1. Life
Cesare Beccaria (1738-1794) was born the eldest son in an aristocratic
family and educated at a Jesuit school. In his mid twenties Beccaria
became close friends with Pietro and Alessandro Verri, two brothers
who formed an intellectual circle called "the academy of fists" which
focused on reforming the criminal justice system. Through this group
Beccaria became acquainted with French and British political
philosophers, such as Hobbes, Hume, Diderot, Helvetius, Montesquieu,
and Hume. At the encouragement of Pietro, Beccaria wrote On Crimes and
Punishments (1764). Some background information was provided by
Pietro, who was in the process of authoring a text on the history of
torture, and Alessandro was an official at a Milan prison had first
hand experience of the prison's appalling conditions. The brief work
relentlessly protests against torture to obtain confessions, secret
accusations, the arbitrary discretionary power of judges, the
inconsistency and inequality of sentencing, using personal connections
to get a lighter sentence, and the use of capital punishment for
serious and even minor offenses. Almost immediately, the work was
translated into French and English and went through several editions.
Philosophers of the time hailed it, and several European emperors
vowed to follow it. With great hesitation, Beccaria acted on an
invitation to Paris to meet the great thinkers of the day. A
chronically shy person, Beccaria made a poor impression at Paris and
returned to Milan after three weeks. Beccaria continued to gain
official recognition and held several nominal political positions in
Italy. Separated from the invaluable input from his friends, though,
he failed to produce another text of equal importance. Outside Italy,
an unfounded myth grew that Beccaria's literary silence owed to
Austrian restrictions on free expression in Italy.
2. On Crimes and Punishment
Editions of Beccaria's text follow two distinct arrangements of the
material: that by Beccaria himself, and that by French translator
Andre Morellet (1765) who imposed a more systematic order to
Beccaria's original text. Beccaria opens his work describing the great
need for reform in the criminal justice system, and he observes how
few studies there are on the subject of such reform. Throughout his
work, Beccaria develops his position by appealing to two key
philosophical theories: social contract and utility. Concerning the
social contract, Beccaria argues that punishment is justified only to
defend the social contract and to ensure that everyone will be
motivated to abide by it. Concerning utility (perhaps influenced by
Helvetius), Beccaria argues that the method of punishment selected
should be that which serves the greatest public good.
Contemporary political philosophers distinguish between two principle
theories of justifying punishment. First, the retributive approach
maintains that punishment should be equal to the harm done, either
literally an eye for an eye, or more figuratively which allows for
alternative forms of compensation. The retributive approach tends to
be retaliatory and vengeance-oriented. The second approach is
utilitarian which maintains that punishment should increase the total
amount of happiness in the world. This often involves punishment as a
means of reforming the criminal, incapacitating him from repeating his
crime, and deterring others. Beccaria clearly takes a utilitarian
stance. For Beccaria, the purpose of punishment is to create a better
society, not revenge. Punishment serves to deter others from
committing crimes, and to prevent the criminal from repeating his
crime.
Beccaria argues that Punishment should be swift since this has the
greatest deterrence value. He defends his view about the swiftness of
punishment by appealing to the theory of the association of ideas
(developed most notably by David Hume and David Hartley). According to
associationists, if we know the rules by which the mind connects
together two different ideas (such as the ideas of crime and
punishment), then we can strengthen their association. For Beccaria
when a punishment quickly follows a crime, then the two ideas of
"crime" and "punishment" will be more quickly associated in a person's
mind. Also, the link between a crime and a punishment is stronger if
the punishment is somehow related to the crime. Given the fact that
the swiftness of punishment has the greatest impact on deterring
others, Beccaria argues that there is no justification for severe
punishments. In time we will naturally grow accustomed to increases in
severity of punishment, and, thus, the initial increase in severity
will lose its effect. There are limits both to how much torment we can
endure, and also how much we can inflict.
Beccaria touches on an array of criminal justice practices,
recommending reform. For example, he argues that dueling can be
eliminated if laws protected a person from insults to his honor. Laws
against suicide are ineffective, and thus should be eliminated,
leaving punishment of suicide to God. Bounty hunting should not be
permitted since it incites people to be immoral and shows a weakness
in the government. He argues that laws should be clear in defining
crimes so that judges do not interpret the law, but only decide
whether a law has been broken. Punishments should be in degree to the
severity of the crime. Treason is the worst crime since it harms the
social contract. This is followed by violence against a person or his
property, and, finally, by public disruption. Crimes against property
should be punished by fines. The best ways to prevent crimes are to
enact clear and simple laws, reward virtue, and improve education.
3. Against Capital Punishment
In On Crimes and Punishments Beccaria presents one of the first
sustained critiques of the use of capital punishment. Briefly, his
position is that capital punishment is not necessary to deter, and
long term imprisonment is a more powerful deterrent since execution is
transient. He starts by describing the connection between the social
contract and our right to life. Locke argued that people forfeit their
right to life when they initiate a state of war with other people.
Beccaria disagrees. Following Hobbes, Beccaria believes that, in the
social contract, we negotiate away only the minimal number of rights
necessary to bring about peace. Thus, people hold onto their right to
life, and do not hand this over to the public good. Given the fact
that capital punishment cannot be justified by Locke's reasoning,
Beccaria argues that the only other justification is that it is either
necessary or useful for public good. He contests both of these claims.
For Beccaria, history shows that capital punishment fails to deter
determined criminals. What we know about human nature also suggests
that it has minimal deterrence value. A steady example over a long
period of time is more effective in creating moral habits than is a
single shocking example of an execution. Beccaria argues that
perpetual slavery is a more effective deterrent than capital
punishment. Since we should choose the least severe punishment which
accomplishes our purpose (that is, deterrence), then perpetual slavery
is the preferred mode of punishment for the worst crimes. From the
spectator's perspective, observing perpetual slavery will have a more
lasting impression than capital punishment. Perpetual slavery will
also seem more terrible from the vantage of the spectator, than from
the criminal himself. Beccaria explains the psychology of the criminal
who wishes to return to the state of nature in view of the gross
inequity between the rich and the poor. Again, perpetual slavery is
the best deterrence against this motivation. Beccaria argues further
that the death penalty in fact has bad effects on society by reducing
their sensitivity to human suffering. Potential criminals see it as
one more method of perpetuating tyranny. Although capital punishment
is practiced in most countries, it is still an error which in time
will become rare. He urges rulers to adopt his stance against capital
punishment, and predicts that this will give them a lasting fame as
peacemakers.
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