the Early Christian Discourse," in Prayer,
Magic, and the Stars, ed. Scott B Noegel (University Park, PA:
Pennsylvania University Press, 2003).
* Dillon, John. The Middle Platonists (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1977)
* Dillon, John and A. A. Long, eds. The Question of "Eclecticism":
Studies in Later Greek Philosophy(Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 1988)
* Edelstein, L. and I. G. Kidd, eds. Posidonius: I. The Fragments
(Cambridge University Press, 1972)
* Firmicus Maternus, The Error of the Pagan Religions, tr.
Clarence A. Forbes (NY: Newman Press, 1970)
* Firmicus Maternus. Mathesis, Vol. I and II, ed. W. Kroll and F.
Skutsch (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1968)
* Firmicus Maternus, Matheseos Libri VIII, tr. Jean Rhus Bram
(Park Ridge, NJ: Noyes Press, 1975)
* Fowden, Garth. Egyptian Hermes (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1986)
* Green, William Chase. Moira: Fate, Good, & Evil in Greek Thought
(Harper & Row, 1944)
* Gundel, W. and Gundel, H. G. Astrologumena: die astrologische
Literatur in der Antike und ihre Geschichte (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner
Verlag GMBH, 1966)
* Holden, James Herschel. A History of Horoscopic Astrology
(Tempe, AZ: American Federation of Astrologers, Inc, 1996)
* Hunger, Hermann, and David Pingree. Astral Science in
Mesopotamia (Leiden: Brill, 1999).
* Iamblichus. On the Mysteries, tr. Thomas Taylor (San Francisco:
Wizards Bookshelf, 1997)
* Layton, Bentley, tr. and ed. The Gnostic Scriptures (New York:
Doubleday, 1987).
* Long, A. A. ed. Problems in Stoicism (London: Athlone Press, 1971).
* Long, A. A., and D. N. Sedley. The Hellenistic Philosophers,
Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987)
* Manilius. Astronomica, tr. G. P. Goold (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1977)
* Neugebauer, Otto. Astronomy and History: Selected Essays (New
York: Springer-Verlag, 1983)
* Pelikan, Jaroslav. Christianity and Classical Culture (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993)
* Plutarch. Plutarchi moralia (Leipzig: Teubner, 1929-1960)
* Claudius Ptolemy. Tetrabiblos, tr. F. E. Robbins (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1956)
* Reiner, Erica. Astral Magic in Babylonia (Philadelphia: The
American Philosophical Society, 1995)
* Rochberg, F. Babylonian Horoscopes, trans. Amer. Philos. Soc.,
Vol. 99, 1 (Philadelphia, 1998)
* Rudolf, Kurt. Gnosis: The Nature and History of Gnosticism, tr.
Robert McLachlan Wilson (San Francisco, CA: Harper San Francisco,
1987)
* Sandbach, F. H. The Stoics (London: Chatto & Windus, 1975)
* Schibli, Hermann S. Hierocles of Alexandria (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002).
* Scott, Walter, ed. and tr. Hermetica Vol 1. (Boston: Shambala, 1985)
* Sextus Empiricus. Against the Professors, Vol IV (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1949)
* Shaw, Gregory. Theurgy and the Soul: The Neoplatonism of
Iamblichus (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press,
1995)
* Siovanes, Lucas. Proclus: Neo-Platonic Philosophy and Science
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996).
* Stoicorum veterum fragmenta, ed. J. von Arnim (Leipzig: Teubner, 1903)
* Vettius Valens. Anthology, ed. David Pingree (Leipzig: Teubner, 1986)
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