Comparative Philosophy

Comparative philosophy—sometimes called cross-cultural philosophy—is a
subfield of philosophy in which philosophers work on problems by
intentionally setting into dialogue sources from across cultural,
linguistic, and philosophical streams. The ambition and challenge of
comparative philosophy is to include all the philosophies of global
humanity in its vision of what is constituted by philosophy.

This approach distinguishes comparative philosophy from several other
approaches to philosophy. First, comparative philosophy is distinct
from both area studies philosophy (in which philosophers investigate
topics in particular cultural traditions, for example, Confucianism)
and world philosophy (in which philosophers construct a philosophical
system based on the fullness of global traditions of thought). Second,
comparative philosophy differs from more traditional philosophy in
which ideas are compared among thinkers within a particular tradition;
comparative philosophy intentionally compares the ideas of thinkers of
very different traditions, especially culturally distinct traditions.

With the unique approach of comparative philosophy also comes unique
difficulties and challenges that are not as characteristic of doing
philosophy within a particular tradition. Such difficulties to be
avoided include descriptive chauvinism (recreating another tradition
in the image of one's own), normative skepticism (merely narrating or
describing the views of different philosophers and traditions,
suspending all judgment about their adequacy), incommensurability (the
inability to find the common ground among traditions needed as a basis
for comparison), and perennialism (failure to realize that
philosophical traditions evolve, that they are not perennial in the
sense of being monolithic or static). Furthermore, since comparative
philosophy involves an approach that is not dominant in academic
philosophy, it has been somewhat neglected by the mainstream of the
profession. However, comparative philosophy is fairly early in its
developmental stages.

1. What is Comparative Philosophy?

Comparative philosophy—sometimes called cross-cultural philosophy—is a
subfield of philosophy in which philosophers work on problems by
intentionally setting into dialogue sources from across cultural,
linguistic, and philosophical streams. Comparative philosophers most
frequently engage topics in dialogue between modern Western (for
example, American and Continental European) and Classical Asian (for
example, Chinese, Indian, or Japanese) traditions, but work has been
done using materials and approaches from Islamic and African
philosophical traditions as well as from classical Western traditions
(for example, Judaism, Christianity, Platonism).

It is important to distinguish comparative philosophy from both area
studies philosophy and world philosophy. Unlike comparative
philosophy, in area studies philosophy, the focus is on a single
region. Chinese philosophy, Indian philosophy, and African philosophy
are examples of area studies philosophy fields, in which the work done
need not be comparative. Area studies philosophers do not necessarily
compare the texts and thinkers with which they work with any ideas
outside of the circumscribed area. For example, Chinese philosophers
may study Confucius, various forms of Confucianism, criticisms of
Confucianism in Chinese Daoism and Buddhism, and even Confucianism in
the contemporary world, but they need not make any attempt to compare
Confucian thought with philosophical texts and thinkers from other
cultures. (For this reason, the bibliography to the present entry does
not have categories that fit area studies philosophy rather than
comparative philosophy.)

World philosophy, like area studies philosophy, should be
distinguished from comparative philosophy. World philosophy may be
thought of as an effort at constructive philosophy that takes into
account the great variety of philosophical writings and traditions
across human cultures and endeavors to weave them into a coherent
world view. As such, it is an extension of comparative philosophy,
because comparison is fundamental to the constructivist task. But
comparative philosophy need not become world philosophy. The
comparative philosopher may be working on isolated topics, or with two
or more philosophers, just for the sake of gaining clarity on some
specific issue. Likewise, those wanting to construct a world
philosophy often find a place for the thought of other traditions in
the system they construct, but it is fair to wonder whether they
really allow the voice of the other to express itself in its strongest
form.

2. Historical Development of Comparative Philosophy

Comparative philosophy as cross-cultural philosophy is a relative
newcomer to the field of philosophy. It has its antecedents in the
Western awareness of different traditions, especially Asian ones, in
the eighteenth century. Much of the work done during this period and
just afterward does not conform to the definition of comparative
philosophy outlined above. As Jonathan Spence (1998) has pointed out,
the earliest treatments of China by Western philosophers, such as that
of Hegel, really cannot properly be called comparative philosophy
because they lack any serious engagement from the Chinese side.

The story is quite different in Asia, where cultural traditions
mingled and clashed with considerably more frequency than in the
relatively provincial West. For instance, the spread of Buddhism into
China from India and central Asia beginning in the first few centuries
CE sparked a long tradition of philosophical reaction to its "foreign"
ideas from Confucian and Daoist intellectuals—much of it hostile, some
of it appreciative and appropriating, but all of it at least
implicitly comparative. The story of Chinese Buddhism over the next
two millennia is very much the story of the dialogue between and among
foreign and indigenous traditions, as is the story of Confucianism and
Daoism during the same period. Similar patterns of dialogue between
indigenous traditions and Buddhism are found in Korea, Japan, Sri
Lanka, Thailand and Vietnam; parallel patterns may be identified among
other players in India. It is, perhaps, because of this long
familiarity with cross-cultural dialogue and the willingness to take
one's partners seriously that many of the earliest works comparing
Eastern and Western philosophies that are still important came not
from Westerners but from non-Westerners responding to Western ideas.
Sri Aurobindo (1872-1950) and Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (1888-1975)
were perhaps the most prominent and influential voices responding from
India in the early part of the last century, presenting Indian
philosophical ideas and comparing, contrasting, and even fusing
Eastern and Western philosophy and religion. In Japan, Nishida
Kitaro's An Inquiry into the Good (1911) initiated a creative,
critical appropriation of Western philosophy and religion from a
perspective anchored in Mahayana Buddhism that continues today in the
work of members of the Kyoto School, most notably Keiji Nishitani and
Masao Abe.

Partially as a result of the emergence of comparative studies in
nineteenth-century Anglo-European intellectual history, the University
of Hawaii sponsored the first in a sequence of East-West Philosophers'
Conferences in 1939. Since that time comparative philosophy, area
studies philosophy, and world philosophy have continued to grow and
cross fertilize each other. Nevertheless, comparative philosophy as a
field is only now becoming fully self-conscious, methodologically and
substantively, about its role and function in the larger enterprises
of philosophy and area studies.

Mainstream Western philosophy has been slow to accept comparative
philosophy. Philosophy departments rarely create space for it in their
curricula, and comparative philosophers often find it difficult to
publish their work in mainline journals. In November of 1996,
comparative philosopher Bryan Van Norden wrote an "Open Letter to the
APA." Van Norden complained directly that philosophers writing on
comparative subjects were being segregated out of the mainstream
philosophical journals. Although Van Norden does not make it entirely
clear in his letter, his complaint seems to be directed toward two
ways in which scholars of comparative philosophy have been
disenfranchised from mainstream journals in the past.

One way in which this has happened is that these scholars must go to
area studies journals, such as those dealing with China, India, Asia,
the Middle East, or Islam. Another way in which this has happened was
that their comparative work was subsumed under area studies philosophy
journals such as the Journal of Chinese Philosophy, African
Philosophy, Journal of Indian Philosophy, Journal of Jewish Thought
and Philosophy, Philosophy in Japan, or Asian Philosophy. The
distinctively comparative journals still remain small in number:
Philosophy East and West and Dao: A Journal in Comparative Philosophy
(which has a restricted area of comparison).

Nevertheless, the Society of Asian and Comparative Philosophy now
convenes its own sections in the annual meetings of the American
Philosophical, the American Academy of Religion, and the Association
of Asian Studies. The Association of Asian Studies also has published
a monograph series featuring works in any area of Asian philosophy (or
in any other field of philosophy examined from a comparative
perspective) since 1974. Some presses, such as the State University of
New York Press and Lexington Books also have specific book series
devoted to topics in comparative philosophy. Examples of work in these
series include Varieties of Ethical Reflection: New Directions for
Ethics in a Global Context, edited by Michael Barnhart (2003) and Self
as Person in Asian Thought, edited by Roger Ames, Wilmal Dissanayake,
and Thomas Kasulis (1994).

Until very recently, most introductory philosophy courses focused
exclusively on the Western tradition, indeed mainly on the
Anglo-European classics and thinkers. But now there is a much wider
variety of work available for introducing students to philosophy that
is either explicitly comparative in itself, or that at least makes
possible comparative philosophical work. (Some of these works are
listed in the bibliography below.)

3. Some Difficulties Facing the Comparative Philosopher

Back to Table of Contents

a. Chauvinism

Martha Nussbaum (1997) warns against several kinds of vices that
infect comparative analysis and some of the activities she cautions
against may represent the kinds of methodological procedures or
dispositions toward belief to which comparative philosophers might
fall victim.

Descriptive chauvinism is that fault which consists in recreating the
other tradition in the image of one's own. This is reading a text from
another tradition and assuming that it asks the same questions or
constructs responses or answers in a similar manner as that one with
which one is most familiar. For example, philosophers who read
Confucius as a virtue ethicist on the model of Aristotle must be on
constant guard against this kind of chauvinism. David Hall and Roger
Ames (1995) have argued against translating the name of the Chinese
text Zhongyong as The Doctrine of the Mean, because they do not think
that it pursues the same kinds of virtue analysis in practical reason
that Aristotle does in his Nicomachean Ethics.

On the opposite end, but still an example of a kind of chauvinistic
vice, is what Nussbaum calls normative chauvinism. This is the
tendency found in many philosophers to believe that their tradition is
best and that insofar as the others are different, they are inferior
or in error. Ideally, philosophers should hold those views that are
most defensible and credible. But the criteria for making this
decision may be tradition-dependent. So, if a philosopher is unwilling
to revisit his own criteria in light of another tradition, he may find
himself committed to little else other than a form of normative
chauvinism. For example, finding that Zhuangzi's antirationalism moves
through quietude and stillness to effortless action might lead some
philosophers to dismiss this approach because it does not employ the
sorts of evidential standards one holds. A common form of normative
chauvinism is the belief that unless philosophy is done in a certain
kind of way (for example, ratiocinative argument), then it cannot
properly be considered philosophy. Many philosophy departments in
Europe, Britain, and America have never thought about including
courses in comparative philosophy, or even area studies philosophies
such as those from China, India, or Japan because these traditions are
not perceived as doing "real philosophy." Some comparative
philosophers believe this is analogous to a person listening to Indian
music, realizing that it sounds very different from Western music, and
concluding that it is not "real music." What gets overlooked in such
cases is that, while the whole concept of a "philosophical work" or
"musical work" often differs according to each tradition, each
tradition-dependent example is intellectually robust and meaningful
nonetheless.

b. Skepticism

Normative skepticism may not actually be considered a vice by some
philosophers, even if Nussbaum names it as one. It consists of
narrating the views of different philosophers and traditions and
suspending all judgment about their adequacy. When teaching the
history of Western philosophy, some philosophers never really offer
any critical view that puts aside a thinker's claims. But many
philosophers hold that some views are less defensible than others, and
some are just wrong. They believe this is not only true when
considering thinkers within the history of Western philosophy, but
also when doing cross-cultural comparative philosophy. While it is
true that not all Western philosophy has it right, it is equally true
that neither does any other tradition. Some Buddhist, Indian,
Confucian, Daoist, and Islamic views should be challenged, and
sometimes they will be found deficient either according to agreed-on
cross-cultural standards, or because of some form of internal
incoherence. Being a comparative philosopher does not entail an
uncritical acceptance of the other traditions simply because they are
different. It is not expressed in a kind of Romanticism that might
think of some philosophical tradition from another culture as always
right, or preferable to Western philosophy. Nor does comparative
philosophy require a suspension of all critical judgment. Indeed, it
is built on the fundamental premise that the conversation across
traditions will burn away some dross and refine and confirm some
truths. But because philosophical viewpoints sometimes differ so
dramatically, it is not always obvious how one might show itself
preferable to another on any philosophical grounds. Forming grounds
for deciding among views is one of the fundamental tasks of
comparative philosophy.

c. Incommensurability

David Wong (1989) has offered a view of the ways in which
philosophical traditions may be incommensurable. One kind of
incommensurability involves the inability to translate some concepts
in one tradition into meaning and reference in some other tradition. A
second sort is that some philosophical models differ from others in
such fundamental ways as to make it impossible for the advocates to
understand each other. Wong thinks that some forms of life may be so
far from a person's experience and philosophical tradition that she is
unable to see the merits in another view. The third version of
incommensurability is that the traditions differ on what counts as
evidence and grounds for decidability, thus making it impossible to
make a judgment between them. There is no common or objective decision
criterion justifying the preference for one set of claims over
another, much less one tradition in its entirety over another. Wong
proposes learning about the other tradition as a remedy. The idea is
that each philosopher infects the other with a way of seeing. So, the
task is to come to an understanding of how the other philosophical
tradition is tied to a life that humans have found satisfying and
meaningful.

It is often the case that philosophers who realize that critical work
must be a part of the comparative project go on to conclude that
traditions should be seen as rivals. Alasdair MacIntyre (1991) has
explored this very impasse. He thinks that once the comparative
project has passed beyond the initial stage of partial incomprehension
and partial misrepresentation of the other, and an accurate
representation of the other emerges, then the task of showing which
rival tradition is rationally superior to the other comes into view.
The triumph of one tradition over another may be a result of one
standpoint acknowledging, based on its own internal standards, that it
is inferior to another viewpoint. And when the resources available for
the corrections of these inadequacies are not present in their own
tradition, then those persons holding the failed view may transfer
their assent to the tradition that has those resources or which has
provided an explanation for why the previously held system failed.
MacIntyre thinks that this situation can occur even if the two
traditions have no common or shared philosophical beliefs or methods;
that is, even if they are totally incommensurable. In those situations
in which comparative philosophers find themselves in rational debate
with those of another tradition, MacIntyre says that each philosopher
has a responsibility to see his own standpoint from as problematic a
view as possible, admitting the possibility of fallibilism. But he
also takes the view that in any comparison of views philosophically,
we must be comparing from some standpoint. There is no neutral ground.
This is what he means when he says that comparative philosophy
eventually becomes the comparison of comparisons.

MacIntyre considers the question whether the comparative philosophical
project is a matter of choosing, and even of rational debate. Raising
an imaginary objection to his own views, he says, that if one accuses
him of presupposing that conception of rational order that is
characteristic of the West and not found in Chinese thought, then he
simply must say that this is the standpoint from which he stands and
he could not have done otherwise. This is a view of the comparative
philosophical task, while describing the way in which some comparative
philosophers work, is by no means true of them all. Many comparative
philosophers (such as those listed in the bibliography below)
typically do not think of their work as enabling a decision between
rival theories in a rational way. They conceive of their work as a
process of conversation in which philosophical progress is made and
all the traditions are altered in the resulting narrative.

d. Perennialism

The difficulty of commensurability is not the only one facing
comparative philosophers. A mistake made by many comparative
philosophers is that they overlook that philosophical traditions have
a present as well as a past. While the classical texts of various
traditions are formative and become the basis for much of the distinct
evolution of a tradition, a philosopher cannot focus only on them. As
those who study any philosophical tradition in depth know very well,
all philosophical traditions are evolving. They are not "perennial" in
the sense of being monolithic or static. They not only have tensions
with other traditions, but they contain internal conflict as well. The
point at which a comparative philosopher steps into the stream of
another tradition is always important. He must understand not only the
reasons for why a particular view is held in another tradition, but
also that it is only one view among others that are possible within
that particular tradition. For example, if one wants to do comparative
morality, focusing on Chinese moral culture, what should he study? The
Confucian, the Daoist, the Buddhist, the Marxist critique of all
three? And with what aspects of his own tradition will he compare
Chinese moral culture? The deontological, the utilitarian, the
Aristotelian?

4. Prospects for Comparative Philosophy

In the end, one may object that actually there is no such thing as
comparative philosophy, as a discrete sub-discipline of philosophical
work, because all philosophical work is comparative. After all, one
thing philosophers habitually do is to compare the work of various
thinkers with those of others, or with their own. Philosophers require
a thorough survey of the full range of significant views on a question
before giving assent. Each view must be tested against others. This is
a characteristically comparative project. For example, if one sets
Hume's discussion of personal identity alongside of Locke's, a
comparison is made. It is not self-evident that there is really a
difference in comparing Confucius' views on morality and those of
Aristotle, and those of Aquinas and Aristotle on the same subject.
Furthermore, if one compares Descartes' epistemology and truth theory
to Hegel's one is not only making a comparison, but some philosophers
would say that the two approaches are so different from each other as
to be incommensurable (that is, lacking any common basis for
comparison). This means that not only is the task of comparison
fundamental to what philosophers do, but also the thought worlds
examined may be incommensurable even though they come from the same
cultural stream. Descartes and Hegel may be incommensurable on truth
in much the same way that Buddhism's approach to the fundamental
problem of humanity and how to handle it is unlike the way Pragmatism
thinks of this problem.

One may take the position that Aristotle compared with Confucius on
morality is different only in degree from a comparison between
Aristotle and Aquinas. However, as Alfred North Whitehead pointed out,
a difference in degree may sometimes become a difference in kind. Even
if the difference between what philosophers regularly do when
comparing thinkers within the Western tradition and what they do when
comparing a Western thinker with one from India, for example, is not a
matter of kind, still the degree of these differences might be
important. But no formal or general rule or criteria can be laid down
for distinguishing these types of comparisons. There are ways in which
comparing philosophical ideas between traditions and comparing those
within the same tradition are similar. Part of the task of comparative
philosophers who work cross-culturally is to reveal, in the pursuit of
their own work, wherein the differences between these comparative
approaches are dramatic and philosophically significant.

Properly speaking, comparative philosophy does not lead toward the
creation of a synthesis of philosophical traditions (as in world
philosophy). What is being created is not a new theory but a different
sort of philosopher. The goal of comparative philosophy is learning a
new language, a new way of talking. The comparative philosopher does
not so much inhabit both of the standpoints represented by the
traditions from which he draws as he comes to inhabit an emerging
standpoint different from them all and which is thereby creatively a
new way of seeing the human condition.
5. References and Further Reading

a. Comparative Philosophy – General

Allen, Douglas, ed. Culture and Self: Philosophical and Religious
Perspectives, East and West. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997.

Ames, Roger, ed. The Aesthetic Turn: Reading Eliot Deutsch on
Comparative Philosophy. Chicago: Open Court, 1999.

Ames, Roger and Wilmal Dissanayake. Self and Deception: A Cross
Cultural Perspective. Albany: State University of New York Press,
1996.

Ames, Roger, Joel Marks, and Robert Solomon. Emotions in Asian
Thought. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995.

Ames, Roger, Wilmal Dissanayake, and Thomas Kasulis. Self as Image in
Asian Theory and Practice. Albany: State University of New York Press,
1998.

Ames, Roger, Wilmal Dissanayake, and Thomas Kasulis. Self as Person in
Asian Thought. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994.

Ames, Roger, Wilmal Dissanayake, and Thomas Kasulis. Self as Body in
Asian Theory and Practice. Albany: State University of New York Press,
1992.

Ames, Roger and J. Baird Callicott, eds. Nature in Asian Traditions of
Thought: Essays in Environmental Philosophy. Albany: State University
of New York Press, 1989.

Barnhart, Michael. Varieties of Ethical Reflection: New Directions in
Ethics in a Global Context. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2003.

Bonevac, Daniel and Stephen Phillips, eds. Understanding Non-Western
Philosophy: Introductory Readings. Mountain View, CA: Mayfield
Publishing, 1993.

Blocker, H. Gene. World Philosophy: An East-West Comparative
Introduction to Philosophy. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall,
1999.

Carmody, Denise and John Carmody. Ways to the Center. 3rd ed. Belmont,
CA: Wadsworth Publishing, 2001.

Clarke, J. J. Oriental Enlightenment: The Encounter Between Asian and
Western Thought. London: Routledge, 1997.

Davidson, Donald. "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme." In
Relativism: Cognitive and Moral, eds. Jack Meiland and Michael Krausz
(Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1982): 66-81.

Deutsch, Eliot. Introduction to World Philosophies. Upper Saddle
River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1997.

Deutsch, Eliot and Ron Bontekoe, eds. A Companion to World
Philosophies. Oxford: Blackwell, 1997.

Dilworth, David. Philosophy in World Perspective: A Comparative
Hermeneutic of the Major Theories. New Haven: Yale University Press,
1989.

Fleischacker, Samuel. Integrity and Moral Relativism. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992.

Hackett, Stuart. Oriental Philosophy: A Westerner's Guide to Eastern
Thought. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979.

Hershock, Peter, Marietta Stepaniants and Roger Ames, eds. Technology
and Cultural Values: On The Edge of the Third Millennium. Honolulu:
University of Hawaii Press, 2003.

Inada, Kenneth, ed. East-West Dialogues in Aesthetics. Buffalo: State
University of New York at Buffalo, 1978.

Larson, Gerald James and Eliot Deutsch, eds. Interpreting Across
Boundaries: New Essays in Comparative Philosophy. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1988.

MacIntyre, Alasdair. "Incommensurability, Truth, and the Conversation
Between Confucians and Aristotelians about the Virtues." In Culture
and Modernity: East-West Philosophic Perspectives, ed. Eliot Deutsch
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991): 104-123.

Masson-Oursel, Paul. Comparative Philosophy. London: Routledge, 2000.

Matilal, Bimal. "Pluralism, Relativism, and Interaction between
Cultures." In Culture and Modernity: East-West Philosophic
Perspectives, ed. Eliot Deutsch (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press,
1991): 141-161.

Mohany, Jitendra. "Phenomenological Rationality and the Overcoming of
Relativism." In Relativism: Interpretation and Confrontation, ed.
Michael Krausz (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1989):
326-339.

Nussbaum, Martha. Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform
in Liberal Education. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997.

Parkes, Graham, ed. Heidegger and Asian Thought. Honolulu: University
of Hawaii Press, 1987.

Parkes, Graham. Nietzsche and Asian Thought. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1991.

Putnam, Hilary. "Truth and Convention: On Davidson's Refutation of
Conceptual Relativism." In Relativism: Interpretation and
Confrontation, ed. Michael Krausz (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University
Press, 1989): 173-182.

Raju, P. T. Introduction to Comparative Philosophy. Reprint ed. Delhi:
Motilal Banarsidass, 1997.

Reynolds, Frank, ed. Religion and Practical Reason: New Essays in the
Comparative Philosophy of Religions. Albany: State University of New
York, 1994.

Rorty, Richard. "Solidarity or Objectivity?" In Relativism:
Interpretation and Confrontation, ed. Michael Krausz (Notre Dame:
Notre Dame University Press, 1989): 35-51.

Scharfstein, Ben-Ami. A Comparative History of World Philosophy: From
the Upanishads to Kant. Albany: State University of New York Press,
1998.

Solomon, Robert and Kathleen Higgins. World Philosophy: A Text with
Readings. New York: McGraw Hill, 1995.

Solomon, Robert and Kathleen Higgins, eds. From Africa to Zen: An
Invitation to World Philosophy. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, 1993.

Van Norden, Byran. "An Open Letter to the APA." Proceedings and
Addresses of the APA. Newark, DE: American Philosophical Association,
1996.

Wong, David. "Three Kinds of Incommensurability." In Relativism:
Interpretation and Confrontation, ed. Michael Krausz (Notre Dame:
Notre Dame University Press, 1989): 140-159.

b. Comparative Philosophy – Chinese-Western

Ames, Roger and Joseph Grange. John Dewey, Confucius and Global
Philosophy. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996.

Carr, Karen and Philip J. Ivanhoe, eds. The Sense of Antirationalism:
The Religious Thought of Zhuangzi and Kierkegaard. New York: Seven
Bridges Press, 2000.

Hall, David and Roger Ames. The Democracy of the Dead: Dewey,
Confucius and the Hope for Democracy in China. Chicago: Open Court,
1999.

Hall, David and Roger Ames. Anticipating China: Thinking Through the
Narratives of Chinese and Western Culture. Albany: State University of
New York Press, 1995.

Kjellberg, Paul and Philip J. Ivanhoe, eds. Essays in Skepticism,
Relativism and Ethics in the Zhuangzi. Albany: State University of New
York Press, 1996.

Li Chenyang, ed. The Tao Encounters the West: Explorations in
Comparative Philosophy. Albany: State University of New York Press,
1999.

Mou Bo, ed. Comparative Approaches to Chinese Philosophy. Aldershot,
UK: Ashgate Press, 2003.

Neville, Robert. Boston Confucianism: Portable Tradition in the
Late-Modern World. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000.

Spence, Jonathan. The Chan's Great Continent: China in Western Minds.
New York: W. W. Norton, 1998.

Yearley, Lee. Mencius and Aquinas: Theories of Virtue and Conceptions
of Courage. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990.

c. Comparative Philosophy – Indian-Western

Halbfass, Wilhelm. India and Europe: An Essay in Understanding.
Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988.

Matilal, Bimal and Jaysankar Shaw, eds. Analytical Philosophy in
Comparative Perspective: Exploratory Essays in Current Theories &
Classical Indian Theories of Meaning. London: Kluwer Publishing, 1985.

McEvilley, Thomas. The Shape of Ancient Thought: Comparative Studies
in Greek and Indian Philosophies. New York: Allworth Press, 2002.

Radahkrishan, S. The Concept of Man: A Study in Comparative
Philosophy. Ed. P. T. Raju. Columbia, MO: South Asia Books, 1999.

Rafique, M. Indian and Muslim Philosophies. Columbia, MO: South Asia
Books, 1988.

Tuck, Andrew. Comparative Philosophy and the Philosophy of
Scholarship: On the Western Interpretation of Nagarjuna. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1990.

d. Comparative Philosophy – Japanese-Western

Franck, Frederick, ed. The Buddha Eye: An Anthology of the Kyoto
School. New York: Crossroads, 1991.

Abe, Masao and William Lafleur, eds. Zen and Western Thought.
Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989.

Loy, David. Nonduality: A Study in Comparative Philosophy. New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1988.

Nishida, Kitaro. An Inquiry into the Good. Trans. Masao Abe and
Christopher Ives. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990.

Nishida, Kitaro. Last Writings: Nothingness and the Religious
Worldview. Trans. David A. Dilworth. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i
Press, 1987.

Nishitani, Keiji. Religion and Nothingness. Trans. Jan Van Bragt.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982.

e. Comparative Philosophy – Other

An, Ok Sun. Compassion and Benevolence: A Comparative Study of Early
Buddhist and Classical Confucian Ethics. New York: Peter Lang
Publishing, 1998.

Taylor, Mark. Journeys to Selfhood: Hegel and Kierkegaard. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1980.