Advaita Vedānta

Advaita Vedānta is one version of Vedānta. Vedānta is nominally a
school of Indian philosophy, although in reality it is a label for any
hermeneutics that attempts to provide a consistent interpretation of
the philosophy of the Upaniṣads or, more formally, the canonical
summary of the Upaniṣads, Bādarāyaņa's Brahma Sūtra. Advaita is often
translated as "non-dualism" though it literally means
"non-secondness." Although Śaṅkara is regarded as the promoter of
Advaita Vedānta as a distinct school of Indian philosophy, the origins
of this school predate Śaṅkara. The existence of an Advaita tradition
is acknowledged by Śaṅkara in his commentaries. The names of Upanṣadic
teachers such as Yajñavalkya, Uddalaka, and Bādarāyaņa, the author of
the Brahma Sūtra, could be considered as representing the thoughts of
early Advaita. The essential philosophy of Advaita is an idealist
monism, and is considered to be presented first in the Upaniṣads and
consolidated in the Brahma Sūtra by this tradition. According to
Advaita metaphysics, Brahman—the ultimate, transcendent and imminent
God of the latter Vedas—appears as the world because of its creative
energy (māyā). The world has no separate existence apart from Brahman.
The experiencing self (jīva) and the transcendental self of the
Universe (ātman) are in reality identical (both are Brahman), though
the individual self seems different as space within a container seems
different from space as such. These cardinal doctrines are represented
in the anonymous verse "brahma satyam jagan mithya; jīvo brahmaiva na
aparah" (Brahman is alone True, and this world of plurality is an
error; the individual self is not different from Brahman). Plurality
is experienced because of error in judgments (mithya) and ignorance
(avidya). Knowledge of Brahman removes these errors and causes
liberation from the cycle of transmigration and worldly bondage.

1. History of Advaita Vedānta

It is possible that an Advaita tradition existed in the early part of
the first millennium C.E., as indicated by Śaṅkara himself with his
reference to tradition (sampradāya). But the only two names that could
have some historical certainty are Gaudapāda and Govinda Bhagavadpāda,
mentioned as Śaṅkara's teacher's teacher and the latter Śaṅkara's
teacher. The first complete Advaitic work is considered to be the
Mandukya Kārikā, a commentary on the Mandukya Upanṣad, authored by
Gaudapāda. Śaṅkara, as many scholars believe, lived in the eight
century. His life, travel, and works, as we understand from
thedigvijaya texts are almost of a superhuman quality. Though he lived
only for 32 years, Śaṅkara's accomplishments included traveling from
the south to the north of India, writing commentaries for the ten
Upaniṣads, the cryptic Brahma Sūtra, the Bhagavad Gītā, and authoring
many other texts (though his authorship of only some is established),
and founding four pītas, or centers of (Advaitic) excellence, with his
pupils in charge. Śaṅkara is supposed to have had four (prominent)
pupils: Padmapāda, Sureśvara, Hastamalaka and Toṭaka. Padmapāda is
said to be his earliest student. Panchapadika, by Padmapāda, is a
lucid commentary on Śaṅkara's commentary on the first verses of the
Brahma Sūtra. Sureśvara is supposed to have written Naiṣkarmya Siddhi,
an independent treatise on Advaita. Mandana Miśra (eight century), an
earlier adherent of the rival school of Bhatta Mīmāṃsa, is responsible
for a version of Advaita which focuses on the doctrine of sphota, a
semantic theory held by the Indian philosopher of language Bhartṛhari.
He also accepts to a greater extent the joint importance of knowledge
and works as a means to liberation, when for Śaṅkara knowledge is the
one and only means. Mandana Miśra's Brahmasiddhi is a significant
work, which also marks a distinct form of Advaita. Two major
sub-schools of Advaita Vedānta arose after Śaṅkara: Bhamati and
Vivarana. The BhamatiSchool owes its name to Vacaspati Miśra's (ninth
century) commentary on Śaṅkara's Brahma SūtraBhāṣya, while the
Vivarana School is named after Prakashatman's (tenth century)
commentary on Padmapāda's Pancapadika, which itself is a commentary on
Śaṅkara's commentary on the Brahma Sūtra. The prominent names in the
later Advaita tradition are Prakāsātman (tenth century), Vimuktātman
(tenth century), Sarvajñātman (tenth century), Śrī Harṣa (twelfth
century), Citsukha (twelfth century), ānandagiri (thirteenth century),
Amalānandā (thirteenth century), Vidyāraņya (fourteenth century),
Śaṅkarānandā (fourteenth century), Sadānandā (fifteenth century),
Prakāṣānanda (sixteenth century), Nṛsiṁhāśrama (sixteenth century),
Madhusūdhana Sarasvati (seventeenth century), Dharmarāja Advarindra
(seventeenth century), Appaya Dīkśita (seventeenth century), Sadaśiva
Brahmendra (eighteenth century), Candraśekhara Bhārati (twentieth
century), and Sacchidānandendra Saraswati (twentieth
century).Vivarana, which is a commentary on Padmapāda's Panchapadika,
written by Vacaspati Mshra is a landmark work in the tradition. The
Khandanakhandakhadya of Śrī Harṣa, Tattvapradipika of Citsukha,
Pañcadasi of Vidyāraņya, Vedāntasāra of Sadānandā, Advaitasiddhi of
Madhusadana Sarasvati, and Vedāntaparibhasa of Dharmarāja Advarindra
are some of the landmark works representing later Advaita tradition.
Throughout the eigteenth century and until the twenty-first century,
there are many saints and philosophers whose tradition is rooted
primarily or largely in Advaita philosophy. Prominent among the saints
are Bhagavan Ramana Maharśi, Swami Vivekananda, Swami Tapovanam, Swami
Chinmayānandā, and Swami Bodhānandā. Among the philosophers, KC
Bhattacharya and TMP Mahadevan have contributed a great deal to the
tradition.
2. Metaphysics and Philosophy

The classical Advaita philosophy of Śaṅkara recognizes a unity in
multiplicity, identity between individual and pure consciousness, and
the experienced world as having no existence apart from Brahman. The
major metaphysical concepts in Advaita Vedānta tradition, such as
māyā, mithya (error in judgment),vivarta (illusion/whirlpool), have
been subjected to a variety of interpretations. On some
interpretations, Advaita Vedānta appears as a nihilistic philosophy
that denounces the matters of the lived-world.
a. Brahman, Jīva, īśvara, and Māyā

For classical Advaita Vedānta, Brahman is the fundamental reality
underlying all objects and experiences. Brahman is explained as pure
existence, pure consciousness and pure bliss. All forms of existence
presuppose a knowing self. Brahman or pure consciousness underlies the
knowing self. Consciousness according to the Advaita School, unlike
the positions held by other Vedānta schools, is not a property of
Brahman but its very nature. Brahman is also one without a second,
all-pervading and the immediate awareness. This absolute Brahman is
known as nirguņa Brahman, or Brahman "without qualities," but is
usually simply called "Brahman." This Brahman is ever known to Itself
and constitutes the reality in all individuals selves, while the
appearance of our empirical individuality is credited to avidya
(ignorance) and māyā (illusion). Brahman thus cannot be known as an
individual object distinct from the individual self. However, it can
be experienced indirectly in the natural world of experience as a
personal God, known as saguņa Brahman, or Brahman with qualities. It
is usually referred to as īśvara (the Lord). The appearance of
plurality arises from a natural state of confusion or ignorance
(avidya), inherent in most biological entities. Given this natural
state of ignorance, Advaita provisionally accepts the empirical
reality of individual selves, mental ideas and physical objects as a
cognitive construction of this natural state of ignorance. But from
the absolute standpoint, none of these have independent existence but
are founded on Brahman. From the standpoint of this fundamental
reality, individual minds as well as physical objects are appearances
and do not have abiding reality. Brahman appears as the manifold
objects of experience because of its creative power, māyā. Māyā is
that which appears to be real at the time of experience but which does
not have ultimate existence. It is dependent on pure consciousness.
Brahman appears as the manifold world without undergoing an intrinsic
change or modification. At no point of time does Brahman change into
the world. The world is but avivarta, a superimposition on Brahman.
The world is neither totally real nor totally unreal. It is not
totally unreal since it is experienced. It is not totally real since
it is sublated by knowledge of Brahman. There are many examples given
to illustrate the relation between the existence of the world and
Brahman. The two famous examples are that of the space in a pot versus
the space in the whole cosmos (undifferentiated in reality, though
arbitrarily separated by the contingencies of the pot just as the
world is in relation to Brahman), and the self versus the reflection
of the self (the reflection having no substantial existence apart from
the self just as the objects of the world rely upon Brahman for
substantiality). The existence of an individuated jīva and the world
are without a beginning. We cannot say when they began, or what the
first cause is. But both are with an end, which is knowledge of
Brahman. According to classical Advaita Vedānta, the existence of the
empirical world cannot be conceived without a creator who is
all-knowing and all-powerful. The creation, sustenance, and
dissolution of the world are overseen by īśvara. īśvara is the purest
manifestation of Brahman. Brahman with the creative power ofmāyā is
īśvara. Māyā has both individual (vyaśti) and cosmic (samaśti)
aspects. The cosmic aspect belongs to one īśvara, and the individual
aspect, avidya, belongs to many jīvas. But the difference is
thatīśvara is not controlled by māyā, whereas the jīva is overpowered
by avidya. Māyā is responsible for the creation of the world. Avidya
is responsible for confounding the distinct existence between self and
the not-self. With this confounding, avidya conceals Brahman and
constructs the world. As a result thejīva functions as a doer (karta)
and enjoyer (bhokta) of a limited world. The classical picture may be
contrasted with two sub-schools of Advaita Vedānta that arose after
Śaṅkara: Bhamati and Vivarana. The primary difference between these
two sub-schools is based on the different interpretations for avidya
and māyā. Śaṅkara described avidya as beginningless. He considered
that to search the origin of avidya itself is a process founded on
avidya and hence will be fruitless. But Śaṅkara's disciples gave
greater attention to this concept, and thus originated the two
sub-schools. TheBhamati School owes its name to Vacaspati Miśra's
(ninth century) commentary on Śaṅkara's Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya, while the
Vivarana School is named after Prakāṣātman's (tenth century)
commentary on Padmapāda's Pañcapadika, which itself is a commentary on
Śaṅkara's Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya. The major issue that distinguishes
Bhamati and Vivarana schools is their position on the nature and locus
of avidya. According to the Bhamati School, the jīva is the locus and
object of avidya. According to the VivaranaSchool, Brahman is the
locus of avidya. The Bhamati School holds that Brahman can never be
the locus of avidya but is the controller of it as īśvara. Belonging
to jīva, tula-avidya, or individual ignorance performs two functions –
veils Brahman, and projects (vikṣepa) a separate world. Mula-avidya
("root ignorance") is the universal ignorance that is equivalent to
Māyā, and is controlled by īśvara. The Vivarana School holds that
since Brahman alone exists, Brahman is the locus and object of avidya.
With the help of epistemological discussions, the non-reality of the
duality between Brahman and world is established. The Vivarana School
responds to the question regarding Brahman's existence as both "pure
consciousness" and "universal ignorance" by claiming that valid
cognition (prama) presumes avidya, in the everyday world, whereas pure
consciousness is the essential nature of Brahman.
b. Three Planes of Existence

There are three planes of existence according to classical Advaita
Vedānta: the plane of absolute existence (paramarthika satta), the
plane of worldly existence (vyavaharika satta) which includes this
world and the heavenly world, and the plane of illusory existence
(pratibhāsika existence). The two latter planes of existence are a
function of māyā and are thus illusory to some extent. A
pratibhāsikaexistence, such as objects presented in a mirage, is less
real than a worldly existence. Its corresponding unreality is,
however, different from that which characterizes the absolutely
nonexistent or the impossible, such as a sky-lotus (a lotus that grows
in the sky) or the son of a barren woman. The independent existence of
a mirage and the world, both of which are due to a certain causal
condition, ceases once the causal condition change. The causal
condition is avidya, or ignorance. The independent existence and
experience of the world ceases to be with the gain of knowledge of
Brahman. The nature of knowledge of Brahman is that "I am pure
consciousness." The self-ignorance of the jīva (individuated self)
that "I am limited" is replaced by the Brahman-knowledge that "I am
everything," accompanied by a re-identification of the self with the
transcendental Brahman. The knower of Brahman sees the one non-plural
reality in everything. He or she no longer gives an absolute reality
to independent and limited existence of the world, but experiences the
world as a creative expression of pure consciousness. The states of
waking (jāgrat), dreaming (svapna) and deep sleep (susupti) all point
to the fourth nameless state turiya, pure consciousness, which is to
be realized as the true self. Pure consciousness is not only pure
existence but also the ultimate bliss which is experienced partially
during deep sleep. Hence we wake up refreshed.
3. Epistemology

The Advaita tradition puts forward three lesser tests of truth:
correspondence, coherence, and practical efficacy. These are followed
by a fourth test of truth: epistemic-nonsublatability (abādhyatvam
orbādhaṛāhityam). According to the Vedānta Paribhāṣa (a classical text
of Advaita Vedānta) "that knowledge is valid which has for its object
something that is nonsublated." Nonsublatablity is considered as the
ultimate criterion for valid knowledge. The master test of
epistemic-nonsublatability inspires a further constraint:
foundationality (anadhigatatvam, lit. "of not known earlier"). This
last criterion of truth is the highest standard that virtually all
knowledge claims fail, and thus it is the standard for absolute, or
unqualified, knowledge, while the former criteria are amenable to
mundane, worldly knowledge claims. According to Advaita Vedānta, a
judgment is true if it remains unsublated. The commonly used example
that illustrates epistemic-nonsublatabilty is the rope that appears as
a snake from a distance (a stock example in Indian philosophy). The
belief that one sees a snake in this circumstance is erroneous
according to Advaita Vedānta because the snake belief (and the visual
presentation of a snake) is sublated into the judgment that what one
is really seeing is a rope. Only wrong cognitions can be sublated. The
condition of foundationality disqualifies memory as a means of
knowledge. Memory is the recollection of something already known and
is thus derivable and not foundational. Only genuine knowledge of the
Self, according to Advaita Vedānta, passes the test of
foundationality: it is born of immediate knowledge (aparokṣa jñāna)
and not memory (smṛti). Six natural ways of knowing are accepted as
valid means of knowledge (pramāṅa) by Advaita Vedānta: perception
(pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), verbal testimony (śabda), comparison
(upamana), postulation (arthapatti) and non-apprehension
(anupalabdhi). The pramāṅas do not contradict each other and each of
them presents a distinct kind of knowledge. Nonfoundational knowledge
of Brahman cannot be had by any means but through Śruti, which is the
supernaturally revealed text in the form of the Vedas (of which the
Upaniṣads form the most philosophical portion). Inference and the
other means of knowledge cannot determinately reveal the truth of
Brahman on their own. However, Advaitins recognize that in addition
toŚruti, one requires yukti (reason) and anubhava (personal
experience) to actualize knowledge of Brahman. Mokṣa (liberation),
which consists in the cessation of the cycle of life and death,
governed by the karma of the individual self, is the result of
knowledge of Brahman. As Brahman is identical with the universal Self,
and this Self is always self-conscious, it would seem that knowledge
of Brahman is Self-knowledge, and that this Self-knowledge is ever
present. If so, it seems that ignorance is impossible. Moreover, in
the adhyāsa bhāṣya (his preamble to the commentary on the Brahma
Sūtra) Śaṅkara says that the pure subjectivity—the Self or Brahman—can
never become the object of knowledge, just as the object can never be
the subject. This would suggest that Self-knowledge that one gains in
order to achieve liberation is impossible. Śaṅkara's response to this
problem is to regard knowledge of Brahman that is necessary for
liberation, derived from scripture, to be distinct from the
Self-consciousness of Brahman, and rather a practical knowledge that
removes ignorance, which is an obstacle to the luminance of the
ever-present self-consciousness of Brahman that does pass the test of
foundationality. Ignorance, in turn, is not a feature of the ultimate
Self on his account, but a feature of the individual self that is
ultimately unreal. Four factors are involved in an external
perception: the physical object, the sense organ, the mind
(antaḥkarana) and the cognizing self (pramata). The cognizing self
alone is self-luminous and the rest of the three factors are not
self-luminous being devoid of consciousness. It is the mind and the
sense organ which relates the cognizing self to the object. The self
alone is the knower and the rest are knowable as objects of knowledge.
At the same time the existence of mind is indubitable. It is the mind
that helps to distinguish between various perceptions. It is because
of the self-luminous (svata-prakāṣa) nature of pure consciousness that
the subject knows and the object is known. In his commentary to
Taittirīya Upaniṣad, Śaṅkara says that "consciousness is the very
nature of the Self and inseparable from It." The cognizing self, the
known object, the object-knowledge, and the valid means of knowledge
(pramāṅa) are essentially the manifestations of one pure
consciousness.
a. Error, True Knowledge and Practical Teachings

Śaṅkara uses adhyāsa to indicate illusion – illusory objects of
perception as well as illusory perception. Two other words which are
used to denote the same are adhyāropa (superimposition) and
avabhāsa(appearance). According to Śaṅkara the case of illusion
involves both superimposition and appearance.Adhyāsa, as he says in
his preamble to the Brahma Sūtra, is the apprehension of something as
something else with two kinds of confounding such as the object and
its properties. The concept of illusion, in Advaita Vedānta, is
significant because it leads to the theory of a "real substratum." The
illusory object, like the real object, has a definite locus. According
to Śaṅkara, adhyāsais not possible without a substratum. Padmapāda
says in Pañcapadika that adhyāsa without a substratum has never been
experienced and is inconceivable. Vacaspati affirms that there cannot
be a case of illusion where the substratum is fully apprehended or not
apprehended at all. The Advaita theory of error (known as anirvacanīya
khyāti, or the apprehension of the indefinable) holds that the
perception of the illusory object is a product of the ignorance about
the substratum. Śaṅkara characterizes illusion in two ways in his
commentary on the Brahma Sūtra. The first is an appearance of
something previously experienced—like memory—in something else
(smṛtirupaḥ paratra pūrva dṛṣṭaḥ avabhāsah). The second is a
minimalist characterization—the appearance of one thing with the
properties of another (anyasya anyadharma avabhāsatam. Śaṅkara devotes
his introduction to his commentary on the Brahma Sūtra, to the idea of
adhyāsa to account for illusory perception relating to both everyday
experience and also transcendent entities. This introduction, called
the adhyāsa bhāṣya (commentary on illusion) presents a realistic
position and a seemingly dualistic metaphysics: "Since it is an
established fact that the object and subject which are presented as
yusmad—'you' /the other, and asmad—'me' are by very nature
contradictory, and their qualities also contradictory, as light and
darkness they cannot be identical." Plurality and illusion, on this
account, are constructed out of the cognitive superimposition of the
category of objects on pure subjectivity. While two conceptual
categories are superimposed to create objects of illusion, the Adavita
Vedānta view is that the only possible way of metaphysically
describing the object of illusion is with the help of a
characteristic, other than those of non-existence and existence, which
is termed as the "indeterminate" (anirvacaniya) which also somehow
connects the two usual possibilities of existence and non-existence.
The object of illusion cannot be logically defined as real or unreal.
Error is the apprehension of the indefinable. It is due to the
"illegitimate transference" of the qualities of one order to another.
Perceptual illusion forms the bridge between Advaita's soteriology, on
the one hand, and its theory of experience, on the other. The
relationship between the experience of liberation in this life (mukti)
and everyday experience is viewed as analogous to the relation between
veridical and delusive sense perception. Śaṅkara formulates a theory
of knowledge in accordance with his soteriological views. Śaṅkara's
interest is thus not to build a theory of error and leave it by itself
but to connect it to his theory of the ultimate reality of
Self-Consciousness which is the only state which can be true according
to his twin criteria for truth (non-sublatability and
foundationality). The characteristic of indeterminacy that qualifies
objects of illusion is that which is truly neither real nor unreal but
appears as a real locus. It serves as a stark contrast to the
soteriological goal of the Self, which is truly real and determinate.
On the basis of his theory of knowledge, Śaṅkara elucidates the
fourfold (mental and physical) practices or qualifications—sādana
catuṣṭaya—to aid in the achievement of liberation: (i) the
discrimination (viveka) between the permanent (nitya) and the
impermanent (anitya) objects of experience; (ii) dispassion towards
the enjoyment of fruits of action here and in heaven; (iii)
accomplishment of means of discipline such as calmness, mental control
etc.; (iv) a longing for liberation. In his commentary to theBrahma
Sūtra, Śaṅkara says that the inquiry into Brahman could start only
after acquiring these fourfold qualifications. The concept of
liberation (mokṣa) in Advaita is cashed out in terms of Brahman. The
pathways to liberations are defined by the removal of self-ignorance
that is brought about by the removal of mithyajñāna (erroneous
knowledge claims). This is captured in the formula of one Advaitin:
"[He] is never born again who knows that he is the only one in all
beings like the ether and that all beings are in him" (Upadesa Sahasri
XVII.69). Many thinkers in the history of Indian philosophy have held
that there is an important connection between action and liberation.
In contrast, Śaṅkara rejects the theory of jñāna-karma-samuccaya, the
combination of karma (Vedic duties) with knowledge of Brahman leading
to liberation. Knowledge of Brahman alone is the route to liberation
for Śaṅkara. The role of action (karma) is to purify the mind
(antaḥkaranasuddhi) and make it free from likes and dislikes (raga
dveṣa vimuktaḥ). Such a mind will be instrumental to knowledge of
Brahman.
4. References and Further Reading
a. Primary Sources

* Alladi Mahadeva Sastri (Trans.). The Bhagavad Gita with the
commentary of Śrī Śaṅkara. Madras: Samata Books, 1981.
* Madhusudana, Saraswati. Gudartha Dipika. Trans. Sisirkumar
Gupta. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Pubs., 1977.
* Brahma Sūtra Śaṅkara Bhāṣya: 3.3.54. Found in, V.H. Date,
Vedānta Explained: Śaṅkara's Commentary on the Brahma-Sūtra, vols. 1
and 2 (Bombay: Book Seller's Publishing Com., 1954).
* Date, V. H. Vedānta Explained: Śaṅkara's commentary on the
Brahma Sūtra. Vol. I. Bombay: Book Seller's Publishing Company, 1954.
* Taittiriya Upaniṣad Śaṅkara Bhāṣya: 2.10. Found in Karl H.
Potter, Gen. Ed. Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Vol. III. 1st
Ind. ed. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1981.
* Upadesa Sahasri of Śaṅkaracharya, Trans. Swami Jagadananda.
Mylapore: Śrī Ramkrishna Math, 1941.
* Dṛg-dṛṣya Viveka of Śaṅkara. Trans. Swami Nikhilananda. 6th ed.
Mysore: Śrī Ramakrishna Ashrama, 1976.

b. Secondary Sources

* Potter, Karl H. Advaita Vedānta up to Śaṅkara and his Pupils.
Vol. III of Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass, 1981.
* Mahadevan, T M P. Śaṅkara. New Delhi: National Book Trust, 1968.
* Mahadevan, T M P. Superimposition in Advaita Vedānta. New Delhi:
Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1985.
* Satprakashananda, Swami. Methods of Knowledge According to
Advaita Vedānta. Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1974.
* Dasgupta, Surendranath. A History of Indian Philosophy. Vol. I.
Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1975.
* Radhakrishnan, S. Indian Philosophy. Vol. II. Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 1940.
* Rangacarya, M. (Trans.). The Sarva Siddhānta-Saṅgraha of
Śaṅkara. New Delhi: Ajay Book Service, 1983.