that emphasizes the formative role the environment plays in the
development of cognitive processes. The general theory contends that
cognitive processes develop when a tightly coupled system emerges from
real-time, goal-directed interactions between organisms and their
environment; the nature of these interactions influences the formation
and further specifies the nature of the developing cognitive
capacities. Since embodied accounts of cognition have been formulated
in a variety of different ways in each of the sub-fields comprising
cognitive science (that is, developmental psychology, artificial
life/robotics, linguistics, and philosophy of mind), a rich
interdisciplinary research program continues to emerge. Yet, all of
these different conceptions do maintain that one necessary condition
for cognition is embodiment, where the basic notion of embodiment is
broadly understood as the unique way an organism's sensorimotor
capacities enable it to successfully interact with its environmental
niche. In addition, all of the different formulations of the general
embodied cognition thesis share a common goal of developing cognitive
explanations that capture the manner in which mind, body, and world
mutually interact and influence one another to promote an organism's
adaptive success.
1. Motivation for the Movement
Although ideas applied in the embodied cognition research program can
be traced back to the seminal works of Heidegger, Piaget, Vygotsky,
Merleau-Ponty, and Dewey, the current thesis can be seen as a direct
response and, in some cases, a proposed alternative to the
cognitivist/classicist view of the mind, which conceptualizes
cognitive functions in terms of a computer metaphor. The
cognitivist/classicist research program can be defined as a
rule-based, information-processing model of cognition that 1)
characterizes problem-solving in terms of inputs and outputs, 2)
assumes the existence of symbolic, encoded representations which
enable the system to devise a solution by means of computation, and 3)
maintains that cognition can be understood by focusing primarily on an
organism's internal cognitive processes (that is, specifically those
involving computation and representation). Although this research
program is still prevalent, a number of problems have been raised
about its viability, including the symbol-grounding problem (Searle
1980, Harnad 1990), the frame problem, the common-sense problem
(Horgan and Tienson 1989), and the rule-described/expertise problem
(Dreyfus 1992).
Embodied cognition theorists view cognitivist/classicist accounts as
problematic for many reasons, but they are especially concerned that
these accounts result in an isolationist assumption that attempts to
understand cognition by focusing almost exclusively on an organism's
internal cognitive processes. Specifically, the concern is that if an
isolationist assumption rests at the heart of the
cognitivist/classicist research program, then the resulting
explanations are inaccurate because they either underplay or
completely overlook environmental factors that are essential to the
formation of an accurate explanation of cognitive development.
Consequently, this isolationist assumption is perceived to result in
decreased explanatory power since it de-emphasizes two crucial factors
that are needed to understand cognitive development: 1) the exact way
organisms are embodied, and 2) the manner in which this embodied form
simultaneously constrains and prescribes certain interactions within
the environment. In its place, embodied cognition theorists favor a
relational analysis that views the organism, the action it performs,
and the environment in which it performs it as inextricably linked.
Yet, before one can fully appreciate why embodied cognition theorists
favor a relational over an isolationist analysis, it is necessary to
discuss the theoretical assumptions that comprise the general embodied
cognition framework.
2. General Characteristics of Embodied Cognition
Since the present embodied cognition research program is in its early
stages, the general approach does not yet have hard and fast tenets
that are agreed upon by all embodied cognition theorists.
Consequently, this program is rather fluid, in that even the central
researchers are striving to understand further exactly what is meant
by embodied cognition. Yet, this should not prevent the
characterization of the common assumptions found in most embodied
cognition theories. The goal of this section is to highlight some of
the most common theoretical assumptions shared by embodied accounts of
cognition. The viewing of these assumptions together will provide a
clearer picture of what embodied cognition roughly entails as a
research program.
Once again, the central claim of embodied cognition is that an
organism's sensorimotor capacities, body and environment not only play
an important role in cognition, but the manner in which these elements
interact enables particular cognitive capacities to develop and
determines the precise nature of those capacities. Developmental
psychologist Esther Thelen (2001) further clarifies the central claim
of this research program in the following passage:
To say that cognition is embodied means that it arises from bodily
interactions with the world. From this point of view, cognition
depends on the kinds of experiences that come from having a body with
particular perceptual and motor capacities that are inseparably linked
and that together form the matrix within which memory, emotion,
language, and all other aspects of life are meshed. The contemporary
notion of embodied cognition stands in contrast to the prevailing
cognitivist stance which sees the mind as a device to manipulate
symbols and is thus concerned with the formal rules and processes by
which the symbols appropriately represent the world (xx).
Although embodied cognition accounts vary significantly across
disciplines in terms of the specific ways in which they attempt to
apply the general theory, a few common theoretical assumptions can be
found in just about any embodied view one examines. These further
theoretical assumptions help to flesh out the central thesis, and
include 1) the primacy of goal-directed actions occurring in
real-time; 2) the belief that the form of embodiment determines the
type of cognition; and 3) the view that cognition is constructive.
Each theoretical assumption will be explained by considering the work
of a theorist whose research exemplifies the particular theoretical
assumption under investigation. The first theoretical assumption, the
primacy of goal-directed actions occurring in real time, is explained
by considering research in robotics/artificial life and developmental
psychology.
a. Primacy of Goal-Directed Actions Occurring In Real-Time
Embodied cognition theorists contend that thought results from an
organism's ability to act in its environment. More precisely, what
this means is that as an organism learns to control its own movements
and perform certain actions, it develops an understanding of its own
basic perceptual and motor-based abilities, which serve as an
essential first step toward acquiring more complex cognitive
processes, such as language. Thus, goal-directed actions are described
as primary for embodied theorists because these theorists argue that
thought and language would not occur without the initial performance
of these actions. In essence these low-level actions and movements are
viewed as necessary for higher cognitive capacities to develop. In
order to consider evidence in support of this initial theoretical
assumption, one need only turn to the research of developmental
psychologists Esther Thelen and Linda Smith (Thelen and Smith 1994,
Thelen 1995). By briefly summarizing one of their numerous experiments
on infant development, we can consider why many embodied cognition
theorists characterize Thelen and Smith's research as some of the most
influential and convincing developmental evidence in support of this
assumption that "thought grows from action and that activity is the
engine of change" (Thelen 1995: 69). This discussion will highlight
why the primacy of actions unfolding in real time is one of the
defining theoretical assumptions of embodied accounts of cognition.
i. Developmental Psychology
In order to understand how infants learn to reach, Thelen and Smith
(1994) examined four different infants from the time the babies were 3
weeks old until they were 1 year old. What Thelen and Smith conclude
is that each of the four infants faced unique problems in learning to
reach based on their individual energy level, body mass and the
different ways in which they initially tried to reach (that is, their
pre-reaching behaviors). Given these different pre-reaching movements,
each of the infants had to learn a different set of strategies for
controlling their arms so that the ultimate solution was specifically
tailored to address the unique problem the particular infant was
encountering. Thus, each infant was eventually able to overcome these
developmental obstacles and learn to reach the toys, but the specific
ways in which they learned this behavior varied depending upon the
specific problem they were encountering. To understand how these
different reaching problems translated into unique reaching solutions,
let's consider two of the infants whose reaching approaches varied
considerably: Gabriel and Hannah.
Thelen and Smith describe Gabriel as an extremely active infant who
was initially unable to successfully reach the toy because he would
excitedly flap his arms, in seemingly random movements that were not
focused enough to enable him to obtain the toy. Consequently, he had
to learn to control these energetic movements so that this energy
would become more focused. By learning to control these excited
movements, he would then be able to produce a more controlled
reaching-action that would propel his hand to the desired location.
Gabriel eventually learned to reach toys after multiple unsuccessful
attempts; however, these unsuccessful reaching attempts were
instrumental in helping him realize how to adjust his muscle patterns
so that a successful reaching pattern finally emerged that enabled him
to focus his energy in the direction of the toy.
In contrast to Gabriel's need to control wildly energetic movements,
Hannah encountered quite the opposite problem. Unlike Gabriel, Hannah
is described as "a quiet, contemplative infant who was visually alert
and socially responsive, but motorically less active" (Thelen and
Smith 1994: 259). Consequently, she did not encounter control
problems, but suffered from the inability to generate enough force to
overcome gravitational forces and propel her arm forward. Like
Gabriel, Hannah learned to exert the proper amount of force needed to
successfully reach an object through trial and error. However, her
initial reaches were closer to an adult pattern than Gabriel's because
her slow movements enabled her to have more control over where her
hand would encounter the toy. Thelen and Smith (1994) conclude that:
Hannah's problem was different from Gabriel's, but it was also the
same. She, like Gabriel, had to adjust the energy of forces moving her
arm—in her case to make her arm sufficiently stiff or forceful to lift
it off her lap. What Gabriel and Hannah had in common, therefore, was
the ability to modulate the forces they delivered to the arms to
change their ongoing, but non-functional patterns to movements that
brought their hands close enough to the toys for them to make contact.
Their solutions were discovered in relation to their own situations,
carved out of their individual landscapes, and not pre-figured by a
synergy known ahead by the brain or the genes (260).
The importance of Thelen and Smith's research becomes clear when we
contrast their conclusions with the manner in which change is
explained in other leading developmental theories. Thelen notes that
in other theories change is explained by appealing to "some deus ex
machina—'the genes,' 'maturation of the brain,' 'a shift into a new
stage,' or 'an increase in information-processing capacity'" (Thelen
1995: 91). Such moves are problematic, Thelen argues since they merely
push the level of explanation back a step so that in order to fully
understand how change occurs this new theoretical mechanism must also
be explained. Moreover, Thelen notes that the unique problems
encountered and solved by individual infants make it extremely
unlikely that the solutions were innate, since no internal mechanism
could know in advance the specific "energy parameters of the system"
(Thelen 1995: 90).
In contrast to these ungrounded attempts at explanation, Thelen and
Smith claim to provide a theoretically-grounded, emergent conception
of change by explaining change in terms of a dynamical systems
framework, in which the challenge is "to understand how the system can
generate its own change, through its own activity, and within its own
continuing dynamics, be it the spring-like attractors of the limbs or
the neural dynamics of the brain" (Thelen 1995: 91).
One advantage of a dynamic systems analysis is that it can account for
how different infants must learn unique pre-reaching strategies based
on their specific energy level, body mass and the different ways in
which they initially tried to reach (that is, their pre-reaching
behaviors). Yet, despite these different techniques, Thelen and
Smith's account still identifies the common factors that all of the
infants had to learn to control: the various forces surrounding arm
control, such as gravitational resistance. By developing a dynamical
systems analysis of reaching behavior, Thelen and Smith provide a
theoretical mechanism that tries to explain the exact way in which
these different forces interact. The resulting analysis tracks how
activity brings about changes in the system, so that new types of
behavior emerge from behaviors the system already knows. This means of
generating new patterns from those that already exist results in
'environmental scaffolding', since a new behavior is generated from
the current resources of the system. Moreover, this dynamic systems
analysis enables the researcher to track how the different
movements/actions change and evolve over time. Consequently,
behaviors, such as reaching, are explained in terms of interactive
forces, which are mathematically understood since they are grounded in
the physics of action.
One possible objection to a dynamic systems analysis of development is
that this research program is limited because it will only be able to
account for low-level, goal-directed action (that is, walking,
reaching, etc.). Although this in itself would be a step forward, the
ultimate goal is to also explain the diachronic emergence of
higher-level cognitive abilities. Thus, in order to even have a chance
at explaining cognitive complexity, a dynamical systems approach must
bridge the gap between explaining how individuals acquire new
lower-order activity patterns and explaining how they acquire higher
order activity patterns, such as learning to categorize. In answer to
this concern, Thelen argues that the infant's ability to gain control
over its body in order to perform various activities enables the
infant to simultaneously learn certain categories. More specifically,
the infant learns "that a certain category of force dynamics is
appropriate for a certain class of tasks" (Thelen 1995: 95). For
instance, infants learn that objects in front of them can be fun to
play with. Therefore, these infants work to remember the ways in which
they must change their muscle patterns in order to manipulate forces,
which enables them to reach the object. Consequently, after a certain
number of experiences with particular perceptual events (e.g., the toy
in front of them), infants begin to recognize that action oriented
solutions to these events are also generalizable (e.g., class of
reaching toy behaviors). It is in this way that infants begin to
associate particular patterns of force with particular events in the
world. Thelen further explains that:
These early movements often look to be entirely without form or
meaning. But if what neuroscientists tell us about the plasticity of
the brain and how it changes is correct, infants are also continually
learning something about the perceptual-motor systems and their
relations to the world in their repeated spontaneous activity. That
is, what infants sense and what they feel in their ordinary looking
and moving are teaching their brains about their bodies and about
their worlds. They are in fact exploring what range of forces
delivered to their muscles get their arms in particular places and
then learning from their exploration, remembering how certain
categories of forces get their hands forward toward some-thing
interesting (90).
Consequently, infants must learn how to perform certain activity
patterns, such as reaching, and then remember when it is appropriate
to generate those patterns again to achieve a desired goal. In order
to effectively perform these behaviors at the appropriate times, the
infant must learn to categorize particular situations and correctly
apply the action solution that corresponds with that situation. For
example, if a baby learns how to control its arm muscles so that it
can reach a toy it desires, then it will not take long for the infant
to realize that the same type of reaching behavior can also be used to
grasp food. It is in this sense that the behaviors become generalized
as the infant learns to use its body to explore its environment.
Moreover, one might argue that the generalized categories formulated
to perform these reaching behaviors could be viewed as one instance of
intentional categorization emerging from action of a dynamical system.
Next, an examination of research conducted in the growing field of
robotics/artificial life will further clarify why the primacy of
action occurring in real time is a defining theoretical assumption
that guides research in all areas of embodied cognition.
ii. Robotics/Artificial Life
Until recently, almost all of the robots built in the field of
artificial intelligence were constructed according to the
stored-description model. Building systems, according to the
stored-description technique, requires programmers to guess at the
conditions the robot will encounter, and then to spell out all of the
relevant information that is needed for the system to generate an
appropriate response in its environment. Determining what information
to include in the system is difficult, since the programmer must
anticipate everything the robot will need to know to perform its task
as well as providing the robot a response to any unexpected
environmental features that might throw it off task. This process of
explicitly stating all of the necessary information is further
complicated by the fact that the system does not start with any prior
knowledge, or even a simplistic understanding of the kinds of things
existing in the world. So, even if all of the relevant information is
correctly represented in the system, there are still no guarantees the
robot will correctly perform its task, since it must then determine
what makes a piece of information relevant in one situation and not in
another. Given these challenges, robots utilizing the stored
description model are very brittle and tend to malfunction in
environments when they encounter unexpected events, or multiple soft
constraints.
In the early 1980's, MIT roboticist Rodney Brooks became dissatisfied
with the stored-description approach as well as with the general
direction of artificial intelligence research. Although systems were
being built that could play chess and calculate taxes, behaviors
commonly associated with higher cognitive functions, Brooks argued
that little progress was being made on developing systems that could
quickly perform simple environmental tasks. After all, if one of the
goals of robotics is to simulate how human cognitive processes work,
then constructing robots only according to the stored description
approach becomes problematic if these robots cannot adapt and change
with their environment; abilities attributed to even simpler
organisms, like insects. Therefore, Brooks decided to try to build a
robot that could thrive in an environment without utilizing a central
planning facility; the result was Herbert.
Herbert was designed to wander around the MIT lab disposing of empty
soda cans. Although Herbert's task might seem relatively simple, to
accomplish it successfully he had to perform a number sub-tasks;
including identifying empty soda cans from full ones, avoiding the
stationary tables and chairs in his path, and maneuvering around the
seldom-stationary people who also inhabit the lab. In order to
efficiently accomplish his task of can removal, Herbert relied on what
Brook's called a "subsumption architecture," which consisted of a
number of connected layers, each responsible for performing a specific
task; actions emerged from the suppression or activation of various
sub-systems. As Herbert moved through his environment, he continuously
encountered stimuli, which dictated which layer was activated at any
given time. For instance, once Herbert's object-detection layer
successfully detected a wall obstructing its path, it activated the
object-avoidance layer, which shut down the layer responsible for
forward motion. The various connected layers plus the environmental
stimuli ultimately determine the suppression or activation of a
particular layer. Brooks argued that the subsumption architecture
enables Herbert to "use the world as its own best representation"
since Herbert does not need to refer to a detailed map of his
surroundings before determining how to react. Instead, in systems such
as Herbert, an effective interface is continually recreated between
the system and the world without relying on a central planning
facility to dictate commands, or encoding classicist representations.
Brook's subsumption architecture provided an alternative to the
stored-description architecture by demonstrating that a robot could
quickly react in its environment without the aid of a formal plan.
From a design perspective, this development was an important
accomplishment since a smart tradeoff was achieved; a fast reaction
time was gained by developing sub-systems/layers that generated
behaviors that reacted to types of phenomena (that is, avoiding walls
in general) instead of tokens (that is, avoiding wall #3). Since
Herbert's task could be successfully executed without needing to
re-identify one wall from the next, Herbert's wall avoidance layer
reacts to every wall in the same manner—by avoiding it. Consequently,
knowledge of tokens was traded for knowledge of types in a manner that
promoted speed.
In summary, Brooks' research in artificial life, as well as the
research of many other roboticists (see also Mataric 1992, Agre and
Chapman 1997, Tilden 1999, Mataric, Clancey 1997), helps to clarify
the first theoretical assumption of embodied cognition: the primacy of
goal-directed action occurring in real time. One reason that Brooks'
research is an excellent example of this theoretical assumption is his
emphasis on developing robots that employ quick, cost-effective
solutions to "everyday" problems encountered in an environment.
Although much more progress needs to occur in Artificial Life before
architectures are developed that are capable of explaining behaviors
associated with higher cognitive processes, these early architectures
are still able to do something the classicist/cognitivist systems have
not: provide a preliminary attempt at modeling some of the simple,
low-level behaviors that are necessary for survival.
In addition, the earlier examination of Thelen and Smith's research
provides us with another example of why embodied cognition accounts
maintain that action occurring in real time is the essential to
understanding cognitive development. Specifically, a dynamic systems
analysis is capable of tracking the way in which behaviors evolve and
unfold over time; this real-time analysis is completely missing from
current classicist/cognitivist accounts of developmental change.
b. Form of Embodiment Constrains Kinds of Cognitive Processes
The next theoretical assumption to which most embodied cognition
theorists ascribe is the belief that the embodiment of an organism
simultaneously limits and prescribes the types of cognitive processes
that are available to it. In other words, the particular way in which
an organism is embodied (e.g., whether it has feet, fins, eyes, a
tail, etc.) will influence how it performs goal-directed actions in
the world, and the particular sensorimotor experiences connected with
these actions will serve as the basis for category and concept
formation.
To illustrate this point, consider how two very different organisms, a
child and a puppy, will try to play with a ball. If the child wishes
to get the ball, she will most likely use her hands, but she could
also use her feet. Yet, she will not normally use her mouth to get the
ball, even if the size of the ball does not preclude this option. This
is because, aside from being culturally frowned upon, the other
options enable greater control, are easier to perform, and are
culturally sanctioned. However, a puppy has fewer options, and will
most likely grab the ball with its mouth, since its particular form of
embodiment will not enable it to grasp the ball with its paws.
Although there are further differences related to how the child and
puppy can perceive and interact with the ball, including the fact that
the child's visual system will include color cues, while the dog's
visual system will only enable it to see the ball in black and white,
the important point is that, in each case, the way the organism is
embodied constrains the options available to it.
A further point is that each of these different types of interactions
(that is, grabbing with one's hands, clutching with one's mouth,
pouncing with one's paws, etc.) has its own set of corresponding
sensorimotor experiences, which directly influence how the organism
interacts with the object. This is because the continuous feedback
from these sensorimotor experiences serves as the basis for how the
organism understands a specific interaction. Moreover, since
activities always take place in a specific environmental context, such
as when a child plays soccer with a friend on a spring day, the
sensorimotor driven understanding of the situation that is gained from
performing the activity in these circumstances can further inform how
the organism might carry out future attempts at performing the same
activity.
In general, environmental factors are very important because they can
influence not only what options are available to a particular
organism, but also why an organism might choose one option over
another when performing a particular goal-directed activity. For
instance, weather conditions, the size of the ball, the rules of the
game, and whether or not an individual has any broken limbs will most
likely factor into their decision to throw the ball, or kick it. Yet,
all of this person's past experiences with an object in these varied
activity-based contexts will in some way contribute to their current
understanding of the activity. The individual's understanding of these
past experiences is directly informed by the kinds of sensorimotor
experiences their form of embodiment allows.
The various sensorimotor experiences that occur while performing an
action in a particular environmental context further specify the type
of categories/concepts the organism is capable of forming. For
instance, it is common for a small child to have a basic understanding
of concepts related to macroscopic objects, such as grass, that are
likely to exist in her immediate environment, while having little to
no real understanding of concepts related to microscopic objects, such
as bacteria, that might be found in the same environment. It is not
surprising that the child gains an understanding of the macroscopic
first, because these objects are the ones that she can see, taste,
feel, hear, and smell unaided. In other words, she has sensorimotor
experiences that are directly linked to the macroscopic objects in her
environment, and these experiences serve as the foundation for concept
formation. Not surprisingly, direct experience of microscopic entities
will most likely occur later in the child's life, when she is
introduced to tools, such as a microscope, that will enable the
detection of these entities. The child can also acquire indirect
knowledge of microscopic entities if the explanation is cast in terms
of those things that she already does understand, namely entities
found on the macroscopic level.
In conclusion, the way in which we are embodied determines the type of
action patterns we can perform and these action patterns shape our
cognitive functions (that is, the way in which we can conceptualize
and categorize). This is because most embodied cognition theorists
argue that category and concept formation is made possible and
constrained by the particular sensorimotor experiences of the
organism. It is in this sense that the form of embodiment partly
determines the kind of cognitive processes available to the organism.
Psychologists, such as Barsalou (1983, 1997), Glenberg (1997,1999),
and Thelen and Smith (1994), are but a few of the cognitive scientists
who adopt this theoretical assumption even though the specific content
of their individual views varies. For instance, Glenberg (1997)
illustrates how cognition results from embodiment due to'mesh,' which
refers to the particular way in which affordances, knowledge, and
goals combine. Yet, Barsalou (1997) develops a theory of simulation,
and as demonstrated earlier, Thelen and Smith (1994) explain the
emergence of this theoretical assumption according to a dynamical
systems framework. Thus, all of these individuals agree with the
theoretical assumption that the form of embodiment partly determines
the cognitive processes available to the organism, but they still
debate precisely how this occurs.
c. Cognition is Constructive
If the way we conceptualize and categorize is based on the way we are
embodied, then according to embodied cognition theorists these
concepts and categories are actively constructed and not merely
apprehended wholesale from an observer-independent environment. The
point here is that the way in which we are embodied not only
constrains the way we can interact in the world, but our particular
form of embodiment also partly determines the way the world appears to
us. In effect, it does not follow from the existence of an
observer-independent world that this world is seen in the same manner
by all organisms. Instead, the claim is that certain environmental
features are re-constructed depending upon a number of relevant
factors, including the task at hand (that is, the goal-oriented action
being performed), the functioning sensorimotor modalities, the vantage
point of the organism, the form of embodiment, etc. The basic idea is
that the organism actively constructs a sensorimotor representation
that is based on those environmental features that are directly
relevant to the goal-directed action it is currently performing.
Consequently, environmental space X could be viewed differently by the
same organism depending on the type of task the organism is performing
in that space, primarily because the goal-directed activity determines
which environmental features are relevant to the successful
performance of the activity. For instance, individuals attend to
different features when they are preparing to mow a stretch of grass
with a lawn mover, than when they are playing soccer on it later the
same day. This is because the environmental features one must observe
to successfully mow the lawn are different from those that impact
playing soccer well.
In direct contrast to viewing cognition as actively constructed from
select environmental features, the cognitivist/classicist assumption
is that the world has a set of pre-given features that are passively
retrieved from the environment through representations that mirror the
world; the way the organism is built and its particular goal-directed
actions are not viewed as integral to the cognitivist/classicist
analysis. Yet, embodied cognition theorists question the evolutionary
viability of viewing cognition as passive retrieval; they maintain it
is too time-consuming and unnecessary for organisms to formulate
representations that completely mirror environmental features that are
unrelated to the goal-directed activity the organism is currently
performing. In response, the classicist/cognitivist might argue that a
more serious problem results if you do claim that the embodiment of an
organism determines how it will view the world; the very existence of
an observer-independent world is called into question if an organism's
understanding of the world is constructed.
The embodied cognition theorist might respond that the
classicist/cognitivist has misinterpreted what it means to claim that
cognition is a constructive process. By constructive, Embodied
theorists do not mean to imply that there is no objective, external
reality and that everything is subjective. Instead, the point is that
a type of mutual specification occurs between the organism and its
environment, so that the way the world looks and the way in which the
organism can interact in the world is primarily determined by the way
the organism is embodied. So, an observer-independent world can be
granted, but embodied cognition theorists claim that an organism will
understand this world in terms of the unique sensorimotor relations it
experiences. These fundamental sensorimotor experiences achieved
through acting in the world are actively constructed to facilitate
concept formation. For instance, we view our bodies as having distinct
fronts and backs. Due to the characteristics we associate with each of
these bodily spatial relations, linguist George Lakoff and philosopher
Mark Johnson (1999) argue that we also characterize objects in the
world according to these assignments (that is, go to the front of the
house, that is the back of her shirt, etc.). This process is
considered to be constructive because we project these characteristics
onto the world because they reflect the foundational understanding we
have of our own bodies.
Consequently, if we were embodied differently then we would not see
the world in this particular way, but in terms of our new set of
defining bodily characteristics. However, by taking into account the
bodies that we do have, our actual projected spatial assignments can
be traced back to sensorimotor experience, which enables the formation
of spatial schemas that are projected onto a scene to facilitate
reasoning without the use of deductive logic. These schemas are
constructive because they do not mirror what exists in the world.
Instead, these schemas structure elements within the world in such a
way that the individuals can understand their environment quickly.
Given this, it should not be surprising that one way for an organism
to interpret its environment is in terms of something it already knows
well: its own bodily interactions.
A number of arguments in support of the constructive nature of
cognition are also offered In The Embodied Mind, in which cognitive
scientist Francisco Varela, philosopher Evan Thompson and psychologist
Eleanor Rosch argue at length that color "provides a paradigm of a
cognitive domain that is neither pre-given nor represented but rather
experiential and enacted" (1991:171). Specifically, Varela, Thompson,
and Rosch maintain that our ability to see colors results from the
active interplay of various sensorimotor modalities. The
interconnected way in which these different sensorimotor modalities
mutually affect one another is clearly demonstrated in the case of the
colorblind painter; a neurological case study from which Varela et al
are not merely arguing that color is constructive as a result of the
visual system, but they are making the stronger claim that "color
perception partakes of both other visual and sensory modalities"
(164).
In this case study, a painter (hereafter Mr. I) who completely lost
his ability to see colors after a car accident finds that this loss
directly affected the way he experienced other sensorimotor
experiences, such as taste and sound. As a result of his accident, he
was only able to see the world in varying degrees of black, white and
gray. Moreover, Mr. I was not able to imagine colors, dream in colors,
or remember what colors looked like. Since he was no longer viewing
the world as colored in any of these ways, Mr. I reported that the
nature of his experience of the world was also affected dramatically.
Reportedly, everything around him "had a distasteful, 'dirty' look,
the whites glaring, yet discolored and off white, the black
cavernous-everything wrong, unnatural, stained, and impure." Due to
this abrupt change in the way he was viewing his environment, he
stated that he was no longer able to have sex or enjoy food. Moreover,
Mr. I was not able to enjoy music to the degree he had before the
accident since he was no longer able to visually transform musical
notes into color sequences.
After living with this condition for some time, Mr. I remarked that
while he was initially upset about his inability to perceive color, he
now no longer misses it. In fact, he reported that his actions, tastes
and behaviors have naturally adjusted over time to reflect that of a
night person. He stated that "I love the night time….I often wonder
about people who work at night. They never see the sunlight. They
prefer it….It's a different world: there's a lot of space—you're not
hemmed in by streets, people….It's a whole new world. Gradually I am
becoming a night person. At one time I felt kindly toward color, very
happy about it….Now I don't even know it exists—it's not even a
phantom" (164). Varela et al. concluded that:
This description provides rare insight into how our perceived
world, which we usually take for granted, is constituted through
complex and delicate patterns of sensorimotor activity. Our colored
world is brought forth by complex processes of structural coupling.
When these processes are altered, some forms of behavior are no longer
possible. One's behavior changes as one learns to cope with new
conditions and situations. And, as one's actions change, so too does
one's sense of the world. If these changes are dramatic enough—as in
Mr. I's loss of color—then a different perceived world will be enacted
(164).
This case is meant to illustrate that if one's ability to see color is
completely removed, then other sensorimotor experiences are also
affected. Varela et al. argue that since vision is not the only
modality affected by Mr. I's accident, his condition provides some
insight into the way in which "perception and action, sensorium and
motorium, are linked together as successively emergent and mutually
selecting patterns" (163).
Although color is but one example of the way in which cognition is
constructive, the above case study might prompt one to ask what is the
proper or correct way to view the world? According to Embodied
theorists, the answer is that there is no single proper or correct way
of viewing the world, since being able to correctly see the world
translates into using whatever sensorimotor modalities one has to act
successfully in one's environment. Moreover, since an organism's
sensorimotor apparatus determines the way it will experience the
world, many embodied theorists argue that instead of assuming that
every organism shares the exact same view of the world (that is, we
all view an objective reality in the same way), it makes more sense to
acknowledge that an organism's particular view of the world is the
direct result of its functioning sensorimotor experiences. The point
is that an organism's knowledge of the world is primarily through its
experiences within the world and these experiences are constrained by
the types of functioning sensorimotor modalities it has. When one of
these modalities is impaired, then its experience of the world will
similarly be affected on multiple levels, since these modalities
influence one another. The case of the colorblind painter illustrates
the cross-modal natures of sensori-motor experience by showing that
the impairment of one modality (color) affected the way the world was
experienced in other modalities (taste, sound, etc.) to the point that
certain previously performed actions suddenly no longer make sense.
Therefore, the type of structural coupling that enables color
perception to occur is a paradigm example of constructive cognition.
The theoretical assumption that at least some forms of cognition are
constructive is supported by a growing number of theorists from a
variety of disciplines. Varela et al. argue that the coupling that
occurs between organism and environment results in constructive
cognition. Lakoff and Johnson (1999) argue that cognition is
constructive since it involves projecting schemas (e.g., bodily) and
combining these schemas to create a metaphorical understanding of the
world. Glenberg (1997, 1999), Damasio (1994), and Fauconnier and
Turner (2002) are but a few of the cognitive scientists who maintain
that cognition is in some way constructive. Thus, this theoretical
assumption is becoming more widely supported in the embodied cognition
literature.
3. Embodied Cognition vs. Classicism/Cognitivism
Based on the analysis of the above theoretical assumptions of embodied
cognition, it is now possible to directly contrast the central themes
of the embodied cognition research program with those commonly
expressed in the classicist/cognitivist research program:
Classicist/Cognitivist View Embodied Cognition View
1. Computer metaphor of mind; rule-based, logic driven. 1. Coupling
metaphor of mind; form of embodiment + environment + action constrain
cognitive processes.
2. Isolationist analysis – cognition can be understood by focusing
primarily on an organism's internal processes. 2. Relational
analysis-interplay among mind, body, and environment must be studied
to understand cognition.
3. Primacy of computation. 3. Primacy of goal-directed action
unfolding in real time.
4. Cognition as passive retrieval. 4. Cognition as active
construction based upon an organism's embodied, goal-directed actions
5. Symbolic, encoded representations 5. Sensorimotor representations
Although most embodied cognition accounts do adhere to the theoretical
assumptions outlined in this entry, it is important to recognize that
this rapidly changing research program encompasses a diverse group of
theorists, who are continuing to refine and revise the preliminary
theoretical assumptions associated with the embodied cognition view.
Consequently, some accounts may reject one of the outlined
assumptions, yet still identify as an embodied account of cognition.
4. Philosophical Implications of the Embodied Cognition Research Program
The ultimate claim of embodied theorists is that new insights into
previously unanswered questions concerning cognitive development will
be attained if cognitive scientists re-orient their approach and
conduct research in a manner that acknowledges the crucial links
existing among an organism's brain, body, and world. Yet, this
immediately begs the question: what does it mean for researchers to
re-orient their approach? Once again, there is no consensus among the
embodied cognition theorists as to what this re-orientation entails;
however; there are currently two distinct views concerning how
cognitive scientists should apply the general embodied cognition
thesis, each with different methodological implications.
a. The Compatibilist Approach
The Compatibalist Approach to Embodied Cognition involves using a
variety of methods to explain cognitive processes. In some cases, the
phenomena will call for a classicist/cognitivist analysis and in other
cases the methods associated with the embodied cognition framework
will make more sense. Researchers who endorse this compatibalist view,
such as philosopher Andy Clark (1997), argue that it would be a
mistake to completely dispense with the theoretical tools associated
with classicist/cognitivist models, especially since it is unclear if
embodied cognition accounts will be able to adequately explain higher
level processes (e.g., meta-cognitive states such as the ability to
think about one's own thoughts) without invoking on some level a
computational or representational analysis. In short, embodied
cognition theorists who endorse a compatibalist view to research are
hedging their bets, and leaving open the possibility of utilizing
tools from multiple theoretical frameworks. A potential problem with
compatibalist conceptions is that it is not clear how mechanisms/tools
derived from opposing theoretical frameworks can be successfully
linked together, since these frameworks employ at best different, and
at times mutually exclusive, assumptions about the world (that is,
cognition is constructive vs. cognition is passive). Given this, one
might question how mechanisms derived from a cognitivist framework can
hook-up and mutually inform mechanisms derived from embodied
frameworks so that a theoretically viable explanation emerges despite
the fundamental theoretical differences. Perhaps it is this very
concern that has led some embodied cognition theorists to endorse a
more stringent form of embodied cognition: the purist approach to
embodied cognition.
b. The Purist Approach
The Purist Approach to Embodied Cognition is often characterized as
the radical version of the embodied cognition thesis because
researchers who adopt it argue that the classicist/cognitivist thesis
is incorrect. Consequently, they claim that any tools or theoretical
mechanisms developed from classicist/cognitivist assumptions are also
flawed. Instead, these classicist/cognitivist tools cannot be
augmented, but must be completely replaced with a diverse set of
tools/mechanisms that are consistent with the central embodied
cognition thesis. One problem with the purist view of embodied
cognition is that there is no guarantee that the necessary
tools/mechanisms will be developed to enable embodied theorists to
explain these higher cognitive processes, especially those specific to
human cognition. Even though a number of promising theoretical tools
currently exist (that is, dynamic systems theory, schemas, conceptual
blending, mesh, etc.), those researchers who are adopting the purist
approach are clearly gambling that more sophisticated theoretical
tools/mechanisms will be developed in the near future to adequately
explain the emergence of higher cognitive processes. Although it is
too early to say definitively what the outcome will be, it is clear
that the general embodiment thesis can no longer be ignored by
researchers in cognitive science, including philosophers of mind,
since the very thesis calls into question widely-held assumptions
about cognition.
5. References and Further Reading Brooks, R. (1991). "Intelligence
without representation." Artificial Intelligence, 47, 139-159.
Clancey, W. (1997). Situated Cognition: On Human Knowledge and
Computer Representations. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Clark, A. (1997). Being There: Putting Brain Body and World Together
Again. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Recommended)
Clark, A. (1999). "Embodied, situated, and distributed cognition." In
W. Betchel and G. Graham (eds), A Companion to Cognitive Science,
Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
Clark, A. and Chalmers, D. (1998). The extended mind. Analysis, 58, 7-19.
Cisek, P. (1999). "Beyond the Computer Metaphor: Behavior as
Interaction." In Nunez, R. and Freeman, W., Reclaiming Cognition: the
primacy of action intention and emotion, Bowling Green, OH: Imprint
Academic.
Dreyfus, H. (1972/92). What Computers Can't Do: A Critique of
Artificial Reason. New York: Harper and Row. (Third edition: What
Computers Still Can't Do. 1992. Cambridge, MA: MIT)
Fauconnier, G. and Turner, M. (2002). The Way We Think: Conceptual
Blending and the Mind's Hidden Complexities. New York, NY: Basic
Books.
Glenberg, A. (1997). "What memory is for: Creating meaning in the
service of action." Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 20, 1-55.
Glenberg, A. (1999). "Why Mental Models Must Be Embodied." In Mental
Models in Discourse Processing and Reasoning, Rickheit, G. and Habel,
C. (eds). New York: Elsevier.
Harnad, S. (1990). "The symbol grounding problem." Physica D, 42,335-346.
Horgan, T and Tienson, J. (1989). "Representations Without Rules."
Philosophical Topics, 17 (Spring), 147-174.
*Hutchins, E. (1995). Cognition in the Wild. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
(Recommended)
*Lakoff, G., and Johnson, M. (1999). Philosophy In the Flesh: The
Embodied Mind And Its Challenge To Western Thought. New York, NY:
Basic Books. (Recommended)
Mataric, M. J. (1992). "Integration of representation into goal-driven
behavior based robots." IEEE Transactions on Robotics and Automation,
8 (3): 304-312.
Searle, J. (1980). "Minds, brains, and programs." Behavioral and Brain
Sciences, 1, 417-424.
Thelen, E.,and Smith, L. (1994). A Dynamic Systems Approach to the
Development of Cognition and Action. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Thelen, E. (1995). "Time-scale dynamics in the development of an
embodied cognition." In Mind In Motion, ed. R. Port and T. van Gelder.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Thelen, E., Schoner, G., Scheier, C., and Smith, L.B.(2001). "The
Dynamics of Embodiment: A Field Theory of Infant Perservative
Reaching." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24: 1-86.
Varela, F., Thompson, E., Rosch, E. (1991). The Embodied Mind.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
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