Gautama, and Buddha Śākyamuni, was born in Lumbini, in the Nepalese
region of Terai, near the Indian border. He is one of the most
important Asian thinkers and spiritual masters of all time, and he
contributed to many areas of philosophy, including epistemology,
metaphysics and ethics. The Buddha's teaching formed the foundation
for Buddhist philosophy, initially developed in South Asia, then later
in the rest of Asia. Buddhism and Buddhist philosophy now have a
global following.
In epistemology, the Buddha seeks a middle way between the extremes of
dogmatism and skepticism, emphasizing personal experience, a pragmatic
attitude, and the use of critical thinking toward all types of
knowledge. In ethics, the Buddha proposes a threefold understanding of
action: mental, verbal, and bodily. In metaphysics, the Buddha argues
that there are no self-caused entities, and that everything
dependently arises from or upon something else. This allows the Buddha
to provide a criticism of souls and personal identity; that criticism
forms the foundation for his views about the reality of rebirth and an
ultimate liberated state called "Nirvana." Nirvana is not primarily an
absolute reality beyond or behind the universe but rather a special
state of mind in which all the causes and conditions responsible for
rebirth and suffering have been eliminated. In philosophical
anthropology, the Buddha explains human identity without a permanent
and substantial self. The doctrine of non-self, however, does not
imply the absolute inexistence of any type of self whatsoever, but is
compatible with a conventional self composed of five psycho-physical
aggregates, although all of them are unsubstantial and impermanent.
Selves are thus conceived as evolving processes causally constrained
by their past.
1. Interpreting the Historical Buddha
a. Dates
There is no complete agreement among scholars and Buddhist traditions
regarding the dates of the historical Buddha. The most common dates
among Buddhists are those of the Theravāda school, 623-543 B.C.E. From
the middle of the 19th century until recently, Western scholars had
believed the dates of the Buddha to be ca. 560-480 B.C.E. However,
after the publication in 1991-2 of the proceedings of the
international symposium on the date of the historical Buddha held in
Göttingen in 1988, the original consensus on these dates no longer
exists.
Although there is no conclusive evidence for any specific date, most
current scholars locate the Buddha's life one hundred years earlier,
around the fifth century B.C.E. Some of the new dates for the Buddha's
"death" or more accurately, for his parinirvāṇa are: ca. 404 B.C.E.
(R. Gombrich), between 410-390 B.C.E. (K.R. Norman), ca. 400 B.C.E.
(R. Hikata), ca. 397 B.C.E. (K.T.S. Sarao), between ca.400-350 B.C.E.
(H. Bechert), 383 B.C.E. (H. Nakamura), 368 B.C.E. (A. Hirakawa),
between 420-380 B.C.E. (A. Bareau).
b. Sources
The historical Buddha did not write down any of his teachings, they
were passed down orally from generation to generation for at least
three centuries. Some scholars have attempted to distinguish the
Buddha's original teachings from those developed by his early
disciples. Unfortunately, the contradictory conclusions have led most
scholars to be skeptical about the possibility of knowing what the
Buddha really taught. This however, does not mean that all Buddhist
texts that attribute teachings to the Buddha are equally valuable to
reconstruct his thought. The early sūtras in Pāli and other Middle
Indo-Aryan languages are historically and linguistically closer to the
cultural context of the Buddha than Mahāyāna sūtras in Sanskrit,
Tibetan, and Chinese. This does not imply that later translations of
the early sūtras in Chinese (there are no Tibetan translations of the
early sūtras) are less authentic or useless in reconstructing the
philosophy of the Buddha. On the contrary, the comparative study of
Pāli and Chinese versions of the early sūtras can help to infer what
might have been the Buddha's position on a number of issues.
Following what seems to be a growing scholarly tendency, I will
reconstruct the philosophy of the historical Buddha by drawing on the
Sutta Piṭaka of the Pāli canon. More specifically, our main sources
are the first four Pāli Nikāyas (Dīgha, Majjhima, Saṃyutta, Aṅguttara)
and some texts of the fifth Pāli Nikāya (Dhammapada, Udāna,
Itivuttaka, and Sutta Nipāta). I do not identify these sources with
the Buddha's "ipsissima verba," that is, with "the very words" of the
Buddha, even less with his "actual" thought. Whether these sources are
faithful to the actual thought and teachings of the historical Buddha
is an unanswerable question; I can only say that to my knowledge there
are not better sources to reconstruct the philosophy of the Buddha.
According to the traditional Buddhist account, shortly after the
Buddha's death five hundred disciples gathered to compile his
teachings. The Buddha's personal assistant, Ānanda, recited the first
part of the Buddhist canon, the Sūtra Piṭaka, which contains
discourses in dialogue form between the Buddha, his disciples, and his
contemporaries on a variety of doctrinal and spiritual questions.
Ānanda is reported to have recited the sutras just as he had heard
them from the Buddha; that is why Buddhist sutras begin with the words
"Thus have I heard." Another disciple, Upāli, recited the second part
of the Buddhist canon, the Vinaya Piṭaka, which also contains sutras,
but primarily addresses the rules that govern a monastic community.
After the recitation of Ānanda and Upāli, the other disciples approved
what they had heard and communally recited the teachings as a sign of
agreement. The third part of the Buddhist canon or Abhidharma Piṭaka,
was not recited at that moment. The Theravāda tradition claims that
the Buddha taught the Abhidharma while visiting the heaven where his
mother was residing.
From a scholarly perspective, the former account is questionable. It
might be the case that a large collection of Buddhist texts was
written down for the first time in Sri Lanka during the first century
B.C.E. However, the extant Pāli canon shows clear signs of historical
development in terms of both content and language. The three parts of
the Pāli canon are not as contemporary as the traditional Buddhist
account seems to suggest: the Sūtra Piṭaka is older than the Vinaya
Piṭaka, and the Abhidharma Piṭaka represents scholastic developments
originated at least two centuries after the other two parts of the
canon. The Vinaya Piṭaka appears to have grown gradually as a
commentary and justification of the monastic code (Prātimokṣa), which
presupposes a transition from a community of wandering mendicants (the
Sūtra Piṭaka period ) to a more sedentary monastic community (the
Vinaya Piṭaka period). Even within the Sūtra Piṭaka it is possible to
detect older and later texts.
Neither the Sūtra Piṭaka nor the Vinaya Piṭaka of the Pāli canon could
have been recited at once by one person and repeated by the entire
Buddhist community. Nevertheless, the Sūtra Piṭaka of the Pāli canon
is of particular importance in reconstructing the philosophy of Buddha
for four main reasons. First, it contains the oldest texts of the only
complete canon of early Indian Buddhism, which belong to the only
surviving school of that period, namely, the Theravāda school,
prevalent in Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia. Second, it has been
preserved in a Middle Indo-Aryan language closely related to various
Prakrit dialects spoken in North of India during the third century
B.C.E., including the area where the Buddha spent most of his teaching
years (Magadha). Third, it expresses a fairly consistent set of
doctrines and practices. Fourth, it is strikingly similar to another
version of the early Sūtra Piṭaka extant in Chinese (Āgamas). This
similarity seems to indicate that a great part of the Sūtra Piṭaka in
Pāli does not contain exclusively Theravāda texts, and belongs to a
common textual tradition probably prior to the existence of Buddhist
schools.
c. Life
Since the Pāli Nikāyas contain much more information about the
teachings of the Buddha than about his life, it seems safe to
postulate that the early disciples of the Buddha were more interested
in preserving his teachings than in transmitting all the details of
his life. The first complete biographies of the Buddha as well as the
Jātaka stories about his former lives appeared centuries later, even
after, and arguably as a reaction against, the dry lists and
categorizations of early Abhidharma literature. The first complete
biography of the Buddha in Pāli is the Nidānakathā, which serves as an
introduction to the Jātaka verses found in the fifth Pāli Nikāya. In
Sanskrit, the most popular biographies of the Buddha are the
Buddhacarita attributed to the Indian poet Aśvaghoṣa (second century
C.E), the Mahāvastu, and the Lalitavistara, both composed in the first
century C.E.
The first four Pāli Nikāyas contain only fragmented information about
the Buddha's life. Especially important are the Mahāpadāna-suttanta,
the Ariyapariyesanā-suttanta, the Mahāsaccaka-suttanta, and the
Mahāparinibbāna-suttanta. According to the Mahāpadāna-suttanta, the
lives of all Buddhas or perfectly enlightened beings follow a similar
pattern. Like all Buddhas of the past, the Buddha of this cosmic era,
also known as Gautama (Gotama in Pāli), was born into a noble family.
The Buddha's parents were King Śuddhodana and Queen Māyā. He was a
member of the Śakya clan and his name was Siddhartha Gautama. Even
though he was born in Lumbinī while his mother was traveling to her
parents' home, he spent the first twenty-nine years of his life in the
royal capital, Kapilavastu, in the Nepalese region of Terai, close to
the Indian border.
Like all past Buddhas, the conception and birth of Gautama Buddha are
considered miraculous events. For instance, when all Buddhas descend
into their mothers' wombs from a heaven named Tuṣita, a splendid light
shines forth and the entire universe quakes; their mothers are
immaculate, healthy, and without pain of any sort during their ten
months of pregnancy, but they die a week after giving birth. Buddha
babies are born clean, though they are ritually bathed with two
streams of water that fall from the sky; they all take seven steps
toward the north and solemnly announce that this is their last
rebirth.
Like former Buddhas, prince Siddhartha enjoyed all types of luxuries
and sensual pleasures during his youth. Unsatisfied with this type of
life, he had a crisis when he realized that everything was ephemeral
and that his existence was subject to old age, sickness, and death.
After seeing the serene joy of a monk and out of compassion for all
living beings, he renounced his promising future as prince in order to
start a long quest for a higher purpose, nirvāṇa (Pali nibbāna), which
entails the cessation of old age, sickness and death. Later traditions
speak of the Buddha as abandoning his wife Yaśodharā immediately after
she gave birth to Rāhula, the Buddha's only son. The Pāli Nikāyas,
however, do not mention this story, and refer to Rāhula only as a
young monk.
According to the Ariyapariyesanā-suttanta and the
Mahāsaccaka-suttanta, the Buddha tried different spiritual paths for
six years. First, he practiced yogic meditation under the guidance of
Ālāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta. After experiencing the states of
concentration called base of nothingness and base of
neither-perception-nor-non-perception, he realized that these lofty
states did not lead to nirvana. Then the Buddha began to practice
breathing exercises and fasting. The deterioration of his health led
the Buddha to conclude that extreme asceticism was equally ineffective
in attaining nirvana. He thus resumed eating solid food; after
recovering his health, he began to practice a more moderate spiritual
path, the middle path, which avoids the extremes of sensual
self-indulgence and self-mortification. Soon after, the Buddha
experienced enlightenment, or awakening, under a bodhi-tree. First he
was inclined to inaction rather than to teaching what he had
discovered. However, he changed his mind after the god Brahmā
Sahampati asked him to teach. Out of compassion for all living beings,
he decided to start a successful teaching career that lasted
forty-five years.
d. Significance
It would be simplistic to dismiss all supernatural aspects of the
Buddha's life as false and consider historically true only those
elements that are consistent with our contemporary scientific
worldview. However, this approach towards the Buddha's life was
prevalent in the nineteenth century and a great part of the twentieth
century. Today it is seen as problematic because it imposes modern
western ideals of rationality onto non-western texts. Here I set aside
the question of historical truth and speak exclusively of
significance. The significance of all the biographies of Buddha does
not lie in their historical accuracy, but rather in their
effectiveness to convey basic Buddhist ideas and values throughout
history. Even today, narratives about the many deeds of Buddha are
successfully used to introduce Buddhists of all latitudes into the
main values and teachings of Buddhism.
The supernatural elements of the Buddha's life are as historically
significant as the natural ones because they help to understand the
way Buddhists conceived – and in many places continue to conceive –
the Buddha. Like followers of other religious leaders, Buddhist
scribes tended to glorify the sanctity of their foundational figure
with extraordinary events and spectacular accomplishments. In this
sense, the narratives of the Buddha are perhaps better understood as
hagiographies rather than as biographies. The historical truth behind
hagiographies is impossible to determine: how can we tell whether or
not the Buddha was conceived without sexual intercourse; whether or
not he was able to talk and walk right after his birth; whether or not
he could walk over water, levitate, fly, and ascend into heaven at
will? How do we know whether the Buddha was really tempted by Māra the
evil one; whether there was an earthquake at the moment of his birth
and death? The answers to these questions are a matter of faith. If
the interpreter does not believe in the supernatural, then many
narratives will be dismissed as historically false. However, for some
Buddhists the supernatural events that appear in the life of Buddha
did take place and are historically true.
The significance of the hagiographies of the Buddha is primarily
ethical and spiritual. In fact, even if the life of Buddha did not
take place as the hagiographies claim, the ethical values and the
spiritual path they illustrate remain significant. Unlike other
religions, the truth of Buddhism does not depend on the historicity of
certain events in the life of the Buddha. Rather, the truth of
Buddhism depends on the efficacy of the Buddhist path exemplified by
the life of the Buddha and his disciples. In other words, if the
different Buddhist paths inspired by the Buddha are useful to overcome
existential dissatisfaction and suffering, then Buddhism is true
regardless of the existence of the historical Buddha.
The fundamental ethical and spiritual point behind the Buddha's life
is that impermanent, conditioned, and contingent things such as
wealth, social position, power, sensual pleasures, and even lofty
meditative states, cannot generate a state of ultimate happiness. In
order to overcome the profound existential dissatisfaction that all
ephemeral and contingent things eventually generate, one needs to
follow a comprehensive path of ethical and mental training conducive
to the state of ultimate happiness called nirvana.
2. The Buddha's Epistemology
a. The Extremes of Dogmatism and Skepticism
While the Buddha's view of the spiritual path is traditionally
described as a middle way between the extremes of self-indulgence and
self-mortification, the Buddha's epistemology can be interpreted as a
middle way between the extremes of dogmatism and skepticism.
The extreme of dogmatism is primarily represented in the Pāli Nikāyas
by Brahmanism. Brahmanism was a ritualistic religion that believed in
the divine revelation of the Vedas, thought that belonging to a caste
was determined by birth, and focused on the performance of sacrifice.
Sacrifices involved the recitation of hymns taken from the Vedas and
in many cases the ritual killing of animals.
Ritual sacrifices were offered to the Gods (gods for Buddhism) in
exchange for prosperity, health, protection, sons, long life, and
immortality. Only the male members of the highest caste, the priestly
caste of Brahmins, could afford the professional space to seriously
study the three Vedas (the Atharva Veda did not exist, or if it
existed, it was not part yet of the Brahmanic tradition). Since only
Brahmins knew the three Vedas, only they could recite the hymns
necessary to properly perform the ritual sacrifice. Both ritual
sacrifice and the social ethics of the caste system were seen as an
expression of the cosmic order (Dharma) and as necessary to preserve
that order.
Epistemologically speaking, Brahmanism emphasized the triple knowledge
of the Vedas, and dogmatic faith in their content: "in regard to the
ancient Brahmanic hymns that have come down through oral transmission
and in the scriptural collections, the Brahmins come to the definite
conclusion: 'Only this is true, anything else is wrong' " (M.II.169).
The extreme of skepticism is represented in the Pāli Nikāyas by some
members of the Śramanic movement, which consisted of numerous groups
of spiritual seekers and wandering philosophers. The Sanskrit word
"śramana" means "those who make an effort," and probably refers to
those who practice a spiritual discipline requiring individual effort,
not just rituals performed by others. In order to become a śramana it
was necessary to renounce one's life as householder and enter into an
itinerant life, which entailed the observance of celibacy and a simple
life devoted to spiritual cultivation. Most śramanas lived in forests
or in secluded places wandering from village to village where they
preached and received alms in exchange.
The Śramanic movement was extremely diverse in terms of doctrines and
practices. Most śramanas believed in free will as well as the efficacy
of moral conduct and spiritual practices in order to attain liberation
from the cycle of reincarnations. However, there was a minority of
śramanas who denied the existence of the after life, free will, and
the usefulness of ethical conduct and other spiritual practices.
Probably as a reaction to these two opposite standpoints, some
śramanas adopted a skeptic attitude denying the possibility of
knowledge about such matters. Skeptics are described by the Buddha as
replying questions by evasion (D.I.58-9), and as engaging in verbal
wriggling, in eel-wriggling (amarāvikkhepa): "I don't say it is like
this. And I don't say it is like that. And I don't say it is
otherwise. And I don't say it is not so. And I don't say it is not not
so" (M.I. 521).
b. The Role of Personal Experience and the Buddha's Wager
In contrast to Brahmanic dogmatism, the Buddha of the Pāli Nikāyas did
not claim to be omniscient (M.I.482); in fact, he proposed a critical
attitude toward all sources of knowledge. In the Majjhima Nikāya
(II.170-1), the Buddha challenges Brahmins who accept Vedic scriptures
out of faith (saddhā) and oral tradition (anussava); he compares those
who blindly follow scripture and tradition without having direct
knowledge of what they believe with "a file of blind men each in touch
with the next: the first one does not see, the middle one does not
see, and the last one does not see." The Buddha also warns Brahmins
against knowledge based on likeability or emotional inclination
(ruci), reflection on reasons (ākāraparivitakka), and consideration of
theories (diṭṭhinijjhānakkhanti). These five sources of knowledge may
be either true or false; that is, they do not provide conclusive
grounds to claim dogmatically that "only this is true, anything else
is wrong."
Dogmatic claims of truth were not the monopoly of Brahmins. In the
Majjhima Nikāya (I.178), the Buddha uses the simile of the elephant
footprint to question dogmatic statements about him, his teachings,
and his disciples: he invites his followers to critically investigate
all the available evidence (different types of elephant footprints and
marks) until they know and see for themselves (direct perception of
the elephant in the open). The Pāli Nikāyas also refer to many
śramanas who hold dogmatic views and as a consequence are involved in
heated doctrinal disputes. The conflict of dogmatic views is often
described as "a thicket of views, a wilderness of views, a contortion
of views, a vacillation of views, a fetter of views. It is beset by
suffering, by vexation, by despair, and by fever, and it does not lead
to disenchantment, to dispassion, to cessation, to peace, to higher
knowledge, to enlightentment, to Nibbāna" (M.I.485).
Public debates were common and probably a good way to gain prestige
and converts. Any reputed Brahmin or śramana had to have not only the
ability to speak persuasively but also the capacity to argue well.
Rational argument played an important role in justifying doctrines and
avoiding defeat in debate, which implied conversion to the other's
teaching. At the time of the Buddha many of these debates seem to have
degenerated into dialectical battles that diverted from spiritual
practice and led to disorientation, anger, and frustration. Although
the Buddha of the Pāli Nikāyas utilizes reasoning to justify his
positions in debates and conversations with others, he discourages
dogmatic attachment to doctrines including his own (see the simile of
the raft, M.I.135), and the use of his teachings for the sake of
criticizing others and for winning debates (M.I.132).
Unlike the skepticism of some śramanas, the Buddha of the Pāli Nikāyas
takes clear stances on ethical and spiritual issues, and rejects
neither the existence of right views (M.I.46-63) nor the possibility
of knowing certain things as they are (yathābhūtaṃ). In order to
counteract skepticism, the Buddha advises to the Kālāma people "not go
by oral tradition, by succession of disciples, by hearsay, by the
content of sacred scripture, by logical consistency, by inference, by
reflection on reasons, by consideration of theories, by appearance, by
respect to a teacher." Instead, the Buddha recommends knowing things
for oneself as the ultimate criterion to adjudicate between
conflicting claims of truth (A.I.189).
When personal experience is not available to someone, the Buddha of
the Pāli Nikāyas proposes taking into account what is praised or
censored by the wise, as well as a method to calculate the benefits of
following certain opinions called the incontrovertible teaching
(apaṇṇakadhamma), which, in some ways, resembles Pascal's wager.
According to the incontrovertible teaching, it would be better to
believe in certain doctrines because they produce more benefits than
others. For instance, even if there is no life after death and if good
actions do not produce good consequences, still a moral person is
praised in this life by the wise, whereas the immoral person is
censured by society. However, if there is life after death and good
action produce happy consequences, a moral person is praised in this
life, and after death he or she goes to heaven. On the contrary, the
immoral person is censured in this life, and after death he or she
goes to hell (M.I.403). Therefore, it is better to believe that moral
actions produce good consequences even if we do not have personal
experience of karma and rebirth.
c. Interpretations of the Buddha's Advice to the Kālāma People
Some have interpreted the Buddha's advice to the Kālāma people as an
iconoclast rejection of tradition and faith. This, however, does
little justice to the Pāli Nikāyas, where the Buddha is said to be
part of a long and respectable tradition of past Buddhas, and where
the first Brahmins are sometimes commended by their holiness. The
Buddha shows respect for many traditional beliefs and practices of his
time, and rejects only those that are unjustified, useless, or
conducive to suffering for oneself and others.
Faith in the Buddha, his teachings, and his disciples, is highly
regarded in the Pāli Nikāyas: it is the first of the five factors of
striving (M.II.95-6), and a necessary condition to practice the
spiritual path (M.III.33). Buddhist faith, however, is not
unconditional or an end in and of itself but rather a means towards
direct knowledge that must be based on critical examination, supported
by reasons, and eventually verified or rooted in vision
(dassanamūlikā) (M.I.320).
Another common interpretation of the advice to the Kālāmas is that for
the Buddha of the Pāli Nikāyas only personal experience provides
reliable knowledge. However, this is misleading because analogical and
inferential reasoning are widely used by the Buddha and his disciples
to teach others as well as in debates with non-Buddhists. Similarly,
analytical or philosophical meditation is a common practice for the
attainment of liberation through wisdom. Personal experience, like any
other means of knowledge is to be critically examined. Except in the
case of Buddhas and liberated beings, personal experience is always
tainted by affective and cognitive prejudices.
The Pāli Nikāyas might give the first impression of endorsing a form
of naïve or direct realism: that is, the Buddha and his disciples seem
to think that the world is exactly as we perceive it to be. While it
is true that the Pāli Nikāyas do not question the common sense
connection between objects of knowledge and the external world, there
are some texts that might support a phenomenalist reading. For
instance, the Buddha defines the world as the six senses (five
ordinary senses plus the mind) and their respective objects (S.IV.95),
or as the six senses, the six objects, and the six types of
consciousness that arise in dependence on them (S.IV.39-40).
Here, the epistemology of the Buddha is a special form of realism that
allows both for the direct perception of reality and the constructions
of those less realized. Only Buddhas and liberated beings perceive the
world directly; that is, they see the Dharma, whose regularity and
stability remains independent of the existence of Buddhas (S.II.25).
Unenlightened beings, on the other hand, see the world indirectly
through a veil of negative emotions and erroneous views. Some texts go
so far as to suggest that the world is not simply seen indirectly, but
rather that it is literally constructed by our emotional dispositions.
For instance, in the Majjhima Nikāya (I.111), the Buddha explicitly
states that "what one feels, one perceives" (Yaṃ vedeti, taṃ
sañjānāti). That is, our knowledge is formed by our feelings. The
influence of feelings in our ways of knowing can also be inferred from
the twelve-link chain of dependent arising, which explains the arising
and cessation of suffering. The second link, saṅkhāra, or formations,
conditions the arising of the third link, consciousness. The term
saṅkhāra literally means "put together," connoting the constructive
role of the mental factors that fall into this category, many of them
affective in nature.
Similarly, the Buddha of the Pāli Nikāyas says that "with what one has
mentally constructed as the root cause (Yaṃ papañceti tato nidānaṃ),
perceptions, concepts, and [further] mental constructions
(papañcasaññāsaṅkhā) beset a man with respect to past, future, and
present forms…sounds…odours…flavors…tangibles…mind-objects cognizable
by the eye…ear… nose…tongue…body…mind" (M.I.111-112). That is, the
knowledge of unenlightened beings has papañca, or mental
constructions, as its root cause. The word papañca is a technical term
that literally means diversification or proliferation; it refers to
the tendency of unenlightened minds to construct or fabricate concepts
conducive to suffering, especially essentialist and ego-related
concepts such as "I" and "mine," concepts which lead to a variety of
negative mental states such as craving, conceit, and dogmatic views
about the self (Ñāṇananda 1971).
It is precisely because our experiences are affectively and
cognitively conditioned that the Buddha of the Pāli Nikāyas advocates
a critical approach toward all sources of knowledge, including
personal experience. Even the lofty experiences derived from
meditation are to be analyzed carefully because they might lead to
false opinions about the nature of the self, the world, and the after
life. The epistemological ideal is to know things directly beyond
mental constructions (papañca), which presupposes the "tranquilization
of all mental formations" (sabbasaṅkhārasamatha).
d. Higher Knowledge and the Question of Empiricism
Contemplative experiences are of two main types: meditative
absorptions or abstractions (jhāna), and higher or direct knowledge
(abhiññā). There are six classes of higher or direct knowledge: the
first one refers to a variety of supernatural powers including
levitation and walking on water; in this sense, it is better
understood as a know-how type of knowledge. The second higher
knowledge is literally called "divine ear element" or clairaudience.
The third higher knowledge is usually translated as telepathy, though
it means simply the ability to know the underlying mental state of
others, not the reading of their minds and thoughts.
The next three types of higher knowledge are especially important
because they were experienced by the Buddha the night of his
enlightenment, and because they are the Buddhist counterparts to the
triple knowledge of the Vedas. The fourth higher knowledge is
retrocognition or knowledge of past lives, which entails a direct
experience of the process of rebirth. The fifth is the divine eye or
clairvoyance; that is, direct experience of the process of karma, or
as the texts put it, the passing away and reappearing of beings in
accordance with their past actions. The sixth is knowledge of the
destruction of taints, which implies experiential knowledge of the
four noble truths and the process of liberation.
Some scholars have interpreted the Buddha's emphasis on direct
experience and the verifiable nature of Buddhist faith as a form of
radical empiricism (Kalupahana 1992), and logical empiricism
(Jayatilleke 1963). According to the empiricist interpretation,
Buddhist faith is always subsequent to critically verifying the
available empirical evidence. All doctrines taught by the Buddha are
empirically verifiable if one takes the time and effort to attain
higher or direct knowledge, interpreted as extraordinary sense
experience. For instance, the triple knowledge of enlightenment
implies a direct experience of the processes of karma, rebirth, and
the four noble truths. Critiques of the empiricist interpretation
point out that, at least at the beginning of the path, Buddhist faith
is not always based on empirical evidence, and that the purpose of
extraordinary knowledge is not to verify the doctrines of karma,
rebirth, and the four noble truths (Hoffman 1982, 1987).
Whether or not the Buddha's epistemology can be considered empiricist
depends on what we mean by empiricism and experience. The opposition
between rationalism and empiricism and the sharp distinction between
senses and reason is foreign to Buddhism. Nowhere in the Pāli Nikāyas
does the Buddha say that all knowledge begins in or is acquired from
sense experience. In this sense, the Buddha is not an empiricist.
3. The Buddha's Cosmology and Metaphysics
a. The Universe and the Role of Gods
The Buddha of the Pāli Nikāyas accepts the cosmology characteristic of
his cultural context: a universe with several realms of existence,
where people are reborn and die again and again (saṃsāra) depending on
their past actions (karma) until they attain salvation (mokṣa).
However, the Buddha substantially modifies the cosmology of his time.
Against the Brahmanic tendency to understand karma as ritual action,
and the Jain claim that all activities including involuntary actions
constitute karma, the Buddha defines karma in terms of volition, or
free will, which is expressed through thoughts, words, and behavior.
That is, for the Buddha, only voluntary actions produce karma.
Another important modification is that for the Buddha of the Pāli
Nikāyas, saṃsāra refers primarily to a psychophysical process that
takes place within the physical universe. For instance, when the
Buddha speaks about the end of the world, he says that it cannot be
reached by traveling through the physical universe, but only by
putting an end to suffering (saṃsāra), where "one is not born, does
not age, does not die, does not pass away, and is not reborn"
Accordingly, salvation is not understood in world-denying terms or as
an escape from the physical universe, but rather as an inner
transformation that takes place within one's own psychophysical
organism: "It is, friend, in just this fathom-high carcass endowed
with perception and mind that I make known the world, the origin of
the world, the cessation of the world, and the way leading to the
cessation of the world." (S.I.62; A.II.47-9).
There are five kinds of destinations within saṃsāra: hell, animal
kingdom, realm of ghosts, humankind, and realm of devas or radiant
beings, commonly translated as gods (M.I.73). There are many hells and
heavens and life there is transitory, just as in other destinations.
In some traditions there is another destination, the realm of asuras
or demigods, who are jealous of the gods and who are always in
conflict with them.
The Pāli Nikāyas further divide the universe of saṃsāra into three
main planes of existence, each one subdivided into several realms. The
three planes of existence are sensorial, fine-material, and immaterial
(M.I.50). Most destinations belong to the sensorial realm. Only a
minority of heavens belong to the fine-material and immaterial realms.
Rebirth in a particular realm depends on past actions: good actions
lead to good destinations and bad actions to bad rebirths. Rebirth as
a human or in heaven is considered a good destination; rebirth in the
realm of ghosts, hell, and the animal realm are bad. Human rebirth is
extremely difficult to attain (S.V.455-6; M.III.169), and it is highly
regarded because of its unique combination of pain and pleasure, as
well as its unique conductivity for attaining enlightenment. In this
last sense human rebirth is said to be even better than rebirth as a
god.
Rebirth also depends on the prevalent mental states of a person during
life, and especially at the moment of death. That is, there is a
correlation between mental states and realms of rebirth, between
cosmology and psychology. For instance, a mind where hatred and anger
prevails is likely to be reborn in hell; deluded and uncultivated
minds are headed toward the animal kingdom; someone obsessed with sex
and food will probably become bound to earth as a ghost; loving and
caring persons will be reborn in heaven; someone who frequently dwells
in meditative absorptions will be reborn in the fine-material and
immaterial realms. Human rebirth might be the consequence of any of
the aforementioned mental states.
Perhaps the most important modification the Buddha introduces into the
traditional cosmology of his time was a new view of Gods (gods within
Buddhism). In the Pāli Nikāyas, gods do not play any significant
cosmological role. For the Buddha, the universe has not been created
by an all-knowing, all-powerful god that is the lord of the universe
and father of all beings (M.I.326-7). Rather, the universe evolves
following certain cyclic patterns of contraction and expansion
(D.III.84-5).
Similarly, the cosmic order, or Dharma, does not depend on the will of
gods, and there are many good deeds far more effective than ritual
sacrifices offered to the gods (D.I144ff). Gods for the Buddha are
unenlightened beings subject to birth and death that require further
learning and spiritual practice in order to attain liberation; they
are more powerful and spiritually more developed than humans and other
living beings, but Buddhas excel them in all regards: spiritual
development, wisdom, and power. Even the supreme type of god, Brahmā,
offers his respects to the Buddha, praises him, and asks him to preach
the Dharma for those with little dust in their eyes (M.I.168-9).
Since the Buddha of the Pāli Nikāyas does not deny the existence of
gods, only their cosmological and soteriological functions, it is
inaccurate to define early Buddhism as atheistic or as non-theistic.
The word atheistic is usually associated with anti-religious attitudes
absent in the Buddha, and the term non-theistic seems to imply that
rejecting the theistic concept of God is one of the main concerns of
the Buddha, when in fact it is a marginal question in the Pāli
Nikāyas.
b. The Four Noble Truths or Realities
One the most common frameworks to explain the basic teachings of early
Buddhism is the four noble truths (ariyasacca, Sanskrit āryasatya).
The word sacca means both truth and reality. The word ariya refers
primarily to the ideal type of person the Buddhist path is supposed to
generate, a noble person in the ethical and spiritual sense.
Translating ariyasacca by 'noble truths' is somehow misleading because
it gives the wrong impression of being a set of beliefs, a creed that
Buddhists accept as noble and true. The four noble truths are
primarily four realities whose contemplation leads to sainthood or the
state of the noble ones (ariya). Other possible translations of
ariyasacca are "ennobling truths" or "truths of the noble ones."
Each noble truth requires a particular practice from the disciple; in
this sense the four noble truths can be understood as four types of
practice. The first noble truth, or the reality of suffering, assigns
to the disciple the practice of cultivating understanding. Such
understanding takes place gradually through reflection, analytical
meditation, and eventually direct experience. What needs to be
understood is the nature of suffering, and the different types of
suffering and happiness within saṃsāra.
A common misconception about the first noble truth is to think that it
presupposes a pessimistic outlook on life. This interpretation would
be correct only if the Buddha of the Pāli Nikāyas had not taught the
existence of different types of happiness and the third noble truth,
or cessation of suffering; that is, the good news about the reality of
nirvana, defined as the highest happiness (Dhp.203; M.I.505). Since
the Buddha of the Pāli Nikāyas teaches the reality of both suffering
and the highest happiness, perhaps it is more accurate to speak of his
attitude as realist: there is a problem but there is also a solution
to that problem.
The second noble truth, or reality of the origin of suffering, calls
for the practice of renunciation to all mental states that generate
suffering for oneself and others. The mental state that appears in the
second noble truth is taṇhā, literally "thirst." It was customary in
the first Western translations of Buddhist texts (Burnouf, Fausboll,
Muller, Oldenberg, Warren) to translate taṇhā by desire. This
translation has misled many to think that the ultimate goal of
Buddhists is the cessation of all desires. However, as Damien Keown
puts it, "it is an oversimplification of the Buddhist position to
assume that it seeks an end to all desire." (1992: 222).
In fact, there are many terms in the Pāli Nikāyas that can be
translated as desire, not all of them related to mental states
conducive to suffering. On the contrary, there are many texts in the
Pāli Nikāyas that demonstrate the positive role of certain types of
desire in the Buddha's path (Webster, 2005: 90-142). Nonetheless, the
term taṇhā in the Pāli Nikāyas designates always a harmful type of
desire that leads to "repeated existence" (ponobhavikā), is
"associated with delight and lust" (nandirāgasahagatā), and "delights
here and there" (tatra tatrābhinandinī) (M.I.48; D.II.308; etc). There
is only one text (Nettipakaraṇa 87) that speaks about a wholesome type
of taṇhā that leads to its own relinquishment, but this text is
extra-canonical except in Myanmar.
The most common translation of taṇhā nowadays is craving. Unlike the
loaded, vast, and ambivalent term desire, the term craving refers more
specifically to a particular type of desire, and cannot be
misinterpreted as conveying any want and aspiration whatsoever.
Rather, like taṇhā in the Pāli Nikāyas, craving refers to intense
(rāga can be translated by both lust and passion), obsessive, and
addictive desires (the idiom tatra tatra can also be interpreted as
connoting the idea of repetition or tendency to repeat itself).
Since craving, or taṇhā, does not include all possible types of
desires, there is no "paradox of desire" in the Pāli Nikāyas. In other
words, the Buddha of the the Pāli Nikāyas does not teach that in order
to attain liberation from suffering one has to paradoxically desire to
stop all desires. There is no contradiction in willing the cessation
of craving. That is, for the Buddha of the Pāli Nikāyas it is possible
to want, like, or strive for something without simultaneously craving
for it.
The Pāli Nikāyas distinguish between three kinds of taṇhā: craving for
sensual pleasures (kāmataṇhā), craving for existence (bhavataṇhā), and
craving for non-existence (vibhavataṇhā). Following Webster, I
understand the last two types of craving as "predicated on two extreme
(wrong) views, those of eternalism and annihilationism" (2005:130-1).
In other words, craving for existence longs for continued existence of
one's self within saṃsāra, and craving for non-existence is a reversed
type of desire or aversion to one's own destruction at the moment of
death.
The underlying root of all suffering, however, is not craving but
spiritual ignorance (avijjā). In the Pāli Nikāyas spiritual ignorance
does not connote a mere lack of information but rather a
misconception, a distorted perception of things under the influence of
conceptual fabrications and affective prejudices. More specifically,
ignorance refers to not knowing things as they are, the Dharma, and
the four noble truths. The relinquishing of spiritual ignorance,
craving, and the three roots of the unwholesome (greed or lobha,
aversion or dosa, delusion or moha) entails the cultivation of many
positive mental states, some of the most prominent in the Pāli Nikāyas
being: wisdom or understanding (paññā), letting go (anupādāna),
selflessness (alobha), love (avera, adosa, avyāpāda), friendliness
(mettā), compassion (karuṇā), altruistic joy (muditā), equanimity
(upekkhā), calm (samatha, passaddhi), mindfulness (sati), diligence
(appamāda).
The third noble truth, or reality of the cessation of suffering, asks
us to directly realize the destruction of suffering, usually expressed
with a variety of cognitive and affective terms: peace, higher
knowledge, the tranquilization of mental formations, the abandonment
of all grasping, cessation, the destruction of craving, absence of
lust, nirvana (Pali nibbāna). The most popular of all the terms that
express the cessation of suffering and rebirth is nirvana, which
literally means blowing out or extinguishing.
Metaphorically, the extinction of nirvana designates a mental event,
namely, the extinguishing of the fires of craving, aversion, and
delusion (S.IV.251). That nirvana primarily denotes a mental event, a
psychological process, is also confirmed by many texts that describe
the person who experiences nirvana with intransitive verbs such as to
nirvanize (nibbāyati) or to parinirvanize (parinibbāyati). However,
there are a few texts that seem to indicate that nirvana might also be
a domain of perception (āyatana), element (dhātu), or reality (dhamma)
known at the moment of enlightenment, and in special meditative
absorptions after enlightenment. This domain is usually defined as
having the opposite qualities of saṃsāra (Ud 8.1), or with metaphoric
expressions (S.IV.369ff).
What is important to point out is that the concern of the Pāli Nikāyas
is not to describe nirvana, which, strictly speaking, is beyond logic
and language (It 37), but rather to provide a systematic explanation
of the arising and cessation of suffering. The goal of Buddhism as it
appears in the Pāli Nikāyas does not consist in believing that
suffering arises and ceases like the Buddha says, but in realizing
that what he teaches about suffering and its cessation is the case;
that is, the Buddha's teaching, or Dharma, is intended to be
experienced by the wise for themselves (M.I.265).
The fourth noble truth, or reality of the path leading to the
cessation of suffering, imposes on us the practice of developing the
eightfold ennobling path. This path can be understood either as eight
mental factors that are cultivated by ennobled disciples at the moment
of liberation, or as different parts of the entire Buddhist path whose
practice ennoble the disciple gradually. The eight parts of the
Buddhist path are usually divided into three kinds of training:
training in wisdom (right view and right intention), ethical training
(right speech, right bodily conduct, and right livelihood), and
training in concentration (right effort, right mindfulness and right
concentration).
c. Ontology of Suffering: the Five Aggregates
A prominent concern of the Buddha in the Pāli Nikāyas is to provide a
solution to the problem of suffering. When asked about his teachings,
the Buddha answers that he only teaches suffering and its cessation
(M.I.140). The first noble truth describes what the Buddha means by
suffering: birth, aging, illness, death, union with what is
displeasing, separation from what is pleasing, not getting what one
wants, the five aggregates of grasping (S.V.421).
The original Pali term for suffering is dukkha, a word that ordinarily
means physical and mental pain, but that in the first noble truth
designates diverse kinds of frustration, and the existential angst
generated by the impermanence of life and the unavoidability of old
age, disease, and death. However, when the Buddha of the Pāli Nikāyas
mentions birth and the five aggregates of grasping, he seems to be
referring to the fact that our psychophysical components are
conditioned by grasping, and consequently, within saṃsāra, the cycle
of births and deaths. This interpretation is consistent with later
Buddhist tradition, which speaks about three types of dukkha: ordinary
suffering (mental and physical pain), suffering due to change (derived
from the impermanence of things), and suffering due to conditions
(derived from being part of saṃsāra).
When the Buddha of the Pāli Nikāyas speaks about personal identity and
the human predicament, he uses the technical expression "five
aggregates of grasping" (pañcupādānakkhandhā). That is, the Buddha
describes human existence in terms of five groups of constituents. The
five aggregates are: material form (rūpa), sensations (vedanā),
perceptions (saññā), mental formations (saṃkhāra), consciousness
(viññāṇa). While the first aggregate refers to material components,
the other four designate a variety of mental functions.
The aggregate material form is explained as the four great elements
and the shape or figure of our physical body. The four great elements
are earth, water, fire, and air. The earth element is further defined
as whatever is solid in our body, and water as whatever is liquid. The
fire element refers to "that by which one is warmed, ages, and is
consumed," and the process of digestion. The air element denotes the
breathing process and movements of gas throughout the body
(M.I.185ff).
The aggregate sensations denote pleasant, unpleasant and neutral
feelings experienced after there is contact between the six sense
organs (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind) and their six objects
(forms, sounds, odors, tastes, tangible objects, and mental
phenomena). The aggregate perceptions express the mental function by
which someone is able to identify objects. There are six types of
perceptions corresponding to the six objects of the senses. The
aggregate formations express emotional and intellectual dispositions,
literally volitions (sañcetanâ), towards the six objects of the
senses. These dispositions are the result of past cognitive and
affective conditioning, that is, past karma or past voluntary actions.
The aggregate consciousness connotes the ability to know and to be
aware of the six objects of the senses (S.III.59ff).
d. Arguments for the Doctrine of Non-self
The Buddha reiterates again and again throughout the Pāli Nikāyas that
any of the five aggregates "whether past, future or present, internal
or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, far or near, ought
to be seen as it actually is with right wisdom thus: 'this is not
mine, this I am not, this is not my self.' " When the disciple
contemplates the five aggregates in this way, he or she becomes
disenchanted (nibbindati), lust fades away (virajjati), and he or she
attains liberation due to the absence of lust (virāgā vimuccati)
(M.I.138-9).
The Buddha of the Pāli Nikāyas justifies this view of the five
aggregates as non-self with three main arguments, which are used as a
method of analytical meditation, and in polemics with members of other
schools. The assumption underlying the Buddha's arguments is that
something might be considered a self only if it were permanent, not
leading to suffering, not dependently arisen, and subject to one's own
will. Since none of the five aggregates fulfill any of these
conditions, it is wrong to see them as belonging to us or as our self.
In the first and most common argument for non-self the Buddha asks
someone the following questions: "What do you think, monks, is
material form permanent or impermanent?" – "Impermanent, venerable
sir." – "Is what is impermanent suffering or happiness?" – "Suffering,
venerable sir." –Is what is impermanent, suffering, and subject to
change, fit to be regarded as: "this is not mine, this I am not, this
is not my self?" – "No, venerable sir" (M.I.138, etc). The same
reasoning is applied to the other aggregates.
The first argument is also applied to the six sensual organs, the six
objects, the six types of consciousness, perceptions, sensations, and
formations that arise dependent on the contact between the senses and
their objects (M.III.278ff). Sometimes the first argument for non-self
is applied to the six senses and their objects without questions and
answers: "Monks, the visual organ is impermanent. What is impermanent
is suffering. What is suffering is non-self. What is non-self ought to
be seen as it really is with right wisdom thus: 'this is not mine,
this I am not, this is not my self' " (S.IV.1ff).
The second argument for non-self is much less frequent: "Monks,
material form is non-self. If it were self, it would not lead to
affliction. It would be possible [to say] with regard to material
form: 'Let my material form be thus. Let my material form not be
thus.' But precisely because it is non-self, it leads to affliction.
And it is not possible [to say] with regard to material form: 'Let my
material form be thus. Let my material form not be thus'
"(S.III.66-7). The same reasoning is applied to the other four
aggregates.
The third argument deduces non-self from that fact that physical and
mental phenomena depend on certain causes to exist. For instance, in
(M.III.280ff), the Buddha first analyzes the dependent arising of
physical and mental phenomena. Then he argues: "If anyone says: 'the
visual organ is self,' that is unacceptable. The rising and falling of
the visual organ are fully known (paññāyati). Since the rising and
falling of the visual organ are fully known, it would follow that: 'my
self arises and falls.' Therefore, it is unacceptable to say: 'the
visual organ is self.' Thus the visual organ is non-self." The same
reasoning is applied to the other senses, their objects, and the six
types of consciousness, contacts (meeting of sense, object and
consciousness), sensations, and cravings derived from them.
The third argument also appears combined with the first one without
questions and answers. For instance, in (A.V.188), it is said that
"whatever becomes, that is conditioned, volitionally formed,
dependently arisen, that is impermanent. What is impermanent, that is
suffering. What is suffering, that is [to be regarded thus]: 'this is
not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.' "
If something can be inferred from these three arguments, it is that
the target of the doctrine of non-self is not all concepts of self but
specifically views of the self as permanent and not dependently
arisen. That is, the doctrine of non-self opposes what is technically
called "views of personal identity" or more commonly translated
"personality views" (sakkāyadiṭṭhi). Views of personal identity relate
the five aggregates to a permanent and independent self in four ways:
as being identical, as being possession of the self, as being in the
self, or as the self being in them (M.I.300ff). All these views of
personal identity are said to be the product of spiritual ignorance,
that is, of not seeing with right wisdom the true nature of the five
aggregates, their origin, their cessation, and the way leading to
their cessation.
e. Human Identity and the Meaning of Non-self
Since the Pāli Nikāyas accept the common sense usages of the word
"self" (attan, Skt. ātman), primarily in idiomatic expressions and as
a reflexive pronoun meaning "oneself," the doctrine of non-self does
not imply a literal negation of the self. Similarly, since the Buddha
explicitly criticizes views that reject karma and moral responsibility
(M.I.404ff), the doctrine of non-self should not be understood as the
absolute rejection of moral agency and any concept of personal
identity. In fact, the Buddha explicitly defines "personal identity"
(sakkāya) as the five aggregates (M.I.299).
Since the sixth sense, or mind, includes the four mental aggregates,
and since the ordinary five senses and their objects fall under the
aggregate of material form, it can be said that for the Buddha of the
Pāli Nikāyas personal identity is defined not only in terms of the
five aggregates, but also in terms of the six senses and their six
objects.
If the meaning of non-self were that there is literally no self
whatsoever, no personal identity and no moral agency whatsoever, then
the only logical conclusion would be to state that the Buddha taught
nonsense and that the Pāli Nikāyas are contradictory, sometimes
accepting the existence of a self and other times rejecting it. Even
though no current scholar of Buddhism would endorse such an
interpretation of non-self, it is still popular in some missionary
circles and apologetic literature.
A more sympathetic interpretation of non-self distinguishes between
two main levels of discourse (Collins 1982). The first level of
discourse does not question the concept of self and freely uses
personal terms and expressions in accordance with ordinary language
and social conventions. The second level of discourse is
philosophically more sophisticated and rejects views of self and
personal identity as permanent and not dependently arisen. Behind the
second level of discourse there is a technical understanding of the
self and personal identity as the five aggregates, that is, as a
combination of psychophysical processes, all of them impermanent and
dependently originated.
This concept of the self as permanent and not dependently arisen is
problematic because it is based on a misperception of the aggregates.
This misperception of the five aggregates is associated with what is
technically called "the conceit I am" (asmimāna) and "the underlying
tendency to the conceits 'I' and 'mine' "
(ahaṃkāra-mamaṅkāra-mānānusaya). This combination of conceit and
ignorance fosters different types of cravings, especially craving for
immortal existence, and subsequently, speculations about the past,
present, and future nature of the self and personal identity. For
instance, in (D.I.30ff), the Buddha speaks of different ascetics and
Brahmins who claim that the self after death is "material, immaterial,
both material and immaterial, neither material nor immaterial, finite,
infinite, both, neither, of uniform perception, of varied perception,
of limited perception, of unlimited perception, wholly happy, wholly
miserable, both, neither." The doctrine of non-self is primarily
intended to counteract views of the self and personal identity rooted
in ignorance regarding the nature of the five aggregates, the conceit
"I am," and craving for immortal existence.
A minority of scholars reject the notion that the Buddha's doctrine of
non-self implies the negation of the true self, which for them is
permanent and independent of causes and conditions. Accordingly, the
purpose of the doctrine of non-self is simply to deny that the five
aggregates are the true self. The main reason for this interpretation
is that the Buddha does not say anywhere in the Pāli Nikāyas that the
self does not exist; he only states that a self and what belongs to a
self are not apprehended (M.I.138). Therefore, for these interpreters
the Buddha of the Pāli Nikāyas only claims that impermanent and
conditioned things like the five aggregates are not the true self. For
these scholars, the Buddha does talk about the true self when he
speaks about the consciousness of liberated beings (M.I.140), and the
unconditioned, unborn and deathless nirvana (Bhattacarya 1973; Pérez
Remón 1981).
However, the majority of Buddhist scholars agree with the traditional
Buddhist self-understanding: they think that the doctrine of non-self
is incompatible with any doctrine about a permanent and independent
self, not just with views that mistakenly identify an alleged true
self with the five aggregates. The main reason for this interpretation
relates to the doctrine of dependent arising.
f. Causality and the Principle of Dependent Arising
The importance of dependent arising (paṭiccasamuppāda) cannot be
underestimated: the Buddha realized its workings during the night of
his enlightenment (M.I.167). Preaching the doctrine of dependent
arising amounts to preaching the Dharma (M.II.32), and whoever sees it
sees the Dharma (M.I.191). The Dharma of dependent arising remains
valid whether or not there are Buddhas in the world (S.II.25), and it
is through not understanding it that people are trapped into the cycle
of birth and death (D.II.55).
The doctrine of dependent arising can be formulated in two ways that
usually appear together: as a general principle or as a chain of
causal links to explain the arising and ceasing of suffering and the
process of rebirth. The general principle of dependent arising states
that "when this exists, that comes to be; with the arising of this,
that arises. When this does not exist, that does not come to be; with
the cessation of this, that ceases" (M.II.32; S.II.28).
Unlike the logical principle of conditionality, the principle of
dependent arising does not designate a connection between two ideas
but rather an ontological relationship between two things or events
within a particular timeframe. Dependent arising expresses not only
the Buddha's understanding of causality but also his view of things as
interrelated. The point behind dependent arising is that things are
dependent on specific conditions (paṭicca), and that they arise
together with other things (samuppāda). In other words, the principle
of dependent arising conveys both ontological conditionality and the
constitutive relativity of things. This relativity, however, does not
mean that for the Buddha of the Pāli Nikāyas everything is
interdependent or that something is related to everything else. This
is a later development of Buddhist thought, not a characteristic of
early Indian Buddhism.
The most comprehensive chain of dependent arising contains twelve
causal links: (1) ignorance, (2) formations, (3) consciousness, (4)
mentality-materiality, (5) the six senses, (6) contact, (7)
sensations, (8) craving (9) grasping, (10) becoming, (11) birth, (12)
old age and death. The most common formulation is as follows: with 1
as a condition 2 [comes to be]; with 2 as a condition 3 [comes to be],
and so forth. Conversely, with the cessation of 1 comes the cessation
of 2; with the cessation of 2 comes the cessation of 3, and so forth.
It is important to keep in mind that this chain does not imply a
linear understanding of causality where the antecedent link disappears
once the subsequent link has come to be. Similarly, each of the causal
links is not to be understood as the one and only cause that produces
the next link but rather as the most necessary condition for its
arising. For instance, ignorance, the first link, is not the only
cause of the process of suffering but rather the cause most necessary
for the continuation of such a process. For the Buddha of the Pāli
Nikāyas, as well as for later Buddhist tradition, there is always a
multiplicity of causes and conditions at play.
The traditional interpretation divides the twelve link chain of
dependent arising into three lives. The first two links (ignorance and
formations) belong to the past life: due to a misperception of the
nature of the five aggregates, a person (the five aggregates) performs
voluntary actions: mental, verbal, and bodily actions, with wholesome,
unwholesome, and neutral karmic effects. The next ten factors
correspond to the present life: the karmic effects of past voluntary
formations are stored in consciousness and transferred to the next
life. Consciousness together with the other mental aggregates combines
with a new physical body to constitute a new psychophysical organism
(mentality-materiality). This new stage of the five aggregates
develops the six senses and the ability to establish contact with
their six objects. Contacts with objects of the senses produce
pleasant, unpleasant and neutral sensations. If the sensations are
pleasant, the person usually responds with cravings for more pleasant
experiences, and if the sensations are unpleasant, with aversion.
Craving and aversion, as well as the underlying ignorance of the
nature of the five aggregates are fundamental causes of suffering and
rebirth: the three roots of the unwholesome according to the Pāli
Nikāyas, or the three mental poisons according to later Buddhist
traditions.
By repeating the affective responses of craving and aversion, the
person becomes more and more dependent on whatever leads to more
pleasant sensations and less unpleasant ones. This creates a variety
of emotional dependencies and a tendency to grasp or hold onto what
causes pleasure and avoids pain. The Buddha of the Pāli Nikāyas speaks
about four types of grasping: towards sensual pleasures, views,
rites-and-observances, and especially towards doctrines of a
[permanent and independent] self (D.II.57-8).
The original term for grasping is upādāna, which also designates the
fuel or supply necessary to maintain a fire. In this sense, grasping
is the psychological fuel that maintains the fires of craving,
aversion, and delusion, the fires whose extinction is called nirvana.
The Buddha's ideal of letting go and detachment should not be
misunderstood as the absence of any emotions whatsoever including love
and compassion, but specifically as the absence of emotions associated
with craving, aversion, and delusion. Motivated by grasping and the
three mental fires, the five aggregates perform further voluntary
actions, whose karmic effects perpetuate existence within the cycle of
rebirth and subsequent suffering. The last two links (birth, aging and
death) refer to the future life. At the end of this present existence,
a new birth of the five aggregates will take place followed by old
age, death, and other kinds of suffering.
The twelve-link chain of dependent arising explains the processes of
rebirth and suffering without presupposing a permanent and independent
self. The Buddha of the Pāli Nikāyas makes this point explicit in his
passionate rebuttal of the monk Sāti, who claimed that it is the same
consciousness that wanders through the cycle of rebirth. For the
Buddha, consciousness, like the other eleven causal links, is
dependent on specific conditions (M.I.258ff), which entails that
consciousness is impermanent, suffering, and non-self.
Instead of a permanent and independent self behind suffering and the
cycle of rebirth, the Buddha of the Pāli Nikāyas presupposes five
psychophysical sets of processes, namely, the five aggregates, which
imply an impermanent and dependently-arisen concept of 'self' and
'personal identity.' In other words, the Buddha rejects
substance-selves but accepts process-selves (Gowans 2003). Yet, the
Buddha of the Pāli Nikāyas explicitly refuses to use personal terms
such as 'self' in technical explanations of rebirth and suffering, and
he prefers to speak in terms of causes and conditions that produce
other causes and conditions (S.II.13-4; S.II.62; M.III.19). But what
happens to consciousness and the other aggregates when grasping no
longer exists and the three mental fires have been extinguished? What
happens when suffering ceases and the cycle of rebirth stops?
4. Nirvana and the Silence of the Buddha
a. Two Kinds of Nirvana and the Undetermined Questions
When the fires of craving, aversion, and ignorance are extinguished at
the moment of enlightenment, the aggregates are liberated due to the
lack of grasping. This is technically called nirvana with remainder of
grasping (saupādisesa-nibbāna), or as later tradition puts it, nirvana
of mental defilements (kilesa-parinibbāna). The expression 'remainder
of grasping' refers to the five aggregates of liberated beings, which
continue to live after enlightenment but without negative mental
states.
The aggregates of the liberated beings perform their respective
functions and, like the aggregates of anybody else, they grow old, get
sick, and are subject to pleasant and unpleasant sensations until
death. The difference between unenlightened and enlightened beings is
that enlightened beings respond to sensations without craving or
aversion, and with higher knowledge of the true nature of the five
aggregates.
The definition of nirvana without remainder (anupādisesa-nibbāna) that
appears in (It 38) only says that for the liberated being "all that is
experienced here and now, without enchantment [another term for
grasping], will be cooled (sīta)." Since "all" is defined in the Pāli
Nikāyas as the six senses and their six objects (S.IV.15), which is
another way of describing the individual psychophysical experience or
the five aggregates, the expression "all that is experienced" refers
to what happens to the aggregates of liberated beings. Since (It 38)
explicitly uses the expression "here and now" (idheva), it seems
impossible to conclude that the definition of nirvana without
remainder is intended to say anything about nirvana or the aggregates
beyond death. Rather (It 38) describes nirvana and the aggregates at
the moment of death: they will be no longer subject to rebirth and
they will become cooled, tranquil, at peace. The question is: what
does this peace or coolness entail? What happens after the nirvana of
the aggregates? Does the mind of enlightened beings survive happily
ever after? Does the liberated being exist beyond death or not?
These questions are left undetermined (avyākata) by the Buddha of the
the Pāli Nikāyas. The ten questions in the the Pāli Nikāyas ask
whether (1) The world is eternal; (2) The world is not eternal; (3)
The world is infinite; (4) The world is finite; (5) Body and soul are
one thing; (6) Body and soul are two different things; (7) A liberated
being (tathāgata) exists after death; (8) A liberated being
(tathāgata) does not exist after death; (9) A liberated being
(tathāgata) both exists and does not exist after death; (10) A
liberated being (tathāgata) neither exists nor does not exist after
death. In Sanskrit Buddhist texts the ten views become fourteen by
adding the last two possibilities of the tetralema (both A and B,
neither A nor B) to the questions about the world.
Unfortunately for those looking for quick answers, the Buddha of the
Pāli Nikāyas does not provide a straightforward yes or no response to
any of these questions. When the Buddha is asked whether the liberated
being exists, does not exist, both, or neither, he sets aside these
questions by saying that (1) he does not hold such views, (2) he has
left the questions undetermined, and (3) the questions do not apply
(na upeti). The first two answers are also used to respond to
questions about the temporal and spatial finitude or infinitude of the
world, and the identity or difference between the soul and the body.
Only the third type of answer is given to the questions about
liberated beings after death.
Most presentations of early Buddhism interpret these three answers of
the Buddha as an eloquent silence about metaphysical questions due
primarily to pragmatic reasons, namely, the questions divert from
spiritual practice and are not conducive to liberation from suffering.
While the pragmatic reasons for the answers of the Buddha are
undeniable, it is inaccurate to understand them as silence about
metaphysical questions. In fact, the Buddha of the Pāli Nikāyas does
address many metaphysical issues with his teachings of non-self and
dependent arising.
The answers of the Buddha to the undetermined questions are due not
only to pragmatic reasons but also to metaphysical reasons: the
questions are inconsistent with the doctrines of non-self and
dependent arising because they assume the existence of a permanent and
independent self, a self that is either finite or infinite, identical
or different from the body, existing or not existing after death.
Besides pragmatic and metaphysical reasons, there are cognitive and
affective reasons for the answers of the Buddha: the undetermined
questions are based on ignorance about the nature of the five
aggregates and craving for either immortal existence or inexistence.
The questions are expressions of 'identity views,' that is, they are
part of the problem of suffering. Answering the questions directly
would have not done any good: a yes answer would have fostered more
craving for immortal existence and led to eternalist views, and a no
answer would have fostered further confusion and led to nihilist views
(S.IV.400-1).
In the case of the undetermined questions about the liberated being,
there are also apophatic reasons for answering "it does not apply."
The Buddha of the Pāli Nikāyas illustrates the inapplicability of the
questions with the simile of the fire extinct: just as it does not
make sense to ask about the direction in which an extinct fire has
gone, it is inappropriate to ask about the status of the liberated
being beyond death: "The fire burned in dependence on its fuel of
grass and sticks. When that is used up, if it does not get any more
fuel, being without fuel, it is reckoned as extinguished. Similarly,
the enlightened being has abandoned the five aggregates by which one
might describe him…he is liberated from reckoning in terms of the five
aggregates, he is profound, immeasurable, unfathomable like the ocean"
(M.I.487-8).
b. Eternalism, Nihilism, and the Middle Way
There are three possible interpretations of the simile of the extinct
fire: (1) liberated beings no longer exist beyond death (2) liberated
beings exist in a mysterious unfathomable way beyond death (3) the
Buddha is silent about both the liberated being and nirvana after
death. The first interpretation seems the most logical conclusion
given the Buddha's ontology of suffering and the doctrine of non-self.
However, the nihilist interpretation makes Buddhist practice
meaningless and contradicts texts where the Buddha criticizes
teachings not conducive to spiritual practice such as materialism and
determinism (M.I.401ff). But more importantly, the nihilist
interpretation is vehemently rejected in the Pāli Nikāyas: "As I am
not, as I do not proclaim, so have I been baselessly, vainly, falsely,
and wrongly misrepresented by some ascetics and brahmins thus: 'the
ascetic Gotama [Buddha] is one who leads astray; he teaches the
annihilation, the destruction, the extermination of an existing being'
"(M.I.140).
The second interpretation appears to some as following from the
Buddha's incontrovertible response to the nihilist reading of his
teachings: since the Buddha rejects nihilism, he must somehow accept
the eternal existence of liberated beings, or at least the eternal
existence of nirvana. For eternalist interpreters, the texts in the
Pāli Nikāyas that speak about the transcendence and ineffability of
liberated beings and nirvana can be understood as implying their
existence after or beyond death.
There are several eternalist readings of the Buddha's thought. We have
already mentioned the most common: the doctrine of non-self merely
states that the five aggregates are not the true self, which is the
transcendent and ineffable domain of nirvana. However, there are
eternalist interpretations within Buddhism too. That is,
interpretations that are nominally consistent with the doctrine of
non-self but that nevertheless speak of something as eternally
existing: either the mind of liberated beings or nirvana. For
instance, Theravāda Buddhists usually see nirvana as non-self, but at
the same time as an unconditioned (asaṃkhata) and deathless (amata)
reality. The assumption, though rarely stated, is that liberated
beings dwell eternally in nirvana without a sense of "I" and "mine,"
which is a transcendent state beyond the comprehension of
unenlightened beings. Another eternalist interpretation is that of the
Dalai Lama who, following the standard interpretation of Tibetan
Buddhists, claims that the Buddha did not teach the cessation of all
aggregates but only of contaminated aggregates. That is, the
uncontaminated aggregates of liberated beings continue to exist
individually beyond death, though they are seen as impermanent,
dependently arisen, non-self, and empty of inherent existence (Dalai
Lama 1975:27). Similarly, Peter Harvey understands nirvana as a
selfless and objectless state of consciousness different from the five
aggregates that exists temporarily during life and eternally beyond
death (1995: 186-7).
The problem with eternalist interpretations is that they contradict
what the Pāli Nikāyas say explicitly about the way to consider
liberated beings, the limits of language, the content of the Buddha's
teachings, and dependent arising as a middle way between the extremes
of eternalism and annihilationism. In (S.III.110ff), Sāriputta, the
Buddha's leading disciple in doctrinal matters, explains that
liberated beings should be considered neither as annihilated after
death nor as existing without the five aggregates.
In (D.II.63-4) the Buddha makes clear that consciousness and
mentality-materiality, that is, the five aggregates, are the limits of
designation (adhivacana), language (nirutti), cognitions (viññatti),
and understanding (paññā). Accordingly, in (D.II.68) the Buddha says
it is inadequate to state that the liberated being exists after death,
does not exist, both, or neither. This reading is confirmed by (Sn
1076): "There is not measure (pamāṇa) of one who has gone out, that by
which [others] might speak (vajju) of him does not exist. When all
things have been removed, then all ways of speech (vādapathā) are also
removed."
Given the Buddha's understanding of the limits of language and
understanding in the Pāli Nikāyas, it is not surprising that he
responded to the accusation of teaching the annihilation of beings, by
saying that "formerly and now I only teach suffering and the cessation
of suffering." Since the Buddha does not teach anything beyond the
cessation of suffering at the moment of death, that is, beyond the
limits of language and understanding, it is inaccurate to accuse him
of teaching the annihilation of beings. Similarly, stating that
liberated beings exist after death in a mysterious way beyond the four
logical possibilities of existence, non-existence, both or neither, is
explicitly rejected in (S.III.118-9) and (S.IV.384), where once again
the Buddha concludes that he only makes known suffering and the
cessation of suffering.
If the eternalist interpretation were correct, it would have been
unnecessary for the Buddha of the Pāli Nikāyas to put so much emphasis
on the teaching of dependent arising. Why would dependent arising be
defined in (S.II.17) as right view and as the middle way between the
extremes of eternalism and annihilationism if the truth were that the
consciousness of liberated beings or the unconditioned nirvana exist
eternally? If knowing and seeing dependent arising precludes someone
from speculating about a permanent self in the past and the future
(M.I.265), why would the Buddha teach anything about the eternal
existence of liberated beings and nirvana?
In order to avoid the aforementioned contradictions entailed by
eternalist readings of the Pāli Nikāyas, all texts about nirvana and
the consciousness of liberated beings are to be understood as
referring to this life or the moment of death, never to some
mysterious consciousness or domain that exists beyond death. Since
none of the texts about nirvana and liberated beings found in the Pāli
Nikāyas refer unambiguously to their eternal existence beyond death, I
interpret the Buddha as being absolutely silent about nirvana and
liberated beings beyond death (Vélez de Cea 2004a). In other words,
nothing of what the Pāli Nikāyas say goes beyond the limits of
language and understanding, beyond the content of the Buddha's
teachings, and beyond dependent arising as the middle way between
eternalism and annihilationism.
Instead of focusing on nirvana and liberated beings beyond death, the
Buddha of the Pāli Nikāyas emphasizes dependent arising and the
practice of the four foundations of mindfulness. Dependent arising is
intended to avoid views about a permanent and independent self in the
past and the future (M.I.265; M.III.196ff), and the four foundations
of mindfulness are said to be taught precisely to destroy such views
(D.III.141). That is, the Buddha's fundamental concern is to address
the problem of suffering in the present without being distracted by
views about the past or the future: "Let not a person revive the past,
or on the future build his hopes; for the past has been left behind
and the future has not been reached. Instead with insight let him see
each presently arising state (paccuppannañca yo dhammaṃ tattha tattha
vipassati); let him know that and be sure of it, invincibly,
unshakeably. Today the effort must be made, tomorrow death may come,
who knows?" (Bhikkhu Bodhi's translation. M.III.193).
5. Buddhist Ethics
Early Buddhist ethics includes more than lists of precepts and more
than the section on ethical training of the eightfold noble path; that
is, Buddhist ethics cannot be reduced to right action (abstaining from
killing, stealing, lying), right speech (abstaining from false,
divisive, harsh, and useless speech), and right livelihood (abstaining
from professions that harm living beings). Besides bodily and verbal
actions, the Pāli Nikāyas discuss a variety of mental actions
including thoughts, motivations, emotions, and perspectives. In fact,
it is the ethics of mental actions that constitutes the main concern
of the Buddha's teaching.
Early Buddhist ethics encompasses the entire spiritual path, that is,
bodily, verbal, and mental actions. The factors of the eightfold noble
path dealing with wisdom and concentration (right view, right
intentions, rights effort, right concentration, right mindfulness)
relate to different types of mental actions. The term "right" (sammā)
in this context does not mean the opposite of "wrong," but rather
"perfect" or "complete;" that is, it denotes the best or the most
effective actions to attain liberation. This, however, does not imply
that the Buddha advocates the most perfect form of ethical conduct for
all his disciples.
Early Buddhist ethics is gradualist in the sense that there are
diverse ways of practicing the path with several degrees of
commitment; not all disciples are expected to practice Buddhist ethics
with the same intensity. Monks and nuns take more precepts and are
supposed to devote more time to spiritual practices than householders.
However, a complete monastic code (prātimoka) like those found in
later Vinaya literature does not appear in the Pāli Nikāyas. The most
comprehensive formulation of early Buddhist ethics, probably common to
monastic disciples and lay people, is the list of ten dark or
unwholesome actions and their opposite, the ten bright or wholesome
actions: three bodily actions (abstaining from killing, stealing,
sexual misconduct), four verbal actions (abstaining from false,
divisive, harsh, and useless speech), and tree mental actions
(abstaining from covetousness, ill-will, and dogmatic views).
The Buddha of the Pāli Nikāyas defines action in terms of intention or
choice (cetanā): "It is intention, monks, what I call action. Having
intended, someone acts through body, speech, and mind" (A.III.415).
The Pāli Nikāyas define the roots of unwholesome (akusala) actions as
greed (lobha), aversion (dosa), and delusion (moha). Conversely, the
roots of wholesome actions are defined as the opposite mental states
(M.I.47). Some scholars infer from these two definitions that Buddhist
ethics is an ethics of intention or an agent-based form of virtue
ethics. That is, according to these scholars, for the Buddha of the
the Pāli Nikāyas, only the agent's intention or motivation determine
the goodness of actions. This interpretation, however, is disproved by
many texts of the Pāli Nikāyas where good and evil actions are
discussed without any reference to the underlying intention or
motivation of the agent. Consequently, the more comprehensive account
understands intention not as the only factor that determines the
goodness of actions, but rather as the condition of possibility, the
necessary condition for speaking about action in the moral sense.
Without intention or choice, there is no ethical action. Similarly,
motivation, while a central moral factor in Buddhist ethics, is
neither the only factor nor always the most important factor to
determine the goodness of actions. Understanding Buddhist ethics as
concerned exclusively with the three roots of the wholesome does not
fully capture the breath of moral concern of the Pāli Nikāyas (Vélez
de Cea 2004b).
The fundamental moral law of the universe according to early Buddhism
is what is popularly called the "law of karma": good actions produce
good consequences, and bad actions lead to bad consequences. The
consequences of volitional actions can be experienced in this life or
in subsequent lives. Although not everything we experience is due to
past actions, physical appearance, character, lifespan, prosperity,
and rebirth destination are believed to be influenced by past actions.
This influence however, is not to be confused with fatalism, a
position rejected in the Pāli Nikāyas. There is always room for
mitigating and even eradicating the negative consequences of past
actions with new volitions in the present. That is, past karma does
not dictate our situation: the existence of freewill and the
possibility of changing our predicament is always assumed. There is
conditioning of the will and other mental factors, but no hard
determinism.
A common objection to early Buddhist ethics is how there can be
freewill and responsibility without a permanent self that
transmigrates through lives. If there is no self, who is the agent of
actions? Who experiences the consequences of actions? Is the person
who performs an action in this life the same person that experiences
the consequences of that action in a future life? Is it a different
person? The Buddha considers these questions improper of his
disciples, who are trained to explain things in terms of causes and
condition (S.II.61ff; S.II.13ff)). In other words, since the Buddha's
disciples explain processes with the doctrine of dependent arising,
they should avoid explanations that use personal terms and presuppose
the extremes of eternalism and nihilism. The moral agent is not a
substance-self but rather the five aggregates, a dynamic and
dependently-arisen process-self who, like a flame or the water of a
river, changes all the time and yet has some degree of continuity.
The most common interpretations of early Buddhist ethics view its
nature as either a form of agent-based virtue ethics or as a
sophisticated kind of consequentialism. The concern for virtue
cultivation is certainly prevalent in early Buddhism, and evidently
the internal mental state or motivation underlying actions is
extremely important to determine the overall goodness of actions,
which is the most important factor for advanced practitioners.
Similarly, the concern for the consequences of actions, whether or not
they lead to the happiness or the suffering of oneself and others,
also pervades the Pāli Nikāyas. However, the goodness of actions in
the Pāli Nikāyas does not depend exclusively on either the goodness of
motivations or the goodness of consequences. Respect to status and
duty, observance of rules and precepts, as well as the intrinsic
goodness of certain external bodily and verbal actions are equally
necessary to assess the goodness of at least certain actions. Since
the foundations of right action in the Pāli Nikāyas are irreducible to
one overarching principle, value or criterion of goodness, early
Buddhist ethics is pluralistic in a metaethical sense. Given the
unique combination of deontological, consequentialist, and virtue
ethical trends found in the Pāli Nikāyas, early Buddhist ethics should
be understood in its own terms as a sui generis normative theory
inassimilable to Western ethical traditions.
6. References and Further Reading
a. Primary Sources
All references to the Pāli Nikāyas are to the edition of The Pāli Text
Society, Oxford. References to the Aṅguttara, Dīgha, Majjhima, and
Saṃyutta Nikāyas are to the volume and page number. References to
Udāna and Itivuttaka are to the page number and to Dhammapada and
Sutta Nipāta to the verse number.
A. Aṅguttara Nikāya
D. Dīgha Nikāya
M. Majjhima Nikāya
S. Saṃyutta Nikāya
Ud. Udāna
It. Itivuttaka
Dhp. Dhammapada
Sn. Sutta Nipāta
b. Secondary Sources
* Bechert, H. (Ed) 1995 When Did the Buddha Live? The Controversy
on the Dating of the Historical Buddha. Selected Papers Based on a
Symposium Held under the Auspices of the Academy of Sciences in
Göttingen. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications. 1995.
* Bhattacharya, K. 1973 L´Ātman-Brahman dans le Bouddhisme Ancien.
París: EFEO.
* Bhikkhu Ñānamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi. 1995 The Middle Length
Discourses of the Buddha. A New Translation of the Majjhima Nikāya.
Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society.
* Bhikkhu Ñāṇananda. 1971 Concept and Reality in Early Buddhist
Thought. Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society.
* Cousins, L.S. 1996 "Good or Skillful? Kusala in Canon and
Commentary." Journal of Buddhist Ethics.Vol. 3: 133-164.
* Collins, S. 1982 Selfless Persons. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
* Collins, S. 1994 "What are Buddhists Doing When They Deny the
Self?" In Religion and Practical Reason, edited by Frank E. Reynolds
and David Tracy. Albany: SUNY.
* Collins, S. 1998 Nirvana and other Buddhist Felicities.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
* Dalai Lama. 1994 The Way to Freedom. San Francisco: Harper.
* Dharmasiri, G. 1996 Fundamentals of Buddhist Ethics. Singapore:
Buddhist Research Society.
* Fuller, P. 2005 The Notion of Diṭṭhi in Theravāda Buddhism.
London: RoutledgeCurzon.
* Gombrich, R. 1988 Theravāda Buddhism: A Social History from
Ancient Benares to Modern Colombo. London: Routledge.
* Gombrich, R. 1996How Buddhism Began. London: Athlone.
* Gethin, R. 2001 The Buddhist Path to Awakening. Richmon Surrey:
Curzon Press.
* Gowans, C. W. 2003 Philosophy of the Buddha. London: Routledge.
* Hallisey, C. 1996 "Ethical Particularism in Theravāda Buddhism."
Journal of Buddhist Ethics. Vol. 3: 32-34.
* Hamilton, S. 2000 Early Buddhism: A New Approach. Richmon
Surrey: Curzon Press.
* Harvey, P. 1995 The Selfless Mind: Personality, Consciousness,
and Nirvana in Early Buddhism. Richmon Surrey: Curzon Press.
* Harvey, P. 1995 "Criteria for Judging the Unwholesomeness of
Actions in the Texts of Theravāda Buddhism." Journal of Buddhist
Ethics. Vol. 2: 140-151.
* Harvey, P. 2000 An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
* Hoffman, F. J. 1987 Rationality and Mind in Early Buddhism. New
Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
* Hwang, S. 2006 Metaphor and Literalism in Buddhism: The
Doctrinal History of Nirvana. London: RoutledgeCurzon.
* Jayatilleke, K. N. 1963 Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge.
London: Allen & Unwin.
* Johansson, R. 1969 The Psychology of Nirvana. London: Allen and Unwin Ltd.
* Kalupahana, D. 1976 Buddhist Philosophy: A Historical Analysis.
Honolulu: University Press of Hawai'i.
* Kalupahana, D. 1992 A History of Buddhist Philosophy:
Continuities and Discontinuities. Honolulu: University Press of
Hawai'i.
* Keown, D. 1992 The Nature of Buddhist Ethics. New York: Palgrave.
* Norman, K. R. 1983 Pāli Literature: Including the Canonical
Literature in Prakrit and Sanskrit of all the Hīnayāna schools of
Buddhism. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz.
* Norman, K. R. 1990-6 Collected Papers. Oxford: The Pāli Text Society.
* Pande, G.C. 1995 Studies in the Origins of Buddhism. New Delhi:
Motilal Banarsidass.
* Pérez-Remón, J. 1980Self and Non-Self in Early Buddhism. New York: Mouton.
* Perret, R. 1986 "Egoism, Altruism, and Intentionalism in
Buddhist Ethics." Journal of IndianPhilosophy. Vol. 15: 71-85.
* Premasiri, P. D. 1987 "Early Buddhist Concept of Ethical
Knowledge: A Philosophical Analysis." Kalupahana, D.J. and Weeraratne,
W.G. eds. Buddhist Philosophy and Culture: Essays in Honor of N.A.
Jayawickrema. Colombo: N.A. Jayawickrema Felicitation Volume
Committee. Pp. 37-70.
* Ronkin, N. 2005 Early Buddhist Metaphysics: The Making of a
Philosophical Tradition. London: RoutledgeCurzon.
* Tilakaratne, A 1993 Nirvana and Ineffability: A Study of the
Buddhist Theory of Reality and Languague. Colombo: Karunaratne and
Sons.
* Vélez de Cea , A. 2004 a "The Silence of the Buddha and the
Questions about the Tathāgata after Death." The Indian International
Journal of Buddhist Studies, no 5.
* Vélez de Cea , A. 2004 b "The Early Buddhist Criteria of
Goodness and the Nature of Buddhist Ethics."Journal of Buddhist Ethics
11, pp.123-142.
* Vélez de Cea , A. 2005 "Emptiness in the Pāli Suttas and the
Question of Nāgārjuna's Orthodoxy."Philosophy East and West. Vol. 55:
4.
* Webster, D. 2005 The Philosophy of Desire in the Pali Canon.
London: RoutledgeCurzon.
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