the serious music or art music that, until very recently, monopolized
attention in philosophical discussions of music. In recent years,
however, popular music has become an important topic for philosophers
pursuing either of two projects. First, popular music receives
attention from philosophers who see it as a test case for prevailing
philosophies of music. Even now, most philosophy of music concentrates
on the European classical repertoire. Therefore, if there are
important differences between popular and art music, widening the
discussion to include popular music might encourage us to reconsider
the nature of music. Second, popular music increasingly serves as a
focal point in general debates about art and aesthetic value. A
growing number of philosophers regard popular music as a vital and
aesthetically rich field that has been marginalized by traditional
aesthetics. They argue that popular music presents important
counterexamples to entrenched doctrines in the philosophy of art.
Similar issues arise for the aesthetics of jazz, but the special topic
of jazz is beyond the scope of this article.
Although the category of popular music presupposes differences from
serious music, there is limited consensus about the nature of these
differences beyond the near-tautology that most people prefer popular
music to art music. This obvious disparity in popular reception
generates philosophical (and not merely sociological) issues when it
is combined with the plausible assumption that popular music is
aesthetically different from folk music, art music, and other music
types. There is general agreement about the concept's extension or
scope of reference – agreement that the Beatles made popular music but
Igor Stravinsky did not. However, there is no comparable agreement
about what "popular music" means or which features of the music are
distinctively popular. Recent philosophizing about popular music
generally sidesteps the issue of defining it. Discussion of particular
genres or examples of popular music can be used to advance broader
philosophical projects. Such arguments have concentrated on rock
music, blues, and hip-hop.
Among the topics that have benefited from this reconsideration are the
nature of music's aesthetic value, music's claim to autonomy, and the
ontology of music.
1. Historical Background
Since both Plato and Aristotle philosophized about music, philosophy
of music predates and is not identical with modern philosophy of art.
Nonetheless, most philosophy of music is strongly influenced by the
aesthetic assumptions of modernism. Eighteenth-century philosophers
organized a new field of study, aesthetics, around the search for a
unifying principle for the disparate "fine arts" of post-Renaissance
Europe. This principle would distinguish science and craft from such
activities as music, poetry, theater, dance, painting, and sculpture.
Following this precedent, most subsequent theorizing about music
inherited distinctively modernist biases about art. Three ideas proved
to be particularly relevant to later efforts to distinguish art from
popular art. First, art is the product of genius. Art is constantly
evolving, so successful new art involves progress. Second, the value
of art is aesthetic, and aesthetic value is autonomous. Artistic value
cannot be reduced to utility, moral effects, or social functions.
Third, whatever is true about fine art is true about music. From the
middle of the eighteenth century until the middle of the nineteenth,
philosophers regarded music as a pillar of the emerging system of the
fine arts. As a result, music could not be regarded as art if it
lacked genius and autonomy. By the beginning of the twentieth century,
most intellectuals endorsed the elitist consensus that popular music
lacks these features.
Despite its influence on subsequent theorizing, the eighteenth-century
intellectual framework did not recognize a clear distinction between
fine art and popular art. For example, Immanuel Kant's philosophy of
art is a landmark work in eighteenth-century aesthetics. It places
great emphasis on genius and artistic autonomy. These elements of the
Kantian aesthetic are often cited to dismiss the art status of popular
music. Many subsequent philosophical analyses of the distinction
between art music and popular music draw on his proposal that the
lesser arts dull the mind. Lacking the interplay of ideas and formal
experimentation that characterizes fine art, the popular arts are mere
entertainment (see Kaplan, 354-55). Nonetheless, it is important to
note that Kant does not himself recognize the field of popular art, so
he does not align the lesser arts and popular art. Furthermore, his
general position on the value of music is inconclusive. Given his
subsequent reputation as a formalist, readers are often surprised to
discover his worry that instrumental music "merely plays with
sensations" and therefore "has the lowest place among the fine arts"
(Kant, 199). Taken seriously, Kant's remarks suggest that songs are to
be ranked higher than instrumental music. As such, Kant might assign
greater artistic value to a folk song than to J. S. Bach's Brandenburg
concertos.
Eighteenth century philosophy's silence on differences between art
songs and popular songs must not be construed as evidence that no one
yet discussed "popular" music. Where we do find discussion of this
topic in the eighteenth-century, popularity is not yet opposed to art.
For instance, at roughly the same time that Kant questions
instrumental music's merits as a fine art, the composer W. A. Mozart
writes of the importance of providing his operas with memorable,
popular melodies. Even here, however, it would be anachronistic to
suppose that Enlightenment categories support a clear distinction
between art music and popular music. At best, philosophers of this
period postulated differences between refined and vulgar taste. This
distinction between better and worse taste gradually developed into an
explicit recognition of a distinctive sphere of popular culture and
music, with a corresponding stigmatization of the "low" or popular
(Shiner, 94-98).
A more rigid distinction between art music and other music gradually
emerges during the nineteenth century. By the middle of the century,
philosophical discussions of music begin to make sporadic reference to
what we now recognize as popular music. Philosophy of music
increasingly concentrates on explaining why recent European concert
music is musically distinctive and superior. Emphasizing Kant's idea
of autonomous aesthetic value, Eduard Hanslick focuses on pure
instrumental music. The art of music is the art of structuring tones.
Only structural properties matter, and they matter only for
themselves. Impure music that relies on words or emotional expression
pleases audiences with non-musical attractions. In this analysis, most
popular music pleases its audience by its extra-musical rewards. In
defending the aesthetic superiority of instrumental music, Hanslick's
aesthetic formalism reinforces the view that popular music, which
emphasizes song, lacks artistic merit. Hanslick deploys a Kantian
aesthetic to undermine Kant's concerns about instrumental music's lack
of artistic value.
A quarter century later, Edmund Gurney provides additional arguments
for musical autonomy. Although he allows that popular music can be
melodically valuable, Gurney's attack on the distractions of emotional
expression clearly consigns most popular music to an inferior
category. Hanslick and Gurney are both reacting against the Romantic
tendency to value music's expressive capacity. Responding to the
longstanding idea that music expresses emotion by generating a felt,
bodily response, both Hanslick and Gurney insist that bodily
engagement indicates an inferior response. Again, they extend a
Kantian theme. Kant argues that bodily responses create a personal
interest that is incompatible with a universalizable and "pure"
aesthetic judgment. Together, Hanslick and Gurney are an important
source of the view that popular music is inferior because its primary
appeal is visceral, bodily, and felt. In contrast, the abstract
structures of classical music demand an intellectual response. The
body hears, but only the intellect listens (see Baugh 1993, Gracyk
2007).
Gurney is not entirely negative about popular music. He distinguishes
between popular music as "low" commercial music found "in common
theaters and places of public entertainment" and popular music as that
which appeals to virtually anyone in a society who is exposed to it
(407). Folk music comprises most of the latter category. This category
also includes appealing melodies of operatic arias and other classical
works. Gurney already recognizes, in 1880, that the maintenance of
social strata requires stereotypes that unnecessarily limit access to
a wide variety of music. Consequently, true popularity is seldom
cultivated. Gurney is particularly critical of Richard Wagner's idea
that genuine popularity is constrained by nationalism. For Gurney,
music cannot be popular if its appeal is limited by social boundaries
of any sort.
Setting a different precedent, Friedrich Nietzsche's views on music
are a byproduct of his general philosophy of culture. Nietzsche
initially defends the superiority of certain strains of European
classical music. He praises composers whose irrational genius provides
the Dionysian energy needed to correct the rational excesses of
European culture. Nietzsche eventually reverses himself. In an
extended attack on Richard Wagner's operas, he rejects the continuing
value of the "great" style that characterizes art music. In what
amounts to a reversal of Kantian aesthetic priorities, Nietzsche
praises Georges Bizet's widely popular opera Carmen (1875) for its
triviality and simplicity (see Sweeney-Turner). However, most
philosophers ignore Nietzsche's defense of "light" music.
Nietzsche aside, philosophy of music has been dominated by the view
that the best music is autonomous and formally complex (John Dewey is
almost alone in defending the vitality of popular art during this time
period. Unfortunately, Dewey said very little about music.). As
recently as 1990, philosophy of popular music consisted of variations
on a single theme. Philosophers defended the twin assumptions that
popular music is essentially different from "serious" or art music,
and that the former is aesthetically inferior to the latter. As a
result, most philosophers who bothered to discuss popular music
concentrated on identifying the aesthetic deficiencies inherent in
such music.
2. Adorno and Standard Criticisms
Theodor Adorno offers an influential, philosophically sophisticated
account of the nature of twentieth-century popular music. He is the
single best source for the view that popular music is simplistic,
repetitive, and boring, and that it remains this way because
commercial forces manipulate it in order to placate and manipulate the
masses who passively respond to it. Although a Marxist orientation
influences almost all of his arguments, his influence is apparent in
many writers who are not explicitly Marxists. Unfortunately, Adorno is
a notoriously difficult writer. His writings on music are subtle,
dense, and fill many hundreds of pages.
Adorno begins with the insight that popular music is characterized by
the synthesis of entertainment values and mass art. Twentieth-century
popular music is mass art because commercial forces now produce it on
an industrial model. It is a commodity aimed at the largest possible
number of consumers. Therefore it must combine a high degree of
standardization with relative accessibility, and so the same rhythms
and structures appear again and again. Yet a constant supply of new
"product" must be marketed to consumers. As a result, popular music
competes with and replaces local and regional folk traditions (In the
wake of the industrial revolution, genuine folk art is no longer
possible.). In a commercial world where one popular song sounds much
like any other, popular music cannot function as a medium of genuine
communication. At best, a philosophically reflective stance sees that
its standardization and commercial presentation reflects important
facets of the socio-economic conditions that shape it. Its
standardization reflects the alienating, oppressive standardization of
modern capitalism. The momentarily pleasurable diversions offered by
popular music are mere distractions from this alienation – a process
that the music itself reinforces. Since it fails to satisfy any
genuine needs, exposure to popular music encourages an endless
repetition of the cycle of consumption, boredom, alienation, and fresh
distraction through consumption.
Adorno's analysis of popular music is transformed into outright
criticism of it when he contrasts it with "art" music. We cannot
complain about popular music if our culture cannot provide a more
satisfying alternative. If nothing better is available, then there is
nothing especially wrong with popular music. Adorno argues that
objectively better music is available. He is sophisticated enough to
avoid a simple contrast of classical and popular music. For Adorno,
almost all of the music that passes as art music is just as bad. It is
barely comprehended by its audience, most of whom respond approvingly
to its familiarity. Radical composers such as Arnold Schoenberg,
however, provide art music that is socially progressive. This music
challenges listeners by presenting them with more "truth" than other
twentieth-century music. For Adorno, artistic truth is neither a
matter of saying conventionally true things nor of making socially
oppositional statements (Within the socio-economic framework of
capitalism, the political stance of punk or hip-hop is just another
"hook" and marketing tool.). Artistic truth is relative to the time
and place of its creation and reception. It requires music that is
sufficiently autonomous from socio-economic pressures to permit
compositional integrity. For example, our expectations for aesthetic
pleasure previously placed a premium on beauty. The quest for beauty
curtails genuine autonomy. Therefore musical integrity comes at a
cost: good music no longer offers us the beauty of conventional fine
art. Instead, it must be compositionally complex enough to incorporate
and display the contradictory demands that we impose on art. By
comparison, music that is readily understood and immediately
pleasurable is not autonomous. It neither discloses nor opposes
society's dominant socio-economic framework. Given these requirements,
very little music succeeds in forcing listeners to deal with the
contradictions of modernity. Popular music fares worst of all. Its
requirement of accessibility deprives it of social truth, so it lacks
any genuinely progressive social role.
Adorno sees no important distinctions within popular music. His
analysis is subject to challenge on the grounds that some popular
music lacks conventional beauty and easy pleasures. However, Adorno
can reply that such music cannot simultaneously achieve popularity
while offering artistic truth, for that truth cannot be conveyed by
music that is accessible enough to generate a commercial profit.
Several philosophers (Brown 2005, Gracyk 1996) have responded that
some jazz and rock musicians are counterexamples to Adorno's analysis.
Charlie Parker and John Coltrane made commercial recordings and so
must be "popular," as Adorno understands the category. Yet they
created autonomous, challenging music. The commercial framework of
twentieth century music has not eradicated artistic truth as Adorno
defines it.
Adorno aside, popular music received limited philosophical attention
before the early 1960s. Then the British Journal of Aesthetics
published articles on the topic by Frank Howes and Peter Stadlen.
Although the Beatles are not mentioned in either article, it is
interesting to note that this pair of essays appeared in the same year
and country that gave the world the Beatles's debut recordings, "Love
Me Do" and "Please Please Me." Within two years, the Beatles's musical
intelligence and emergence as an international cultural force invited
serious reconsideration of the claim that repetition and cognitive
vapidity define popular music. Although neither Howes nor Stadlen
cites Adorno, their analyses endorse many of his basic ideas. Howes
sets out to explain why "there is little bad folk music and much bad
popular music" (247). Where Gurney treats folk music as a species of
popular music, Howes opposes the two categories. Howes proposes that
the communal composition and ongoing re-fashioning of folk music
ensures a unique combination of simplicity and excellence. In
contrast, popular music is created for immediate widespread
consumption and thus prioritizes "ease of comprehension," discouraging
musical development and subtlety. Popular music is more often
"indifferent" than it is bad through incompetence. Like Adorno, Howes
thinks that popular music must employ excessive repetition and crude
clichés.
Stadlen departs from Howes in recognizing that the emergence of blues
music represented a "novel type of virtuosity" and an unheralded
combination of tragic and comic elements (359). Otherwise, Stadlen
regards popular or "light" music as aesthetically impoverished for its
avoidance of musical complication and for its juvenile emotional
ambivalence about sex, which it exploits for its emotional impact. In
a few short paragraphs, Stadlen encapsulates most of the position that
Allan Bloom revived more hyperbolically in 1987.
3. Defending Popular Music
To summarize the modernist view, genres of art develop a hierarchy.
"Higher" forms of music satisfy the most advanced modes of response.
Superior genres require attention to abstract structures, so they
require active, focused listening. Therefore the best music is found
in the classical repertoire, where composers have emphasized autonomy
and cognitive complexity. By comparison, popular music is
aesthetically deficient. It sacrifices autonomy because its design is
driven by functional demands for emotional expression and for dance
rhythms. Popularity requires accessibility, so popular music cannot
combine popularity and complexity.
Richard Shusterman has produced several essays that challenge these
standard dismissals of popular music. Bringing a more balanced
perspective to the philosophical debate, these essays demonstrate that
popular music is philosophically more interesting than modernism
suggests. Inspired by Dewey's pragmatism, Shusterman argues that the
social distinction between high and low music does not correspond to
any distinctive aesthetic differences. He offers no analysis of either
"popular art" or "popular music." Instead, he focuses on highly
selective examples of popular music that achieve "complex aesthetic
effects," thereby satisfying our "central artistic criteria" (2000b,
pp. 215-16). Good popular music satisfies the aesthetic criteria
routinely used to praise serious music. Although Shusterman concedes
that a great deal of popular music is aesthetically poor and may have
negative social effects, he argues that at least some of it succeeds
aesthetically while offering a socially progressive challenge to
prevailing cultural biases.
Shusterman's arguments are based on a very small sample of rock,
hip-hop, and country music. He identifies and criticizes a core set of
criticisms that are typically directed against popular music. He
focuses on its alleged lack of creativity, originality, and artistic
autonomy. He also replies to claims that it degrades culture generally
by offering an inferior substitute for better music, that its escapism
makes for shallow rewards, and that it encourages an uncritical
passivity that generates a disengaged populace (2000b, pp. 173-77).
(Most of these arguments originate in Adorno. Several of them are
found in Roger Scruton and Julian Johnson, neither of whom endorses
Adorno's Marxism.) Against these criticisms, Shusterman argues that
the rewards and pleasures of art music are no less transitory than
those of popular music, that critics over-emphasize art's capacity to
engage the intellect, and that the standards used to discredit popular
art are essentially Romantic in origin and therefore offer a
historically limited perspective on the nature and value of art.
Directly responding to Adorno, Shusterman's pragmatism rejects the
modernist opposition of art and "life" (2000b). Shusterman recommends
aesthetic criteria that are broad enough to endorse the functional
dimension of every art form. These proposals gain specificity in
Shusterman's response to the charge that popular music is formulaic
and falls short of the formal achievement of good music. Resisting the
traditional association of form and intellectual engagement, he argues
that musical form should be rooted in "organic bodily rhythms" and the
social conditions that make them meaningful (199). Popular music's
continuing reliance on dance rhythms returns Western music to its
"natural roots" (2000a, p. 4). The fundamental structure of popular
music lies in its bodily rhythms, so movement is necessary for
appreciating it. Since these movements bear meanings, a genuine
response to music is both physical and intellectual. This active,
bodily engagement is also supplemented by awareness of lyrics because
songs dominate popular music. When language is connected to the
music's rhythms, the integrated experience of music and language is as
creative and complex as is the experience of "high" or classical
music.
Shusterman's most important essays are "Form and Funk: The Aesthetic
Challenge of Popular Art" and "The Fine Art of Rap" (both in 2000b).
The latter focuses on hip-hop recordings that are verbally complex,
philosophically insightful, and rhythmically funky. They are
aesthetically satisfying in a way that integrates both bodily and
intellectual responses. The best hip-hop presents a life philosophy.
However, concentrating on a handful of exemplary cases does not
demonstrate that popular music is generally complex in this manner.
For this purpose, Shusterman's arguments should be considered in light
of the recent outpouring of books that discuss philosophy's relevance
to different popular musicians. These books feature essays that
explore the philosophical underpinnings of groups such as the Beatles,
the Grateful Dead, Metallica, and U2. These analyses show that
Shusterman's limited examples cannot be dismissed as the rare
exceptions in popular music. They also correct another major bias.
Adopting Hanslick's position that an aesthetics of music must be an
aesthetics of instrumental or "absolute" music, traditional philosophy
of music pays little attention to songs. It is clear that many
accessible popular songs grapple with complex ideas and issues,
however.
Finally, Shusterman argues that some popular music has the additional
merit of presenting a postmodern challenge to the modernist categories
that have dominated philosophical aesthetics (2000a). In particular,
hip-hop often highlights postmodern strategies of recycling and
appropriation. It engages with the concerns of subcultures and
localized communities rather than with an allegedly universal
perspective. These strategies reverse and thus repudiate modernist
standards of artistic value. This line of argument does little to
address traditional criticisms of popular music, however. Instead, it
acknowledges that popular music is deficient according to traditional
standards while also contending that cultural change renders those
standards irrelevant. This argument does not answer critics who still
endorse traditional views about art because the force of this argument
depends on a complex understanding of historical developments in art
and aesthetics. Furthermore, Shusterman's appeal to postmodernism
suggests that when we find anything in popular music that is not
endorsed by traditional aesthetic theory, its presence can be
interpreted as a challenge to the dominant tradition. Shusterman thus
weakens his earlier charge that aesthetic theory has systematically
misrepresented the nature of most art. Traditional aesthetic
categories still frame the debate as popular music divides into two
broad categories. Good popular music succeeds according to either
modernist or postmodernist values. Either way, popular music is
evaluated according to fine art standards (see Gracyk 2007).
Shusterman supplements his discussions of rock and hip-hop with an
independent essay on country music (2000a). He focuses on a small
genre of films about the careers of fictional country singers. This
essay moves Shusterman away from the bifurcation just outlined.
Country music is discussed without reference to either modernist or
postmodernist standards. Instead of arguing that country music is
aesthetically complex and socially progressive, Shusterman focuses on
the issue of how country music succeeds in conveying emotional
authenticity to its fans. He thus endorses a line of analysis that is
found in many ethnomusicological analyses of popular music. Shusterman
concedes that country music is excessively sentimental and that
commercial processes undercut its claim to authenticity. Nonetheless,
it is comparatively authentic to its fans for a variety of reasons.
First, its working class white audience is generally "uncritical" and,
due to social circumstances, seeks "easy emotional release" in music
(86). Second, it is commercially positioned as more authentic than
contemporary alternatives in popular music. Third, its emphasis on
first-person storytelling has a self-validating authority. Together,
these factors give country music an aura of authenticity that explains
its appeal. It is striking that this analysis cites neither aesthetic
excellence nor progressive ideas to account for the music's popular
success, however. Hence Shusterman's analysis offers no answer to
critics who dismiss country music as simplistic and politically
reactionary.
Inspired by Shusterman's analysis of hip-hop, Crispin Sartwell offers
an alternative and arguably more satisfying account of the value of
blues and country music. Building on the general theme that a
modernist aesthetic does not apply to most art produced by most
cultures, Sartwell builds on Dewey's theme that healthy arts involve
form and expression that give a unifying coherence to everyday
experiences. Hence, popular music should not be judged against the
elitist ideals that have dominated aesthetic theory. It must be judged
in relation to its capacity to embody and consolidate social
relationships and values that are central to the society that creates
and assimilates it.
In place of Shusterman's appeal to a comparative authenticity,
Sartwell calls attention to the importance of genuine tradition in
blues and country music. For several generations, both kinds of music
have evolved organically in response to social change. These musical
traditions have not changed for the sake of originality and novelty,
as encouraged by modernist aesthetics. Art music embraces progress
that dictates continuously new forms, experiments, and innovations.
Blues and country music constantly re-adapt established forms and
signifiers. They change as necessary to remain relevant in the face of
changing circumstances. As a result, ongoing styles of American
popular music are extraordinarily successful at expressing racial,
generational, and class-specific values in a way that remains
comprehensible and emotionally satisfying to almost everyone in their
respective audiences. As such, the vitality of popular music is best
seen by highlighting its commonalities with non-Western art. Sartwell
argues that the continuity of American popular music does an admirable
job of satisfying non-Western expectations for art, especially those
articulated in Asian traditions infused with Confucianism.
Bruce Baugh (1993) defends popular music by concentrating on rock
music. His position recalls Shusterman's argument that the best
popular music exhibits a postmodern rejection of modernist aesthetic
standards. Baugh contends that rock music and European concert music
succeed according to different and opposing aesthetic standards.
Traditional musical aesthetics was formulated by reference to the
European classical repertoire. Therefore what is valuable about rock
music cannot be explained by appeal to aesthetic standards appropriate
to Mozart or Wagner. Baugh proposes that rock music is best
appreciated by "turning Kantian or formalist aesthetics on its head"
(26), literally reversing traditional priorities. Rock places more
value on performance than composition, more on material embodiment
than structure, more on rhythm than melody and harmony, more on
expressivity than formal beauty, and more on heteronomy than autonomy.
Like Shusterman, Baugh thinks that this music is fundamentally
experienced in the body, especially through dancing, rather than by
listening intellectually, without moving. Rock music thus serves as
evidence of the limitations of traditional musical aesthetics.
Traditional aesthetics concentrates on aesthetic standards
"appropriate to only a very small fragment of the world's music" (28).
Against Baugh, James O. Young and Stephen Davies argue that rock and
classical music do not invite evaluation under distinct standards.
Young argues that Baugh merely shows that rock music tends to employ
different means of expression, not that the music has different ends.
The European concert tradition includes a great deal of music that
prioritizes expressivity and requires performance practices that
highlight the music's material embodiment. Consequently, Baugh has not
identified standards that are unique to rock. Davies (1999) criticizes
Baugh's strategy of aligning classical and rock with intellect and
body, respectively. Since music is patterned sound, anything that
counts as listening to music will require attention to both form and
matter. Davies also attacks Baugh's assumption that a bodily or
somatic response is noncognitive. A somatic response to music is a
response to its pattern of movement. This response requires awareness
of its distinctive pattern of tensions and relaxations, which requires
knowledge of the "grammar" of the appropriate musical style. A
visceral, somatic response seems immediate and nonintellectual to
listeners. The response actually requires a considerable amount of
cognitive processing, however. In a similar manner, the expressive
power of rock music is due to, and not opposed to, a cognitive
response.
In their responses to Baugh, Young and Davies spend much of their time
summarizing and refuting the alleged differences between rock and
classical music. As a consequence, it is easy to lose sight of the
larger issue that emerges. To what extent is there such a thing as
"traditional musical aesthetics," and to what extent have philosophers
adequately formulated the standards for any music? Shusterman and
Baugh assume that Hanslick and Gurney accurately describe European art
music and its associated listening standards. This assumption leads
them to reason that because popular music is different from art music,
popular music cannot be understood by appeal to prevailing standards
of musical value. Young and Davies suggest a more radical response,
however, by proposing that classical music is far more varied than
modernism allows. To the extent that modernist standards of musical
excellence fail to make sense of popular music, those standards may be
equally distorting for most of the European classical repertoire. (To
some extent, Adorno already recognizes this point when he argues that
Stravinsky and Schoenberg are engaged in very different aesthetic
projects, so that Stravinsky has more in common with popular music
than with Schoenberg's rejection of a tonal hierarchy.)
4. Race, Gender, and Expressive Authenticity
In the second half of the twentieth century, philosophy of art came to
be seen as a kind of meta-criticism, identifying legitimate and
illegitimate patterns of critical activity directed toward the arts.
Derived from analytic philosophy's concern for language and logic,
this approach must not be confused with Adorno's Marxist position that
the best art is always a powerful vehicle for cultural criticism,
demonstrating a corresponding failure of the popular arts due to their
critical passivity. For the most part, philosophers in the so-called
"analytic" tradition do not claim to have any special insights into
the nature of music. With a few notable exceptions, such as Roger
Scruton, they have abandoned the traditional project of developing a
privileged critical perspective from which to sort music into better
and worse kinds. Today, analytic philosophers are more likely to
examine what is characteristically said about music as a starting
point for examining our implicit assumptions about it. Once the
emphasis shifts to an examination of the logic of what is said about
music, popular and art music are revealed to be equally rich fields
for philosophical analysis. As a result, an increasing number of
philosophers have investigated popular music by identifying and
critiquing key concepts that shape our response to this music. These
investigations frequently incorporate insights gained from social and
political philosophy.
Joel Rudinow adopts the analytic method in order to summarize and
respond to the enormous body of non-philosophical writing about
authenticity and the blues. He calls attention to the logic that
supports criticisms of musical borrowing or appropriation of
African-American music by white musicians and audiences. Addressing
selected critics of white appropriation, Rudinow focuses on the social
and conceptual issues embodied by white blues musicians.
Rudinow identifies, summarizes, and challenges the two most common
arguments advanced against the phenomenon of blues music performed by
white musicians. The first is the proprietary argument. It says that
when one cultural community owns a musical style, its appropriation by
another group constitutes a serious wrong. According to this argument,
white blues players participate in a racist appropriation that
deprives African-Americans of what is rightfully theirs. The second
argument addresses experiential access. It says that white musicians
lack relevant experiences that are necessary for expressive
authenticity in the blues tradition. At best, white musicians produce
blues-sounding music that cannot mean what the blues have
traditionally meant. Unable to draw on the full cultural resources
that inform the blues, white appropriations will be expressively
superficial.
Rudinow responds to the proprietary argument by arguing there is no
plausible analysis of ownership according to which a community or
culture can "own" an artistic style. He responds to the experiential
access argument by arguing that, absent a double standard, it will
assign inauthenticity to recent African-American blues performances as
readily as to white appropriations. In an argument that echoes
Sartwell's reflections on tradition, Rudinow points out that, after a
century of development and change, the African-American experiences
that were expressed in early blues cannot plausibly be the standard
for evaluating contemporary blues. An evolving tradition that includes
white participants is neither more nor less a departure from the core
tradition than was, for example, the introduction of electric guitars.
Furthermore, African-American experience is sufficiently diverse to
allow some white musicians routes of initiation into experiences that
can, in combination with mastery of the musical idiom, defuse the
charge of mere posturing.
Paul Taylor responds by reviving the experiential access argument. He
argues that the blues tradition was, and remains, a racial project. A
blues performance is authentic only if it "can properly bear witness
to the racialized moral pain that the blues is about" (314), and it
only does so if it generates an appropriate feeling in informed
listeners. These listeners care very much about the racial identity of
performers and regard white performers as less capable of bearing
witness about African-American experience. As a result, white
appropriations do not generate the proper feeling in blues fans.
Therefore white blues performances are not expressively authentic.
Rudinow responds with two arguments. First, Taylor postulates a
criterion for expressive authenticity that cannot be applied to most
other music. Second, Taylor's argument involves a question-begging
assumption that the blues is a homogenous and static racial project.
Because this assumption cannot be accepted a priori, it is readily
challenged a posteriori by the fact that many African-American
musicians and audiences admire the best white blues performers. Since
Taylor's argument links authenticity with audience response, these
facts about audience response appear to certify the expressive
authenticity of some white blues performances.
As Rudinow predicts (1996, p. 317), his exchange with Taylor merely
sets the stage for further argument. Lee B. Brown (2004) explores the
overlap between arguments about blues authenticity and longstanding
debates about white jazz musicians. He documents and criticizes the
outmoded essentialism found in such arguments. Expanding this topic to
embrace the popularity of "world music," Theodore Gracyk (2001)
outlines and criticizes common assumptions about the communicative
processes involved in popular music. Given that so much popular music
is created and heard in recorded form, it is foolish to postulate a
unified audience that responds uniformly. There are at least four
distinct kinds of musical appropriation that can affect expressive
authenticity, and there are at least three kinds of musical reception
for any music listening that cross cultural boundaries. So it is
implausible to maintain that blues music, to take one example,
continues to be a unified cultural project. Popular music authenticity
can only be determined on a case-by-case basis, by inspecting the
complex interplay of cultural processes, musician's intentions, and
listener's activities.
Jeanette Bicknell argues that the logic of authenticity is
particularly complicated when it involves the singing of songs, as is
the case with most popular music. Although some popular musicians
compose their own material, such is not always the case. When
listening to a song performance, audiences for popular music do not
necessarily demand authenticity, narrowly construed. Because singing
is akin to acting, each singer's public persona influences the
audience's aesthetic response whenever a song is sung. This persona
includes relatively obvious facts about a singer, such as ethnicity
and gender, together with readily available information about the
singer's personal history. Bicknell proposes that most of the popular
audience understands that few singers have a public persona that
closely matches their "true personality" (263). Hence the actual
standard of authenticity is the degree to which the material's meaning
seems appropriate to the singer's public persona. Furthermore, singing
is a physical activity. Few singers will seem authentic when they
perform material that the audience regards as unsuitable for someone
of their apparent race, gender, or age. For example, Johnny Cash's
performance of "Hurt" in the final year of his life is more
expressively authentic than are performances by its composer, rock
musician Trent Reznor. Due to the prominence of race in a singer's
persona, most white musicians will find it difficult to sing the blues
convincingly. It is not impossible, however.
Feminist aesthetics raises many of the same issues that dominate
debates about race and ethnicity. Furthermore, feminist aesthetics
frequently discusses performance art. Exploring song performance,
Bicknell argues that gender and race are equally relevant for popular
song reception. Renée Cox and Claire Detels have provided a
philosophical foundation for further work and Gracyk has outlined
several philosophically rich issues that deserve further attention
(Gracyk 2001). Yet as is the case with aesthetics in general,
explicitly feminist analyses are usually directed at fine art and far
more attention is paid to the visual arts than to music. In contrast,
musicologists have produced many essays and books that highlight
feminist perspectives on popular music.
5. Ontology of Music
Philosophy contains the sub-field of ontology. Proceeding from the
assumption that different kinds of things exist in very different
ways, ontology examines different categories of things that exist.
Philosophers engage in musical ontology when they identify and analyze
the various distinct kinds of things that count as music. For example,
traditional philosophy of music distinguishes between a musical work
and its performances. Unlike physical objects, the same musical work
can be in different places at the same time, simply by being performed
in two places simultaneously. Furthermore, not every performance seems
to require reference to a pre-existing musical work. Many musicians
improvise without performing any recognizable work. What kind of
thing, then, is a musical work, such that George Gershwin's
"Summertime" remains the same musical work in a jazz performance by
Billie Holiday and a rock performance by Janis Joplin? What is the
shared object of musical attention when current audiences access these
performances through the mediation of recording?
A number of philosophers think that popular music complicates the
traditional ontology of music because the established distinction
between works and performances has been supplemented by music that
exists as recorded sound. Reflecting on popular music's reliance on
mass-mediation, Gracyk (1996, 2001), Fisher, Brown (2000), Davies
(2001), and Kania argue that there are important aesthetic dimensions
to the processes by which popular music, particularly rock music, is
created and shared as recorded music. It is here, rather than in
stylistic differences, that recent popular music differs most sharply
from the classical repertoire.
Granted, most popular musicians make a significant amount of their
income from live performances. Dedicated fans will often follow their
favorite performers from show to show on the concert circuit. Others
pay exorbitantly inflated prices to ticket agencies in order to secure
prime seats when their favorite singer performs. Nonetheless, the
audience for popular music generally spends more time with recorded
music than with live music. Furthermore, the enormous return on
investment made by the recording industry throughout most of the
twentieth century led the industry to invest considerable time and
creative energy in the process of recording music. These shifts of
listening activity and creative investment have encouraged
philosophers to examine the kinds of musical objects that are
involved.
Before music was recorded, musical works were known almost exclusively
by listening to musical performances or, for those with the proper
training, by reading a score. This state of affairs presented a simple
ontological or metaphysical analysis of the fundamental nature of
musical works. Musical works are not physical particulars. Particular
events and objects (performances and scores) provide access to the
repeatable sound structures that constitute musical works. For
example, Beethoven's "Moonlight" piano sonata (Opus 27, No. 2) has
received many thousands of performances since its composition in 1801.
Each complete performance exists at a particular location for about a
quarter hour. However, the musical work is an abstract structure that
cannot be identified with any of its particular instantiations. The
musical work is distinct from its performances, and the performances
exist in order to make the work accessible to listeners.
Recordings complicate this straightforward ontological distinction
between works and performances. Once recording technology became
advanced enough to allow for the production of multiple copies of the
same recording, it became necessary to distinguish between a recording
(for example, Aretha Franklin's 1967 hit record "Respect"), its
various physical copies (for example, your 8-track and my vinyl 45),
and the particular events that listeners hear (for example, the sounds
produced from various car radios when a radio station broadcasts a
copy of the record). Gracyk (1996) proposes that the experience of
popular music now involves a complex web of particulars (for example,
distinct performances and recording playbacks) and abstract objects
(the song "Respect" and the 1967 "track" or recording of it). The song
"Respect" was written by Otis Redding. Franklin subsequently performed
the song in a studio, from which record producer Jerry Wexler created
a recorded track. Gracyk proposes that Wexler's recorded track is a
distinct musical work, a work-for-playback related to but distinct
from both Redding's song and Franklins' performance of it.
The relevance of ontological analysis begins to emerge in Davies's
(1999) response to Baugh's analysis of rock music. Baugh contends that
rock music places more emphasis on performances than compositions.
Davies responds by noting that Baugh's sweeping generalization arises
from his failure to discuss ontology. Rock musicians, blues singers,
and wedding bands do not fill their performances with free
improvisations. They perform musical works. Successful performances of
both "Respect" and Beethoven's "Moonlight" piano sonata require
performers to correctly perform that musical work and not some other.
Whenever Franklin performs "Respect," she is constrained by Redding's
musical composition (minimal as it may be). For Davies, the most
important difference between the rock and classical traditions is that
two very different kinds of musical works are normally performed.
Beethoven's sonatas are compositions of the European concert tradition
and these works are ontologically "thicker" than popular songs. This
simply means a work like the "Moonlight" sonata specifies relatively
more of what should be heard during an authentic performance than is
the case with the song "Respect" and other musical works in folk and
popular music. The sonata is presented in a performance only if a high
degree of what occurs during the performance is work-determinative. In
other words, far more of the properties of a performance of the piano
sonata are dictated by the musical work than is the case for a
performance of "Respect." In contrast, popular songs are generally
"thinner" than works of the classical repertoire. Relatively few of
the properties that appear in a given performance of "Respect" are
present because they are essential to the identity of the musical work
that is being performed.
Based on this distinction between thicker and thinner musical works,
Baugh is wrong to contrast rock music and European art music by saying
that rock music requires far less "faithfulness" to the music being
performed. It is certainly true that performances of "Respect" will
vary greatly in their performance arrangements and particular
realizations. Where Redding is the only vocalist present on his 1965
recording of it, Franklin's features backing vocalists. Where Franklin
spells out the word "respect," Redding does not. Both Redding and
Franklin perform the same song, and they produce equally faithful or
authentic performances of the same musical work despite their very
different presentations of it. Their interpretative freedom is due to
the fact that popular songs are thin with respect to work-constitutive
properties and not because the performance matters more than the work
that is being performed (Davies 1999).
Additional ontological complications arise when we address the nature
of recorded music in each tradition. In the classical tradition,
recordings function either to capture the sound of a particular live
performance or they attempt to present the sound of an ideal
performance (Davies 2001). Popular music developed a third function by
exploiting studio technology to create inventive sonic presentations
that are not meant to be judged by reference to what can be duplicated
in live performance. Philosophers debate whether these recorded tracks
constitute distinct, thick musical works. Gracyk (1996) and Kania
propose that the studio engineering that is typical of rock and other
popular music identifies such recordings as musical works in their own
right. Like some electronic music of the European art tradition, the
tracks created by many record producers are musical works that can
only be instantiated through electronic playback (In fact, some
popular music simply is electronic music.). Tracks are extremely thick
musical works. The work (the track) determines most of what is heard
during its instantiations, which are its playbacks.
Unlike works-for-playback in the art music tradition, popular music
tracks feature songs or instrumental compositions that can also be
performed live. Returning to the 1968 hit recording of "Respect,"
Wexler's track offers access to Redding's song. Just as there are
multiple performances of "Respect," there are multiple recordings of
it. Where each performance of "Respect" is a distinct instantiation of
the song, something else must be said about Wexler's track, which
itself has distinct instantiations in its various playbacks. Listening
to recorded music, the popular audience attends to both an
ontologically thick work-for-playback and an ontologically thin song.
A track's production style can be distinguished from the song's
musical style. Thus there is a way in which popular music tracks are
more complex than is electronic art music Electronic music offers no
parallel distinction between track and composition.
Davies (2001) rejects the proposal that most popular song recordings
feature two distinct musical works, the track and the song. He
contends that there are very few cases in which two musical works are
simultaneously available to an audience. For Davies, a recording is a
distinct musical work only if the music cannot possibly be performed
live. With music that can be performed live, one of two situations
holds. Either way, the recorded track does not count as a distinct
musical work. First, some recordings represent a studio performance of
an ordinary musical work. An example is Franklin's recorded
performance of "Respect." Second, the recording studio is sometimes
used to create compositions or arrangements that are too complex or
too electronically sophisticated to be performed live. Only derivative
arrangements can be performed live. For example, the Beatles's studio
production of their 1966 song "Rain" features guitar and vocal parts
that were created by reversing the tape on which the music was
recorded. Treating the studio as special kind of performance space,
Davies classifies "Rain" as a work for studio performance. Other
musicians have since performed this song for an audience, but to do so
they must substitute different guitar passages. According to Davies,
these performances require the musicians to perform a simpler,
derivate musical work, an ordinary song for performance. By
distinguishing between three kinds of musical works (works for
performance, works for studio performance, and works-for-playback),
Davies maintains that recorded tracks of popular music seldom count as
works-for-playback.
Gracyk and Kania disagree with Davies on the grounds that popular
music audiences regard tracks as distinct objects of critical
attention. In the same way that an audience for a live performance of
a song can critically distinguish between the song and its performance
(for example, recognizing a weak performance of a superior song),
audiences distinguish between and critically assess songs,
performances, and their recordings. As evidence, Kania notes that
"cover" versions or remakes are discussed and assessed by reference to
previous recordings, not simply as new recordings of familiar songs.
Furthermore, because recordings have sonic properties that belong to
neither songs nor their originating performances, they ought to be
regarded as distinct musical works. Like electronic music, popular
music tracks are ontologically thick works-for-playback. Unlike
electronic art music, popular music tracks generally present the
audience with a distinct, ontologically thin work that can be
authentically instantiated in other recordings and in live
performance. Thus, when a Beatles cover band gives a live performance
of the song "Rain," the song that is being performed is not, as Davies
contends, a different work from the one that the Beatles recorded.
Where Davies thinks that a work for performance has been derived from
a work for studio performance, Gracyk and Kania recognize one song,
"Rain," which is the same song in either case.
This debate about the ontology of recorded tracks might seem to be a
dispute over mere semantics. However, it has many implications for the
aesthetics of popular music. In part, it reveals disagreement on
whether a musical event can belong to multiple ontological categories
at the same time. Davies thinks not; Gracyk and Kania regard this
result as relatively common with recorded popular music. The debate
also reveals assumptions about what counts as genuine music making.
Elevating tracks to the status of full-fledged musical works implies
that record producers and sound engineers are as important as
songwriters and performers. This status will, in turn, complicate
attributions of authorship and thus interpretation. Furthermore,
treating tracks as works suggests that a great deal of popular music
might be better understood by exploring its connections with film
rather than with other music (Gracyk 1996, Kania).
One need not classify tracks as musical works in order to see that a
great deal of popular music culture centers on recorded music. This
phenomenon has consequences for philosophy of music. Although Davies
and his opponents disagree on the correct analysis of these
recordings, both lines of analysis imply that listening to popular
music is cognitively quite complex. Contrary to stereotypes about
passive reception, listening involves complex discriminations
regarding multiple objects of interest. Furthermore, this debate
demonstrates the incompleteness of a philosophy of music derived from
reflection on the European classical tradition. Analyses of popular
music must develop conceptual tools that move beyond discussion
compositions and performances. For good or ill, recordings are
ubiquitous in our musical culture. Philosophy of music must come to
grips with its status and its role in musical culture.
6. References and Further Reading
* Adorno, Theodor W. "On Popular Music" In Essays on Music. Ed.
Richard Leppert. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 2002, pp. 437-69.
o This 1941 essay is the most accessible place to begin
reading Adorno on popular music.
* Baugh, Bruce. "Music for the Young at Heart." The Journal of
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 53:1 (1995): 81-83.
o Responds to criticisms of his analysis of the contrast
between rock music and classical music.
* Baugh, Bruce. "Prolegomena to Any Aesthetics of Rock Music." The
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 51:1 (1993): 23-29.
o Analysis of rock music that contrasts it with classical
music in order to show that traditional music aesthetics does not
adequately account for some music.
* Baur, Michael, and Stephen Baur, eds. The Beatles and
Philosophy: Nothing You Can Think That Can't Be Thunk. Chicago: Open
Court, 2006.
o Multiple essays demonstrate that a popular group can be
socially progressive and philosophically insightful.
* Bicknell, Jeanette. "Just a Song? Exploring the Aesthetics of
Popular Song Performance." The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
63:3 (2005): 261-70.
o Sophisticated analysis of what audiences find authentic
about a popular song performance.
* Bloom, Allan. The Closing of the American Mind. New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1987.
o A much-discussed and frequently cited book on American
culture, one chapter of which utilizes Plato's philosophy of art to
condemn American popular music.
* Brown, Lee B. "Adorno's Case Against Popular Music." Aesthetics:
A Reader in Philosophy of the Arts. 2nd ed. Ed. David Goldblatt and
Lee B. Brown. Upper Saddle River: Pearson/Prentice Hall, 2005, pp.
378-85.
o Extremely accessible introduction to Adorno's philosophy of music.
* Brown, Lee B. "Marsalis and Baraka: An Essay in Comparative
Cultural Discourse." Popular Music 23 (2004): 241-55.
o Argues that major accounts of the authenticity of
African-American music are burdened by a philosophically questionable
essentialism.
* Brown, Lee B. "Phonography, Rock Records, and the Ontology of
Recorded Music." The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 58:4
(2000): 361-72.
o Criticizes, revises, and extends Gracyk's account of
recording technology in popular music.
* Carroll, Noël. The Philosophy of Mass Art. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998.
o Defends the importance of thinking about mass art instead
of popular art. Although it is not Carroll's primary focus, he often
discusses popular music.
* Collingwood, R. G. The Principles of Art. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1938, reprint 1958.
o Classic statement of the position that popular music and
other popular arts are insufficiently expressive to be genuine art.
* Cox, Renée. "A History of Music." The Journal of Aesthetics and
Art Criticism 48:4 (1990): 395-409.
o An overview of how music has been conceptualized in the
Western tradition that concludes with interesting reflections on
popular music.
* Davies, Stephen. Musical Works and Performances: A Philosophical
Exploration. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001.
o Extremely thorough examination of the nature of musical
works and their presentation in performances; takes seriously the need
to address these topics in relation to popular music.
* Davies, Stephen. "Rock versus Classical Music." The Journal of
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 57:2 (1999): 193-204.
o Criticizes Baugh's contrast of rock music and classical music.
* Detels, Claire. Soft Boundaries: Re-Visioning the Arts and
Aesthetics in American Education. Westport, CT: Berfin and Garvey,
1999.
o Challenges standard disciplinary and cultural boundaries
imposed on music, including boundaries between art and popular music.
* Dewey, John. Art as Experience. New York: Minton, Balch and Co., 1934.
o Despite its limited discussion of music, presents a
non-elitist, pragmatist aesthetic that opposes the thesis of artistic
autonomy.
* Eliot, T. S. "Marie Lloyd." Selected Prose of T. S. Eliot. Ed.
Frank Kermode. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976, pp. 172-74.
o Although Eliot is regarded as an exponent of aesthetic
modernism, this 1922 essay applauds the "art" of a popular music-hall
singer and comedian.
* Fisher, John Andrew. "Rock 'n' Recording: The Ontological
Complexity of Rock Music." Musical Works: New Directions in the
Philosophy of Music. Ed. Philip Alperson. University Park:
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998, pp. 109-23.
o Argues that rock music is distinctive in placing
recordings, rather than performances or compositions, as its primary
musical object.
* Frith, Simon. Performing Rites: On the Value of Popular Music.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996.
o Engages with philosophical aesthetics but ultimately
argues that sociology of music is the basis of all music aesthetics.
* Gracyk, Theodore. I Wanna Be Me: Rock Music and the Politics of
Identity. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001.
o Begins with an account of how popular music expresses
meanings and cultural values, then analyzes and responds to
controversies surrounding musical appropriation and gendered
communication in popular music.
* Gracyk, Theodore. Listening to Popular Music: Or, How I Learned
to Stop Worrying and Love Led Zeppelin. Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 2007.
o Analyzes aesthetic value in music and argues that popular
music's aesthetic value is a central element of its appeal.
* Gracyk, Theodore. Rhythm and Noise: An Aesthetics of Rock.
Durham: Duke University Press, 1996.
o The opening three chapters explore the ontological and
interpretive implications of rock music's exploitation of recording
technology; the remainder defends rock against a range of common
criticisms, including those offered by Adorno and Bloom.
* Gurney, Edmund. The Power of Sound. London: Smith, Elder, and
Company,1880. Reprint New York: Basic Books, 1966.
o Long article that offers important arguments against
musical expression and in favor of musical autonomy.
* Hanslick, Eduard. On the Musically Beautiful. Trans. Geoffrey
Payzant. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1986.
o A historically influential work that emphasizes musical autonomy.
* Howes, Frank. "A Critique of Folk, Popular, and 'Art' Music."
British Journal of Aesthetics 2:3 (1962): 239-48.
o Provides an analysis of the differences between art music,
folk music, and popular music and offers reasons why popular music is
generally inferior to music in the other categories.
* Irwin, William, ed. Metallica and Philosophy: A Crash Course in
Brain Surgery. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007.
o Multiple essays demonstrate that a popular rock band can
be philosophically insightful.
* Johnson, Julian. Who Needs Classical Music? Cultural Choice and
Musical Value. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
o An articulate defense of traditional elitism that regards
the classical repertoire as superior to popular music.
* Kania, Andrew. "Making Tracks: The Ontology of Rock Music." The
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 64:4 (2006): 401-14.
o Summarizes the debate between Davies and Gracyk about the
ontology of recorded music and offers original arguments against
Davies.
* Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Judgment. Trans. Werner Pluhar.
Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987. Contains Kant's aesthetic theory.
o Although Kant does not distinguish between art music and
popular music, his theory of aesthetic judgment is an important source
for the doctrines of artistic genius and autonomy that have been used
against popular music.
* Kaplan, Abraham. "The Aesthetics of the Popular Arts." The
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 24:3 (1966): 351-364.
o Argues that popular art is essentially formulaic, and
therefore of limited aesthetic value.
* Kraut, Robert. "Why Does Jazz Matter to Aesthetic Theory?" The
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 63:1 (2005): 3-15.
o Using the example of jazz, argues that prevailing
aesthetic theory pays insufficient attention to the ways that some
music functions linguistically.
* Meltzer, Richard. The Aesthetics of Rock. New York: Something
Else Press, 1970.
o The argument is free-form and not intended as serious
philosophy, yet Meltzer is philosophically knowledgeable and
occasionally makes connections between popular music and philosophical
aesthetics.
* Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Birth of Tragedy and The Case of
Wagner. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Random House, 1967.
o Contains both Nietzsche's original position on European
classical music and his later misgivings.
* Porter, Carl, and Peter Vernezze, eds. Bob Dylan and Philosophy:
It's Alright, Ma (I'm Only Thinking). Chicago: Open Court Publishing,
2006.
o Multiple essays demonstrate that the work of a prominent
popular songwriter and performer can be philosophically engaging.
* Rudinow, Joel. "Race, Ethnicity, Expressive Authenticity: Can
White People Sing the Blues?" The Journal of Aesthetics and Art
Criticism 52:1 (1994): 127-37.
o An important essay on white appropriation of African-American music.
* Rudinow, Joel. "Reply to Taylor." The Journal of Aesthetics and
Art Criticism 53:3 (1995): 316-18.
o Continuation of an exchange about the expressive
authenticity of white blues performers.
* Sartwell, Crispin. The Art of Living: Aesthetics of the Ordinary
in World Spiritual Traditions. Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1995.
o Contains a chapter defending the vitality of blues and
country music.
* Shiner, Larry. The Invention of Art: A Cultural History. Chicago
and London: University of Chicago Press, 2001.
o Examines the social transformations that accompanied the
modern development of the category of fine art.
* Scruton, Roger. The Aesthetics of Music. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1997.
o A review of all major topics in the aesthetics of music;
argues, at some length, that the aesthetic inferiority of recent
popular music is calamitous for Western culture.
* Shusterman, Richard. Performing Live: Aesthetic Alternatives for
the End of Art. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2000a.
o Continues ongoing project of defending popular art;
contains several essays on popular music.
* Shusterman, Richard. "Popular Art and Entertainment Value," in
Philosophy and the Interpretation of Pop Culture. Ed. William Irwin
and Jorge Gracia. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006: pp. 131-57.
o Provides a historically informed analysis of the concept
of entertainment as distinct from the concept of the popular.
* Shusterman, Richard. Pragmatist Aesthetics: Living Beauty,
Rethinking Art. 2nd edition. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000b.
o Outlines a pragmatist aesthetic as an antidote to
traditional, elitist accounts of art and collects two seminal papers
on popular music.
* Stadlen, Peter. "The Aesthetics of Popular Music." British
Journal of Aesthetics 2:4 (1962), pp. 351-61.
o Argues that popular music is not inherently non-artistic
and then concentrates on explaining why it is nonetheless so
aesthetically impoverished.
* Taylor, Paul. "Black and Blue: Response to Rudinow." The Journal
of Aesthetics and Art Criticism53:3 (1995): 313-16.
o Challenges Rudinow by offering a reformulated and more
sophisticated criticism of white appropriations of African-American
music.
* von Appen, Ralf. "On the Aesthetics of Popular Music." Music
Therapy Today 8:1 (2007): 5-25.
o Distinguishing among three dimensions of aesthetic
experience, argues that popular music often invites the same response
as does art music.
* Wicke, Peter. Rock Music: Culture, Aesthetics and Sociology.
Trans. Rachel Fogg. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
o More sociology than philosophy, explores the opposition of
popular and art music and suggests several major aesthetic
differences.
* Wrathall, Mark, ed. U2 and Philosophy: How to Dismantle an
Atomic Band. Chicago: Open Court Press, 2006. Multiple essays
demonstrate that a popular rock band can be socially progressive and
philosophically insightful.
* Young, James O. "Between Rock and a Harp Place." The Journal of
Aesthetics and Art Criticism53:1 (1995): 78-81.
o Criticizes Baugh's contrast of rock music and classical music.
* Zabel, Gary. "Adorno on Music: A Reconsideration." The Musical
Times 130:1754 (April 1989): 198-201.
o A good starting point for those seeking a very brief
introduction to Adorno.
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