knowledge of the world, the term "skeptic" actually covers a wide
range of attitudes and positions. There are skeptical elements in the
views of many Greek philosophers, but the term "ancient skeptic" is
generally applied either to a member of Plato's Academy during its
skeptical period (c. 273 B.C.E to 1st century B.C.E.) or to a follower
of Pyrrho (c. 365 to 270 B.C.E.). Pyrrhonian skepticism flourished
from Aenesidemus' revival (1st century B.C.E.) to Sextus Empiricus,
who lived sometime in the 2nd or 3rd centuries C.E. Thus the two main
varieties of ancient skepticism: Academic and Pyrrhonian.
The term "skeptic" derives from a Greek noun, skepsis, which means
examination, inquiry, consideration. What leads most skeptics to begin
to examine and then eventually to be at a loss as to what one should
believe, if anything, is the fact of widespread and seemingly endless
disagreement regarding issues of fundamental importance. Many of the
arguments of the ancient skeptics were developed in response to the
positive views of their contemporaries, especially the Stoics and
Epicureans, but these arguments have been highly influential for
subsequent philosophers and will continue to be of great interest as
long as there is widespread disagreement regarding important
philosophical issues.
Nearly every variety of ancient skepticism includes a thesis about our
epistemic limitations and a thesis about suspending judgment. The two
most frequently made objections to skepticism target these theses. The
first is that the skeptic's commitment to our epistemic limitations is
inconsistent. He cannot consistently claim to know, for example, that
knowledge is not possible; neither can he consistently claim that we
should suspend judgment regarding all matters insofar as this claim is
itself a judgment. Either such claims will refute themselves, since
they fall under their own scope, or the skeptic will have to make an
apparently arbitrary exemption. The second sort of objection is that
the alleged epistemic limitations and/or the suggestion that we should
suspend judgment would make life unlivable. For, the business of
day-to-day life requires that we make choices and this requires making
judgments. Similarly, one might point out that our apparent success in
interacting with the world and each other entails that we must know
some things. Some responses by ancient skeptics to these objections
are considered in the following discussion.
(Hankinson [1995] is a comprehensive and detailed examination of
ancient skeptical views. See Schmitt [1972] and Popkin [1979] for
discussion of the historical impact of ancient skepticism, beginning
with its rediscovery in the 16th Century, and Fogelin [1994] for an
assessment of Pyrrhonian skepticism in light of contemporary
epistemology. The differences between ancient and modern forms of
skepticism has been a controversial topic in recent years-see
especially, Annas [1986], [1996], Burnyeat [1984], and Bett [1993].)
1. Academic vs. Pyrrhonian Skepticism
The distinction between Academic and Pyrrhonian skepticism continues
to be a controversial topic. In the Second Century C.E., the Roman
author Aulus Gellius already refers to this as an old question treated
by many Greek writers (Attic Nights 11.5.6, see Striker [1981/1996]).
The biggest obstacle to correctly making this distinction is that it
is misleading to describe Academic and Pyrrhonian skepticism as
distinctly unified views in the first place since different Academics
and Pyrrhonists seem to have understood their skepticisms in different
ways. So even though the terms Academic and Pyrrhonian are appropriate
insofar as there are clear lines of transmission and development of
skeptical views that unify each, we should not expect to find a simple
account of the distinction between the two.
2. Academic Skepticism
a. Arcesilaus
Following Plato's death in 347 B.C.E., his nephew Speusippus became
head of the Academy. Next in line were Xenocrates, Polemo and Crates.
The efforts of the Academics during this period were largely directed
towards developing an orthodox Platonic metaphysics. When Crates died
(c. 272 B.C.E.) Arcesilaus of Pitane (c. 318 to 243 B.C.E.) became the
sixth head of the Academy. Another member of the Academy, Socratides,
who was apparently in line for the position, stepped down in favor of
Arcesilaus (Diogenes Laertius [DL] 4.32); so it seems he was held in
high regard by his predecessors, at least at the time of his
appointment. (See Long [1986] for discussion of the life of
Arcesilaus.)
i. Platonic Innovator
According to Diogenes Laertius, Arcesilaus was "the first to argue on
both sides of a question, and the first to meddle with the traditional
Platonic system [or: discourse, logos] and by means of question and
answer, to make it more of a debating contest" (4.28, translation
after R.D. Hicks).
Diogenes is certainly wrong about Arcesilaus being the first to argue
on both sides of a question. This was a long standing practice in
Greek rhetoric commonly attributed to the Sophists. But Arcesilaus
wasresponsible for turning Plato's Academy to a form of skepticism.
This transition was probably supported by an innovative reading of
Plato's books, which he possessed and held in high regard (DL 4.31).
Diogenes' remark that Arcesilaus "meddled" with Plato's system and
made it more of a debating contest indicates a critical attitude
towards his innovations. Diogenes (or his source) apparently thought
that Arcesilaus betrayed the spirit of Platonic philosophy by turning
it to skepticism.
Cicero, on the other hand, in an approving tone, reports that
Arcesilaus revived the practice of Socrates, which he takes to be the
same as Plato's.
"[Socrates] was in the habit of drawing forth the opinions of those
with whom he was arguing, in order to state his own view as a response
to their answers. This practice was not kept up by his successors; but
Arcesilaus revived it and prescribed that those who wanted to listen
to him should not ask him questions but state their own opinions. When
they had done so, he argued against them. But his listeners, so far as
they could, would defend their own opinion" (de Finibus 2.2,
translated by Long and Sedley, 68J, see also de Natura Deorum 1.11).
Arcesilaus had (selectively) derived the lesson from Plato's dialogues
that nothing can be known with certainty, either by the senses or by
the mind (de Oratore 3.67, on the topic of Plato and Socrates as
proto-skeptics, see Annas [1992], Shields [1994] and Woodruff [1986]).
He even refused to accept this conclusion; thus he did not claim to
know that nothing could be known (Academica 45).
ii. Attack on the Stoics
In general, the Stoics were the ideal target for the skeptics; for,
their confidence in the areas of metaphysics, ethics and epistemology
was supported by an elaborate and sophisticated set of arguments. And,
the stronger the justification of some theory, the more impressive is
its skeptical refutation. They were also an attractive target due to
their prominence in the Hellenistic world. Arcesilaus especially
targeted the founder of Stoicism, Zeno, for refutation. Zeno
confidently claimed not only that knowledge is possible but that he
had a correct account of what knowledge is, and he was willing to
teach this to others. The foundation of this account is the notion of
katalêpsis: a mental grasping of a sense impression that guarantees
the truth of what is grasped. If one assents to the proposition
associated with a kataleptic impression, i.e. if one experiences
katalepsis, then the associated proposition cannot fail to be true.
The Stoic sage, as the perfection and fulfillment of human nature, is
the one who assents only to kataleptic impressions and thus is
infallible.
Arcesilaus argued against the possibility of there being any
sense-impressions which we could not be mistaken about. In doing so,
he paved the way for future Academic attacks on Stoicism. To summarize
the attack: for any sense-impression S, received by some observer A,
of some existing object O, and which is a precise representation of O,
we can imagine circumstances in which there is another
sense-impression S', which comes either (i) from something other than
O, or (ii) from something non-existent, and which is such that S' is
indistinguishable from S to A. The first possibility (i) is
illustrated by cases of indistinguishable twins, eggs, statues or
imprints in wax made by the same ring (Lucullus 84-87). The second
possibility (ii) is illustrated by the illusions of dreams and madness
(Lucullus 88-91). On the strength of these examples, Arcesilaus
apparently concluded that we may, in principle, be deceived about any
sense-impression, and consequently that the Stoic account of empirical
knowledge fails. For the Stoics were thorough-going empiricists and
believed that sense-impressions lie at the foundation of all of our
knowledge. So if we could not be certain of ever having grasped any
sense-impression, then we cannot be certain of any of the more complex
impressions of the world, including what strikes us as valuable. Thus,
along with the failure to establish the possibility of katalepsis goes
the failure to establish the possibility of Stoic wisdom (see
Hankinson [1995], Annas [1990] and Frede [1983/1987] for detailed
discussions of this epistemological debate).
iii. On Suspending Judgment
In response to this lack of knowledge (whether limited to the Stoic
variety or knowledge in general), Arcesilaus claimed that we should
suspend judgment. By arguing for and against every position that came
up in discussion he presented equally weighty reasons on both sides of
the issue and made it easier to accept neither side (Academica 45).
Diogenes counts the suspension of judgment as another of Arcesilaus'
innovations (DL 4.28) and refers to this as the reason he never wrote
any books (4.32). Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [generally
referred to by the initials of the title in Greek, PH] 1.232) and
Plutarch (Adversus Colotes 1120C) also attribute the suspension of
judgment about everything to him.
Determining precisely what cognitive attitude Arcesilaus intended by
"suspending judgment" is difficult, primarily because we only have
second and third hand reports of his views (if indeed he endorsed any
views, see Dialectical Interpretation below). To suspend judgment
seems to mean not to accept a proposition as true, i.e. not to believe
it. It follows that if one suspends judgment regarding p, then he
should neither believe that p nor should he believe that not-p (for
this will commit him to the truth of not-p). But if believing p just
means believing that p is true, then suspending judgment regarding
everything is the same as not believing anything. If Arcesilaus
endorsed this, then he could not consistently believe either that
nothing can be known or that one should consequently suspend judgment.
iv. Dialectical Interpretation
One way around this problem is to adopt the dialectical interpretation
(advanced by Couissin [1929]). According to this interpretation,
Arcesilaus merely showed the Stoics that they didn't have an adequate
account of knowledge, not that knowledge in general is impossible. In
other words, knowledge will only turn out to be impossible if we
define it as the Stoics do. Furthermore, he did not show that everyone
should suspend judgment, but rather only those who accept certain
Stoic premises. In particular, he argued that if we accept the Stoic
view that the Sage never errs, and since katalepsis is not possible,
then the Sage (and the rest of us insofar as we emulate the Sage)
should never give our assent to anything. Thus the only way to achieve
sagehood, i.e. to consistently avoid error, is to suspend judgment
regarding everything and never risk being wrong (Lucullus 66-67,
76-78, see also Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians [generally
referred to by the initial M, for the name of the larger work from
which it comes,Adversus Mathematikos] 7.150-57). But the dialectical
Arcesilaus himself neither agrees nor disagrees with this.
v. Practical Criterion: to Eulogon
The biggest obstacle to the dialectical interpretation is Arcesilaus'
practical criterion, to eulogon. Arcesilaus presented this criterion
in response to the Stoic objection that if we were to suspend judgment
regarding everything, then we would not be able to continue to engage
in day to day activities. For, theStoics thought, any deliberate
action presupposes some assent, which is to say that belief is
necessary for action. Thus if we eliminate belief we will eliminate
action (Plutarch, Adversus Colotes 1122A-F, LS 69A).
Sextus remarks that
inasmuch as it was necessary . . . to investigate also the conduct
of life, which cannot, naturally, be directed without a criterion,
upon which happiness-that is, the end of life-depends for its
assurance, Arcesilaus asserts that he who suspends judgment about
everything will regulate his inclinations and aversion and his actions
in general by the rule of "the reasonable [to eulogon]," and by
proceeding in accordance with this criterion he will act rightly; for
happiness is attained by means of wisdom, and wisdom consists in right
actions, and the right action is that which, when performed, possesses
a reasonable justification. He, therefore, who attends to "the
reasonable" will act rightly and be happy (M 7.158, translated by
Bury).
There is a good deal of Stoic technical terminology in this passage,
including the term eulogon itself, and this may seem to support the
dialectical interpretation. On this view, Arcesilaus is simply showing
the Stoics both that their account of knowledge is not necessary for
virtue, and that they nonetheless already have a perfectly acceptable
epistemic substitute, to eulogon (see Striker [1980/1996]). But this
raises the question, why would Arcesilaus make such a gift to his
Stoic adversaries? It would be as if, Maconi's words, "Arcesilaus
first knocked his opponent to the ground and then gave him a hand up
again" (1988: 248). Such generosity would seem to be incompatible with
the purely dialectical purpose of refutation. Similarly, if he had
been arguing dialectically all along, there seems to be no good reason
for him to respond to Stoic objections, for he was not presenting his
own views in the first place. On the other hand, the proponent of the
dialectical view could maintain that Arcesilaus has not done any
favors to the Stoics by giving them the gift of to eulogon; rather,
this "gift" may still be seen as a refutation of the Stoic view that a
robust knowledge is necessary for virtue.
An alternative to the dialectical view is to interpret to eulogon as
Arcesilaus' own considered opinion regarding how one may live well in
the absence of certainty. This view then encounters the earlier
difficulty of explaining how it is consistent for Arcesilaus to
endorse suspending judgment on all matters while at the same time
believing that one may attain wisdom and happiness by adhering to his
practical criterion.
b. Carneades
Arcesilaus was succeeded by Lacydes (c. 243 B.C.E.), and then Evander
and Hegesinus in turn took over as heads of the Academy. Following
Hegesinus, Carneades of Cyrene (c. 213 to 129 B.C.E.), perhaps the
most illustrious of the skeptical Academics, took charge. Rather than
merely responding to the dogmatic positions that were currently held
as Arcesilaus did, Carneades developed a wider array of skeptical
arguments against any possible dogmatic position, including some that
were not being defended. He also elaborated a more detailed practical
criterion, to pithanon. As was the case with Arcesilaus, he left
nothing in writing, except for a few letters, which are no longer
extant (DL 4.65).
i. Socratic Dialectic
Carneades employed the same dialectical strategies as Arcesilaus
(Academica 45, Lucullus 16), and similarly found his inspiration and
model in Plato's Socrates. The Socratic practice which Carneades
employed, according to Cicero, was to try to conceal his own private
opinion, relieve others from deception and in every discussion to look
for the most probable solution (Tusculan Disputations 5.11, see also
de Natura Deorum 1.11).
In 155 B.C.E., nearly one hundred years after Arcesilaus' death in
243, Carneades is reported to have gone as an Athenian ambassador to
Rome. There he presented arguments one day in favor of justice and the
next he presented arguments against it. He did this not because he
thought that justice should be disparaged but rather to show its
defenders that they had no conclusive support for their view
(Lactantius, LS 68M). Similarly, we find Carneades arguing against the
Stoic conception of the gods, not in order to show that they do not
exist, but rather to show that the Stoics had not firmly established
anything regarding the divine (de Natura Deorum 3.43-44, see also
1.4). It seems then that Carneades was motivated primarily by the
Socratic goal of relieving others of the false pretense to knowledge
or wisdom and that he pursued this goal dialectically by arguing both
for and against philosophical positions.
ii. On Ethical Theory
But whereas Arcesilaus seemed to limit his targets to positions
actually held by his interlocutors, Carneades generalized his
skeptical attack, at least in ethics and epistemology. The main task
of Hellenistic ethics was to determine the summum bonum, the goal at
which all of our actions must aim if we are to live good, happy lives.
Carneades listed all of the defensible candidates, including some that
had not actually been defended, in order to argue for and against each
one and show that no one in fact knows what the summum bonum is, if
indeed there is one (de Finibus 5.16-21). He may have even intended
the stronger conclusion that it is not possible to acquire knowledge
of the summum bonum,assuming his list was exhaustive of all the
serious candidates.
iii. On the Stoic Sage
As with Arcesilaus, Carneades also focused much of his skeptical
energy on the Stoics, particularly the views of the scholarch
Chrysippus (DL 4.62). The Stoics had developed a detailed view of
wisdom as life in accordance with nature. The Stoic sage never errs,
he never incorrectly values the goods of fortune, he never suffers
from pathological emotions, and he always remains tranquil. His
happiness is completely inviolable since everything he does and
everything he experiences is precisely as it should be; and crucially,
he knows this to be true. Even though the Stoics were extremely
reluctant to admit that anyone had so far achieved this extraordinary
virtue, they nonetheless insisted that it was a real possibility
(Luc.145, Tusc. 2.51, Seneca Ep. 42.1, M 9.133, DL 7.91).
As a dialectician, Carneades carefully examined this conception of the
sage. Sometimes he argued, contrary to the Stoic view, that the sage
would in fact assent to non-kataleptic impressions and thus that he
was liable to error (Luc. 67); for he might form opinions even in the
absence of katalepsis (Luc. 78). But he also apparently argued against
the view that the sage will hold mere opinions in the absence of
katalepsis (Luc. 112). Presumably he didn't himself endorse either
position since the issue that had to be decided first was whether
katalepsis was even possible. In other words, if certainty is
possible, then of course the sage should not settle for mere opinion.
But if it is not possible, then perhaps he will be entitled to hold
mere opinions, provided they are thoroughly examined and considered.
iv. On Epistemology
Just as Carneades generalized his skeptical attack on ethical
theories, he also argued against all of his predecessors'
epistemological theories (M 7.159). The main task of Hellenistic
epistemology was to determine the criterion (standard, measure or
test) of truth. If the criterion of truth is taken to be a sort of
sense-impression, as in the Stoic theory, then we will not be able to
discover any such impression that could not in principle appear true
to the most expertly trained and sensitive perceiver and yet still be
false (M 7.161-65, see Arcesilaus' "Attack on the Stoics" above). But
if we can discover no criterial sense-impression, then neither will
the faculty of reason alone be able to provide us with a criterion,
insofar as we accept the empiricist view (common among Hellenistic
philosophers) that nothing can be judged by the mind that hasn't first
entered by the senses.
We have no evidence to suggest that Carneades also argued against a
rationalist, or a priori approach to the criterion.
v. Practical Criterion: to Pithanon
According to Sextus, after arguing against all the available
epistemological theories, Carneades himself needed to advance a
criterion for the conduct of life and the attainment of happiness (M
7.166). Sextus does not tell us why it was necessary for Carneades to
do so, but it was probably for the same reason that Arcesilaus had
presented his practical criterion-namely, in response to the objection
that if there were no epistemic grounds on which to prefer one
impression over another then, despite all appearances, we cannot
rationally govern our choices. Thus, Carneades expounded his practical
criterion, to pithanon.
First he noted that every sense impression exists in two distinct
relations: one relative to the object from which it comes, the
"impressor", and the other relative to the perceiver. The first
relation determines what we ordinarily think of as truth: does the
impression correspond to its object or not? The second relation
determines plausibility: is the impression convincing to the perceiver
or not? Rather than relying on the first relation, Carneades adopted
the convincing impression [pithanê phantasia] as the criterion of
truth, even though there will be occasions on which it fails to
accurately represent its object. Yet, he apparently thought that these
occasions are rare and so they do not provide a good reason for
distrusting the convincing impressions. For such impressions are
reliable for the most part, and in actual practice, life is regulated
by what holds for the most part (M 7.166-75, LS 69D).
Sextus also reports the refinements Carneades made to his criterion.
If we are considering whether we should accept some impression as
true, we presumably have already found it to be convincing, but we
should also consider how well it coheres with other relevant
impressions and then thoroughly examine it further as if we were
cross-examining a witness. The amount of examination that a convincing
impression requires is a function of its importance to us. In
insignificant matters we make use of the merely convincing impression,
but in weighty matters, especially those having to do with happiness,
we should only rely on the convincing impressions that have been
thoroughly explored (M 7.176-84).
Cicero translates Carneades' pithanon with the Latin terms probabile
and veri simile, and he claims that this criterion is to be employed
both in everyday life and in the Academic dialectical practice of
arguing for and against philosophical views (Luc. 32, see also
Contr.Ac. 2.26, and Glucker [1995]). The novel feature of this
criterion is that it does not guarantee that whatever is in accordance
with it is true. But if it is to play the dialectical role explicitly
specified by Cicero and suggested by Sextus' report, then it must have
some connection with truth. This is especially clear in the case of
sense-impressions: the benefit of thoroughly examining
sense-impressions is that we may rule out the deceptive ones and
accept the accurate ones. And we may make a similar case, as Cicero
does, for the dialectical examination of philosophical views. A major
difficulty in interpreting Carneades' pithanon in this way is that it
requires some explanation for how we are able to identify what
resembles the truth (veri simile) without being able to identify the
truth itself (Luc. 32-33).
vi. Dialectical Skeptic or Fallibilist?
Even if the fallibilist interpretation of Carneades' criterion is
correct, it remains a further issue whether he actually endorsed his
criterion himself, or whether he merely developed it dialectically as
a possible view. Indeed, even Carneades' student Clitomachus was
unable to determine what, if anything, Carneades endorsed (Luc. 139,
see also Striker [1980/1996]). A number of difficulties arise if he
did endorse his criterion. First, Carneades argued that there is
absolutely no criterion of truth (M 7.159) and that would presumably
include to pithanon. Second, Clitomachus claims that Carneades endured
a nearly Herculean labor "when he cast assent out of our minds, like a
wild and savage beast, that is mere opinion and thoughtlessness" (Luc.
108). Thus it would seem to be inconsistent for him to accept a
moderate, fallible form of assent if it leads to holding opinions.
We may more simply deal with Carneades' criterion by noting that
sometimes he argued so zealously in support of some view that people
reasonably, but incorrectly, assumed that he accepted it himself
(Luc.78, Fin. 5.20). Thus we may say that Carneades only advanced
views dialectically but remained uncommitted to any of them. His
criterion in this case would be the disappointing consequence of Stoic
epistemological commitments-disappointing (as in the case with the
dialectical reading of Arcesilaus'eulogon) because the Stoics believed
these same commitments led to a much more robust criterion.
On the other hand, Cicero endorses a fallibilist interpretation of to
pithanon which he seems to think was also endorsed by Carneades
himself. This interpretation was developed by another of Carneades'
students, Metrodorus, and by Cicero's teacher, Philo. We also have
evidence that Carneades made an important distinction between assent
and approval that he may have appealed to in this context (Luc. 104,
see Bett [1990]). He limits assent to the mental event of taking a
proposition to be true and adopts the term "approval" for the more
modest mental event of taking a proposition to be convincing but
without making any commitment to its truth. If this distinction is
viable it would allow Carneades to approve of his epistemological
criterion without committing himself at any deeper theoretical level.
In other words Carneades could appeal to his criterion for his very
adoption of that criterion: it is pithanon but not certain that to
pithanon is the criterion for determining what we should approve of.
Cicero claims that Carneades made just this sort of move in the case
of his rejection of the possibility of Stoic katalepsis: it
isprobabile (= pithanon), but not certain, that katalepsis is not
possible (Luc. 110, see Thorsrud [2002]).
c. Philo and Antiochus
According to Sextus Empiricus, most people divide the Academy into
three periods: the first, the so-called Old Academy, is Plato's; the
second is the Middle Academy of Arcesilaus; and the third is the New
Academy of Carneades. But, he remarks, some also add a fourth Academy,
that of Philo, and a fifth Academy, Antiochus' (PH 1.220). Philo was
head of the Academy from about 110 to 79 B.C.E. His interpretation of
Academic skepticism as a mitigated form that permits tentative
approval of the view that survives the most dialectical scrutiny is
recorded and examined in Cicero's Academica, and in the earlier
version of this dialogue, the Lucullus. The Lucullus is just one of
the two books that constituted the earlier version. The second book,
now lost was called Catulus, after one of the main speakers. Cicero
later revised these books, dividing them into four; but only part of
the first of those four, what is usually referred to as the Academica
posteriora, has survived. Nevertheless, we have enough of these books
to get a pretty good sense of the whole work (see Griffin [1997],
Mansfeld [1997]).
Philo apparently claimed that some sense-impressions very well may be
true but that we nonetheless have no reliable way to determine which
ones these are (Luc. 111, see also 34). Similarly, Sextus attributes
to Philo the view that "as far the Stoic standard (i.e. apprehensive
appearance [= kataleptic impression]) is concerned, objects are
inapprehensible, but as far as the nature of the objects themselves is
concerned they are apprehensible" (PH 1.235, translated by Annas and
Barnes). He may have made these remarks in order to underwrite the
Academic practice of accepting certain views as resembling the truth;
for there must be some truth in the first place-even if we don't have
access to it-in order for something to resemble it.
Under the pressure of Stoic objections to his fallibilist epistemology
Philo apparently made some controversial innovations in Academic
philosophy. Cicero refers to these innovations but doesn't discuss
them in any detail (Luc. 11-12), nor did he accept them himself,
preferring Philo's earlier view of the Academy and the dialectical
practices of Carneades. Philo's innovation may have been to commit
himself to the metaphysical claim that some impressions are indeed
true by providing arguments to that effect. So rather than rely on the
likelihood that some impressions are true he may have sought to
establish this more firmly. He then may have lowered the standard for
knowledge by giving up the internalist requirement that one be able to
identify which impressions are true and adopted instead the
externalist position that just having true impressions, as long as
they have the right causal history, is enough for one to have
knowledge (see Hankinson [1997] for this interpretation, see also
Tarrant [1985] and Brittain [2001]).
After Philo, Antiochus (c. 130 to c. 68 B.C.E.) led the Academy
decidedly back to a form of dogmatism. He claimed that the Stoics and
Peripatetics had more accurately understood Plato and thus he sought
to revive these views, including primarily Stoic epistemology and
ethics, in his Academy (Cicero examines Antiochus' views in de Finibus
5. Glucker [1978] is a groundbreaking study of Antiochus.).
d. Cicero
Cicero was a lifelong student and practitioner of Academic philosophy
and his philosophical dialogues are among the richest sources of
information about the skeptical Academy. Although he claims to be a
mere reporter of other philosophers' views (Att. 12.52.3), he went to
some trouble in arranging these views in dialogue form and most
importantly in supplying his own words to express them. In some cases
he coined the words he needed thereby teaching philosophy to speak
Latin. His philosophical coinages-e.g.essentia, qualitas,
beatitudo-have left a lasting imprint on Western philosophy.
He is generally not considered to be an original thinker but it is
difficult to determine the extent to which this is true since
practically none of the books he relied on have survived and so we do
not know how much, or whether, he modified the views he presented.
Nevertheless, despite questions of originality, his dialogues express
a humane and intelligent view of life. Plutarch, in his biography,
claims that Cicero often asked his friends to call him a philosopher
because he had chosen philosophy as his work, but merely used oratory
to achieve his political ends (Life of Cicero 32.6, Colish [1985] is a
comprehensive survey of Cicero's philosophical dialogues, so too
MacKendrick [1989], and see Powell [1995] for more recent essays on
Cicero's philosophy).
3. Pyrrhonian Skepticism
Pyrrho of Elis (c. 360 to c. 270 BCE), the founder of Pyrrhonian
skepticism, is a shadowy figure who wrote nothing himself. What little
we know of him comes, for the most part, from fragments of his pupil
Timon's poems and from Diogenes Laertius' biography (9.61-108) which
is based on a book by Antigonus of Carystus, an associate of Timon.
There seem to have been no more disciples of Pyrrho after Timon, but
much later in the 1st Century B.C.E., Aenesidemus proposed a skeptical
view that he claimed to be Pyrrhonian. Later still in the 2nd Century
C.E., Sextus Empiricus recorded a battery of skeptical arguments aimed
at all contemporary philosophical views. As with Aenesidemus, Sextus
claimed Pyrrho as the founder, or at least inspiration, for the
skepticism he reports. The content of these skeptical views, the
nature of Pyrrho's influence, and the relations between succeeding
stages of Pyrrhonism are controversial topics.
a. Pyrrho and Timon
The anecdotal evidence for Pyrrho tends to be sensational. Diogenes
reports, for example, that Pyrrho mistrusted his senses to such an
extent that he would have fallen off cliffs or been run over by carts
and savaged by dogs had his friends not followed close by (9.62). He
was allegedly indifferent to certain norms of social behavior, taking
animals to market, washing a pig and even cleaning the house himself
(9.66). For the most part we find his indifference presented as a
positive characteristic. For example, while on a ship in the midst of
a terrible storm he was able to maintain a state of tranquility
(9.68). Similarly, Timon presents Pyrrho as having reached a godlike
state of calm, having escaped servitude to mere opinion (9.64-5, see
also the fragments of Timon's prose works, as recorded by Aristocles,
LS 2A and 2B). He was also held in such high regard by his native city
that he was appointed as high priest and for his sake they made all
philosophers exempt from taxation (9.64). We also find a tantalizing
report of a journey to India where Pyrrho mingled with, and presumably
learned from, certain naked sophists and magi (9.61, the connection
with Indian Buddhism is explored by Flintoff [1980]).
Generally, the anecdotal evidence in Diogenes, and elsewhere, is
unreliable, or at least highly suspect. Such reports are more likely
colorful inventions of later authors attributed to Pyrrho to
illustrate, or caricature, some part of his philosophical view.
Nevertheless, he is consistently portrayed as being remarkably calm
due to his lack of opinion, so we may cautiously accept such accounts.
The most important testimony to the nature of Pyrrho's skepticism
comes from Aristocles, a Peripatetic philosopher of the 2nd Century
C.E.:
It is supremely necessary to investigate our own capacity for
knowledge. For if we are so constituted that we know nothing, there is
no need to continue enquiry into other things. Among the ancients too
there have been people who made this pronouncement, and Aristotle has
argued against them. Pyrrho of Elis was also a powerful spokesman of
such a position. He himself has left nothing in writing, but his pupil
Timon says that whoever wants to be happy must consider these three
questions: first, how are things by nature? Secondly, what attitude
should we adopt towards them? Thirdly, what will be the outcome for
those who have this attitude? According to Timon, Pyrrho declared that
[1] things are equally indifferent, unmeasurable and inarbitrable. For
this reason [2] neither our sensations nor our opinions tell us truths
or falsehoods. Therefore, for this reason we should not put our trust
in them one bit, but we should be unopinionated, uncommitted and
unwavering, saying concerning each individual thing that it no more is
than is not, or it both is and is not, or it neither is nor is not.
[3] The outcome for those who actually adopt this attitude, says
Timon, will be first speechlessness, and then freedom from disturbance
. . . (Aristocles apudEusebius, Praeparatio evangelica 14.18.1-5,
translated by Long and Sedley, 1F).
Let us consider Pyrrho's questions and answers in order. First, what
are things like by nature? This sounds like a straightforward
metaphysical question about the way the world is, independent of our
perceptions. If so, we should expect Pyrrho's answer, [1] that things
are equally indifferent, unmeasurable and inarbitrable, to be a
metaphysical statement. But this will lead to difficulties, for how
can Pyrrho arrive at the apparently definite proclamation that things
are indefinite? That is, doesn't his metaphysical statement refute
itself by implicitly telling us that things are decidedly
indeterminate? If we take this view we may defend Pyrrho by allowing
his claim to be exempt from its own scope-so we can determine only
this much: every property of every thing is indeterminate (see Bett
[2000] for this defense). Alternatively, we may allow Pyrrho to
embrace the apparent inconsistency and assert that his claim is itself
neither true nor false, but is inarbitrable. The former option seems
preferable insofar as the latter leaves Pyrrho with no definite
assertion whatsoever and it thus becomes unclear how he could draw the
inferences he does from [1] to [2].
On the other hand, we may seek to avoid these difficulties by
interpreting Pyrrho's first answer as epistemological. After all, the
predicates he uses suggest an epistemological claim is being made. And
further, Aristocles introduces this passage by noting that we must
investigate our capacity for knowledge and he claims that Pyrrho was a
spokesman for the view that we know nothing. Bett [2000] argues
against the epistemological reading on the grounds that it doesn't
make good sense of the passage as it stands. For if we assume the
epistemological reading of [1], that we are unable to determine the
natures of things, then it would be pointless to infer from that that
[2] our senses lie. It would make much more sense to reverse the
inference: one might reasonably argue that our senses lie and thus we
are unable to determine the natures of things. Some have proposed
emending the text from "for this reason (dia touto)" to "on account of
the fact that (dia to)" to capture this reversal of the inference. But
if we read the text as it stands, we may still explain Aristocles'
epistemological focus by pointing out that if [1] things are
indeterminate, then the epistemological skepticism will be a
consequence: things are indeterminable.
Second, in what way ought we to be disposed towards things? Since
things are indeterminate (assuming the metaphysical reading) then no
assertion will be true, but neither will any assertion be false. So we
should not have any opinion about the truth or falsity of any
statement (with the exception perhaps of these meta-level skeptical
assertions). Instead, we should only say and think that something no
more is than is not, or both is and is not, or neither is nor is not,
because in fact that's the way things are. So for example, having
accepted [1] (and assuming the predicative reading of "is" in [2]), I
will no longer believe that this book is red, but neither will I
believe that it is not red. The book is no more red than not-red, or
similarly, it is as much red as not-red.
Third, what will be the result for those who are so disposed? The
first result is speechlessness (literally, not saying anything)-but
this is odd given that we are encouraged to adopt a form of speech in
[2]. Perhaps speechlessness follows after initially saying only that
things are no more this than that, etc.; then finally, freedom from
disturbance follows. Presumably, the recognition that things are no
more to be sought after than not sought after is instrumental in
producing tranquility, for if nothing is intrinsically good or bad, we
have no reason to ever be distressed, or to be exuberantly joyful. But
then it seems we would not be able to even choose one thing over
another. Pyrrho's tranquility thus begins to look like a kind of
paralysis and this is probably what prompted some of the sensational
anecdotes.
Diogenes notes, however, that according to Aenesidemus, Pyrrho
exercised foresight in his day-to-day activities, and that he lived to
be ninety (9.62). So it seems his tranquility did not paralyze him
after all. This may be either because Pyrrho (or Timon) was
disingenuous about what he was up to intellectually, or more
charitably because he followed appearances (9.106) without ever
committing himself to the truth or falsity of what appeared. (See
"Sextus on the skeptical life" below for further discussion).
b. Aenesidemus
We know practically nothing about Aenesidemus except that he lived
sometime in the 1st Century B.C.E., and that he dedicated one of his
written works to a Lucius Tubero, a friend of Cicero's who was also a
member of the Academy. This has led most scholars to suppose that
Aenesidemus was a member of the Academy, probably during the period of
Philo's leadership, and that his revival of Pyrrhonian skepticism was
probably a reaction to Philo's tendency towards fallibilism. Although
this is plausible, it makes the fact that Cicero never mentions him
quite puzzling.
i. Revival of Pyrrhonism
Aenesidemus' Pyrrhonian Discourses (Pyrrhoneia), like the rest of his
works, have not survived, but they are summarized by a ninth century
Byzantine patriarch, Photius, who is remarkable in his own right. In
his Bibliothêkê (Bib.), he summarized 280 books, including the
Pyrrhoneia, apparently from memory. It is clear from his summary that
he thinks very little of Aenesidemus' work. This is due to his view
that Aenesidemus' skepticism makes no contribution to Christian dogma
and drives from our minds the instinctive tenets of faith (Bib.
170b39-40). Nevertheless, a comparison of his summaries with the
original texts that have survived reveal that Photius is a generally
reliable source (Wilson [1994]). So despite his assessment of
Aenesidemus' skepticism, the consensus is that he provides an accurate
summary of thePyrrhoneia. The proper interpretation of that summary,
however, is disputed.
Aenesidemus was a member of Plato's Academy, apparently during the
period of Philo's leadership. Growing dissatisfied with what he
considered the dogmatism of the Academy, he sought to revitalize
skepticism by moving back to a purer form inspired by Pyrrho. His
specific complaint against his contemporary Academics was that they
confidently affirm some things, even Stoic beliefs, and unambiguously
deny other things. In other words, the Academics, in Aenesidemus'
view, were insufficiently impressed by our epistemic limitations.
His alternative was to "determine nothing," not even the claim that he
determines nothing. Instead, the Pyrrhonist says that things are no
more one way than another. This form of speech is ambiguous (in a
positive sense, from Aenesidemus' perspective) since it neither denies
nor asserts anything unconditionally. In other words, the Pyrrhonist
will only assert that some property belongs to some object relative to
some observer or relative to some set of circumstances. Thus, he will
conditionally affirm some things but he will absolutely deny that any
property belongs to anything in every possible circumstance. This
seems to be what Aenesidemus meant by "determining nothing," for his
relativized assertions say nothing definite about the nature of the
object in question. Such statements take the form: it is not the case
that X is by nature F. This is a simple denial that X is always and
invariably F, though of course X may be F in some cases. But such
statements are importantly different from those of the form: X is by
nature not-F. For these sorts of statements affirm that X is
invariably not-F and that there can be no cases of X that exhibit the
property F. The only acceptable form of expression for Aenesidemus
then seems to be statements that may sometimes be false (See Woddruff
[1988] for this interpretation, also Bett 2000).
ii. The Ten Modes
The kinds of conclusion that Aenesidemus countenanced as a Pyrrhonist
can more clearly be seen by considering the kinds of arguments he
advanced to reach them. He apparently produced a set of skeptical
argument forms, or modes, for the purpose of refuting dogmatic claims
regarding the natures of things. Sextus Empiricus discusses one such
group, the Ten Modes, in some detail (PH 1.35-163, M 7.345, see also
Diogenes Laertius' account of the Ten Modes at 9.79-88, and the
partial account in Philo of Alexandria, On Drunkenness 169-205, and
see Annas and Barnes [1985] for detailed and critical discussion of
all ten modes).
The first mode is designed to show that it is not reasonable to
suppose that the way the world appears to us humans is more accurate
than the incompatible ways it appears to other animals. This will
force us to suspend judgment on the question of how these things are
by nature, in and of themselves, insofar as we have no rational
grounds on which to prefer our appearances and insofar as we are not
willing to accept that something can have incompatible properties by
nature. If, for example, manure appears repulsive to humans and
delightful to dogs, weare unable to say that it really is, in its
nature, either repulsive or delightful, or both repulsive and
delightful. It is no more delightful than not-delightful, and no more
repulsive than not-repulsive, (again, in its nature).
Just as the world appears in incompatible ways to members of different
species, so too does it appear incompatibly to members of the same
species. Thus, the second mode targets the endless disagreements among
dogmatists. But once again, we will find no rational ground to prefer
our own view of things, for if an interested party makes himself
judge, we should be suspicious of the judgment he reaches, and not
accept it.
The third mode continues the line of reasoning developed in the first
two. Just as the world appears in incompatible ways to different
people, it also appears incompatibly to the different senses of one
and the same person. So, for example, painted objects seem to have
spatial dimensions that are not revealed to our sense of touch.
Similarly, perfume is pleasant to the nose but disgusting to the
tongue. Thus, perfume is no more pleasant than not-pleasant.
The fourth mode shows that differences in the emotional or physical
state of the perceiver affects his perception of the world. Being in
love, calm and warm, one will experience the cold wind that comes in
with his beloved quite differently than if he is angry and cold. We
are unable to adjudicate between these incompatible experiences of the
cold wind because we have no rational grounds on which to prefer our
experience in one set of circumstances to our experience in another.
One might say that we should give preference to the experiences of
those who are healthy, sane and calm as that is our natural state. But
in response, we may employ the second mode to challenge the notion of
a single, healthy condition that is universally applicable.
The fifth mode shows that differences in location and position of an
observed object relative to the observer will greatly affect the way
the object appears. Here we find the oar that appears bent in water,
the round tower that appears square from a distance, and the pigeon's
neck that changes color as the pigeon moves. These features are
independent of the observer in a way that the first four modes are
not. But similar to the first four, in each case we are left without
any rational grounds on which to prefer some particular location or
position over another. Why should we suppose, for example, that the
pigeon's neck is really green rather than blue? And if we should
propose some proof, or theory, in support of it being really blue, we
will have to face the skeptic's demand for further justification of
that theory, which will set off an infinite regress.
The sixth mode claims that nothing can be experienced in its simple
purity but is always experienced as mixed together with other things,
either internally in its composition or externally in the medium in
which it is perceived. This being the case, we are unable to ever
experience the nature of things, and thus are unable to ever say what
that nature is.
The seventh mode appeals to the way different effects are produced by
altering the quantity and proportions of things. For example, too much
wine is debilitating but the right amount is fortifying. Similarly, a
pile of sand appears smooth, but individual grains appear rough. Thus,
we are led to conclude that wine is no more debilitating than
fortifying and sand is no more smooth than rough, in their natures.
The eighth mode, from relativity, is a paradigm for the whole set of
modes. It seeks to show, in general, that something appears to have
the property F only relative to certain features of the perceiving
subject or relative to certain features of the object. And, once
again, insofar as we are unable to prefer one set of circumstances to
another with respect to the nature of the object, we must suspend
judgment about those natures.
The ninth modes points out that the frequency of encountering a thing
affects the way that thing appears to us. If we see something that we
believe to be rare it will appear more valuable. And when we encounter
some beautiful thing for the first time it will seem more beautiful or
striking than it appears after we become familiar with it. Thus, we
must conclude, for example, that a diamond is no more valuable than
worthless.
Finally, the tenth mode, which bears on ethics, appeals to differences
in customs and law, and in general, to differences in the ways we
evaluate the world. For some, homosexuality is acceptable and good,
and to others it is unacceptable and bad. In and of itself,
homosexuality is neither good nor bad, but only relative to some way
of evaluating the world. And again, since we are unable to prefer one
set of values to another, we are led to the conclusion that we must
suspend judgment, this time with respect to the intrinsic value of
things.
In each of these modes, Aenesidemus seems to be advancing a sort of
relativism: we may only say that some object X has property F relative
to some observer or set of circumstances, and not absolutely. Thus his
skepticism is directed exclusively at a version of Essentialism; in
this case, the view that some object has property F in any and every
circumstance. A further question is whether Aenesidemus intends his
attack on Essentialism to be ontological or epistemological. If it is
epistemological, then he is claiming that we simply cannot know what
the nature or essence of some thing is, or even whether it has one.
This seems most likely to have been Aenesidemus' position since
Photius' summary begins with the remark that the overall aim of the
Pyrrhoneia is to show that there is no firm basis for cognition.
Similarly, the modes seem to be exclusively epistemological insofar as
they compel us to suspend judgment; they are clearly designed to force
the recognition that no perspective can be rationally preferred to any
other with respect to real natures, or essences. By contrast, the
ontological view that there are no essences, is not compatible with
suspending judgment on the question.
iii. Tranquility
We do not have enough evidence to determine precisely why Aenesidemus
found inspiration in Pyrrho. One important point, however, is that
they both promote a connection between tranquility and an acceptance
of our epistemic limitations (see Bett [2000] for an elaboration of
this view). Diogenes Laertius attributes the view to both Anesidemus
and the followers of Timon that as a result of suspending judgment,
freedom from disturbance (ataraxia) will follow as a shadow (DL
9.107-8). Similarly, Photius reports Aenesidemus' view that those who
follow the philosophy of Pyrrho will be happy, whereas by contrast,
the dogmatists will wear themselves out in futile and ceaseless
theorizing (Bib. 169b12-30, LS 71C). Although there seem to be
important differences in what Pyrrho and Aenesidemus understood by our
epistemic limitations, they both promoted tranquility as the goal, or
at least end product. In general terms the idea is clear enough: the
way to a happy, tranquil existence is to live in accordance with how
things seem, including especially our evaluative impressions of the
world. Rather than trying to uncover some hidden reality, we should
accept our limitations, operate in accordance with custom and habit,
and not be disturbed by what we cannot know (see Striker [1990/1996]).
c. Sextus Empiricus
We know very little about Sextus Empiricus, aside from the fact that
he was a physician. He may have been alive as early as the 2nd Century
C.E. or as late as the 3rd Century C.E. We cannot be certain as to
where he lived, or where he practiced medicine, or where he taught, if
indeed he did teach. In addition to his philosophical books, he also
wrote some medical treatises (referred to at M 7.202, 1.61) which are
no longer extant.
There are three philosophical works that have survived. Two of these
works are grouped together under the general heading, Adversus
Mathematikos-which may be translated as Against the Learned, or
Against the Professors, i.e. those who profess to know something worth
teaching. This grouping is potentially misleading as the first group
of six books (chapters, by current standards) are complete and form a
self-contained whole. In fact Sextus refers to them with the title
Skeptical Treatises. Each of these books target some specific subject
in which people profess to be experts, thus: grammar, rhetoric,
mathematics, geometry, astrology and music. These are referred to as M
1 through 6, respectively.
There are five additional books in the second set grouped under the
heading Adversus Mathematikos:two books containing arguments against
the Logicians (M 7, 8), two books against the Physicists (M 9, 10),
and one book against the Ethicists (M 11). This set of books is
apparently incomplete since the opening of M 7 refers back to a
general outline of skepticism that is in none of the extant books of
M.
The third work is the Outlines of Pyrrhonism, in three books. The
first book provides an outline summary of Pyrrhonian skepticism and
would correspond to the missing portion of M. Books 2 and 3 provide
arguments against the Logicians, Physicists and Ethicists,
corresponding to M 7 through 11. The discussion in PH tends to be much
more concise and carefully worded, though there is greater detail and
development of many of the same arguments in M. The nature of the
relation between these three works is much disputed, especially since
the view presented in PH seems to be incompatible with large portions
of M (see Bett [1997]).
The following discussion is limited to the views presented in PH.
i. General Account of Skepticism
Sextus begins his overview of Pyrrhonian skepticism by distinguishing
three fundamental types of philosopher: dogmatists, who believe they
have discovered the truth; Academics (negative dogmatists), who
believe the truth cannot be discovered; and skeptics, who continue to
investigate, believing neither that anyone has so far discovered the
truth nor that it is impossible to do so. Although his
characterization of Academics is probably polemical and unfair, the
general distinctions he makes are important.
Sextus understands the skeptic, at least nominally as Pyrrho and
Aenesidemus do, as one who by suspending judgment determines nothing,
and enjoys tranquility as a result. But, as we will see, his
conception of suspending judgment is considerably different from his
predecessors'.
ii. The Path to Skepticism
According to Sextus, one does not start out as a skeptic, but rather
stumbles on to it. Initially, one becomes troubled by the kinds of
disagreements focused on in Aenesidemus' modes and seeks to determine
which appearances accurately represent the world and which
explanations accurately reveal the causal histories of events. The
motivation for figuring things out, Sextus asserts, is to become
tranquil, i.e. to remove the disturbance that results from confronting
incompatible views of the world. As the proto-skeptic attempts to sort
out the evidence and discover the privileged perspectiveor the correct
theory, he finds that for each account that purports to establish
something true about the world there is another, equally convincing
account, that purports to establish an opposed and incompatible view
of the same thing. Being faced with this equipollence, he is unable to
assent to either of the opposed accounts and thereby suspends
judgment. This, of course, is not what he set out to do. But by virtue
of his intellectual integrity, he is simply not able to arrive at a
conclusion and so he finds himself without any definite view. What he
also finds is that the tranquility that he originally thought would
come only by arriving at the truth, follows upon his suspended
judgment as a shadow follows a body.
Sextus provides a vivid story to illustrate this process. A certain
painter, Apelles, was trying to represent foam on the mouth of the
horse he was painting. But each time he applied the paint he failed to
get the desired effect. Growing frustrated, he flung the sponge, on
which he had been wiping off the paint, at the picture, inadvertently
producing the effect he had been struggling to achieve (PH 1.28-29).
The analogous point in the case of seeking the truth is that the
desired tranquility only comes indirectly, not by giving up the
pursuit of truth, but rather by giving up the expectation that we must
acquire truth to get tranquility. It is a strikingly Zen-like point:
one cannot intentionally acquire a peaceful, tranquil state but must
let it happen as a result of giving up the struggle. But again, giving
up the struggle for the skeptic does not mean giving up the pursuit of
truth. The skeptic continues to investigate in order to protect
himself against the deceptions and seductions of reason that lead to
our holding definite views.
Arriving at definite views is not merely a matter of intellectual
dishonesty, Sextus thinks; more importantly, it is the main source of
all psychological disturbance. For those who believe that things are
good or bad by nature, are perpetually troubled. When they lack what
they believe to be good their lives must seem seriously deficient if
not outright miserable, and they struggle as much as possible to
acquire those things. But when they finally have what they believe to
be good, they spend untold effort in maintaining and preserving those
things and live in fear of losing them (PH 1.27).
Sextus' diagnosis is not limited to evaluative beliefs, however. This
is clear by virtue of the fact that he provides extensive arguments
against physical and logical (broadly speaking, scientific and
epistemological) theories also. How, then, do such beliefs contribute
to the psychological disturbances that Sextus seeks to eliminate? The
most plausible reply is that any such belief that we find Sextus
arguing against in PH is one that will inevitably contribute to one's
evaluations of the world and thus will contribute to the intense
strivings that characterize disturbance. An examination of a sample of
the logical and physical theses that Sextus' discusses bears this out.
Many of these beliefs played foundational roles in the Epicurean or
Stoic systems, and thus were employed to establish ethical and
evaluative beliefs. Believing that the physical world is composed of
invisible atoms, for example, would not, by itself, produce any
disturbance since we must draw inferences from this belief in order
for it to have any significance for us with respect to choice and
avoidance. So it is more appropriate to look past the disturbance that
may be produced by individual, isolated beliefs, and consider instead
the effect of accepting a system of interrelated, mutually supporting
dogmatic claims.
iii. The Modes of Agrippa
As a supplement to the Ten Modes of Aenesidemus (as well as his Eight
Modes aimed at causal explanations, see PH 1.180-85, and Hankinson
[1998]), Sextus offers a set of Five Modes (PH 1.164-77) and Two Modes
(PH 1.178-79) employed by "more recent skeptics." We may gather from
Diogenes (9.88) that the more recent skeptic referred to is Agrippa.
It is important to point out that Sextus merely reports these modes,
he does not endorse them at a theoretical level. That is, he does not
claim that they possess any sort of logical standing, e.g. that they
are guaranteed to reveal a flaw in dogmatic positions, or that they
represent some ideal form of reasoning. Instead, we should think of
these modes as part of the general account of skepticism, with which
the skeptic's practice coheres (PH 1.16-17). In other words, these
modes simply describe the way Sextus and his fellow skeptics behave
dialectically.
Agrippa's Five Modes relies on the prevalence of dispute and repeats
the main theme of Aenesidemus' Modes: we are frequently faced with
dissenting opinions regarding the same matter and yet we have no
adequate grounds on which to prefer one view over another. Should a
dogmatist offer an account of such grounds, the skeptic may then
request further justification, thereby setting off an infinite
regress. And presumably, we should not be willing to accept an
explanation that is never complete, i.e. one that requires further
explaining itself. Should the dogmatist try to put a stop to the
regress by means of a hypothesis, the skeptic will refuse to accept
the claim without proof, perhaps citing alternative, incompatible
hypotheses. And finally, the skeptic will refuse to allow the
dogmatist to support his explanation by what he is supposed to be
explaining, disallowing any circular reasoning. And of course the
skeptic may also avail himself of the observation that what is being
explained only appears as it does relative to some relevant
conditions, and thus, contrary to the dogmatist's presumption, there
is no one thing to be explained in the first place (see Barnes
[1990]).
iv. Skepticism vs. Relativism
Sextus employs these skeptical modes towards quite a different goal
from Aenesidemus'. Aenesidemus, as we have seen, countenances
relativistic assertions of the form, X is no more F than not F. This
is to say that although X is not really, in its nature, F, it is still
genuinely F in some particular circumstance. And it is acceptable for
the Aenesidemean skeptic to believe that this is the case. But for
Sextus, the skeptical refrain, "I determine nothing" excludes
relativistic beliefs as well. It is not acceptable for Sextus to
believe that X is F, even with relativistic disclaimers. Instead,
Sextus would have us refrain from believing even that X is no more F
than not-F. Thus, suspension of judgment extends farther for Sextus
than it does for Aenesidemus.
v. The Skeptical Life
So, skepticism is an ability to discover opposed arguments of equal
persuasive force, the practice of which leads first to suspension of
judgment and afterwards, fortuitously, to tranquility. This makes
Sextus' version of Pyrrhonian skepticism dramatically different from
other Western philosophical positions, for it is a practice or
activity rather than a set of doctrines. Indeed, insofar as the
skeptic is supposed to live without belief (adoxastôs), he could not
consistently endorse any philosophical doctrine. But how is it
possible to live without beliefs?
The short answer is that one may simply follow appearances and
withhold judgment as to whether the world really is as it appears.
This seems plausible with respect to physical perceptions, but
appearances for Sextus include evaluations, and this creates a
complication. For how can the skeptic say "this appears good (or bad)
to me, but I don't believe that it is really good or bad"? It seems
that there is no difference between evaluative appearances and
evaluative beliefs.
One possible response to this problem is to say that Sextus only
targets sophisticated, philosophical theories about value, or about
physics or logic, but allows everyday attitudes and beliefs to stand.
On this view, skepticism is a therapy designed to cure the disease of
academics and theoreticians. But it seems that Sextus intends his
philosophical therapy to be quite widely applicable. The skeptical
life, as he presents it, is an achievement and not merely the
recovering of a native innocence lost to philosophical speculation.
(See Burnyeat and Frede [1997], Brennan [1999] for the debate
regarding what the skeptic is supposed to suspend judgment about.)
Any answer to the question about how the skeptic may live without
beliefs will depend on what sort of beliefs we think the skeptic
avoids. Nevertheless, an elaboration on living in accordance with
appearances comes in the form of the fourfold observances. Rather than
investigate the best way to live or even what to do in some particular
circumstance, Sextus remarks that the skeptic will guide his actions
by (1) nature, (2) necessitation by feelings, (3) laws and customs,
and (4) kinds of expertise (PH 1.23-24). Nature provides us with the
capacity for perception and thought, and we may use these capacities
insofar as they don't lead us to dogmatic belief. Similarly, hunger
and thirst will drive us towards food and drink without our having to
form any explicit beliefs regarding those physical sensations. One
need not accept any nutritional theories to adequately and
appropriately respond to hunger and thirst. Laws and customs will
inform us of the appropriate evaluations of things. We need not
actually believe that the gods exist and that they are benevolent to
take part in religious ceremonies or even to act in a manner that is
(or at least appears) pious. But note that the skeptic will neither
believe that the gods exist nor that they do not exist-he is neither a
theist nor an atheist, but agnostic in a very robust sense. And
finally, the skeptic may practice some trade or profession without
accepting any theories regarding his practice. For example, a
carpenter need not have any theoretical or geometrical views about
doors in order to be skillful at hanging them. Similarly, a doctor
need not accept any physiological theories to successfully heal his
patients. The further question, recalling the dispute explored in
Burnyeat and Frede [1997], is whether the skeptic merely avoids
sophisticated, theoretical beliefs in employing these observances, or
whether he avoids all beliefs whatsoever.
4. Skepticism and the Examined Life
A unifying feature of the varieties of ancient skepticism is that they
are all concerned with promoting, in some manner of speaking, the
benefits of recognizing our epistemic limitations. Thus, ancient
skeptics nearly always have something to say about how one may live,
and indeed live well, in the absence of knowledge.
The fallibilism that developed in Plato's Academy should be seen in
this light. Rather than forego the potential benefits of an
examination aimed at acquiring better beliefs, the later Academics
opted for a less ambitious criterion, one that would give them merely
reliable beliefs. Nonetheless, they maintained a thoroughly skeptical
attitude towards the possibility of attaining certainty, but without
claiming to have conclusively ruled it out.
The more radical skepticism that we find in Sextus' Outlines of
Pyrrhonism suggests a move in a different direction. Rather than
explain how or why we should trust the skeptical employment of reason,
Sextus avoids the problem altogether by, in effect, refusing to
answer. Instead, he would suggest that we consider the reasons in
support of some particular answer and the reasons opposed in
accordance with the skeptical ability so that we may regain
tranquility.
5. Greek and Latin Texts, Commentaries, and Translations
General:
* Long and Sedley, eds. (1987), The Hellenistic Philosophers,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), is a good place to start.
These volumes contain selections from the primary sources grouped by
topic. See volume 1, sections 68-72 and the following commentaries
(pp. 438-488) for readings on Academic and Pyrrhonian skepticism, and
sections 1-3 with commentaries (pp. 13-24) for readings on Pyrrho.
Volume 2 contains the original Greek and Latin texts corresponding to
the translations in volume 1.
* Inwood and Gerson, eds. (1988), Hellenistic Philosophy:
Introductory Readings, Indianapolis: Hackett), also contains
translated selections from the primary sources for Academic and
Pyrrhonian skepticism.
* Annas and Barnes, eds. (1985), The Modes Of Scepticism,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), is a very useful arrangement
and translation of the texts that discuss the different varieties of
Pyrrhonian argumentation.
For the Greek edition of Photius' summary of Aenesidemus, see R.
Henry, ed. (1962), Photius: Bibliothêque, Tome III, (Paris). For a
very readable translation, informative introduction and notes, see
N.G. Wilson (1994), Photius: The Bibliotheca, (London: Duckworth).
There have been some recently updated and much improved translations
and commentaries on Sextus Empiricus.
* Annas, J. and J. Barnes (1994), Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of
Scepticism, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
* Bett, R. (1997), Sextus Empiricus: Against the Ethicists
(Adversus Mathematikos XI),(Oxford: Oxford University Press).
* Blank, D. (1998), Sextus Empiricus: Against the Grammarians
(Adversus Mathematikos I),(Oxford: Oxford University Press).
* Greaves, D.D. (1986), Sextus Empiricus: Against the Musicians
(Adversus Mathematikos VI), (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press).
* Mates, B. (1996), The Skeptic Way: Sextus Empiricus's Outlines
of Pyrrhonism, Translated with Introduction and Commentary, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press).
Many of the primary texts can be found in the Loeb series, which
contains facing pages of text in the original language and
translation. Among the most important are (all published by Harvard
University Press):
* Bury, R.G. (1933), trans., Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Pyrrhonism.
* Bury, R.G. (1935), trans., Sextus Empiricus: Against the Logicians
* Bury, R.G. (1936), trans., Sextus Empiricus: Against the
Physicists, Against the Ethicists.
* Bury, R.G. (1949), trans., Sextus Empiricus: Against the
Professors. Hicks, R.D. (1925), trans.,Diogenes Laertius: Lives of
Eminent Philosophers, vols. 1 and 2.
* Rackham, H. (1933), trans., Cicero: De Natura Deorum, Academica.
* Rackham, H. (1914), trans., Cicero: De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum.
6. References and Further Reading
* Annas, J., (1996), "Scepticism, Old and New," in M. Frede and G.
Striker, eds., Rationality in Greek Thought, (Oxford: Clarendon).
* Annas, J. (1993), The Morality of Happiness, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press).
* Annas, J. (1992), "Plato the Sceptic," in J. Klagge and N.
Smith, eds., Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supp. Vol., 43-72.
* Annas, J. (1990), "Stoic Epistemology," in S. Everson, ed.,
Epistemology, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
* Annas, J. (1986), "Doing Without Objective Values: Ancient and
Modern Strategies," in M. Schofield, et. al., eds., Norms of Nature
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
* Barnes, J. (1990), The Toils of Scepticism, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press).
* Bett, R. (2000), Pyrrho, his antecedents, and his legacy,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press).
* Bett, R. (1990), "Carneades' Distinction Between Approval and
Assent," Monist 73.1: 3-20.
* Bett, R. (1993), "Scepticism and Everyday Attitudes in Ancient
and Modern Philosophy," Metaphilosophy24.4: 363-81.
* Bett, R. (1989), "Carneades' pithanon: A Reappraisal of its Role
and Status," Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 7: 59-94.
* Brennan, T. (1999), Ethics and Epistemology in Sextus Empiricus,
(New York: Garland).
* Brittain, C. (2001), Philo of Larissa, (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
* Burnyeat, M. (1984), "The Sceptic in his Place and Time," in
Rorty, Schneewind and Skinner, eds.,Philosophy in History, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press), 225-54, reprinted in Burnyeat and Frede,
eds. (1997).
* Burnyeat, M. and M. Frede, Eds. (1997), The Original Sceptics: A
Controversy, (Indianapolis: Hackett).
* Burnyeat, M., Ed. (1983), The Skeptical Tradition, (Berkeley:
University of California Press).
* Colish, M. (1985), The Stoic Tradition From Antiquity to the
Early Middle Ages, vol. 1, (Leiden: Brill).
* Couissin, P. (1929), "Le Stoicisme de la nouvelle Academie,"
Revue d'historie de la philosophie 3: 241-76, tr. by Jennifer Barnes
and M. Burnyeat as "The Stoicism of the New Academy," in M. Burnyeat,
Ed. (1983) 31-63.
* Flintoff, E. (1980), "Pyrrho and India," Phronesis 25: 88-108.
* Fogelin, R. (1994), Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and
Justification, (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
* Frede, D. (1996) "How Sceptical Were the Academic Sceptics?," in
R.H. Popkin, ed., Scepticism in the History of Philosophy: A
Pan-American Dialogue, 1-26, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic).
* Frede, M. (1987), Essays in Ancient Philosophy, (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press).
* Frede, M. (1983/1987), "Stoics and Skeptics on Clear and
Distinct Impressions" in M. Burnyeat, ed., (1983), reprinted in Frede
(1987), 151-78.
* Griffin, M. (1997), "The Composition of the Academica: Motives
and Versions" in Inwood and Mansfeld, eds. (1997), 1-35.
* Glucker, J. (1995), "Probabile, Veri Simile, and Related Terms,"
in J.G.F. Powell, ed., Cicero the Philosopher: Twelve Papers, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press).
* Glucker, J. (1978), Antiochus and the Late Academy, (Gottingen:
Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht).
* Hankinson, R.J. (1998), Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek
Thought, (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
* Hankinson, R.J. (1997), "Natural Criteria and the Transparency
of Judgement: Antiochus, Philo and Galen on Epistemological
Justification," in B. Inwood and J. Mansfeld, Eds. (1997), 161-216.
* Hankinson, R.J. (1995), The Sceptics, (London: Routledge).
* Inwood, B., and J. Mansfeld, Eds. (1997), Assent and Argument:
Studies in Cicero's Academic Books, (Leiden: Brill).
* Long, A.A. (1974), Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans
and Sceptics, (Berkeley: University of California Press).
* Long, A.A. (1986), "Diogenes Laertius' Life of Arcesilaus,"
Elenchos 7: 432-49.
* Long, A.A. (1988), "Socrates in Hellenistic Philosophy,"
Classical Quarterly 38: 150-71.
* MacKendrick, P. (1989), The Philosophical Books of Cicero, (New
York: St. Martin's Press).
* Maconi, H. (1988), "Nova non philosophandi philosophia: A review
of Anna Maria Ioppolo,Opinione e Scienza," Oxford Studies in Ancient
Philosophy 6: 231-253.
* Mansfeld, J. (1997), "Philo and Antiochus in the Lost Catulus,"
Mnemosyne 50.1: 45-74.
* Popkin, R. (1979), The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to
Spinoza, (Berkeley: University of California Press).
* Powell, J.G.F. (1995), Cicero the Philosopher: Twelve Papers,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press).
* Schmitt, C. (1972), Cicero Scepticus, (The Hague: Nijhoff).
* Shields, C. (1994), "Socrates Among the Sceptics," in P. Vander
Waerdt, Ed. (1994), The Socratic Movement, (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press).
* Sihvola, J., ed. (2000), Ancient Scepticism and the Sceptical
Tradition, (Helsinki : Philosophical Society of Finland).
* Striker, G. (1996), Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and
Ethics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
* Striker, G. (1990/1996), "Ataraxia: Happiness as Tranquility"
Monist 73: 97-110, repr. in Striker (1996), 183-195.
* Striker, G. (1981/1996), "Uber den Unterschied zwischen den
Pyrrhoneern und den Akademikern,"Phronesis 26: 153-71, repr. and
transl. by M.M. Lee as "On the Difference Between the Pyrrhonists and
the Academics" in Striker (1996), 135-49.
* Striker, G. (1980/1996), "Sceptical Strategies," in M.
Schofield, M. Burnyeat, and J. Barnes, Eds. (1980),Doubt and
Dogmatism, 54-83, repr. in Striker (1996), 92-115.
* Tarrant, H. (1985), Scepticism or Platonism: the Philosophy of
the 4th Academy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
* Thorsrud, H. (2002), "Cicero on His Academic Predecessors: the
Fallibilism of Arcesilaus and Carneades," Journal of the History of
Philosophy 40: 1-18.
* Woodruff , P. (1988), "Aporetic Pyrrhonism," Oxford Studies in
Ancient Philosophy 6: 139-68.
* Woodruff , P. (1986), "The Skeptical Side of Plato's Method,"
Revue International de Philosophie 156-57: 22-37.
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