philosophy in India. "Bhedābheda" is a Sanskrit word meaning
"Difference and Non-Difference." The characteristic position of all
the different Bhedābheda Vedānta schools is that the individual self
(jīvātman) is both different and not different from the ultimate
reality known as Brahman. Bhedābheda reconciles the positions of two
other major schools of Vedānta. The Advaita (Monist) Vedānta that
claims the individual self is completely identical to Brahman, and the
Dvaita (Dualist) Vedānta that teaches complete difference between the
individual self and Brahman. However, each thinker within the
Bhedābheda Vedānta tradition has his own particular understanding of
the precise meanings of the philosophical terms "difference" and
"non-difference." Bhedābheda Vedāntic ideas can traced to some of the
very oldest Vedāntic texts, including quite possibly
Bādarāyaṇa'sBrahma Sūtra (app. 4th c. CE). Bhedābheda ideas also had
an enormous influence on the devotional (bhakti) schools of India's
medieval period. Among medieval Bhedābheda thinkers are Vallabha
(1479-1531 CE), founder of the Puṣṭimārga devotional sect now centered
in Nathdwara, Rajasthan, and Caitanya (1485-1533 CE) the founder of
the Gaudīya Vaiṣṇava sect based in the northeastern Indian state of
West Bengal.
1. Historical Overview
Bhedābheda is often presented as a school of Vedānta. Vedānta, in
turn, is sometimes spoken about as a single philosophy, when in
reality "Vedānta" has different uses. Its most inclusive use is as a
label for a philosophy that purports to be expressed at length in the
latter part of the Vedas, that is, the Upaniṣads. It is centrally
concerned with the inquiry into the nature of an ultimate entity
called "Brahman." There are many different accounts of this synoptic
philosophy, and the various accounts are often considered schools of
philosophy themselves. Unlike the well-known schools of Advaita
(Non-Dualist) Vedānta, Viśiṣṭādvaita (Non-Dualism of the Qualified)
Vedānta, and Dvaita (Dualist) Vedānta, it makes more sense to refer to
Bhedābheda Vedānta as a "tradition" or "family" of philosophies rather
than as a single "school." This is because, unlike the three
aforementioned schools, Bhedābheda has no single founder who created
an institutionalized network of monasteries dedicated to the study,
development, and propagation of the founder's teachings. The history
of Bhedābheda in India stretches back at least until the 7th century
CE and likely quite earlier, and continues into the present day.
Although there are substantial philosophical disagreements among the
many Bhedābheda thinkers, their philosophies also show certain
characteristic similarities. After a short historical introduction to
several major Bhedābhedavādins, I will discuss a few viewpoints that
almost all Bhedābheda schools share. These include the understanding
of the relation between individual self (jīvātman) and Brahman as one
of part and whole; the doctrine that the phenomenal world is a real
transformation of Brahman (Pariṇāmavāda); and the doctrine that
liberation can only be attained by means of a combination of knowledge
and ritual action (Jñānakarmasamuccayavāda), not by knowledge alone.
a. Bādarāyaṇa and Bhartṛprapañca
Numerous scholars have concluded that Bādarāyaṇa's Brahma Sūtra (circa
4th c. CE), one of the foundational texts common to all Vedānta
schools, was written from a Bhedābheda Vedāntic viewpoint (Dasgupta
1922: vol. 2, p. 42; Nakamura 1989: p. 500). While that claim is
disputed by other schools, there is little doubt that Bhedābheda
predates Śaṅkara's Advaita Vedānta. In his commentary on the
Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, Śaṅkara (8th c.) repeatedly criticizes
interpretations by an earlier Vedāntin named Bhartṛprapañca, who
characterized the relation between Brahman and individual souls as one
of difference and non-difference. One of the central disagreements
between the two is that Śaṅkara claims that Brahman's entire creation
is a mere appearance (vivarta), while Bhartṛprapañca maintains that it
is real (Hiriyanna 1957: vol. 2, pp. 6-16).
b. Bhāskara
The first Bhedābhedavādin widely recognized as such by the later
tradition is Bhāskara (8th-9th c.). He was either a younger
contemporary of Śaṅkara or perhaps lived slightly after Śaṅkara. His
only extant work is a commentary on the Brahma Sūtra. That work is
expressly written in order to defend the earlier claims of
Bhedābhedavādins against Śaṅkara's interpretation of the Brahma Sūtra.
Although he never mentions Śaṅkara by name, he makes it clear from the
beginning that his primary intention in commenting on the Brahma Sūtra
is to oppose some predecessor: "I am writing a commentary on thissūtra
in order to obstruct those commentators who have concealed its ideas
and replaced them with their own" (Bhāskara 1903: p. 1). Bhāskara is
the earliest in a long line of Vedāntic authors concerned to refute
Advaita (including Rāmānuja and Madhva, not to mention numerous
Bhedābhedavādins). Many of the stock arguments used against the
Advaita originated with Bhāskara, if indeed he did not borrow them
from an even earlier source. He also seems to have been remembered by
the collective Advaita tradition as a thorn in its side. So, for
instance, in the 14th century hagiography of Śaṅkara,
theŚaṅkaradigvijaya, Mādhava depicts one "Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara" as a
haughty and famous Bhedābhedavādin whom Śaṅkara defeats in a lengthy
debate.
c. Yādavaprakāśa and Nimbārka
While the Viśiṣṭādvaita philosopher Rāmānuja (11th-12th c.) is widely
acknowledged as the most influential Vedāntin after Śaṅkara,
Rāmānuja's complicated relationship with Bhedābhedavāda is rarely
discussed. Rāmānuja's teacher Yādavaprakāśa was a Bhedābhedavādin.
Yādavaprakāśa's works have been lost, and therefore almost all of what
we know of his ideas comes from Rāmānuja and one of Rāmānuja's
commentators, Sudarśanasῡri. However, it is possible from these
numerous hints to draw a sketch of Yādavaprakāśa's basic views.
Rāmānuja depicts Yādavaprakāśa as an exponent of Svābhāvika
Bhedābhedavāda, the view that Brahman is both different and not
different than the world in its very nature, and that difference is
not simply due to difference of artificial limiting conditions (see
Oberhammer 1997: p. 10). Yādavaprakāśa shares this basic viewpoint
with Nimbārka (13th c.?), and disagrees with the Aupādhika
Bhedābhedavāda of Bhāskara, who maintains that the difference of the
world and Brahman is due to limiting conditions. Another
characteristic of Yādavaprakāśa's thought is his repeated insistence
that Brahman has the substance of pure existence (sanmātradravya). The
relationship between Brahman and the world is not merely one of class
and individual, but rather both are existent entities, standing in the
relationship of cause and effect (see Oberhammer 1997: p. 14).
d. Vallabha
In the late medieval period, the doctrine of Bhedābheda became
increasingly associated with devotional (bhakti) movements in North
India. It is largely on the basis of their reputations as the founders
of religious sects, and not as philosophers per se, that thinkers such
as Vallabha (1479-1531) and Caitanya (1485-1533) became widely known.
Among the former's most influential works are a commentary on the
Brahma Sūtraentitled the Anubhāṣya, and his commentary on the
Bhāgavata Purāṇa, entitled theSubodhinī. Vallabha founded the Vaiṣṇava
sect of the Puṣṭimārga ("path of nourishment") now based in Nathdwara,
Rajasthan. His philosophical system, called Śuddhādvaita (Pure
Non-Dualism), takes its name from his view that there is no dualism
whatsoever between a real Brahman and an unreal world. Since both are
completely real, he denies that there can be any sort of ontological
dualism of real and unreal between the two—therefore it is a "pure"
non-dualism. Obviously, this refers to the Advaita school's view that
the phenomenal world is not real in an ultimate sense, and is a clever
attempt to re-appropriate the valued label "Advaita" for his own
school. Yet in this regard all Bhedābhedavādins might claim the name
Śuddhādvaita, since they all assert the reality of the phenomenal
world.
e. Caitanya
Caitanya was another medieval Vaiṣṇava philosopher/theologian, famous
for a school of thought known as Acintya Bhedābhedavāda (Inconceivable
Difference and Non-difference). Although Caitanya never wrote down his
teachings, numerous followers authored works based on his philosophy,
such as Jīva Gosvāmin, author of a well-known commentary on the
Bhāgavata Purāṇa. This system's notion of "inconceivability"
(acintyatva) is a central concept used to reconcile apparently
contradictory notions, such as the simultaneous oneness and
multiplicity of Brahman, or the difference and non-difference of God
and his powers. The tradition of Acintya-Bhedābheda, also commonly
known as Gaudīya Vaiṣṇavism, thrives to this day in the Indian state
of West Bengal. Perhaps the most famous offshoot of this devotional
tradition is the International Society for Krishna Consciousness
(ISKON), more popularly known in the West by the name the "Hari
Krishnas."
f. Vijñānabhikṣu
The last major Bhedābheda thinker in pre-modern India, Vijñānabhikṣu
(16th c.), did not follow the path of bhakti. Vijñānabhikṣu sought to
show the ultimate unity of the schools of Vedānta, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, and
Nyāya, and is most well known today for commentaries on Sāṅkhya and
Yoga texts. In his innovative sub-commentary on Patanjali's Yoga
Sūtra, Vijñānabhikṣu argues that yoga is the most effective means to
liberation, although he never repudiates the Bhedābheda metaphysical
framework of his earliest writings (Nicholson 2005). Vijñānabhikṣu was
a theist who considered Viṣṇu the supreme God. In his commentary on
the Sāṅkhya Sūtra, he argues that the Sāṅkhya school requires an
omnipotent God in order to cause the union of its two fundamental
principles, primordial nature (prakṛti) and pure consciousness
(puruṣa). Vijñānabhikṣu grounds his reinterpretations of fundamental
concepts in Sāṅkhya-Yoga in Bhedābheda metaphysics. In his earliest
works, such as his Bhedābheda Vedāntic commentary on the Brahma
Sūtras, he understands the concepts of difference and non-difference
in terms of separation and non-separation (Ram 1995). Although for him
the fundamental relation of the individual self and Brahman is one of
non-separation, the Sāṅkhya-Yoga analysis of the individual selves as
multiple and separate from one another is correct, as long as it is
understood that this state of separation is temporary and
adventitious. While Vijñānabhikṣu's acceptance of Sāṅkhya-Yoga
philosophical truths puts him at odds with some earlier
Bhedābhedavādins, he continues in the tradition of Bhāskara in his
trenchant criticism of the Advaita Vedāntins, whom he decries as
"crypto-Buddhists" (pracchannabauddha) and "Vedāntins in name alone"
(vedāntibruva).
2. Ontology
One of the most notable differences between Bhedābheda Vedānta and
Advaita (Monistic) Vedānta is their views on the existence of the
phenomenal world. While Advaita holds that the phenomenal world is
ultimately unreal (mithyā) and that only Brahman truly exists,
Bhedābheda thinkers insist that the phenomenal world is real, and not
at all illusory. In this basic assertion they are in line with the
majority of Indian philosophical schools, including the schools of
Qualified Non-Dualist (Viśiṣṭādvaita) Vedānta, Dualist (Dvaita)
Vedānta, Nyāya, Sāṅkhya, and Mīmāṃsā. Although Advaitins cite certain
passages from the Upaniṣads as supporting the notion that the world is
akin to a mirage or a magical trick, Bhedābhedavādins accuse Advaitins
of borrowing this idea from the Mind-only (Cittamātra) school of
Buddhism, and frequently employ the epithet of "crypto-Buddhist"
(pracchannabauddha) to refer to Advaitins.
a. Part and Whole
Bhedābhedavādins understand the relation between Brahman and the
individual souls to be a relation between a whole and its parts. They
frequently employ stock examples to illustrate this relation. Some of
the most common are a fire and its sparks, the sun and its rays, a
father and his son, and the ocean and its waves. Each of these is an
example of a part-whole relation, which is also a variety of
difference and non-difference (Bhedābheda). So, to take one example,
the sparks that come off of a fire are both the same as that fire and
different from it. They are the same insofar as they came from the
fire, and are constituted by the same substance as fire. But they are
also distinguishable from the original fire, as occupying a separate
point in space. Although these four examples each seem to illustrate a
different relation (and it may seem to make no sense at all to
understand a son as a "part" of his father), Bhedābhedavādins cite
these familiar examples from the physical world in order to shed light
on the true metaphysical relation between Brahman and the individual
selves. While each might capture some aspect of that relation,
inevitably they are mere approximations, requiring further commentary
and philosophical analysis.
Advaita Vedāntins object to the characterization of the individual
self as a part, and characterize Brahman as partless. All schools of
Vedānta understand the Veda as the ultimate epistemic authority, and
arguments from scripture play a large part in intra-Vedāntic disputes.
Advaitins point out that both the Upaniṣads and the Brahma Sūtras say
that Brahman is partless (niravayava, niṣkala). Furthermore, the
assertion that Brahman has parts seems to defy logic. It is
inconceivable that Brahman could be made up of parts, for things that
are made up of parts are dependent on those parts, and impermanent.
Advaitins offer their own stock examples to show that Brahman cannot
be divided up, and that any such division is purely an artificial
limitation on an indivisible entity. For example, Advaitins commonly
liken Brahman to the element called "space" (ākāśa). According to
traditional science in India, space is an element that is omnipresent
in the world, just as all Vedāntins agree that Brahman is omnipresent.
Although we can talk about space as being delimited (the space inside
a room, the space inside a pot), such limitations of space are purely
accidental, not essential to the element itself. It may appear to an
observer that the space inside a pot and the space outside the pot are
two different entities, but this is a misunderstanding of the
fundamental nature of space.
The Bhedābhedavādins can themselves appeal to textual authority for
the idea that the relation between Brahman and the individual self is
a relation between a whole and its parts. In Brahma Sūtra 2.3.43, The
individual self is referred to as a "part" (aṁśa), and
Bhedābhedavādins cite this passage whenever they require a textual
support for their views. However, Advaitins take this description of
the relation as a figurative, and not literal description of the
status of the individual self. Otherwise, this passage will conflict
with Brahma Sūtra 2.1.26, which says that Brahman is "partless"
(niravayava). For Advaita, the world appears as if to be made of
parts. But when it is understood correctly, all of the many entities
in the world are seen to be false, and only one entity, a single,
partless Brahman remains. Bhedābhedavādins, in their assertion of the
world's phenomenal reality, insist that multiplicity is real. Brahman
is simultaneously one and many, depending on the perspective from
which it is viewed, just as the ocean can be described as one or many,
depending on the perspective from which it is described.
Bhedābhedavādins maintain that Brahman's being made up of parts in no
way diminishes the perfection of Brahman, just as the existence of
waves in the ocean in no way diminishes the amount of water therein.
b. Aupādhika and Svābhāvika Bhedābheda
All Bhedābhedavādins maintain the reality of the phenomenal world and
the multiplicity of individual selves. However, some Bhedābheda
thinkers edge closer to the Advaita position by arguing that although
multiplicity is real, it is in some way less real than the absolute
unity of Brahman. The early Bhedābheda thinker Bhāskara (8th-9th c.
CE) exemplifies this tendency to reduce the ontological status of the
phenomenal world, while still maintaining its reality. Bhāskara's
philosophy is an example of Aupādhika Bhedābhedavāda ("Difference and
Non-difference Based on Limiting Conditions"). According to Bhāskara,
the one, absolute Brahman becomes finite and multiple by means of
limiting conditions (upādhis). Just as a pure diamond appears to be
red when it is placed next to a red flower, so too the absolute
Brahman appears finite when it is transformed through limiting
conditions. This transformation is a real one; the individual self
really is finite, subject to ignorance, suffering, and bondage, so
long as it is filtered through limiting conditions. Although the
individual self is real as differentiated from Brahman, for Bhāskara
difference is merely a temporary state. In its natural state, Brahman
is one and not many. Although it undergoes limitations to become
finite, the ultimate goal of the individual is to realize his or her
absolute state. Liberation is precisely the removal of such limiting
conditions.
At the other end of the spectrum from Bhāskara's Aupadhika
Bhedābhedavāda is Nimbārka's philosophy of Svābhāvika Bhedābheda
(Natural Difference and Non-Difference). For Nimbārka (13th c.),
Brahman is different and non-different not because of artificial
limiting conditions, but contains both non-difference and
non-difference as its essential nature. Along with Yādavaprakāśa (11th
c.), Nimbārka comes closest to upholding both difference and
non-difference as equally real states of Brahman. The tendency among
most Bhedābhedavādins, however, is to subordinate difference to
non-difference. Although difference is a real state that Brahman
undergoes as it transforms into multiple individual selves, Bhāskara
in essence makes the state of non-difference "more real" than the
state of difference. In this way, school of Bhedābheda Vedānta is
often closer to the school of Advaita (Monist) Vedānta than it is to
the school of Dvaita (Dualist) Vedānta.
3. Causality
a. Pariṇāmavāda (Theory of real transformation)
Closely related to Bhedābheda Vedānta's ontology is its theory of
causality. Bhedābheda Vedāntins subscribe to the theory of
Pariṇāmavāda, which states that the phenomenal world is a real
transformation (pariṇāma) of the material cause of the world. They
share this theory with the Sāṅkhya school of philosophy, as well as
with most other schools of Vedānta. The major difference between the
Vedāntic theory of Pariṇāmavāda and the Sāṅkhya's Pariṇāmavāda is the
understanding of what constitutes the material cause of the world. For
Sāṅkhya, primordial nature (prakṛti) transforms itself into the
phenomenal world. The principle of primordial nature is completely
insentient, and the process of transformation that creates the world
is a blind, automatic process. For Bhedābheda Vedāntins, Brahman is
both the material and efficient cause of the universe. Brahman, unlike
the Sāṅkhya's prakṛti, is sentient. Yet both the sentient (individual
souls) and insentient (physical things) have their origin in Brahman,
according to Bhedābhedavādins. In spite of their apparent proximity to
the Sāṅkhya school on the issue of causality, early Bhedābheda
thinkers such as Bhāskara took pains to critique the Sāṅkhya notion
ofprakṛti, accusing it of being both contrary to scripture and
contrary to logic. A few later Bhedābheda thinkers took a softer line
on Sāṅkhya. The most notable of these was Vijñānabhikṣu (16th c.), who
argued for the ultimate unity of Sāṅkhya and Bhedābheda Vedānta
doctrines.
b. Vivartavāda (Theory of unreal manifestation)
Once again, it is useful to contrast the doctrines of the Bhedābheda
school with Advaita Vedānta. Advaita Vedānta maintains the doctrine of
Vivartavāda, which states that the world is an unreal manifestation
(vivarta) of Brahman. Advaita, like other schools of Vedānta,
identifies Brahman as both material and efficient cause. But for the
Advaitins, Brahman is the cause of an unreal effect. Although the
world can be described as conventionally real (paramārthasat), the
Advaitins claim that all of Brahman's effects must ultimately be
acknowledged as unreal before the individual self can be liberated.
Although the theory of Vivartavāda is traditionally accepted as a
theory shared by the entire Advaita school, some recent historians
have questioned this, noting passages in the work of Śaṅkara, the
founder of the Advaita, that appear to be closer to the theory
ofpariṇāma (Hacker 1953: pp. 24ff.; Rao 1996: pp. 265ff.). It is
likely that the theory ofVivartavāda is a theory that emerged
gradually out of the earlier Vedāntic theory ofPariṇāmavāda, rather
than one that sprang fully formed out of the head of Śaṅkara. It also
bears repeating that some Bhedābheda Vedāntins come perilously close
to the Advaita view of the phenomenal world as only conventionally
real, as they often emphasize that multiplicity is an unnatural,
temporary state.
c. Satkāryavāda (Theory of pre-existent effect)
Proponents of both Vedāntic theories of causality, Pariṇāmavāda and
Vivartavāda, justify each by citing a central passage at Chāndogya
Upaniṣad 6.1.4-5. There, the sage Aruni describes the nature of
causality to his son, Śvetaketu, using the example of the relation of
clay to a pot:
It is like this, son. By means of just one lump of clay one would
perceive everything made of clay—the transformation is a verbal
handle, a name—while the reality is just this: 'It's clay.'It is like
this, son. By means of just one copper trinket one would perceive
everything made of copper—the transformation is a verbal handle, a
name—while the reality is just this: 'It's copper.' (Olivelle 1996:
148)
This passage uses the examples of an everyday material cause, clay or
copper, to shed light on the nature of cause and effect. It expresses
the doctrine of Satkaryavāda, which says that the effect preexists in
its cause. All Vedāntins subscribe to this theory—the doctrines of
real tranformation (pariṇāma) and unreal manifestation (Vivartavāda)
can be understood as two different versions of the theory of
Satkāryavāda. According toSatkāryavāda, the lump of clay does not go
out of existence when it is transformed into a pot, a cup, a saucer,
or the like, only to be replaced by something entirely new. Although
the form of the clay has changed, its essence, its clay-ness, remains.
The same logic applies to everything caused by Brahman. The entire
world, in all of its many forms, nonetheless shares the same essence,
as being Brahman. This view, something like an early Indian theory of
the conservation of matter, suggests that nothing ever arrives in the
universe completely new, but only as a transformation of some earlier
material cause. Nothing can be created ex nihilo. In this belief, the
Vedāntins are at odds with the Buddhist and Nyāya schools, who for
separate reasons argue that the effect does not preexist in the cause.
Although Bhedābheda Vedāntins and Advaita Vedāntins have the theory of
Satkāryavādain common, they part ways when asked to characterize the
status of the effect. Is the effect a real transformation (pariṇāma)
of the cause, or merely an unreal manifestation (vivarta)? The passage
at Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6.1.4-5 has been interpreted in both ways.
Advaitins emphasize the apparent nominalism expressed by Aruni in this
passage: "the transformation is a verbal handle, a name—while the
reality is just this: 'It's copper.'" This might suggest that the
effect is unreal, and only the cause is truly real. But
Bhedābhedavādins see this passage as simply another instantiation of
the principle of difference and non-difference, just as it is
illustrated by the examples of a fire and its sparks or the sun and
its rays. From one perspective, focusing on substance, we can say that
all of the various cups, saucers, and plates are one—they are all
clay. Yet at the same time, they have been transformed by the
pot-maker into different forms, multiple in number, occupying
different points in space. From this perspective, the effects are
real. Just as the many pots, plates, and saucers are simultaneously
different and non-different from the original lump of clay, so too all
of the individual selves are both different and non-different from
Brahman, the original material cause.
4. Theology and soteriology
a. God in Bhedābhedavāda
In the medieval period, Bhedābheda Vedānta became closely associated
with theism in general, and the movement of bhakti devotionalism in
particular. There is a reason thatbhaktas such as Vallabha (1479-1531
CE) and Caitanya (1485-1533) built the foundations of their
theological systems on centuries-old Bhedābheda concepts. Like the
schools of Rāmānuja and Madhva, Bhedābhedavāda is a realist school.
Whereas in the Advaita school even God has to be understood as
ultimately unreal, since He too is merely Brahman limited by the
artificial condition of lordliness, certain types of Bhedābheda
philosophy can accommodate a God who is real in his qualified (saguṇa)
form. Although on a certain level, an Advaitin can profess a belief in
God, he or she knows that ultimately God is merely a crutch, a
heuristic to enable human beings to go one step closer to that
ultimate Brahman devoid of qualities (nirguṇa). Such a God is
ultimately unsatisfying for those whose primary interest is
devotion—in any system of Advaita, devotion must occupy a lower
position than pure knowledge. On the other hand, many worshippers will
also be unsatisfied with the Dvaita school's uncompromising notion
that they themselves are completely separate from God, and that
ultimate unification with the Godhead is impossible. Both
Bhedābhedavāda and Viśiṣṭādvaita offer the possibility to bridge these
two alternatives, by offering the alternative of both a real God
possessing qualities and the possibility of personal participation in
that Godhead.
b. Knowledge combined with ritual acts leads to liberation
Besides insistence that the phenomenal world is a real transformation
(pariṇāma) of Brahman, another view shared by Bhedābhedavādins is the
necessity of ritual acts in combination with knowledge
(Jñānakarmasamuccayavāda) in order to obtain liberation. Bhāskara
devotes much of the beginning of his commentary on the Brahma Sūtra to
a critique of Śaṅkara's radical view that knowledge alone is
sufficient for the attainment of Brahman, as long as one has fulfilled
one's ritual requirements at an earlier stage. Although today polemics
between Vedāntins are usually depicted in solely philosophical or
theological terms, this suggests that above all, Śaṅkara's new
teachings were seen by other Vedāntins in the 8th century as a serious
threat to the ritual-social order. Bhāskara's arguments in favor of
Brahmanic ritualism are an important reminder of the continuities
between early Vedānta and the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā (Prior Exegesis) school of
ritual hermeneutics. The two schools are so close that Sanskrit
authors in pre-modern India typically refer to Vedānta by the names
"Brahma Mīmāṃsā" (Exegesis of Brahman) or "Uttara Mīmāṃsā" (Later
Exegesis), emphasizing the central importance of Vedic interpretation
for all Vedāntic thinkers.
The notion of bhakti finds a home in Bhedābhedavāda, since Bhedābheda
takes activity in the world (karman) seriously, believing that
activities in the world are real, and produce real effects. But it
should not be thought that all Bhedābhedavādins were proponents
ofbhakti. The early Bhedābheda of Bhāskara was not concerned at all
with bhakti. Instead, Bhāskara uses Bhedābheda conceptual terminology
as a conservative apologist, to defend the importance of Brahmanical
ritual orthodoxy from Śaṅkara, a radical who rejected the ultimate
efficacy of Vedic ritual. It is only with Nimbārka, a Bhedābheda
thinker heavily influenced by the bhakti system of Rāmānuja, that we
first fully see the union of bhaktiworship and Bhedābhedavāda. Even in
medieval northern India, where bhakti was influential and widespread,
not all Bhedābhedavādins were bhaktas. Vijñānabhikṣu, for example, was
more interested in espousing a modified, Bhedābheda Vedāntic form of
Patañjali's Yoga than he was to proselytize for the path of devotion.
Such flexibility of the Bhedābheda philosophical apparatus has allowed
it to survive as a living tradition for over 1500 years in a number of
very different historical contexts. Although in the modern period
Bhedābheda Vedānta has been eclipsed in popularity by neo-Vedāntic
interpretations of Advaita Vedānta philosophy, its lineage continues
today among traditional scholars in Puṣṭimārga and Gaudīya Vaiṣṇava
religious communities. And, for the first time in its long history, in
the early 21st century Bhedābheda Vedānta is beginning to receive the
attention it deserves among historians, philosophers, and theologians
outside of India.
5. References and Further Reading
* Bhāskara (1903). Brahmasūtrabhāṣyam, ed. Pandit Vindhyeshvari
Prasada Dvivedin. Benares: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Book Depot.
* Dasgupta, Surendranath (1922). A History of Indian Philosophy,
vol III. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
* Hacker, Paul (1953). Vivarta: Studien zur Geschichte der
illusionistischen Kosmologie und Erkenntnistheorie der Inder.
Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag.
* Kapoor, O.B.L (1976). The Philosophy and Religion of Sri
Caitanya. Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal.
* Marfatia, Mrdula I. (1967). The Philosophy of Vallabhācarya.
Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal.
* Nakamura, Hajime (1989). A History of Early Vedānta Philosophy,
part 1. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
* Nicholson, Andrew (2005). "Vijñānabhikṣu's Yoga," Journal of
Vaishnava Studies vol.14, no. 1: pp. 43-53.
* Oberhammer, Gerhard (1997). Materialien zur Geschichte der
Rāmānuja-Schule III:Yādavaprakāśa, der vergessene Lehrer Rāmānujas.
Wien: Verlag der Osterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften.
* Olivelle, Patrick, translator (1996). Upaniṣads. New York:
Oxford University Press.
* Ram, Kanshi (1995). Integral Non-Dualism: A Critical Exposition
of Vijñānabhikṣu's System of Philosophy. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
* Rao, Srinivasa (1996). "Two 'Myths' in Advaita," Journal of
Indian Philosophy vol. 24: pp. 265-279.
* Smith, Frederick M. (2005). "The Hierarchy of Philosophical
Systems According to Vallabhācārya," Journal of Indian Philosophy vol.
33: pp. 421-453.
* Srinivasachari, P.N. (1972). The Philosophy of Bhedābheda.
Madras: Adyar Library.
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