The beginnings of English Deism appear in the seventeenth century. Its
main principles are to be found in the writings of Lord Herbert of
Cherbury (d. 1648), who devoted the latter part of a life spent in a
military and diplomatic career to a search for a standard and a guide
in the conflicts of creeds and systems. He was a friend of Grotius,
Casaubon, and Gassendi, and during a long sojourn in France made
himself acquainted with the thought of Montaigne, of Bodin, and
especially of Charron. His works are: De Veritate (Paris, 1624);
Cherbury. De religions Gentilium errorumque apud eos causes (London,
1645); and two minor treatises, De cause errorum and De religions
laici. The first work advances a theory of knowledge based upon the
recognition of innate universal characteristics on the object
perceived, and rigidly opposed to knowledge supernatural in its origin
and determinable in only by strife and conflict. The second work lays
down the common marks by which religious truth is recognized. These
are (1) a belief in the existence of the Deity, (2) the obligation to
reverence such a power, (3) the identification of worship with
practical morality, (4) the obligation to repent of sin and to abandon
it, and, (5) divine recompense in this world and the next. These five
essentials (the so-called "Five Articles" of the English Deists)
constitute the nucleus of all religions and of Christianity in its
primitive, uncorrupted form. The variations between positive religions
are explained as due partly to the allegorization of nature, partly to
self-deception, the workings of imagination, and priestly guile.
2. Hobbes and Others
Rejection of theological supernaturalism stands out as the most
conspicuous characteristic in Hobbes's philosophical writings (d.
1679), which were inspired by the teachings of the new mathematical
and natural sciences. The different religions are explained as the
product of human fear interpreting natural phenomena in
anthropomorphic form, or, in their higher aspects, as the outcome of
reflection on causal relation in the universe. Miracles and
revelations are in themselves improbable, and may be most easily
explained as the imaginings of the ignorant. Positive religion is the
creation of the State, and the sovereign justly possesses
unconditional power to enforce its prescriptions, for only in this way
can religious strife be avoided. Between religion thus naturally
explained and a prophetic and Christian revelation Hobbes,
nevertheless, attempted to mediate; he mentions as the means that
might lead to such a reconciliation the rational interpretation of
miracles, the differentiation between the inner moral sense of
Scripture and mere figurative expression, and the historical
criticisms of Biblical sources. The entire apparatus of Rationalism is
here to be found, limited only in its application. Further, Spinoza's
Tractatus theologico-politicus (1670) and Bayle's Dictionnaire
(1695-97) were effective in shaping the character of Deism. Of no
small importance, also, was the rise of a literature of comparative
religion and the publication of ethnographical studies and works of
travel. China, Arabia, Egypt, Persia, India, and primal regions, were
brought within the horizon of religious investigation. Philosophy,
beginning with Locke's theory of knowledge, and natural science, with
Newton's theory of gravitation, contributed to the opposition with
which theological dogma was confronted. Yet their attitude was not one
of hostility to religions which they sought rather to utilize for the
purpose of establishing the desired universal standard of truth.
Newton and Boyle succeeded in reconciling the creed of the Church with
their mechanical metaphysics; and this union remained characteristic
of England, so that even men like Priestley and Hartley did not shrink
from supporting their materialistic theories by theological arguments.
We have here the blending of a sensualistic epistemology, a
mechanical-teleological metaphysics, a historical criticism, and an a
prioristic ethics whose product in the shape of natural religion was
destined first to undermine Christianity, then to compete with it, and
finally to supplant it.
3. Charles Blount
These various tendencies could not show themselves fully under the
ecclesiastical restraint of the Restoration, yet they appear clearly
enough in the writings of Charles Blount (d. 1693), usually placed
second to Herbert in the lists of Deists. Like his predecessor, Blount
dwells on the conflict between rival religions, and finds a standard
of adjustment in a fusion of Herbert's theory of universal
characteristics with Hobbes's prescription by the State. Like Hobbes
and Spinoza, he touches serious problems of Biblical criticism at this
early date. Freedom from prejudice is his boast; he asserts the
supernatural character of Christianity on the basis of its miracles,
after he has already rendered them dubious by parallels with
non-Christian miracles. His works were: Anima mundi (London, 1679),
Great is Diana of the Ephesians (1680), and The Two First Books of
Philostratus concerning the Life of Apollonius Tyaneus, published in
English with notes (1680).
4. John Locke
The Revolution of 1688, the establishment of the freedom of the press
in 1694, the political favor that was bestowed on the new tendencies
in theology, in opposition to the stricter Anglicanism which was
tainted with Stuart partizanship, were conditions favorable to the
development of the seed that had already been planted. Parallel with
the liberalization of orthodox dogma, there ran a more radical
development with the attainment of a standard for the testing of the
contents of revelation. Of surpassing importance in this direction was
the influence and work of John Locke (d. 1704), who, in the field of
theology, found his starting point, like most prominent thinkers of
the age, in the conflict of systems, doctrines, and practices. Out of
his reflections on the data of experience he developed a
mechanical-teleological metaphysics and an empirical-utilitarian
ethics, the latter agreeing, with the old idea of lex naturae in that
ethical experience merely confirms the connection established by a
teleological government of the universe between certain acts and their
consequences. In spite of his supernaturalist tendencies, Locke
nevertheless maintained, in his Letters on Toleration (1689-92), that
only rational demonstration, and not compulsion or mere assertion, can
establish the validity of revelation. In the Essay concerning Human
Understanding (1690) he had investigated the conception of revelation
from the epistemological standpoint, and laid down the criteria by
which the true revelation is to be distinguished from other doctrines
which claim such authority. Strict proof of the formal character of
revelation must be adduced; the tradition which communicates it to us
must be fully accredited by both external and internal evidence; and
its content must be shown to correspond with rational metaphysics and
ethics. Revelation is revelation; but, after it is once given, it may
be shown a posteriori to be rational, i.e., capable of being deduced
from the premises of our reason. Only where this is possible is there
a presumption in favor of the purely mysterious parts of revelation.
Where these criteria are disregarded the way is open to the excesses
of sects and priesthoods by which religion, the differentia of
reasoning man, has often made him appear less rational than the
beasts. Locke advances therefore the remarkable conception of a
revelation that reveals only the reasonable and the universally
cognizable. The practical consequences of the thesis are deduced in
his Reasonableness of Christianity as Delivered in the
Scriptures(1695), which aims at the termination of religious strife
through the recovery of the truths of primitive, rational
Christianity. From the Gospels and the Acts, as distinguished from the
Epistles, he elicits as the fundamental Christian truths the doctrine
of the messiahship of Jesus and that of the kingdom of God.
Inseparably connected with these are the recognition of Jesus as ruler
of this kingdom, forgiveness of sins, and subjection to the moral law
of the. kingdom. This law is identical with the ethical portion of the
law of Moses, which in its turn corresponds to the lex naturae or
rationis. The Gospel is but the divine summary and exposition of the
law of nature, and it is the advantage of Christianity over pagan
creeds and philosophies that it offers this law of nature
intelligibly, with divine authority, and free from merely ceremonial
sacerdotalism. To do this it requires the aid of a supernatural
revelation, whose message is attainable through reason also, but only
in an imperfect way.
5. Toland, Collins, and Others
Deducing the full consequences of Locke's theory, John Toland (d.
1722), in his Christianity not Mysterious (1696), maintained that the
content of revelation must neither contradict nor transcend the
dictates of reason. Revelation is not the basis of truth, but only a "
means of information " by which man may arrive at knowledge, the
sanction for which must be found in reason. Primitive Christianity
knew nothing of mystery, whose sources are Judaic and Greek, and the
original Christian use of the word mysterium conveyed no idea of that
which transcended reason. The basis is thus laid for the critical
study of early Christianity. Further problems of Biblical criticism
and the distinction between the diverse parties in primitive
Christianity are advanced in Toland's Amyntor (1699) and Nazarenus ;
or Jewish, Gentile and illahometan Christianity (1718). In like
manner, Anthony Collins (d. 1729), in his Discourse of Freethinking
(1713), developed the consequences of Locke's propositions. Revelation
depends for its sanction upon its agreement with reason, and what is
contrary to reason is not revelation. Practical morality is
independent of dogma, which, on the contrary, has been the cause of
much evil in the history of the world. Christ and the Apostles, the
prototypes. of the freethinkers, never made use of supernatural
authority, but confined themselves to simple, rational demonstration.
Collins's work elicited numerous replies; but none really made answer
to his main thesis. After remaining silent for eleven years, Collins
renewed the contest with a contribution on prophecy and miracles.
Setting out from Locke's proposition that revelation was truth
sanctioned by reason, he found it a simple step to reject prophecy and
miracles as non-essential characteristics of religion, amounting at
most to mere didactic devices. The mathematician William Whiston (d.
1752) gave a new impulse to the controversy by the publication of The
True Text (1722), in which the lack of real concordance between the
New Testament interpretation of Old Testament prophecies is pointed
out, and the prevailing allegorical method of reconciling such
differences summarily rejected. The present form of the Old Testament
is characterized as a forgery perpetrated by the Jews, and an attempt
is made by Whiston to restore the original text. Collins, in his
Discourse on the Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion (1724),
agreed with Whiston as to the discrepancies between the two
Testaments, but defended the allegorical method of interpretation.
Thomas Woolston (d. 1733) came to the support of Collins in this
controversy over the Biblical prophecies; and when his opponents
shifted their appeal from the prophecies to the miraculous acts of
Jesus he applied his destructive allegorical method to those also, in
his Discourses on the Miracles of our Saviour (1727-30).
6. Matthew Tindal
Matthew Tindal (d. 1733), in his dialogue Christianity as Old as the
Creation, or the Gospel a Republication of the Religion of Nature
(1730), produced the standard text-book of Deism. Proceeding from
Locke's proposition of the identity of the truths of revelation with
those of reason, he adduces a new array of arguments in support of
that position. The goodness of God, the vast extent of the earth, the
long duration of human life on earth render it improbable that only to
Jews and Christians was vouchsafed the favor of perceiving truth. We
now have brought in the classic example of the three hundred million
Chinese who surely could not all be excluded from the truth, and
Confucianism begins to be extolled against much that is repugnant and
harsh in the Mosaic law. Christianity, to be the truth, must find the
substance in all religions; it must be as old as creation. The
doctrines of the fall and of original sin can not stand, since it is
irrational to believe in the exclusion from the truth of the vast
majority of humanity. Tindal's position is orthodox to the extent that
Judaism and Christianity are acknowledged as revelations, though
revelations only of the lex naturae, which is identified with natural
religion, the primitive, uncorrupted faith, consisting in "the
practise of morality in obedience to the will of God." An echo of the
teachings of Tindal is found in Thomas Chubb (d. 1747), whoseTrue
Gospel of Jesus Christ (1738) attempts to prove that what Jesus sought
to teach his followers was but natural morality, or the law of nature.
7. Morgan, Annet, and Middleton
Thomas Morgan (d. 1743) continued Tindal's argument on its historical
side in The Moral Philosopher (1737-40),displaying much originality in
tracing the development of heathen religions, as well as of Judaism
and Christianity. Abandoning the old method of deriving specific
religions from priestly deception, he explains their rise through the
gradual supplanting of the one God of the law of nature by a crowd of
divinities connected with definite natural phenomena. The legislation
of Moses, under Egyptian influences, imposed a rigid and nationally
restricted form upon the lex naturae, and the Jewish ritual and
ceremonial is in essence a purely political institution. Full
revelation of the law of nature came with Christ, who gave to the
world in concentrated form the truth that had already been revealed to
Confucius, Zoroaster, Socrates, and Plato. The protagonist of this
divinely revealed truth after Christ was Paul, who, in his form of
expression, indeed, was compelled to make concessions to the influence
of Judaism, and in whom, therefore, much is to be taken figuratively.
Peter, on the other hand, and the author of the Apocalypse
misunderstood the import of the revelation of Christ and corrupted it
in the spirit of Messianic Judaism. Persecution forced the two
tendencies into union in the Catholic Church, and the Reformation has
only partially succeeded in separating them. Morgan's argument
results, therefore, in the rejection of the formerly assumed identity
between the law of Moses and the lex naturm, and the restriction of
the latter, in the fullness of revelation, to Christianity. His
conclusions were denied by William Warburton in The Divine Legation of
Moses (1738-41). When the Christian apologists substituted for the
argument from miracles the argument from personal witness and the
credibility of Biblical evidence, Peter Annet (d. 1769), in his
Resurrection of Jesus (1744), assailed the validity of such evidence,
and first advanced the hypothesis of the illusory. death of Jesus,
suggesting also that possibly Paul should be regarded as the founder
of a new religion. In Supernaturals Examined (1747) Annet roundly
denies the possibility of miracles. Conyers Middleton (d. 1750) in his
later writings sought to bridge over the gulf between sacred and
profane history, and to test them equally by the same method. His
Inquiry into the Miraculous Powers (1748) demonstrates that the belief
in miracles is common to primitive Christianity and heathen creeds,
and that it developed to great proportions in the later life of the
Church,, so that one is then confronted with an endless succession of
miracle to which belongs the same degree of credibility that the
apologists attributed to the miracles of the Bible. Though special
reference to the New Testament was omitted, Middleton propounded a
question to answer which no serious attempt was mad when he asked why
credence should be granted to one faith that is denied to another.
8. Shaftesbury, Mandeville, Dodwell, Bolingbroke
The Deistic controversy died out in England about the middle of the
eighteenth century. The Deistic literature had exhausted its stock of
materials, while its tenets had never obtained a strong hold on the
people. The cold, inflexible, rational supernaturalism of Paley (d.
1805) was considered as the final settlement of these long conflicts.
From the beginning, however, there had been a class of critics,
representatives of the old Renaissance spirit, and inimical,
therefore, to the Stoic and Christian ethics, who had only partially
shared the views of the Deists, and in some ways had advanced to a
position far beyond them. Shaftesbury (d. 1713), in opposition to the
utilitarian and supernaturalist ethics of Locke and Clarke, developed
the conception of a strictly autonomous moral code having its basis in
a moral instinct in man whose end is to bring individual and society
to harmonious self-perfection. Bernard Mandeville (1733) adopted the
Epicureanism of Hobbes and Gassendi, studied moral problems in the
skeptical spirit of Montaigne and La Rochefoucauld, gave the
preference to Bayle over the Deists, and developed empiricism into a
sort of Agnosticism. He criticized the prevailing morality as a more
conventional lie. Christianity-which the Deists had wished, while
reforming, to maintain-he declared impossible, not only as a religion,
but as a system of morality. His Free Thought on Religion (1720) has
caused him to be included in the ranks of the Deists; but his real
position is brought out in the Fable of the Bees (1714). Henry Dodwell
(d. 1711), in Christianity not Founded on Argument(1742), attempted to
demonstrate the invalidity of the rationalistic basis for Christian
truth constructed by the Deists, from the very nature of the religious
impulse, which, being opposed to rational argumentation, calls for the
support of tradition and mystery, and finds fascination in the
attitude of credo quia absurdum. The only proof proceeds from a mystic
inner enlightenment; logical demonstrations like those of Clarke or
the Boyle lectures are only destructive of religion. Bolingbroke (d.
1751) voices the French influence in a capricious and dilettante
manner. Despising all religions as the product of enthusiasm, fraud,
and superstition, he nevertheless concedes to real Christianity the
possession of moral and rational truth; an advocate of freedom of
thought, he supports an established church in the interest of the
State and of public morals (Letters on the Study and Use of History
1752; Essays, 1753).
9. Hume's Influence
Far greater is the influence of David Hume (d. 1776), who summarized
the Deistic criticism and raised it to the level of modern scientific
method by emancipating it from the conception of a deity conceived
through the reason and by abandoning its characteristic interpretation
of history. He separates Locke's theory of knowledge from its
connection with a scheme of mechanical teleology and confines the
human mind within the realm of sense perception. Beginning then with
the crudest factors of experience and not with a religious and ethical
norm, he traces the development of systems of religion, ethics, and
philosophy in an ascending course through the ages. He thus overthrow
the Deistic philosophy of religion while lie developed their critical
method to the extent of making it the starting-point for the English
positivist philosophy of religion. Distinguishing between the
metaphysical problem of the idea of God and the historical problem of
the rise of religions, lie denied the possibility of attaining a
knowledge of deity through the reason, and explained religion as
arising from the misconception or arbitrary misinterpretation of
experience (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, written in 1751,
but not published till 1779; Natural History of Religion, 1757).
Against the justification of religion by other means than rational
Hume directs his celebrated critique of miracles, in which to the
possibility of miraculous occurrences he opposes the possibility of
error on the part of the observer or historian. Human experience,
affected by ignorance, fancy, and the imaginings of fear and hope,
explains sufficiently the growth of religion. Hume's contemporaries
failed to recognize the portentous transformation which he had
effected in the character of Deism. The Scottish "common-sense school
" saved for a time the old natural theology and the theological
argument from miracles to revelation; but in reality Hume's skeptical
method, continued by Hamilton and united to French Positivism by Mill
and Browne, became, in connection with modern ethnology and
anthropology, the basis of a psychological philosophy of religion in
which the data of outward experience are the main factors
(Evolutionism, Positivism, Agnosticism, Tylor, Spencer, Lubbock,
Andrew Lang). In so far as Hume's influence prevailed among his
contemporaries, it may be said to have amalgamated with that of
Voltaire; the "infidels," as they were now called, were Voltairians.
Most prominent among them was Gibbon (d. 1794), whose Decline and Fall
offers the first dignified pragmatic treatment of the rise of
Christianity. The fundamental principles of Deism became tinged in the
nineteenth century with skepticism, pessimism, or pantheism, but the
conceptions of natural religion retained largely their old character.
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