natural philosopher and scientist who lived and taught in Athens for
approximately thirty years. He gained notoriety for his materialistic
views, particularly his contention that the sun was a fiery rock. This
led to charges of impiety, and he was sentenced to death by the
Athenian court. He avoided this penalty by leaving Athens, and he
spent his remaining years in exile. While Anaxagoras proposed theories
on a variety of subjects, he is most noted for two theories. First, he
speculated that in the physical world everything contains a portion of
everything else. His observation of how nutrition works in animals led
him to conclude that in order for the food an animal eats to turn into
bone, hair, flesh, and so forth, it must already contain all of those
constituents within it. The second theory of significance is
Anaxagoras' postulation of Mind (Nous) as the initiating and governing
principle of the cosmos.
1. Life and Writing
The exact chronology of Anaxagoras is unknown, but most accounts place
his dates around 500-428 BCE. Some have argued for dates of c. 534-467
BCE, but the 500-428 time period is the most commonly accepted among
scholars. Anaxagoras was born in Ionia in the town of Clazomenae, a
lively port city on the coast of present-day Turkey. As such, he is
considered to be both the geographical and theoretical successor to
the earliest Ionian philosophers, particularly Anaximenes. Eventually,
Anaxagoras made his way to Athens and he is often credited with making
her the home of Western philosophical and physical speculation.
Anaxagoras remained in Athens for some thirty years, according to most
accounts, until he was indicted on the charge of impiety and sentenced
to death. Rather than endure this penalty, Anaxagoras, with the help
of his close friend and student, Pericles, went to Lampsacus, in Asia
Minor, where he lived until his death.
Anaxagoras' trial and sentencing in Athens were motivated by a
combination of political and religious concerns. His close association
with Pericles left him vulnerable to those who wished to discredit the
powerful and controversial student through the teacher. Furthermore,
his materialistic beliefs and teachings were quite contrary to the
standard orthodoxy of the time, particularly his view that the
heavenly bodies were fiery masses of rock whirling around the earth in
ether. Such convictions are famously attested to inPlato's Apology
when Socrates, accused by Meletus of believing that the sun is stone
and the moon is earth, distances himself from such atheistic notions:
My dear Meletus, do you think you are prosecuting Anaxagoras? Are
you so contemptuous of the jury and think them so ignorant of letters
as not to know that the books of Anaxagoras of Clazomenae are full of
those theories, and further, that the young men learn from me what
they can buy from time to time for a drachma, at most, in the
bookshops, and ridicule Socrates if he pretends that these theories
are his own, especially as they are so absurd? (26d)
As with the dates of his birth and death, the chronology of
Anaxagoras' exile and subsequent time in Lampsacus are a bit of a
mystery. Some of the historical testimonies indicate that his trial
occurred shortly before the Peloponnesian War, around 431 BCE. If this
is the case, then Anaxagoras' time in exile would have lasted no more
than a few years. Other records indicate that his trial and exile
occurred much earlier, and his time in Lampsacus enabled him to start
an influential school where he taught for nearly twenty years. With
regard to the persona of Anaxagoras, there are quite a few interesting
anecdotes that paint a picture of an ivory tower scientist and
philosopher who was extremely detached from the general concerns and
practical matters of life. While the stories are possibly fanciful,
the consistent image of Anaxagoras presented throughout antiquity is
that of a person entirely consumed by the pursuit of knowledge. In
fact, he apparently maintained that the opportunity to study the
universe was the fundamental reason why it is better to be born than
to not exist.
In his Lives of the Philosophers, Diogenes Laertius states that
Anaxagoras is among those philosophers who wrote only one book. This
work was a treatise on natural philosophy and, as the above quote from
the Apology indicates, it was probably not a very long work, since it
could be purchased for "a drachma, at most." Although the book has not
survived, it was available until at least the sixth-century CE. While
it is impossible to recreate the entire content and order of his work,
various ancient sources have provided scholars with enough information
to fairly represent Anaxagoras' philosophy. Noteworthy among these
sources are Aristotle, Theophrastus (ca. 372-288 BCE) and Themistius
(ca. 317-387 CE). We are primarily indebted, however, to Simplicius
(sixth-century CE) for most of our knowledge of, and access to, the
fragments of Anaxagoras' work. Before moving on to the theories of
Anaxagoras, it should be noted that there are some rather wide ranging
disagreements among scholars today about some of the basic tenets of
his philosophy. In fact, within the past twenty years or so, there
have been a greater variety of interpretations of Anaxagoras than
perhaps any other Presocratic philosopher.
2. The Structure of Things: A Portion of Everything in Everything
Anaxagoras' innovative theory of physical nature is encapsulated in
the phrase, "a portion of everything in everything." Its primary
expression is found in the following difficult fragment:
And since the portions of both the large and the small are equal
in amount, in this way too all things would be in everything; nor can
they be separate, but all things have a portion of everything. Since
there cannot be a smallest, nothing can be separated or come to be by
itself, but as in the beginning now too all things are together. But
in all things there are many things, equal in amount, both in the
larger and the smaller of the things being separated off. (frag. 6)
It should be pointed out that it is rather difficult to determine what
exactly Anaxagoras meant by "things." It is tempting to view this as a
theory of matter, but this would be misguided as it tends to apply
later Aristotelian categories and interpretations onto Anaxagoras. At
times, the term "seeds" has been utilized but it would seem that many
scholars today prefer the neutral term "stuffs" to depict this notion.
In any case, this rather complex theory is best understood as
Anaxagoras' attempt to reconcile his perceptions of the world with an
influential argument (presented some time earlier by Parmenides) about
how reality must be conceived.
a. The Challenge of Parmenides
According to Parmenides, whatever is, is (being) and whatever is not,
is not (nonbeing). As a result, whatever constitutes the nature of
reality must always "have been" since nothing can come into being from
nothing. Furthermore, reality must always "be" since being (what is)
cannot become nonbeing (what is not). This argument led Parmenides to
a monistic and static conception of reality. As such, the world of
changing particulars is deceptive, despite appearances to the
contrary. Anaxagoras appears to accept this argument of Parmenides as
the following statement indicates: "The Greeks are wrong to accept
coming to be and perishing, for no thing comes to be, nor does it
perish." (frag. 17) Anaxagoras could not, however, square the thesis
of radical monism with his experience of a world that seems to admit
plurality and change. In fact, if all of the theses of Parmenides are
correct, there is no possibility of science because all empirically
gathered data is misleading. Therefore, the challenge for Anaxagoras
and other post-Parmenidian philosophers was to present a proper
account of nature while maintaining the demand that the stuff that
constitutes reality can neither come into being from nothing nor pass
away into nonbeing.
b. Empedocles's Theory
Empedocles was a contemporary of Anaxagoras and, while the historical
records are inconclusive, it is possible that the latter was partially
reacting to the theory of the former in the development of his own
views. In response to Parmenides, Empedocles maintained that the four
elements—earth, air, fire, water—were the constituents or "roots" of
all matter. These four roots cannot come into being, be destroyed or
admit any change. Therefore, apart from the fact that there are four,
they are essentially identical to the "one" of Parmenides. The roots
mix together in various proportions to account for all the things in
the world that we suppose to be real, such as apples, horses, etc. As
an apple dissolves, it does not collapse into nonbeing, rather the
mixture that has accounted for the apparent apple of our senses has
simply been rearranged. Apples, and other "mortal things," as
Empedocles called them, do not actually come to be, nor are they
actually destroyed. This is simply the way humans like to talk about
entities which appear to exist but do not.
Anaxagoras' relationship to Empedocles is difficult to discern, but it
is possible that he was not satisfied with Empedocles' response to
Parmenides and the Eliatics. On Aristotle's interpretation, Anaxagoras
maintained that the pluralism of Empedocles unduly singled out certain
substances as primary and others as secondary. According to
Anaxagoras, the testimony of our senses maintains that hair or flesh
exist as assuredly as earth, air, water or fire. In fact, all of the
infinite numbers of substances are as real as the root substances.
Therefore, under this interpretation the key problem for Anaxagoras is
that under Empodocles' theory it would be possible to divide a hair
into smaller and smaller pieces until it was no longer hair, but a
composite of the root substances. As such, this would no longer
satisfy the requirement that a definite substance cannot pass into
nonbeing. According to other interpretations, however, some of the
textual evidence from Anaxagoras seems to suggest that he treated some
"things" (ala Empedocles) as more basic and primary than others. In
any case, the theoretical distinctions between the two philosophers
are somewhat unclear. Despite these difficulties, it is clear that
Anaxagoras proposes a theory of things that is distinct from
Empedocles while encountering the challenges of Parmenides.
c. The Lesson of Nutrition
While there is some recent scholarly debate about this, Anaxagoras'
contention that all things have a portion of everything may have had
its genesis in the phenomenon of nutrition. He observed among animals
that the food that is used to nourish develops into flesh, hair, etc.
For this to be the case, Anaxagoras believed that rice, for instance,
must contain within it the substances hair and flesh. Again, this is
in keeping with the notion that definite substances cannot arise from
nothing: "For how can hair come to be from not hair or flesh from not
flesh?" (frag. 10). Moreover, not only does a piece of rice contain
hair and flesh, it in fact contains the entirety of all the infinite
amount of stuffs (a portion of everything). But how is this possible?
d. The Divisibility of "Stuffs"
To understand how it is possible for there to be a portion of
everything in everything, it is necessary to develop Anaxagoras'
contention that stuff is infinitely divisible. In practical terms,
this can be explained by continuing with the example of the rice
kernel. For Anaxagoras, if one were to begin dividing it into smaller
and smaller portions there would be no point at which the rice would
no longer exist. Each infinitesimally small piece could be divided
into another, and each piece would continue to contain rice, as well
as hair, flesh and a portion of everything else. Prior to Anaxagoras,
Zeno, a disciple of Parmenides, argued against the notion that matter
could be divided at all, let alone infinitely. Apparently, Zeno had
about forty reductio ad absurdum attacks on pluralism, four of which
are known to us. For our purposes, it is not necessary to delve into
these arguments, but a key assumption that arises from Zeno is the
contention that a plurality of things would make the notion of
magnitude meaningless. For Zeno, if an infinite division of things
were possible then the following paradox would arise. The divisions
would conceivably be so small that they would have no magnitude at
all. At the same time, things would have to be considered infinitely
large in order to be able to be infinitely divided. While the
scholarly evidence is not conclusive, it seems quite possible that
Anaxagoras was replying to Zeno as he developed his notion of infinite
divisibility.
As the following fragment indicates, Anaxagoras did not consider the
consequence that Zeno presented to be problematic: "For of the small
there is no smallest, but always a smaller (for what is cannot not
be). But also of the large there is always a larger, and it is equal
in amount to the small. But in relation to itself, each is both large
and small" (frag. 3). According to some interpreters, what is
remarkable about this fragment, and others similar to it, is that it
indicates the extent to which Anaxagoras grasped the notion of
infinity. As W.K.C. Guthrie points out, "Anaxagoras' reply shows an
understanding of the meaning of infinity which no Greek before him had
attained: things are indeed infinite in quantity and at the same time
infinitely small, but they can go on becoming smaller to infinity
without thereby becoming mere points without magnitude" (289). Other
interpretations are somewhat less charitable toward Anaxagoras' grasp
of infinity, however, and point out that he may not have been
conceptualizing about the notion of mathematical infinity when
speaking about divisibility.
In any case, as strange as it may appear to modern eyes, Anaxagoras'
unique and subtle theory accomplished what it set out to do. It
satisfied the Parmenidian demand that nothing can come into or out of
being and it accounted for the plurality and change that constitutes
our world of experience. A difficult question remains for Anaxagoras'
theory, however.
e. Why is Something What It Is?
If, according to Anaxagoras, everything contains a portion of
everything, then what makes something (rice, for instance) what it is?
Anaxagoras does not provide a clear response to this question, but an
answer is alluded to in his claim that "each single thing is and was
most plainly those things of which it contains most." (frag. 12)
Presumably, this can be taken to mean that each constituent of matter
also has a part of matter that is predominant in it. Commentators from
Aristotle onward have struggled to make sense of this notion, but it
is perhaps Guthrie's interpretation that is most helpful: "Everything
contains a portion of everything else, and a large piece of something
contains as many portions as a small piece of it, though they differ
in size; but every substance does not contain all the infinite number
of substances in equal proportions" (291). As such, a substance like
rice, while containing everything, contains a higher proportion of
white, hardness, etc. than a substance like wood. Simply stated, rice
contains more stuff that makes it rice than wood or any other
substance. Presumably, rice also contains higher proportions of flesh
and hair than wood does. This would explain why, from Anaxagoras'
perspective, an animal can become nourished by rice by not by wood.
Anaxagoras' theory of nature is quite innovative and complex, but
unfortunately his fragments do not provide us with very many details
as to how things work on a micro level. He does, however, provide us
with a macro level explanation for the origins of the world as we
experience it. It is to his cosmogony that we now turn our attention.
3. The Origins of the Cosmos
Anaxagoras' theory of the origins of the world is reminiscent of the
cosmogonies that had been previously developed in the Ionion
tradition, particularly through Anaximenes and Anaximander. The
traditional theories generally depict an original unity which begins
to become separated off into a series of opposites. Anaxagoras
maintained many of the key elements of these theories, however he also
updated these cosmogonies, most notably through the introduction of a
causal agent (Mind or nous) that is the initiator of the origination
process.
Prior to the beginning of world as we know it everything was combined
together in such a unified manner that there were no qualities or
individual substances that could be discerned. "All things were
together, unlimited in both amount and smallness." (frag. 1) As such,
reality was like the Parmenidian whole, except this whole contained
all the primary matters or "seeds," which are represented in the
following passages through a series of opposites:
But before these things separated off, when [or, since] all things
were together, not even any color was manifest, for the mixture of all
things prevented it—the wet and the dry, the hot and the cold, the
bright and the dark, there being also much earth in the mixture and
seeds unlimited in amount, in no way like one another. For none of the
other things are alike either, the one to the other. Since this is so,
it is necessary to suppose that all things were in the whole. (frag.
4b) The things in the single cosmos are not separate from one another,
nor are they split apart with an axe, either the hot from the cold or
the cold from the hot (frag. 8).
At some point, the unity is spurred into a vortex motion at a force
and a speed "of nothing now found among humans, but altogether many
times as fast" (frag. 9). This motion begins the separation and it is
"air and aither" that are the first constituents of matter to become
distinct. Again, this is not to be seen in Empedoclean terms to
indicate that air and ether are primary elements They are simply a
part of the infinite constituents of matter represented by the phrase
"mixture and seeds." As the air and ether became separated off, all
other elements become manifest in this mixture as well: "From these
things as they are being separated off, earth is being compounded; for
water is being separated off out of the clouds, earth out of water,
and out of the earthy stones are being compounded by the cold, and
these [i.e., stones] move further out than the water" (frag. 16).
Therefore, the origin of the world is depicted through this process of
motion and separation from the unified mixture. As mentioned above, in
answering the "how" of cosmogony, Anaxagoras is fairly traditional in
his theory. In proposing an initiator or causal explanation for the
origins of the process, however, Anaxagoras separates himself from his
predecessors.
4. Mind (nous)
a. The Role of Mind
According to Anaxagoras, the agent responsible for the rotation and
separation of the primordial mixture is Mind or nous: "And when Mind
began to cause motion, separating off proceeded to occur from all that
was moved, and all that Mind moved was separated apart, and as things
were being moved and separated apart, the rotation caused much more
separating apart to occur" (fr. 13). As is previously mentioned, it is
rather significant that Anaxagoras postulates an explanation for the
movement of the cosmos, something that prior cosmogonies did not
provide. But how is this explanation to be understood? From the
passage above, one may infer that Mind serves simply as the initial
cause for the motion, and once the rotation is occurring, the momentum
sets everything else into place. In this instance it is tempting to
assign a rather deistic function to Mind. In other passages, however,
Mind is depicted as "ruling" the rotation and setting everything in
order as well as having supreme power and knowledge of all things (see
fr. 12 and Simplicius' Commentary on Aristotle's Physics, 495.20). In
this case it is tempting to characterize Mind in theistic terms. Both
of these temptations should be avoided, for Anaxagoras remained fully
naturalistic in his philosophy. In fact, the uniqueness of Anaxagoras
is that he proposed a rationalistic governing principle that remained
free from the mythical or theological characteristics of prior
cosmogonies. His philosophical successors, particularly Socrates,
Plato and Aristotle, are very excited to find in Anaxagoras a unifying
cosmic principle which does not allude to the whims of the gods. They
hope to find in him an extension of this principle into a
purpose-driven explanation for the universe. Alas, they are all
disappointed that Anaxagoras makes no attempt to develop his theory of
Mind in such a way.
What Socrates, Plato and Aristotle were hoping to discover in
Anaxagoras was not simply an account of how the cosmos originated (an
efficient cause), but an explanation for why and for what purpose the
cosmos was initiated (a final cause). Their initial excitement about
his theory is replaced by disillusionment in the fact that Anaxagoras
does not venture beyond mechanistic explanatory principles and offer
an account for how Mind has ordered everything for the best. For
example, in the Phaedo, Socrates discusses how he followed Anaxagoras'
argument with great joy, and thought that he had found, "a teacher
about the cause of things after my own heart" (97d). Socrates' joy is
rather short-lived: "This wonderful hope was dashed as I went on
reading and saw that the man made no use of Mind, nor gave it any
responsibility for the management of things, but mentioned as causes
air and ether and water and many other strange things" (98b).
Similarly, Aristotle calls Anaxagoras a sober and original thinker,
yet chastises him for using Mind as a deus ex machina to account for
the creation of the world: "When he cannot explain why something is
necessarily as it is, he drags in Mind, but otherwise hew will use
anything rather than Mind to explain a particular phenomenon"
(Metaphysics, 985a18). Despite the fact that Anaxagoras did not pursue
matters as far as his teleologically-minded successors would have
liked, his theory of Mind served as an impetus toward the development
of cosmological systems that speculated on final causes. On the flip
side, Anaxagoras' lack of conjecture into the non-mechanistic forces
in the world also served as an inspiration to the more materialistic
cosmological systems that followed.
b. The Nature of Mind
Thus far, we have examined the role of Mind in the development of the
world. But what exactly is Mind, according to Anaxagoras? Based on the
evidence in the fragments, this is a rather difficult question to
answer, for Mind appears to have contradictory properties. In one
small fragment, for example, Anaxagoras claims that mind is the sole
exception to the principle that there is a portion of everything in
everything, yet this claim is immediately followed by the counter
claim, "but Mind is in some things too" (frag. 11). Elsewhere,
Anaxagoras emphasizes the autonomy and separateness of Mind:
The rest have a portion of everything, but Mind is unlimited and
self-ruled and is mixed with no thing, but is alone and by itself. For
if it were not by itself but were mixed with something else, it would
have a share of all things, if it were mixed with anything. For in
everything there is a portion of everything, as I have said before.
And the things mixed together with it would hinder it so that it would
rule no thing in the same way as it does being alone and by itself.
For it is the finest of all things and the purest, and it has all
judgment about everything and the greatest power. (frag. 12)
He goes on to say, however, that Mind "is very much even now where all
other things are too, in the surrounding multitude and in things that
have come together in the process of separating and in things that
have separated off" (frag. 14).
Most commentators maintain that Anaxagoras is committed to a dualism
of some sort with his theory of Mind. But his Mind/matter dualism is
such that both constituents appear to be corporeal in nature. Mind is
material, but it is distinguished from the rest of matter in that it
is finer, purer and it appears to act freely. This theory is best
understood by considering Anaxagoras' contention that plants possess
minds. It is the mind of a plant which enables it to seek nourishment
and grow, but this dynamic agent in a plant is not distinct from the
plant itself. This would have been a common biological view for the
time, but where Anaxagoras is novel is that he extends the workings of
"mind" at the level of plants and animals into a cosmic principle
which governs all things. The Mind of the cosmos is a dynamic
governing principle which is immanent to the entire natural system
while still maintaining its transcendental determining power. From
Anaxagoras' perspective it appears to be a principle which is both
natural and divine.
5. Other Theories
Anaxagoras' theory of things and his postulation of Mind as a cosmic
principle are the most important and unique aspects of his philosophy.
A few other theories are worth mentioning, though it should be pointed
out that many of them are probably not original and our primary
knowledge of these views arises from second-hand sources.
As a natural scientist and philosopher of his day, Anaxagoras would
have been particularly concerned with the subjects of astronomy and
meteorology and he made some significant contributions in these areas.
It was mentioned above that his outlook on the heavenly bodies played
a part in his condemnation in Athens. His beliefs about the earth,
moon and sun are clearly articulated in the following lengthy quote
from Hippolytus, a source from the late second century CE:
The earth [according to Anaxagoras] is flat in shape. It stays up
because of its size, because there is no void, and because the air,
which is very resistant, supports the earth, which rests on it. Now we
turn to the liquids on the earth: The sea existed all along, but the
water in it became the way it is because it suffered evaporation, and
it is also added to from the rivers which flow into it. Rivers
originate from rains and also from subterranean water; for the earth
is hollow and has water in its hollows. The Nile rises in the summer
because water is carried down into it from the snow in the north.The
sun, the moon, and all the heavenly bodies are red-hot stones which
have been snatched up by the rotation of the aether. Below the
heavenly bodies there exist certain bodies which revolve along with
the sun and the moon and are invisible….The moon is below the sun,
closer to us. The sun is larger than the Peloponnesus. The moon does
not shine with its own light, but receives its light from the sun….
Eclipses of the moon occur when the earth cuts off the light, and
sometimes when the bodies below the moon cut off the light. Eclipses
of the sun take place at new moon, when the moon cuts off the light….
Anaxagoras was the first to describe the circumstances under which
eclipses occur and the way light is reflected by the moon. He said
that the moon is made of earth and has plains and gullies on it. The
Milky Way is the light of those stars which are not lit up by the sun.
(A Refutation of All Heresies, 1, epitome, 3)
A key advantage of Anaxagoras' belief that the heavenly bodies were
simply stone masses was that it enabled him to provide an account of
meteorites as bodies that occasionally become dislodged from the
cosmic vortex and plummet to earth. Plutarch attests that Anaxagoras
was credited with predicting the fall of a meteorite in 467 BCE, but
it is unclear from the historical attestations whether Anaxagoras'
theory predated or was prompted by the event.
Along with his contributions in Astronomy and Meteorology, Anaxagoras
proposed a theory of sensation that works on the principle of
difference. The assumption behind Anaxagoras' theory is that there is
some sort of qualitative change that occurs with any sensation or
perception. When a cold hand touches a hot object the agent will only
experience the sensation of heat because her hand is cold and the hot
object has brought about some sort of change. Therefore, in order for
this change (the sensation) to occur, it is necessary that unlike
things interact with each other, i.e., hot with cold, light with dark.
If like things interact—hot with hot, for example—then no change
occurs and there is no sensation. Perception works the same way as our
sense of touch. Humans are able to see better during the daytime
because our eyes are generally dark. Furthermore, perception works the
same way as touch for Anaxagoras in that there is a physical
interaction with the perceiver and the object perceived. Since a
sensation requires an encounter with an opposite, Anaxagoras also
maintained that every sensory act is accompanied by some sort of
irritation. As Theophrastus notes, "Anaxagoras comes to this
conclusion because bright colors are excessively loud noises are
irritating, and it is impossible to bear them very long" (On Sense
Perception, 27). Anaxagoras theory of sensation and perception is in
direct opposition to Empedocles who maintained that perception could
be accounted for by an action between like objects.
A couple of final speculations that are worth mentioning pertain to
the science of biology. It has already been noted that Anaxagoras
believes plants to have minds along with animals and humans. What
places humans in a higher category of intelligence, however, is the
fact that we were equipped with hands, for it is through these unique
instruments that we are able to handle and manipulate objects.
Finally, Anaxagoras proposed an hypothesis on how the sex of an infant
is determined. If the sperm comes from the right testicle it will
attach itself to the right side of the womb and the baby will be a
male. If the sperm comes from the left testicle it will attach itself
to the left side of the womb and the baby will be a female.
6. References and Further Reading
* Barnes, Jonathan. The Presocratic Philosophers. New York, NY:
Routledge, 1996.
* Furley, David. Anaxagoras, "Plato and Naming of Parts."
Presocratic Philosophy. Eds. Victor Caston and Daniel W. Graham.
Burlington VT: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2002. 119-126.
* Gershenson, Daniel E. and Greenberg, Daniel A. Anaxagoras and
the Birth of Physics. New York: Blaisdell Publishing Company, 1964.
[It should be pointed out that scholars have been rather critical of
this work, but it is a rather helpful reference for sources on
Anaxagoras.]
* Graham, Daniel, "The Postulates of Anaxagoras", Apeiron 27
(1994), pp.77-121.
* Guthrie, W.K.C. A History of Greek Philosophy. Vol. 2.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965.
* Kirk, G.S., Raven, J.E. and Schofield, M. The Presocratic
Philosophers. 2nd ed. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
* McKirahan, Richard D. Philosophy Before Socrates. Indianapolis,
IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1994.
* Schofield, Malcolm. An Essay on Anaxagoras. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1980.
* Sider, David. The Fragments of Anaxagoras. 2nd ed. revised.
Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag, 2005
* Taylor, C.C.W. "Anaxagoras and the Atomists." From the Beginning
to Plato: Routledge History of Philosophy, Vol. I. Ed. C.C.W. Taylor.
New York, NY: Routledge, 1997. 208-243.
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