neo-Confucian movement in the Song and Ming dynasties, which is often
regarded as the second epoch of the development of Confucianism, with
pre-Qin classical Confucianism as the first, and contemporary
Confucianism as the third. If neo-Confucianism is to be understood as
the learning of li (conventionally translated as "principle"), then
Cheng Hao and his younger brother Cheng Yi can be regarded as the true
founders of neo-Confucianism, as with them li came to be regarded as
the ultimate reality of the universe for the first time in Chinese
history . Cheng Hao's unique understanding of the ultimate reality is
that it is not some entity but rather is the "life-giving activity."
This understanding strikes a similar tone to Martin Heidegger's Being
of beings which was created almost a millennium later. Assuming the
identity of li and human nature, Cheng Hao argues that human nature is
good, since what is essential to human nature is humanity (ren), also
the cardinal virtue in Confucianism, and this is nothing but this
life-giving activity. A person of ren is the one who is in one body
with "ten thousand things" and therefore can feel their pains and
itches just as one can feel them in one's own body. This is an idea
central to the whole idealist school (xinxue, learning of heart-mind)
of the neo-Confucian movement, a movement culminating in Wang
Yangming.
1. Life and Works
Cheng Hao was born in Huangpi of the present Hubei Province in Mingdao
Year 1 of Emperor Ren of the Song dynasty (1032) and so is also called
Mr. Mingdao. He and his younger brother Cheng Yi (1033-1107) are often
referred to as "the two Chengs" by later Confucians. Growing up, the
brothers moved quite often as their father, Cheng Xiang, was appointed
as a local official in various places. In 1046, his father became
acquainted with Zhou Dunyi (1016-1073), one of the so-called "five
Confucian masters" of the Northern Song. He sent Cheng Hao and Cheng
Yi – who themselves turned out to be the other two of the five masters
– to study with Zhou for about a year. In 1057, after passing the
civil service examination, Cheng Hao followed in his father's
footsteps and started his own career as a local official, culminating
in his initial participation in (1069) and eventual withdrawal from
(1070) the reform movement led by Wang Anshi (1021-1086). Cheng Hao
returned to Luoyang after 1072 and continued to assume a few minor
official positions, but he spent most of his time studying and
teaching Confucian classics together with his brother. During this
period, the brothers also had frequent discussions with the final two
of the five masters, Shao Yong (1011-1077) and Zhang Zai (1020-1077).
The former was their neighbor in Luoyang, and the latter was their
uncle.
Cheng Hao's philosophical ideas are largely developed in conversations
with his students, many of whom recorded his sayings. In 1168, Zhu Xi
(1130-1200) edited some of these recorded sayings in Chengs' Surviving
Sayings (Yishu) in 25 volumes, in which 4 volumes are attributed to
Cheng Hao and 11 volumes to Cheng Yi. The first 10 volumes are sayings
by the two masters, where in most cases it is not clearly indicated
which saying belongs to which brother. In 1173, Zhu Xi edited Chengs'
Additional Sayings (Waishu) in 12 volumes, including those recorded
sayings circulated among scholars and not included in Yishu (in most
cases, it is not indicated which saying belongs to which Cheng). As
Zhu Xi himself acknowledged that the authenticity of sayings in this
second collection is mixed, it should be used with caution. Before Zhu
Xi edited these two works, Yang Shi (1053-1135), one of the common
students of the two Chengs, rewrote some of these sayings in a
literary form in The Purified Words of the Two Chengs (Cuiyan).
However, it mostly represents Cheng Yi's views. Cheng Hao's own
writings, mostly official documents, letters, and poetry, are
collected in the first four volumes of Chengs' Collected Writings
(Wenji). In addition, Cheng Hao wrote a correction of the Great
Learning, which is included in Chengs' Commentary on Classics
(Jingshuo). All of these are now conveniently collected in the two
volume edition of Works of the Two Chengs (Er Cheng Ji) by Zhonghua
Shuju, Beijing (1981).
2. Principle
What is called neo-Confucianism in Western scholarship is most
frequently called lixue, or the learning of li (commonly translated as
"principle"), in Chinese scholarship. Lixue refers to neo-Confucianism
in the Song and Ming (and sometimes Qing) dynasties. However, although
"neo-Confucianism" was originally used to translate lixue, it is now
sometimes understood more broadly than lixue to include Confucianism
in the Tang Dynasty which preceded it. Cheng Hao and his younger
brother Cheng Yi can be properly regarded as the founders of
neo-Confucianism as the learning of principle. Although Shao Yong,
Zhou Dunyi, and Zhang Zai are often also treated as neo-Confucians in
this sense, it is in Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi that li first becomes the
central concept in a philosophical system. Cheng Hao makes a famous
claim that "although I have learned much from others, the two words
tian li are what I grasped myself" (Waishu 12; 425). Tian is commonly
translated as "heaven," although it can also mean "sky" or "nature."
By combining these two words, however, Cheng Hao does not mean to
emphasize that it is a principle of heaven or a heavenly principle but
simply that heaven, the term traditionally used to refer to the
ultimate reality, is nothing but principle (see Yishu 11; 132), and so
tian li simply means "heaven-principle." As a matter of fact, not only
tian, but many other terms such as "change" (yi), dao, shen (literally
"god," but Cheng Hao focuses on its meaning of "being wonderful and
unfathomable" ), "human nature" (xing), and "lord" (di) are all seen
as identical to principle. For example, Cheng Hao claims that "what
the heaven embodies does not have sound or smell. In terms of the
reality, it is change; in terms of principle, it is dao; in terms of
its function, it is god; in terms of its destiny in a human being, it
is human nature" (Yishu 1; 4). "Tian is nothing but principle. We call
it god to emphasize the wonderful mystery of principle in ten thousand
things, just as we call it lord (di) to characterize its being the
ruler of events " (Yishu 11; 132). He even identifies it with
heart-mind (xin) (Yishu 5; 76) and propriety (li). Because Cheng Hao
thinks that all these terms have the same referent as principle, his
philosophy is often regarded an ontological monism.
From this it becomes clear in what sense Cheng Hao claims that he
grasps the meaning of tian li on his own. After all he must be aware
that not only the two words separately, tian and li, but even the two
words combined into one phrase, tian li, had appeared in Confucian
texts before him. So what he means is that principle is understood
here as the ultimate reality of the universe that has been referred to
as heaven, god, lord, dao, nature, heart-mind, and change among
others. In other words, with Cheng Hao "principle" acquires an
ontological meaning for the first time in the Confucian tradition.
Thus Cheng Hao claims that "there is only one principle under heaven,
and so it is efficacious throughout the world. It has not changed
since the time of three kings and remains the same between heaven and
earth" (Yishu 2a; 39). In contrast, everything in the world exists
because of principle. Thus Cheng Hao claims that "ten thousand things
all have principle, and it is easy to follow it but difficult to go
against it" (Yishu 11; 123). In other words, things prosper when
principle is followed and disintegrate when it is violated. One of the
most unique ideas of Cheng Hao is that ten thousand things form one
body, and he tells us that "the reason that ten thousand things can be
in one body is that they all have principle" (Yishu 2a; 33).
While principle is the ontological foundation of ten thousand things,
Cheng Hao emphasizes that, unlike Plato's form, it is not temporally
prior to or spatially outside of ten thousand things. This can be seen
from his discussion of two related pairs of ideas. The first pair is
dao and concrete things (qi). After quoting from the Book of Change
that "what is metaphysical (xing er shang) is called dao, while what
is physical (xing er xia) is called concrete thing" (Yishu 11; 119),
Cheng Hao immediately adds that "outside dao there are no things and
outside things there is no dao" (Yishu 4; 73). In other words, what is
metaphysical is not independent of the physical; the former is right
within the latter. The second pair is principle (dao, human nature,
god) and vital force (qi). In Cheng Hao's view, "everything that is
tangible is vital force, and only dao is intangible" (Yishu 6; 83).
However, he emphasizes that "human nature is inseparable from vital
force, and vital force is inseparable from human nature" (Yishu 1;
10), and that "there is no god (shen) outside vital force, and there
is no vital force outside god" (Yishu 1; 10).
What does Cheng Hao precisely mean by principle, which is intangible
and does not have sound or smell? Although translated here as
"principle" according to convention, li for Cheng Hao is not a reified
entity as the common essence shared by all things or universal law
governing these things or inherent principle followed by these things
or patterns exhibited by these things. Li as used by Cheng is a verb
referring to activity, not a noun referring to thing. For example, he
says that "the cold in the winter and the hot in the summer are [vital
forces] yin and yang; yet the movement and change [of vital forces] is
god" (Yihsu 11; 121). Since god for Cheng means the same as li, li is
here understood as the movement and change of vital forces and things
constituted by vital forces. Since things and li are inseparable, as
li is understood as movement and change, all things are things that
move and change, while movement and change are always movement and
change of things. Things are tangible, have smell, and make sound, but
their movement and change is intangible and does not have sound or
smell. We can never perceive things' activities, although we can
perceive things that act. For example we can perceive a moving car,
but we cannot perceive the car's moving. In Cheng Hao's view,
principle as activity is present not only in natural things but also
in human affairs. Thus, illustrating what he means by "nowhere between
heaven and earth there is no dao" (Yishu 4; 73), Cheng points out that
"in the relation of father and son, to be father and son lies in
affection; in the relation of king and minister, to be king and
minister lies in seriousness (reverence). From these to being husband
and wife, being elder and younger brothers, being friends, there is no
activity that is no dao. That is why we cannot be separated from dao
even for a second" (Yishu 4; 73-74). Cheng makes it clear that the
principle that governs these human relations is such activity as
affection and reverence.
However, in what sense can li as activity be regarded as the
ontological foundation of things, as activity is not self-existent and
has to belong to something? For Cheng Hao, li is a special kind of
activity. To explain this, Cheng Hao appeals to the idea of the
unceasing life-giving activity (sheng sheng) from the Book of Change.
Commenting on the statement that "The unceasing life-giving activity
is called change" in the Book of Change, Cheng Hao argues that "it is
right in this life-giving activity that li is complete" (Yishu 2a;
33). So li is the kind of activity that gives life. It is indeed in
this sense of life-giving activity that Cheng Hao regards dao and tian
as identical to li, as he claims that "because of this [the unceasing
life-giving activity] tian can be dao. Tian is dao only because it is
the life-giving activity" (Yishu 2a; 29). Thus, although life-giving
activity is always the life-giving activity of ten thousand things,
ten thousand things cannot come into being without the life-giving
activity. It is in this sense that the life-giving activity of ten
thousand things becomes ontologically prior to ten thousand things
that have the life-giving activity. This is quite similar to Martin
Heidegger's ontology of Being: while Being is always the Being of
beings, beings are being because of their Being.
3. Goodness of Human Nature
Since for Cheng Hao, human nature (xing) is nothing but principle
destined in human beings, and since principle is nothing but
life-giving activity (sheng), this life-giving activity is also human
nature. It is in this sense that he speaks approvingly of Gaozi's
sheng zhi wei xing, a view criticized in the Mencius. By sheng zhi wei
xing, Gaozi means that "what one is born with is nature." Mencius
criticizes this view and argues that human nature is what
distinguishes human beings from non-human beings, which according to
him is the beginning of four cardinal Confucian virtues: humanity
(ren), rightness (yi), propriety (li), and wisdom (zhi). When Cheng
Hao claims that what Gaozi says is indeed correct, however, he does
not mean to disagree with Mencius. On the contrary, he endorses
Mencius' view in the same passage where he approves Gaozi's view. This
is because Cheng Hao has a very different understanding of sheng in
sheng zhi wei xing than Gaozi does. For Gaozi, sheng means what one is
born with, while for Cheng Hao it is the life-giving activity, which
is the ultimate reality of the universe. So for Gaozi the phrase says
that what humans are born with is human nature, but for Cheng Hao it
means that the life-giving activity is human nature. This is most
clear because Cheng Hao quotes this saying of Gaozi together with the
statement from the Book of Change that "the greatest virtue of heaven
and earth is the life-giving activity" and then explains this
statement in his own words: "the most spectacular aspect of things is
their atmosphere of life-giving activity" (Yishu 11; 120).
To understand human nature as the life-giving activity, it is
important to see the actual content of human nature for Cheng Hao:
"These five, humanity, rightness, propriety, wisdom, and faithfulness,
are human nature. Humanity is like the complete body and the other
four are like the four limbs" (Yishu 2a; 14). So his view of human
nature is basically the same as Mencius, except he adds the fifth
component, faithfulness. Since these five components of human nature
are also five cardinal Confucian virtues, Cheng Hao talks about
"virtuous human nature" (dexing) and "virtue of human nature" (xing
zhi de): " 'virtuous nature' indicates the worthiness of nature and so
means the same thing as goodness of human nature. 'Virtues of human
nature' refers to what human nature possesses" (Yishu 11; 125). To
illustrate the goodness of human nature, Cheng Hao highlights the
importance of humanity (ren), regarding it as the complete human
nature that includes the other four components, because "rightness,
propriety, wisdom, and faithfulness are all humanity" (2a; 16-17). For
Cheng, humanity is precisely the life-giving activity. In the same
passage in which he affirms Gaozi's saying, after stating that "the
atmosphere of life-giving activity is most spectacular," Cheng Hao
further makes it clear that it is humanity that continues the
life-giving activity: " 'what is great and originating becomes (in
humans) the first and chief (quality of goodness).' This quality is
known as humanity" (Yishu 11; 120). Thus, for Cheng Hao, humanity is
not merely a human virtue. It is actually no different from the
life-giving activity. Just like heaven, dao, god, and lord, it is
indistinguishable from principle (li) as the ultimate reality.
Understood as life-giving activity, it becomes clear why human nature,
which can be illustrated by humanity (as it includes other components
of human nature) is good. In Cheng Hao's view, this sense of
life-giving activity that humanity (ren) has is best explained by
doctors when they refer to a person who is numb as lacking ren:
"doctors regard a person as not-ren when the person cannot feel pain
and itch; we regard a person as lacking humanity when the person does
not know, is not conscious of, and cannot recognize rightness and
principle. This is the best analogy" (Yishu 2a; 33). A person whose
hands and feet are numb cannot even feel the pain of oneself, to say
nothing of that of others. In contrast, "a person of humanity will be
in one body with ten thousand things" (2a; 15). This means that a
person of humanity, a person who is not numb (lacking ren) is
sensitive to the pain of other beings, not only human beings but also
non-human beings, in the same way that one is sensitive to one's own
pain.
A difficulty in understanding Cheng Hao's view of human nature is that
he sometimes seems to think that not only good but also evil can be
attributed to human nature and principle. About the former, he states
that, "while goodness indeed belongs to human nature, it cannot be
said that evil does not belong to human nature" (Yishu 1; 10). About
the latter, he says that "it is tian li that there are both good and
evil in the world" (Yishu 2a; 14) and "that some things are good and
some things are evil" (2b; 17). In both cases, however, Cheng Hao does
not mean that evil belongs to human nature or principle in the same
way as good belongs to human nature, and so what he says in these
passages is not inconsistent with his view of human nature as good. As
for evil belonging to human nature, Cheng Hao uses the analogy of
water. Just as we cannot say muddy water is not water, so we cannot
say the distorted human nature is not human nature. Here Cheng Hao
makes it clear that water is originally clear, and human nature is
originally good. That is why in the same passage in which he says that
evil cannot be said not to belong to human nature, he emphasizes that
Mencius is right in insisting that human nature is good. So goodness
inherently belongs to human nature, while evil is only externally
attached to and therefore can be detached from human nature, just as
clearness inherently belongs to water, while mud is only externally
mixed in and therefore can be eliminated from water (Yishu 1; 10-11).
In the two passages in which Cheng Hao states that it is li or tian li
that there are both good and evil people, Cheng does not mean that
heaven or principle as life-giving activity is both good and evil. In
such contexts, Cheng Hao means something different by li and tian li.
It does not mean heaven or principle but means something similar to
what Descartes sometimes called "natural light." What he says in these
passages is then that it is natural or naturally understandable (tian
li) that there are good people and there are bad people. The question
then is why it is natural or naturally understandable to have both
good people and evil people when human nature is purely good.
4. Origin of Evil
Cheng Hao holds the view that human nature is good and yet thinks it
natural that there are both good people and evil people. To explain
this, like many other neo-Confucians, Cheng Hao appeals to the
distinction between principle and vital force (qi). While the ideas of
both principle (li) (to which human nature is identical) and vital
force (qi), appeared in earlier Confucian texts, it is in
neo-Confucianism that these two become an important pair. In Cheng
Hao's view, "it is not complete to talk about human nature without
talking about qi, while it is not illuminating to talk about qi
without talking about human nature" (Yishu 6; 81). It is common among
neo-Confucians to regard human nature as good and to attribute the
origin of evil to the vital force. In this respect Cheng Hao is not an
exception. Cheng Hao claims that it is natural that there are good
people and evil people precisely because of vital force. Thus, in the
same passage in which he uses the analogy of water, after claiming
that human nature and vital force cannot be separated from each other,
he states that "human life is endowed with vital force, and therefore
it is naturally understandable (li) that there are good and evil
(people)…. Some people have been good since childhood, and some people
have been evil since childhood. This is all because of the vital force
they are endowed with" (Yishu 1; 10). Then he uses the analogy of
water. Water is the same everywhere, but some water becomes muddy
after flowing a short distance, some becomes muddy after flowing a
long distance, and some remains clear even when flowing into the sea.
The original state of water is clear; whether it remains clear or
becomes muddy depends upon the condition of the route it flows. The
original state of human nature is good; whether a person remains good
or becomes evil depends upon the quality of the vital force the person
is endowed with.
There is an apparent problem, however, with this solution to the
problem of the origin of evil. Cheng Hao argues that what constitutes
human nature is not only present in human beings but also in all ten
thousand things. Thus, after explaining the five constant components
of human nature – humanity, rightness, propriety, wisdom, and
faithfulness – Cheng Hao points out that "all ten thousand things have
the same nature, and these five are constant natures" (Yishu 9; 105).
Cheng Hao repeatedly claims that ten thousand things form one body. In
his view, this is "because all ten thousand things have the same
principle"; human beings are born with a complete nature, but "we
cannot say other things do not have it" (Yishu 2a; 33). Thus Cheng Hao
argues that horses and cows also love their children, because the four
beginnings that Mencius talks about are also present in them (Yishu
2b; 54). In other words, in terms of nature, there is no difference
between human beings and other beings. The difference between human
beings and other beings lies in their ability to extend (tui) the
principle destined in ten thousand things (to extend the natural love
beyond one's intimate circle), and the difference in this ability
further lies in the kind of vital force they are respectively endowed
with. Thus Cheng Hao argues that "Humans can extend the principle,
while things cannot because their vital force is muddy" (Yishu 2a;
33). Here, he emphasizes that the vital force that animals are endowed
with is not clear. In contrast, "the vital force that human beings are
endowed with is most clear, and therefore human beings can become
partner [with heaven and earth]" (Yishu 2b; 54). In addition to this
distinction between clear and muddy vital forces, Cheng Hao also
claims that the vital force that humans are endowed with is balanced
(zheng), while the vital force that animals are endowed with is
one-sided (pian). After reaffirming that human heart-mind is the same
as the heart-mind of animals and plants, he says that "the difference
between human beings and other beings is whether the vital force they
are respectively endowed with is balanced or one-sided [between yin
and yang]. Neither yin alone nor yang alone can give birth to
anything. When one-sided, yin and yang give birth to birds, beast, and
barbarians; when balanced, yin and yang give birth to humans" (Yishu
1; 4; see also Yishu 11; 122).
Cheng Hao thus makes precisely the same distinction between good
people and evil people as he makes between human beings and animals.
The apparent problem here would seem to be that evil people would then
be indistinguishable from animals since they are both endowed with
turbid, one-sided, and mixed vital force, as Cheng Hao does often
regard evil people as beasts. However, the problem is rather: since
Cheng Hao believes that animals cannot be transformed into human
beings because their endowed vital force is turbid, one-sided, and
mixed, how can he believe, as he does, that evil humans who are also
endowed with such turbid, one-sided, and mixed vital force can be
transformed into moral beings and even sages? In other words, what is
the difference between evil humans and beasts that makes the
difference?
Cheng Hao seems to be aware of this problem, and he attempts to solve
it by making the distinction between host vital force (zhu qi) and
alien or guest vital force (ke qi). For example, he states that
"rightness (yi) and the principle (li) on the one side and the alien
vital force on the other often fight against each other. The
distinction between superior persons and inferior persons is made
according to the degree of the one conquered by another. The more the
principle and rightness gain the upper hand…the more the alien vital
force is extinguished" (Yishu 1; 4-5). For human beings, the host
vital force is the one that is constitutive of human beings, which
makes human being a bodily existence, while the guest vital force is
constitutive of the environment, in which a human being, as a bodily
existence, is born and lives. This distinction between host and alien
vital force is equivalent to the one between internal (nei qi) and
external vital force (wai qi) that his brother Cheng Yi makes, and
therefore the analogy the Cheng Yi uses to explain the latter
distinction can assist us in understanding the former distinction. For
Cheng Yi, the internal vital force is not mixed with but absorbs
nourishment from the external vital force. Then he uses the analogy of
fish in water to explain it: "The life of fish is not caused by water.
However, only by absorbing nourishment from water can fish live. Human
beings live between heaven and earth in the same way as fish live in
water. The nourishment humans receive from drinking and food is from
the external vital force" (Yishu 15; 165-166).
In this analogy, a fish has both its internal or host vital force, the
vital force that it is internally endowed with, which accounts for its
corporeal form, and its external or guest vital force, the vital force
it is externally endowed with, which provides the environment in which
fish can live. This analogy performs the same function as Cheng Hao's
own analogy of water (mentioned above). Water itself is a bodily being
with a nature and internal vital force, both of which guarantee its
clearness. However, water has to exist in external vital force (river,
for example). If this external vital force is also favorable, the
water will remain clear, but if it is not favorable, the water will
become muddy. In this analogy, water is equivalent to human beings,
and "the clearness of water is equivalent to the goodness of human
nature" (Yishu 1; 11). Through such an analogy, Cheng Hao attempts to
show that, in addition to human nature, humans are endowed both
internally with the host vital force, which is constitutive of human
body, and externally with the alien vital force, which makes up the
natural and social environment in which humans live. Therefore, not
only is human nature all good, but the host vital force constitutive
of human beings is also pure, clear, and balanced. Neither of the two
can account for human evil. However, since human beings are corporeal
beings, they must be born to and live in the midst of external vital
force, which can be pure or impure. It is the quality of this external
or guest vital force, purity or impurity, and the way people deal with
it, that distinguishes between good and evil people. If the external
vital force is also pure, it will provide the necessary nourishment to
the internal vital force and therefore the original good human nature
will not be damaged, and people will be good. If the external vital
force is turbid and human beings living in it have not developed
immunity to it, their internal vital force will be malnourished or
even polluted and the original good human nature will be damaged, and
people will be evil.
Thus, in Cheng Hao's view, although both evil people and animals are
endowed with muddy, mixed, and one-sided vital force, evil people are
endowed with it externally as the necessary environment in which they
have to live, while animals are endowed with it internally as
constitutive of their bodily existence. In other words, such muddy,
mixed, and one-sided vital force is the external guest vital force for
human beings but is the internal host vital force for animals. Since
the host vital force constitutive of animals – the vital force that
makes animals animals – is muddy, mixed, and one-sided, animals can
never be transformed into moral beings. On the other hand, since the
host vital force constitutive of evil people, just as that
constitutive of good people, is originally pure, clear, and balanced,
but is only later polluted by muddy, mixed, and one-sided alien vital
force, they can be made to become good by clearing up the pollution.
Here, just as muddy water, when purified, does not enter into a state
it has never been in before but simply returns to its original state
of clearness, so an evil person, when made good, does not become an
entirely new being, but simply returns to its original state of
goodness (Yishu 1; 10-11). A return to this original state requires
moral cultivation.
5. Moral Cultivation
Cheng Hao's distinction between the host vital force and guest vital
force makes a great contribution to the solution of the problem of the
origin of evil. At least this is a step further than simply appealing
to the distinction between principle and vital force. Still it is hard
to say that it is completely successful, as it seems to attribute the
origin of evil entirely to the external environment, which is also
suggested by Mencius in his analogies of the growing of wheat (Mencius
6a7) and the Niu Mountain (Mencius 6a8). Some scholars believe such a
view is implausible, and even both Cheng Hao and Mencius think that an
evil person is also responsible for becoming bad. However, neither of
them provides a satisfactory explanation about the internal origin of
evil. Perhaps their very idea of the original goodness of human nature
prevents such an explanation, just as Xunzi's idea of the original
badness of human nature perhaps prevents him from a satisfactory
explanation of the origin of goodness: Xunzi does appeal to the
transformative influence of sages and their teaching as a solution to
the problem, but then he faces the problem of the origin of sages as
their nature, as he claims, is also evil.
Whether Cheng Hao's solution to the problem of the origin of evil is
satisfactory or not, it is undeniable that one can become evil even
though his or her nature is good. So Cheng Hao emphasizes the
importance of moral cultivation. Since evil occurs when the turbid
external vital force pollutes one's originally clean internal vital
force, just as the dust and dirt in the river makes the originally
clear water muddy, what is needed is to purify the contaminated
internal vital force, just as the turbid water must settle to become
clear. This process is called cultivation of the vital force (yang qi)
in Mencius. When the internal vital force is cultivated to the utmost,
it becomes as clear, bright, pure, and complete as it is in its
original state. This is also what Mencius calls "flood-like" vital
force (haoran zhi qi), and so Cheng Hao puts a great emphasis on the
passage of the Mencius in which Mencius talks about the cultivation of
this flood-like vital force (Yishu 11; 117). Cheng Hao claims that
"the flood-like vital force is nothing but my own [internally endowed]
vital force. When it is cultivated instead of being harmed, it can
fill between heaven and earth. Once it is blocked by private desires,
however, it will immediately become withered" (Yishu 2a; 20). In other
words, Mencius' flood-like vital force is what everyone is originally
internally endowed with, and everyone should cultivate it in case it
gets contaminated by the turbid external vital force.
How does one cultivate the flood-like vital force? Cheng Hao claims
that it does not come from outside. Rather it results from "consistent
moral actions (jiyi)" (Yishu 2a; 29 and Yishu 11; 124). So jiyi
becomes the way to cultivate the flood-like vital force. Thus,
commenting on the passage in which Mencius talks about the flood-like
vital force, Cheng Hao points out that, "cultivated straightly from
dao and along the line of principle, it fills up between heaven and
earth. [Mencius says that] 'it is to be accompanied with rightness and
dao,' which means that it takes rightness as its master and never
diverts from dao. [Mencius says that] 'This is generated by consistent
moral actions,' which means that everything one does is in accordance
with rightness" (Yishu 1; 11).
To say that cultivation of vital force consists in consistent moral
actions, however, for Cheng Hao, does not mean that one has to exert
artificial effort to do what is right, even though one does not have
the inclination to do it. For this reason, he repeatedly cites
Mencius' claim that "while you must never let it out of your mind, you
must not forcibly help it grow either" (Mencius 2a2). In other words,
one has to set one's mind on moral actions and yet cannot force such
actions upon oneself. What is important for Cheng Hao is that, when
one engages oneself in moral practices, one is not to regulate one's
action with the principle of rightness, as otherwise one will not be
able to feel joy in it. In Cheng Hao's view, this is a distinction
best exemplified by the sage king Shun, who "practices from rightness
and humanity" instead of "practicing rightness and humanity" (Yishu 3;
61). In other words, one cannot regard morality as external rules that
constrain one's action but as internal source that inclines one to act
naturally, without effort, and at ease.
A person becomes evil because of the turbid external force. However,
the turbid force can also make one evil because a person's will is not
firm. Thus another way of moral cultivation is to firm up one's will
(chi zhi). While cultivation of the vital force can help firming up
one's original good will, firming up one's original good will can also
help cultivate the vital force. Thus, referring to Mencius' view about
the relationship between these two, Cheng Hao states that, "for a
person whose vital force is yet to be cultivated, the activity of the
vital force may move one's will, and the decision of one's will may
cause the movement of the vital force. However, to a person whose
virtue is fulfilled, since the will is already firmed up, the vital
force will not be able to change one's will" (Yishu 1; 11). So in
Cheng Hao's view, to avoid being polluted by turbid vital force, it is
important to firm up one's will: "as soon as one's will is firmed up,
the vital force cannot cause any trouble" (Yishu 2b; 53). On the one
hand, if one's will is not firm, it may be disturbed by violent vital
force; on the other hand, if one's will is firm, the vital force
cannot disturb it.
In order to firm up one's will, Cheng Hao claims that it is most
important to live in reverence (ju jing). The primary function of
being in reverence is to overcome one's selfish desires: "As soon as
one has selfish desires, [one's heart-mind] will wither, and the
flood-like vital force will be lacking" (Yishu 2a; 29). To be reverent
inside is to overcome selfish desires. As soon as these selfish
desires are overcome, one will be like a sage, who "is happy with
things because they are things one ought to be happy with, and is
angry at things because they are things one ought to be angry at. The
sage's being happy or angry is thus according to things and not
according to his own likes or dislikes" (Wenji 2; 461). This is
because, in Cheng Hao's view, the inborn virtues of sages and worthies
are also complete in everyone's original nature. Thus when not harmed,
one need only practice straightly from the inside. If there is some
damage, one must be reverent so that it can be purified and return to
its original state (Yishu 1; 1).
These two ways of moral cultivation – cultivation of the vital force
(yang qi), which relies upon consistent moral actions (jiyi), and
firming up one's will (chi zhi), which relies upon one's being
reverent (ju jin) – are what the Book of Chang calls "being reverent
(jing) so that one's inner [heart-mind] will be upright and being
right (yi) so that one's external [actions] will be in accord [with
principle]." The former is internal and the latter is external. In
Cheng Hao's view, they are also the only ways to become a sage. One of
the common features of these two methods is that they both aim at
one's virtues so that a virtuous person takes delight in being
virtuous without making forced efforts (Yishu 2a; 20). Thus, just as
he emphasizes "being reverent so that the inner will be straightened"
(jing yi zhi nei) instead of "using reverence to straighten the inner"
(yi jing zhi nei), he emphasizes "being morally right so that one's
external action will be squared" (yi yi fang wai) instead of "using
rightness to square one's external action" (yi yi fang wai) (Yishu 11;
120). (Although these two Chinese phrases appear identical in
romanization, they contain different characters, as can be seen from
their different translations.) Moreover, while the two ways can be
respectively called internal way and external way, Cheng Hao
emphasizes that it is important "to combine the inner way and the
external way" (Yishu 1; 9). In other words, these two ways are not
separate, as if one could practice one without practicing the other.
6. Influence
Han Yu (768-824), an important Tang dynasty Confucian, established a
lineage of the Confucian tradition (daotong) from Yao, Shun, Yu, Tang,
King Wen, King Wu, Duke of Zhou, Confucius, and Mencius. He claimed
that, after Mencius, this lineage was interrupted. Cheng Yi accepted
this Confucian daotong and claimed that his brother Cheng Hao was the
first one to continue this lineage after Mencius (Wenji 11; 640).
While there may be some exaggeration in such a claim, particularly as
it is in the tomb inscription he wrote for his own brother, there is
also truth in it. According to one widely accepted chronology, there
are three epochs of Confucianism: pre-Qin Classical Confucianism,
neo-Confucianism in the Song and Ming dynasties, and contemporary
Confucianism. In the second stage, as far as neo-Confucianism can be
characterized as the learning of principle, Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi can
indeed be regarded as its true founders, and their learning, through
their numerous students, to a large extent determined the later
development of neo-Confucianism. While the two brothers share
fundamentally similar views and most of these students learned from
both, different students noticed and exaggerated their different
emphases and thus developed different schools. Among all their
students, Xie Liangzuo (1050-1103) and Yang Shi (1053-1135) are the
most distinguished. Yang Shi transmitted Cheng Yi's teaching through
his student Luo Congyan (1072-1135) and the latter's student Li Tong
(1093-1163), to Zhu Xi. The synthesizer of the lixue school of
neo-Confucianism, Xie Liangzuo transmitted Cheng Hao's learning
through a few generations of students such as Wang Ping (1082-1153)
and Zhang Jiucheng (1092-1159) to Lu Jiuyuan (1139-1193) and
eventually to Wang Yangming, the culminating figure of the xinxue
school of neo-Confucianism. Sometimes a third school of
neo-Confucianism, xingxue (learning of human nature), is identified,
whose most important representative is Hu Hong (?-1161). Hu Hong
continued the learning of his father, Hu Anguo (1074-1138), who in
turn was also influenced by Xie Liangzuo. In this sense, Cheng Hao
leaves his mark on all three main schools of neo-Confucianism (all
recognized, in Chinese scholarship, as lixue, learning of principle,
understood in the broad sense).
7. References and Further Reading
* Bol, Peter. Neo-Confucianism in History. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Asia Center, 2008.
o There are scattered discussions of Cheng Hao throughout the book.
* Chan, Wing-tsit. A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1963.
o Chapter 31 is the most extensive English translation of
selected sayings and writings by Cheng Hao.
* Chang, Carsun. The Development of Neo-Confucianism, vol. 1. New
Haven, Conn.: College and University Press, 1957.
o Chapter 9 is devoted to Cheng Hao.
* Cheng, Hao & Cheng, Yi. Collected Works of the Two Chengs (Er
Cheng Ji). Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1988.
o A collection of the works and sayings of Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi.
* Fung, Yu-lan (Feng, Yulan). A History of Chinese Philosophy.
Vol. II. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953.
o Chapter XII, Section 2, is a combined study of Cheng Hao
and Cheng Yi.
* Graham, A.C. Two Chinese Philosophers. La Salle, Illinois: Open
Court, 1992.
o The only book length study of Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi in English.
* Hon, Tze-ki. "Cheng Hao." In A. S. Cua, ed., Encyclopedia of
Chinese Philosophy. New York: Routledge, 2003.
o A full length article on Cheng Hao's philosophy.
* Hsu, Fu-kuan. "Chu Hsi and Cheng Brothers." In Wing-tsit Chan,
ed., Chu Hsi and Neo-Confucianism. Honolulu: University of Hawaii,
1986.
o A study of the similarity and difference between Zhu Xi
and the Cheng brothers.
* Huang, Siu-chi. Essentials of Neo-Confucianism: Eight Major
Philosophers of the Song and Ming Periods. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood
Press, 1999.
o One chapter is devoted to a philosophical study of Cheng Hao.
* Huang, Yong. "Confucian Love and Global Ethics: How the Cheng
Brothers Would Help Respond to Christian Criticisms." Asian Philosophy
15/1 (2005): 35-60.
o A discussion of the contemporary significance of the Cheng
brothers' interpretation of love with distinction.
* Huang, Yong. "The Cheng Brothers' Onto-Theological Articulation
of Confucian Values." Asian Philosophy 17/3 (2007): 187-211.
o An interpretation of the Cheng brothers' li as life-giving activity.
* Huang, Yong. "Neo-Confucian Political Philosophy: The Cheng
Brothers on Li (Propriety) as Political, Psychological, and
Metaphysical." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 34/2 (2007): 217-239.
o An exposition of the Cheng brothers' li as rules of
action, as one's inner feeling, and as human nature.
* Huang, Yong. "Why Be Moral? The Cheng Brothers' Neo-Confucian
Answer." Journal of Religious Ethics 36/2 (2008): 321-353.
o A discussion of the Cheng brothers' conception of human
nature as a response to the question of why be moral.
* Wong, Wai-ying. "The Status of li in the Cheng Brothers'
Philosophy." Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 3/1 (2003):
109-119.
o An important study of the Cheng brothers' conception of propriety.
* Wong, Wai-ying. "Morally Bad in the Philosophy of the Cheng
Brothers." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 36/1 (2009): 157-176.
o A good discussion of the Cheng brothers' view of evil.
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