people have voluntary control over their beliefs. Philosophers in the
debate about doxastic voluntarism distinguish between two kinds of
voluntary control. The first is known as direct voluntary control and
refers to acts which are such that if a person chooses to perform
them, they happen immediately. For instance, a person has direct
voluntary control over whether he or she is thinking about his or her
favorite song at a given moment. The second is known as indirect
voluntary control and refers to acts which are such that although a
person lacks direct voluntary control over them, he or she can cause
them to happen if he or she chooses to perform some number of other,
intermediate actions. For instance, a person untrained in music has
indirect voluntary control over whether he or she will play a melody
on a violin. Corresponding to this distinction between two kinds of
voluntary control, philosophers distinguish between two kinds of
doxastic voluntarism. Direct doxastic voluntarism claims that people
have direct voluntary control over at least some of their beliefs.
Indirect doxastic voluntarism, however, supposes that people have
indirect voluntary control over at least some of their beliefs, for
example, by doing research and evaluating evidence. This article
offers an introductory explanation of the nature of belief, the nature
of voluntary control, the reasons for the consensus regarding indirect
doxastic voluntarism, the reasons for the disagreements regarding
direct doxastic voluntarism, and the practical implications for the
debate about doxastic voluntarism in ethics, epistemology, political
theory, and the philosophy of religion.
1. Introduction
The central issue in the debate about doxastic voluntarism is the
relationship between willing and acquiring beliefs. Necessarily
related to this central issue are two other important issues: the
nature of belief and the nature of the will, or more specifically, the
nature of voluntary control. In order to provide a basic foundation
for understanding the central issue, let us begin by clarifying each
of these related issues.
First, let us make a preliminary and necessarily cursory clarification
about the nature of belief. Consider your own case. Assuming that you
are like most people, you believe a wide variety of things. Among the
various things you believe, is one of them that the sum of
thirty-seven and three is forty? If all went well, as you read and
replied to that question, two things happened: (i) you comprehended
the proposition the sum of thirty-seven and three is forty—that is, it
was immediately present to your mind, you understood it, and you
actively considered it, etc.—and (ii) you answered affirmatively. In
light of such examples, philosophers have traditionally characterized
the nature of belief as follows. To say that a person believes a
proposition is to say that, at a given moment, the person both
comprehends and affirms the proposition. It is in this sense that
Augustine claims, "To believe is nothing but to think with assent"
(Augustine, De Praedestione Sanctorum, v; cf. Aquinas, Summa
Theologicae II-II, Q. 2, a. 1; Descartes, Meditations IV, Principles
of Philosophy I.34; Russell 1921. For a detailed discussion of the
nature of assent, see, for example, Newman 1985.).
This traditional characterization is a reasonable starting point for
understanding the nature of belief, but it is at the very least
incomplete. To see why, reflect on your own experience of considering
the above-raised question. Both prior to and subsequent to considering
the question, the proposition the sum of thirty-seven and three is
forty was neither immediately present to your mind nor something you
were actively considering. Nonetheless, you still believed it, and you
still believe it. In this respect, you are like most other people.
There are, as a matter of fact, some propositions that people believe
about which they are currently thinking and others that they believe
about which they are not currently thinking. To account for this fact,
let us amend the traditional characterization of belief. To say that a
person believes some proposition is to say that, at a given moment,
the person either
i) comprehends and affirms the proposition, or
ii) is disposed to comprehend and to affirm the proposition (cf.
Audi 1994, Price 1954, Ryle 2000, Scott-Kakures 1994, Schwitzgebel
2002).
There are, as one might expect, a number of subtle and controversial
issues regarding the nature of belief that one could raise at this
point, and addressing such issues would certainly be important in
developing a complete theory about doxastic voluntarism. This amended
description of belief should be sufficient, however, for our
introductory discussion.
Second, let us make a preliminary and, again, necessarily cursory
clarification about the nature of voluntary control. Take a moment to
visualize the White House or to imagine the melody of your favorite
song. Such mental activities are not difficult. Assuming your mental
faculties are functioning properly, if you choose to perform these
actions, they will happen immediately. They are things over which you
have, what we will call, direct voluntary control. Suppose, however,
that you want to learn either to play a particular song on a musical
instrument on which you are currently untrained or to say a particular
phrase in a foreign language that you do not currently speak. You will
not acquire these abilities immediately after choosing to do so.
Rather, you will have to choose to engage in a series of acts (for
example, attending lessons, practicing, etc.) that will eventually
result in your acquiring of these abilities. So, you do not have
direct voluntary control over whether you can play a musical
instrument or learn a foreign language. Nonetheless, acquiring
abilities such as these is something that you choose to do. Thus, it
is something over which you have a form of voluntary control—namely,
what we will call, indirect voluntary control.
As with the nature of belief, at this point one could raise a number
of subtle and controversial issues regarding the nature of voluntary
control, and addressing such issues would surely be important in
developing a complete theory about doxastic voluntarism. (For related
discussions of these issues, see, for example, Alston 1989, Steup
2000, Nottelmann 2006.) Nonetheless, this distinction between direct
and indirect voluntary control should be sufficient for our
introductory discussion.
Corresponding to this distinction between direct and indirect
voluntary control, philosophers distinguish between direct doxastic
voluntarism and indirect doxastic voluntarism. The former is concerned
with answering the question: to what extent, if any, do people have
direct voluntary control over their beliefs? The latter is concerned
with answering the question: to what extent, if any, do people have
indirect voluntary control over their beliefs? Since the debate about
indirect doxastic voluntarism is less contentious, let us examine it
first.
2. Indirect Doxastic Voluntarism
Is indirect doxastic voluntarism true? Consider the following cases.
First, suppose you walk into a room that is dark but has a working
light that you can turn on by flipping the switch on the wall. When
you walk into the room, you believe the proposition the light in the
room is off. You realize, though, that you could change your belief by
flipping the switch, so you flip the switch. The light comes on, and
subsequently, you believe the proposition the light in the room is on.
Second, suppose a usually trustworthy friend tells you that Paul David
Hewson is one of the most popular singers of all time. You have no
idea who this Hewson fellow is, but you would like to know whether you
should trust your friend and, hence, believe the proposition Paul
David Hewson is one of the most popular singers of all time. So, you
do some research and discover that Paul David Hewson is the legal name
of the incredibly popular lead singer for the Irish rock band U2.
Consequently, you come to believe that Paul David Hewson is one of the
most popular singers of all time. Thus, there are at least two cases
in which someone has indirect voluntary control over his or her
beliefs.
These cases, however, are not unique. The first illustrates that
people have indirect voluntary control over whether they will believe
any proposition, if they have voluntary control over the evidence
confirming or disconfirming the proposition. The second illustrates
that people have indirect voluntary control over whether they will
believe many propositions, provided that they can discover evidence
confirming or disconfirming these propositions, that they choose to
seek out this evidence, and that they form their beliefs according to
the evidence.
The significance of cases such as these is widely recognized among
participants in the debate about doxastic voluntarism. (For summaries
of such cases, see, for example, Alston 1989, Feldman 2001.) In fact,
they are so widely accepted that philosophers seem to have reached a
consensus on one aspect of the debate, recognizing that indirect
doxastic voluntarism is true. In light of this consensus, they focus
the majority of their attention on the more contentious question of
direct doxastic voluntarism, to which we will now turn.
3. Direct Doxastic Voluntarism
Is direct doxastic voluntarism true? On this issue, philosophers are
divided. Many argue that it is not, but some argue that it is. To each
position, however, there are important challenges. Let us consider the
most influential arguments and counterarguments in some detail,
beginning with arguments against direct doxastic voluntarism.
a. Arguments against Direct Doxastic Voluntarism
i. The Classic Argument
Bernard Williams (1970) offers two arguments against direct doxastic
voluntarism. Call the first "The Classic Argument," since it is,
perhaps, the locus classicus of the debate. Call the second "The
Empirical Belief Argument," since the notion of empirical belief is
its essential feature.
The Classic Argument runs as follows: If people could believe
propositions at will, then they could judge propositions to be true
regardless of whether they thought the propositions were, in fact,
true. Moreover, they would know that they had this power—that is, the
power to form a judgment regarding a proposition regardless of whether
they thought it was true. For instance, direct doxastic voluntarism
seems to imply that, at this very moment, Patti could form the belief
that Oswald killed Kennedy regardless of whether, at this very moment,
she regards the proposition Oswald killed Kennedy as true or as false.
Moreover, if direct doxastic voluntarism is correct, then it seems
that Patti would know that she has the power to form a judgment
regarding the proposition Oswald killed Kennedy regardless of whether
she considers the proposition to be true. This phenomenon, however, is
at odds with the nature of belief for the following reason. If a
person believes that a proposition is true, then he or she would be
surprised (or experience some related form of cognitive dissonance) to
discover that the proposition is false. Similarly, if a person
believes that a proposition is false, then he or she would be
surprised (or experience some related form of cognitive dissonance) to
discover that the proposition is true. For instance, if Patti believes
that Oswald killed Kennedy, then she would experience some form of
cognitive dissonance upon discovering that C.I.A. operatives killed
Kennedy. Similarly, if Patti believes that Oswald did not kill
Kennedy, then she would experience some form of cognitive dissonance
upon discovering that he did. Thus, people could not seriously think
of the beliefs they set out to acquire at will as beliefs—such as the
things that "purport to represent reality." Thus, Williams continues,
With regard to no belief could I know—or, if all this is to be
done in full consciousness, even suspect—that I had acquired it at
will. But if I can acquire beliefs at will, I must know that I am able
to do this; and could I know that I was capable of this feat, if with
regard to every feat of this kind which I had performed I necessarily
had to believe that it had not taken place? (1970, 108)
Williams suggests that the answer to his rhetorical question is clear:
'no'. It follows that such a person would not know that he or she is
capable of acquiring beliefs at will and, hence, that such a person
could not acquire beliefs at will. Therefore, Williams suggests,
direct doxastic voluntarism is not merely false; rather it is
conceptually impossible (1970, 108).
Critics, however, argue that The Classic Argument has at least three
major flaws. First, they suggest that there is a difference between
belief acquisition and belief fixation. It is at least possible that
at one moment a person could will, in full consciousness, to acquire a
belief concerning a proposition merely for practical reasons,
regardless of the truth of the proposition. Once the person does this,
however, he or she might perceive the evidence for the proposition
differently than before—such that he or she comes to perceive some
fact, which previously seemed like a terrible evidence for the
proposition, as conclusive evidence for the proposition. In which
case, the person's belief would be fixed for theoretical reasons that
are concerned with the truth of the proposition. Thus, the person
might perceive his or her previous position as a kind of doxastic
blindness, in which he or she failed to recognize the evidence for
what it really is—namely, conclusive evidence. Hence, it is possible
that at one moment a person could will, in full consciousness, to
acquire a belief regardless of the truth of the proposition, and in
the next moment regard his or her belief as a belief and believe that
his or her belief was acquired at will just a moment ago. Therefore,
critics conclude, The Classic Argument fails (cf. Johnston 1995, 438;
Winters 1979, 253; see also Scott-Kakures 1994).
Second, they contend that a person could know, in general, that he or
she had the ability to acquire beliefs at will without knowing that
any particular belief was acquired at will. Jonathan Bennett
illustrates the objection nicely with a thought experiment involving a
group of fictional characters called 'Credamites'. According to
Bennett's tale,
Credam is a community each of whose members can be immediately
induced to acquire beliefs. It doesn't happen often, because they
don't often think: 'I don't believe that p, but it would be good if I
did.' Still, such thoughts come to them occasionally, and on some of
those occasions the person succumbs to temptation and will himself to
have the desired belief. […] When a Credamite gets a belief in this
way, he forgets that this is how he came by it. The belief is always
one that he has entertained and has thought to have some evidence in
its favour; though in the past he has rated the counter-evidence more
highly, he could sanely have inclined the other way. When he wills
himself to believe, that is what happens: he wills himself to find the
other side more probable. After succeeding, he forgets that he willed
himself to do it. (1990, 93)
To understand, more clearly, how Bennett's Credamites can exercise
direct voluntary control over their beliefs, consider a particular
(hypothetical) case. Suppose there is a Credamite who is very ill and
who finds it possible, but less than likely, that she will recover
from her illness. Nonetheless, her chances of recovery will increase
if she believes that she will recover from her illness, and she is
aware of this connection between her beliefs and her illness. So, as
any rational Credamite might, she simply chooses to believe that she
will recover and, consequently, forgets that she willed herself to
form the belief. Thus, Bennett's thought experiment suggests that,
contrary to what Williams claims, there could be beings who have the
ability to form beliefs at will, choose to exercise that ability on a
specific occasion, and immediately forget that they exercised their
ability on that occasion (see also Scott-Kakures 1994, 83; Winters
1979, 255). Therefore, he and sympathetic critics conclude, The
Classic Argument fails.
Third, they contend that a person could possess an ability without
knowing that he or she possesses the ability (see, for example,
Winters 1979, 255). Thus, a person could have the ability to acquire
beliefs at will even if it were impossible for her to know that he or
she had this kind of ability. Therefore, the critics conclude, The
Classic Argument fails.
ii. The Empirical Belief Argument
The Empirical Belief Argument against direct doxastic voluntarism runs
as follows. A person can have an empirical belief concerning a
proposition only if the proposition is true and the person's
perceptual organs are working correctly to cause the belief. For
example, a woman can have an empirical belief, say, that the walls in
her office are white only if the walls in her office are, in fact,
white and her eyes are working correctly to cause the belief. In cases
of believing empirical matters at will, "there would be no regular
connection between the environment, the perceptions," and the belief.
Thus, believing at will would fail to satisfy the necessary conditions
of 'empirical belief'. Therefore, believing empirical matters at will
is conceptually impossible (Williams 1970, 108).
Critics suggest that there are at least two problems with The
Empirical Belief Argument. First, people believe all sorts of things
about empirical matters that are not caused by the state of affairs
obtaining and their perceptual organs functioning properly (cf.
Bennett 1990, 94-6). For instance, one might believe that a tower in
the distance is round because it seems round to one whose perceptual
organs are functioning properly—even though at this distance square
towers appear round. Hence, the argument seems to rely on a false
premise. Second, even if the argument were sound, it would show only
that it is impossible for people to will to believe some propositions.
Therefore, the critics contend, even if The Empirical Belief Argument
were sound, it would show only that certain beliefs are not within
one's voluntary control, not that direct doxastic voluntarism is
false, let alone conceptually impossible.
The problem, however, might seem merely to be Williams' suggestion
that a person can have an empirical belief concerning a proposition
only if the proposition is true. Supporters of The Empirical Belief
Argument, however, could reject that claim and offer a revised version
of the argument. In fact, Louis Pojman has offered such an argument,
which runs as follows (Pojman 1999, 576-9). Acquiring a belief is
typically a happening in which the world forces itself on a subject. A
happening in which the world forces itself on a subject is not a thing
the subject does or chooses. Therefore, acquiring a belief is not
typically something a subject does or chooses.
Critics contend, however, that there are at least two problems with
Pojman's version of the argument. First, they contend that people do
have some direct form of voluntary control over their beliefs they
form in light of sensory experiences. For instance, someone might have
a very strong sensory experience suggesting that there is an external
world and, nonetheless, not judge that there is an external world.
Rather, one might suspend judgment about the matter (see, for example,
Descartes's First Meditation). Similarly, someone like John Nash, the
M.I.T and Princeton professor portrayed in "A Beautiful Mind," might
have a very strong sensory experience as if he or she is in the
presence of another person and, nevertheless, not judge that he or she
is in the presence of another person. Rather, such a person might
judge that he or she is alone and that the sensory experience is a
hallucination. Thus, critics conclude, even if people cannot control
the information provided to them by their senses, they can control
whether they believe (so to speak) "what their senses tell them."
Second, they contend that like Williams' original version of the
argument, Pojman's revised version would demonstrate, at best, that it
is impossible for people to will to believe some propositions. Thus,
they conclude that it does not demonstrate that direct doxastic
voluntarism is false, let alone conceptually impossible.
iii. The Intentional Acts Argument
Dion Scott-Kakures (1994) offers another kind of argument that
attempts to show that direct doxastic voluntarism is conceptually
impossible. The argument uses an analysis of the nature of intentional
acts to suggest that direct doxastic voluntarism is impossible. It
goes as follows. If direct doxastic voluntarism is true, then
believing is an act that is under people's direct voluntary control.
Moreover, any act that is under a person's direct voluntary control is
guided and monitored by an intention. For instance, steering one's car
through a left turn signal is an act that is under one's direct
voluntary control, and it is an act that is guided and monitored by
one's intention to turn left. Acquiring a belief, however, is
different. It is, by its very nature, not the kind of act that can be
guided and monitored by an intention. Thus, acquiring a belief is not
under a person's direct voluntary control. Therefore, direct doxastic
voluntarism is conceptually impossible.
The critical premise in the argument is the claim that acquiring a
belief is, by its very nature, not the kind of act that can be guided
and monitored by an intention. Why, though, should we think that that
claim is true? Suppose someone wants to form a belief at will. Let's
take a particular case. Suppose Dave wants to will himself to believe
that God exists. The problem, according to Scott-Kakures, is that Dave
has a certain perspective on the world, which includes his other
beliefs, his desires, etc., and that perspective is incompatible with
Dave believing that God exists. Thus, so long as Dave maintains that
perspective, he cannot form an intention that could succeed in guiding
and monitoring an act of believing that God exists. This problem,
however, is not unique to Dave. Any person who wants to will himself
or herself to believe a proposition faces the same obstacle. The
perspective the person has of the world will not allow him or her to
form an intention that is compatible with the belief he or she wants
to form. Therefore, as long as the person maintains that perspective,
it is simply not possible for him or her to form an intention that
could guide and monitor the act of willing himself or herself to
believe. Hence, acquiring a belief is, by its very nature, not the
kind of act that can be guided and monitored by an intention.
Critics, however, suggest that the perspective of a person who
attempts to believe at will might be compatible with the proposition
he or she attempts to believe (Radcliffe 1997). They argue as follows.
Consider Dave's case. Because of his isolated background, he may be
ignorant both of the standard arguments for and of the standard
arguments against the existence of God. Nonetheless, he might
understand the proposition God exists and desire to believe it for
pragmatic purposes. For instance, reading Pascal's Pensées may have
persuaded him that the potential benefits of believing that God exists
outweigh the potential detriments of not believing that God exists.
From this perspective, he might form the intention to acquire at will
the belief that God exists; however, nothing in the perspective that
generates his intention is incompatible with believing that God
exists. Hence, the perspective from which Dave generates his intention
to believe that God exists is not necessarily incompatible with
believing that God exists. Moreover, Dave's case is not unique. Other
people can find themselves in similar circumstances. Thus, at the
moment a person attempts to acquire a belief at will, his or her
perspective might be compatible with the proposition he or she wants
to believe. Hence, the critics conclude, Scott-Kakures's argument
fails to show that direct doxastic voluntarism is conceptually
impossible.
iv. The Contingent Inability Argument
Some philosophers, such as Edwin Curley, contend that regardless of
whether direct doxastic voluntarism is conceptually impossible, it is
false. Curley, specifically, argues as follows (1975, 178). If direct
doxastic voluntarism is true, then people should be able to believe at
will at least those propositions for which the evidence is not
compelling. Let us test the doctrine empirically. Consider the recent
meteorological conditions on Jupiter. We do not have compelling
evidence either confirming or disconfirming the proposition it rained
three hours ago on Jupiter, so it is a proposition about which we
ought to be able to form a belief at will. Curley, however, suggests
that he cannot form a belief about the proposition and suggests that
his readers cannot either, unless they have strikingly different minds
than his. Thus, he suggests, there is at least one (and probably many
other) clear counterexamples to the claim that people have direct
voluntary control over their beliefs. Therefore, he suggests,
regardless of whether direct doxastic voluntarism is conceptually
impossible, it is false.
Critics could grant that the argument seems to succeed in showing that
there are propositions with respect to which we stand, like Buridan's
Ass, unable to decide between our options—in this case, affirming or
denying a proposition. They would contend, however, that the
argument's success is limited and that it shows, at most, that there
are some propositions with respect to which people do not have direct
voluntary control (cf. Ryan 2003, 62-7). Therefore, they would
conclude, the argument does not show that direct doxastic voluntarism
is false.
b. Arguments for Direct Doxastic Voluntarism
i. The Observed Ability Argument
According to Carl Ginet, there are a number of cases in which people
can will to believe certain propositions, provided that their evidence
regarding the propositions is inconclusive (2001, 64-5; cf. Ryan 2003,
62-7). He offers a number of examples. Let us consider two. The first
involves a person deciding to believe a proposition so that she can
stop worrying. The scenario is as follows:
Before Sam left for his office this morning, Sue asked him to
bring from his office a particular book that she needs to use for
preparing her lecture the next day, on his way back home.. Later Sue
wonders whether Sam will remember to bring the book. She recalls that
he has sometimes, though not often, forgotten such things. But, given
the thought that her continuing to wonder whether he'll remember to
bring the book will make her anxious all day, she decides to stop
fretting and decides to believe that he will remember to bring the
book she wanted.
The second involves a road trip taken by Ginet and his wife. He says,
We have started on a trip by car, and 50 miles from home my wife
asks me if I locked the front door. I seem to remember that I did, but
I don't have a clear, detailed, confident memory impression of locking
that door (and I am aware that my unclear, unconfident memory
impressions have sometimes been mistaken). But, given the great
inconvenience of turning back to make sure the undesirability of
worrying about it while continuing on, I decide to continue on and
believe that I did lock it.
According to Ginet, a person decides to believe a proposition when he
or she stakes something on the truth of the proposition, where to
"stake something" on the truth of a proposition is understood as
follows:
In deciding to perform an action, a person staked something on its
being that case that a certain proposition, p, was true if and only if
when deciding to perform the action, the person believed that
performing the action was (all things considered) at least as good as
other options open to him or her if and only if the proposition, p,
was true.
Thus, on Ginet's account, in deciding not to remind Sam to bring the
book she needed, Sue staked something on the truth of the proposition
Sam will bring the book and, hence, decided to believe that Sam would
bring it. If Sue had decided to remind Sam to bring the book she
needed, Sue would have staked something on the truth of the
proposition Sam will not bring the book and, hence, decided to believe
that Sam would not bring it. Thus, on Ginet's account, Sue could have
decided to believe that Sam will bring the book or that Sam will not
bring the book. Similarly, in deciding to continue on his road trip
without worrying, Ginet staked something on the truth of the
proposition I locked the door and, hence, decided to believe that he
locked the door. If Ginet had decided to pull off the road to call and
ask his neighbor to check Ginet's front door, then Ginet would have
staked something on the truth of the proposition I did not lock the
door and, hence, decided to believe that he did not lock the door.
Thus, on Ginet's account, he could have decided to believe that he did
lock the door or that he did not lock the door. Therefore, direct
doxastic voluntarism is a thesis that describes an observed ability
that people have.
Ginet surely seems correct in noting that people have experiences in
which they are (at least moderately) anxious about the truth of some
proposition, when the evidence they have for the proposition is
ambiguous, and they alleviate their anxiety by electing to act as if
the proposition is true (or false). Thus, to rebut Ginet's argument,
critics would have to show that what people do in such cases is not
decide to believe. But how else such cases can be described? If such
people are not deciding to believe, then what are they deciding to do?
A quick survey of the philosophical literature on the nature of belief
suggests two possible lines of reply. First, someone might be able to
rebut Ginet's argument by showing that that the kind of cases to which
Ginet refers are cases not of believing a proposition, but of
accepting a proposition. According to this line of rebuttal, the
person understands the proposition and decides to act as if the
proposition is true for some practical purpose, but (unlike in cases
of believing) the person neither affirms nor denies the proposition
(see, for example, Buckareff 2004; cf. Bratman 1999; Cohen 1989,
1992). Second, someone might be able to rebut Ginet's argument by
showing that the kind of cases to which he refers are cases not of
believing a proposition, but of acting as if a proposition is true
(see, for example, Alston 1989, 122-7; cf. Steup 2000). According to
this second line of rebuttal, the person decides to act as if the
proposition is true for some practical purpose(s), regardless of
whether the person understands the proposition, and of whether he or
she affirms, denies, or suspends judgment about the proposition. (For
a related discussion of another of Ginet's cases, see Nottelmann
2006.)
i. The Action Analogy Argument
James Montmarquet offers the following, analogical argument for direct
doxastic voluntarism (1986, 49). "[R]easons for action play a role in
the determination of action which is analogous to the role played by
reasons for thinking-true in the determination of beliefs." Hence, if
the controlling influence of reasons on actions is compatible with the
voluntariness of the action, the same is true with respect to the
influence of reasons for thinking-true on beliefs. The controlling
influence of reasons on actions is compatible with the voluntariness
of action. Therefore, the controlling influence of reasons on beliefs
is compatible with the voluntariness of belief. Hence, direct doxastic
voluntarism is no more problematic than voluntarism about people's
other actions, and since we regard voluntarism as true with respect to
people's other actions, we should also regard direct doxastic
voluntarism as true. (For discussions of related arguments, see, for
example, Nottelmann 2006, Ryan 2003, Steup 2000.)
Granting that the inferences are warranted, there are two lines of
objection open for a possible rebuttal. First, one might be able to
rebut the argument by showing that there is a significant difference
between the role that reasons play in determining action and the role
that reasons play in determining beliefs. For instance, one could
undermine Montmarquet's argument if one could show that there is a
problem with the analogy on which it depends: the controlling
influence of reasons on acting is to the voluntariness of acting as
the controlling influence of reasons on believing is to the
voluntariness of believing. What, though, is wrong with that analogy?
One possibility is that the controlling influence of reasons on
people's actions is often resistible in a way that the controlling
influence of reasons on people's beliefs is not. For example, it seems
to make sense that a person would say, "I have overwhelming evidence
that I should not smoke, but I still smoke." Does it make sense,
however, for a person to say, similarly, that she has overwhelming
evidence that a proposition is false but that she believes it is true?
Some would answer negatively, pointing to claims like, "I have
overwhelming evidence that lead does not float in water, but I still
believe that it does." Others would answer affirmatively, pointing to
claims like, "I have overwhelming evidence that my son has been killed
in action in the war—for example, he has been M.I.A. for years, the
rescue team recovered his bloody uniform—nonetheless, I still believe
that he is alive" (cf. Meiland 1980). The challenge for those who take
this first strategy in attempting to undermine Montmarquet's argument
is to show that the cases of those who answer affirmatively are not
cases of choosing to believe, but cases of something else—for example,
accepting that a proposition is true or acting as if a proposition is
true (cf. Bratman 1999; Cohen 1989, 1992, as well as Alston 1989,
122-7, Buckareff 2004).
Second, one might be able to rebut the argument by showing that the
controlling influence of reasons on actions is incompatible with the
voluntariness of actions. For instance, one could undermine
Montmarquet's argument if one could show that as the influence of
people's reasons on their actions become stronger, their performance
of the actions becomes less voluntary. Why, though, might we think
that the influence of reasons on people's actions would have this
effect? One type of possibility includes cases of coercion (cf.
Aquinas, Summa Theologicae, I-II, Q. 6, aa. 6-7). Suppose a person
gave her money to a mugger who threatened her with a loaded gun,
yelling, "Your money or your life!" Did she give the money
voluntarily? Some would argue that she did not. At this point, the
debate becomes rather subtle. On the one hand, she did choose (that
is, she did 'will') to perform the action. On the other hand, her act
of willing seems to lack the requisite freedom such that we would say
she had direct voluntary control over that act in the way that we
would say, for instance, that she had direct voluntary control over
her act of writing a check to charity earlier that morning. Thus, a
second strategy for undermining Montmarquet's argument requires one
both (i) to show that there are cases of acting with respect to which
people lack direct voluntary control and (ii) to demonstrate why cases
of believing are like such cases of acting.
4. Significance: Ethical, Epistemological, Political, and Religious
The issue of doxastic voluntarism has three particularly significant
philosophical implications. The first concerns an issue at the
intersection of ethics and epistemology: specifically, the possibility
of an ethics of belief. The second concerns political philosophy:
specifically, the extent of intellectual (and especially religious)
freedom. The third concerns philosophy of religion: specifically, the
doctrine of hell.
Each relies on a certain moral principle. Call it the Blameworthiness Principle:
People are morally blameworthy only for those actions they perform
(or for those dispositions they acquire) voluntarily.
Proponents suggest that the truth of this principle is intuitively
evident in light of commonsense examples. For instance, proponents
contend, we can hold people morally blameworthy for acts like murder
or dispositions like being cruel only if they killed an innocent
person or developed the disposition to be cruel voluntarily. If a
person committed murder or developed a disposition to be cruel because
he or she was under the control of an evil demon, or a nefarious
neurosurgeon, or some other such manipulative agent, we would blame
the manipulative agent, not the person who committed the act or caused
the development of the disposition. We would do so, proponents argue,
because we recognize, intuitively, the truth of the Blameworthiness
Principle.
In light of this principle, some philosophers argue, as follows, that
an ethics of belief is untenable (see, for example, Price 1954,
especially, p. 11; for a related debate, see, for example, Chisholm
1968, 1991, Firth 1998a, 1998b, Haack 2001). Direct doxastic
voluntarism is false: people do not have direct voluntary control over
their beliefs. Moreover, since the Blameworthiness Principle is true,
people are not morally blameworthy for their beliefs. Thus, although
we might hold people morally responsible for being intellectually lazy
or intellectually cowardly (for example, by failing to gather evidence
or by failing to consider evidence), there is no such thing as an
ethics of belief per se—that is, an ethical evaluation of a person for
judging that a particular proposition is true (or false).
Some political philosophers have traditionally utilized the preceding
type of argument against the possibility of an ethics of belief in
their arguments for toleration (see, for example, Bayle 2005; Locke
1983; Mill 1974; Spinoza 2001). The general line of thought is as
follows. People can control whether they conduct an inquiry and
whether they evaluate a body of evidence, so they are certainly
responsible for inquiring and examining evidence. However, since the
Blameworthiness Principle is true and since believing (or, more
specifically, judging) is not the sort of thing over which people have
voluntary control, if people examine a body of evidence in good
conscience and form a belief regarding a proposition, the state has no
right to punish them for holding that belief. Thus, for instance,
although the state may demand that people hear the evidence for a
particular religion, it has no right to punish people for failing to
believe the tenets of that religion.
Some philosophers of religion have suggested that the same kind of
argument applies to questions of justice not only regarding human
affairs, but also regarding divine affairs. For example, they contend
that it follows from the falsity of direct doxastic voluntarism and
the truth of the Blameworthiness Principle that not even God could
punish people, in this life or in the next, for failing to believe the
tenets of a certain religion. Thus, they contend that a just God could
not torment people eternally in hell, for failing to believe the
tenets of a certain religion. Those who wish to deny this line of
argument seem compelled to choose among the following strategies.
First, they could attempt to show that direct doxastic voluntarism is
true. Second, they could attempt to demonstrate that the
Blameworthiness Principle is false. Third, they could attempt to show
that God holds people accountable not for failing to form certain
judgments about a particular set of religious principles, but for some
other fault(s)—for example, failing to conduct an adequate
investigation into or failing to be open to the truth of the tenets of
a certain religion.
5. Conclusion
Thus, the debate about doxastic voluntarism is particularly intriguing
and important for two reasons. First, it requires us to form a deeper
understanding about vital aspects of human nature. For instance, it
entails that we do further research in philosophy of mind, action
theory, and moral psychology so that we can understand both the nature
of belief and the nature of the will, or (more specifically) the
nature of voluntary control. Second, the outcome of the debate has
direct and significant practical implications for our understanding of
the scope of ethical and of epistemic obligations, our understanding
of the relationship between personal rights and state responsibility,
and our understanding both of the nature of God and of divine justice.
6. References and Further Reading
Alston, William. "The Deontological Conception of Epistemic
Justification." In Essays in the Theory of Knowledge, 115-52. Ithaca:
Cornell UP, 1989.
Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologica. Translated by Thomas Gilby et al.
61 volumes. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964-80.
Audi, Robert. "Doxastic Voluntarism and the Ethics of Belief." In
Knowledge, Truth, and Duty, ed. Matthias Steup, 93-111. Oxford: Oxford
UP, 2001.
Augustine. De Praedestione Sanctorum. In Sancti Augustini Opera.
Turnholti: Typographi Brepols, 1954-1981.
Bayle, Pierre. A Philosophical Commentary. Edited by John Kilcullen
and Chandran Kukathas. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005.
Bennett, Jonathan. "Why is Belief Involuntary?" Analysis 50 (1990): 87-107.
Bratman, Michael. "Practical Reason and Acceptance in a Context." In
Faces of Intention, 15-34. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999.
Buckareff, Andrei A. "Acceptance and Deciding to Believe." Journal of
Philosophical Research 29 (2004): 173-90.
Buckareff, Andrei A. "Doxastic Decisions and Controlling Belief." Acta
Analytica 21 (2006): 102-14.
Chisholm, R. M. "Lewis' Ethics of Belief." In The Philosophy of C. I.
Lewis, ed. P. A. Schilpp, 223-42. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court
Publishing, 1968.
Chisholm, R. M. "Firth and the Ethics of Belief." Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 51 (1991): 119-127.
Cohen, Jonathan. "Belief and Acceptance." Mind 98 (July 1989): 367-89.
Cohen, Jonathan. An Essay on Belief and Acceptance. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1992.
Curley, E.M. "Descartes, Spinoza, and the Ethics of Belief." In
Spinoza: Essays in Interpretation, ed. Maurice Mandelbaum and Eugene
Freeman, 159-89. LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court Publishing, 1975.
Descartes, Rene. Oeuvres de Descartes. Edited by Charles Adam and Paul
Tannery. 12 Vols. Paris: Libraire Philosophique J. Vrin, 1964-76.
Original edition, Paris: Cerf, 1897-1913.
Descartes, Rene. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. Translated
by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, and (vol. 3
only) Anthony Kenny. 3 Vols. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1984-91.
Feldman, Richard. "Voluntary Belief and Epistemic Evaluation." In
Knowledge, Truth, and Duty, ed. Matthias Steup, 77-92. Oxford: Oxford
UP, 2001.
Firth, Roderick. "Chisholm and the Ethics of Belief." In In Defense of
Radical Empiricism: Essays and Lectures by Roderick Firth, ed. John
Troyer, 143-53. New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998.
Firth, Roderick. "Are Epistemic Concepts Reducible to Ethical
Concepts." In In Defense of Radical Empiricism: Essays and Lectures by
Roderick Firth, ed. John Troyer, 237-49. New York: Rowman and
Littlefield, 1998.
Gale, Richard M. "William James and the Willfulness of Belief."
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1999): 71-91.
Ginet, Carl. "Deciding to Believe." In Knowledge, Truth, and Duty, ed.
Matthias Steup, 63-76. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2001.
Govier, Trudy. "Belief, Values, and the Will." Dialogue 15 (1976): 642-663.
Haack, Susan. "'The Ethics of Belief' Reconsidered." In Knowledge,
Truth, and Duty, ed. Matthias Steup, 21-33. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2001.
Hall, Richard J., and Charles R. Johnson. "The Epistemic Duty to Seek
More Evidence." American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (1998): 129-40.
Heil, John. "Doxastic Agency." Philosophical Studies 43 (1983): 355-64.
James, William. "The Will to Believe." In The Will to Believe and
Other Essays in Popular Philosophy, 1-31. New York: Dover, 1956.
Johnston, Mark. "Self-Deception and the Nature of Mind." In Philosophy
of Psychology, ed. Cynthia MacDonald and Graham MacDonald. Cambridge,
Mass.: Blackwell, 1995.
Kaplan, Mark. "Rational Acceptance." Philosophical Studies 40 (1981): 129-145.
Locke, John. A Letter concerning Toleration. Edited by James H.
Tulley. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983.
Meiland, Jack. "What Ought We to Believe, or the Ethics of Belief
Revisited." American Philosophical Quarterly 17 (1980): 15-24.
Reprinted in The Theory of Knowledge: Classic and Contemporary
Readings, ed. Louis P. Pojman, 514-25. Belmont, Ca.: Wadsworth, 1993.
Mele, Alfred. "Akratic Belief." In Irrationality, 109-20 Oxford:
Oxford UP, 1987.
Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty, ed. Gertrude Himmelfarb. New York, Penguin, 1974.
Montmarquet, James. "The Voluntariness of Belief." Analysis 46 (1986): 49-53.
Naylor, Margery Bedford. "Voluntary Belief." Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 45 (1985): 427-36.
Newman, J. H. An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent. Edited by I. T.
Ker. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985.
Nottelmann, N. "The Analogy Argument for Doxastic Voluntarism."
Philosophical Studies 131 (2006): 559-582.
Owens, David. Reason without Freedom. London: Routledge, 2000.
Owens, David. "Epistemic Akrasia." The Monist 85 (2002): 381-97.
Pascal, Blaise. Pensees. Edited and translated by Roger Ariew.
Indianapolis: Hackett: 2005.
Peirce, Charles S. "The Fixation of Belief." In Charles S. Peirce:
Selected Writings, ed. Philip P. Weiner, 91-112. New York: Dover,
1958.
Pojman, Louis P. "Believing and Willing." Canadian Journal of
Philosophy 15 (1985): 37-5.
Pojman, Louis P. Religious Belief and the Will. London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1985.
Pojman, Louis P. "Believing, Willing, and the Ethics of Belief." In
The Theory of Knowledge. 2d ed. Belmont, Ca.: Wadsworth, 1999.
Price, H.H. "Belief and Will." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
28, supplement (1954): 1-26.
Price, H.H. "Some Considerations About Belief." In Knowledge and
Belief, ed. A. Phillips Griffiths, 41-59. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1967.
Price, H.H. Belief. London: Allen and Unwin, 1969.
Radcliffe, Dana. "Scott-Kakures on Believing at Will." Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 57 (1997): 145-51.
Ryan, Sharon. "Doxastic Compatibilism and the Ethics of Belief."
Philosophical Studies 114 (2003): 47-79.
Scott-Kakures, Dion. "On Belief and Captivity of the Will." Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research 54 (1994): 77-103.
Scott-Kakures, Dion. "Motivated Believing: Wishful and Unwelcome."
Nous 34 (2000): 348-75.
Spinoza, Benedict. Theological-Political Treatise. Translated by
Samuel Shirley. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2001.
Steup, Matthias. "Doxastic Voluntarism and Epistemic Deontology." Acta
Analytica 15 (2000): 25-56.
Stocker, Michael. "Responsibility Especially for Beliefs." Mind 151
(1982): 398-417.
Van Fraassen, Bas C. "Belief and the Will." The Journal of Philosophy
81 (1984): 235-256.
Wansing, Heinrich. "Seeing To It That an Agent Forms a Belief." Logic
and Logical Philosophy 10 (2002): 185-197.
Wansing, Heinrich. "Doxastic Decisions, Epistemic Justification, and
the Logic of Agency." Philosophical Studies 128 (2006): 201-227.
Williams, Bernard. "Deciding to Believe." In Language, Belief, and
Metaphysics, ed. Howard E. Kiefer and Milton K. Munitz, 95-111.
Albany: SUNY Press, 1970.
Winters, Barbara. "Believing at Will." Journal of Philosophy 76 (1979): 243-56.
No comments:
Post a Comment