Abortion

This article gives an overview of the moral and legal aspects of
abortion, and it evaluates the most important arguments. The central
moral aspect concerns whether there is any morally relevant point
during the biological process of the development of the fetus from its
beginning as a unicellular zygote to birth itself that may justify not
having an abortion after that point. Leading candidates for the
morally relevant point are the onset of movement, consciousness, the
ability to feel pain, and viability. The central legal aspect of the
abortion conflict is whether fetuses have a basic legal right to live
or, at least, a claim to live. The most important argument with regard
to this conflict is the potentiality argument, which turns on whether
the fetus is potentially a human person and thus should be protected.
The question of personhood depends on both empirical findings and
moral claims. The article ends with an evaluation of a pragmatic
account. According to this account, one has to examine the different
kinds of reasons for abortion in a particular case to decide about the
reasonableness of the justification given. Take the example of a
young, raped woman. The account suggests that it would seem cruel and
callous to force her to give birth to "her" child. So, according to
this pragmatic account, it seems that some abortions may be morally
justifiable whereas other abortions may be morally reprehensible.

1. Preliminary Distinctions

One of the most important issues in biomedical ethics is the
controversy surrounding abortion. The controversy a long tradition and
is still heavily discussed among researchers and in public—both in
terms of morality and in terms of legality. The following basic
questions may characterize the subject in more detail: Is abortion
morally justifiable? Does the fetus (embryo, conceptus, and zygote)
have any moral and/or legal rights? Is the fetus a human person and,
thus, should be protected? What are the criteria for being a person?
Is there any morally relevant break along the biological process of
development from the unicellular zygote to birth? This list of
questions is not meant to be exhaustive, but it describes the issues
of the following analysis.
a. Three Views on Abortion

There are three main views: first, the extreme conservative view (held
by the Catholic Church), second, the extreme liberal view (held by
Singer), and third, moderate views which lie between both extremes.
Some opponents (anti-abortionists, pro-life activists) holding the
extreme view argue that human personhood begins right from the
unicellular zygote and thus – according to the religious stance – one
should not have an abortion by virtue of the imago dei of the human
being (for example, Schwarz 1990). To have an abortion would be, by
definition, homicide, which is prohibited. The extreme liberal view is
held by proponents (abortionists). They claim that human personhood
begins immediately after birth or a bit later (Singer). Thus they see
the appropriate date at birth or a short time later (say, one month).
The proponents of the different moderate views argue that there is a
morally relevant break in the biological process of development – from
the unicellular zygote to the birth of the offspring – which
determines the justifiability and non-justifiability of having an
abortion. According to them, there is a gradual process from being a
fetus to being an infant whereas the fetus is no human being but a
human offspring with a different moral status. The advantage of the
extreme conservative view is the fact that it defines human personhood
right from the beginning of life (the unicellular zygote); there is no
slippery slope. But, it seems implausible to say that the zygote is a
human person. The advantage of the extreme liberal view is that its
main claim is supported by a common philosophical usage of the notion
personhood and thus seems more sound than the extreme conservative
view because the offspring is far more developed as the unicellular
zygote. But this view also faces severe problems; for example, it is
not at all clear where the morally relevant difference is between the
fetus five minutes before birth and a just born offspring. Some
moderate views have commonsense plausibility especially when they
argue that there are significant differences between the developmental
stages. The fact that they also claim for a break in the biological
process which is morally relevant seems to be a relapse into old and
unjustified habits. As Gillespie stresses in his article "Abortion and
Human Rights" (1984, 94-102) there is no morally relevant break in the
biological process of development. But, in fact, there are differences
which make a comparative basis possible without solving the problem of
drawing a line. How should one decide?
b. The Standard Argument

The standard argument is the following practical syllogism:

1. The killing of human beings is prohibited.
2. A fetus is a human being.
3. The killing of fetuses is prohibited.

Hence, abortion is not allowed since homicide is prohibited. It seems
obvious to question the result of the practical syllogism since one is
able to argue against both premises. First, there are possible
situations where the first premise could be questioned by negating it,
for example killing in self-defense which is not prohibited by law.
Second, the second premise could also be questioned since it is not at
all clear whether fetuses are human beings – though they are of course
members of the species of homo sapiens. Consecutively, one would deny
that fetuses are persons but admit that a young two year old child may
be a person. Although, in the end, it may be difficult to claim that
every human being is a person. For example, people with severe mental
handicaps or disorder seem not to have personhood. That is, if
personhood is defined with regard to specific criteria like the
capacity to reason, or to have consciousness, self-consciousness, or
rationality, some people might be excluded. But, in fact, this does
not mean that people with severe mental handicaps who lack personhood
can be killed. Even when rights are tied to the notion of personhood,
it is clearly prohibited to kill disabled people. Norbert Hoerster, a
well-known German philosopher, claims that fetuses with severe
handicaps can be – like all other fetuses – aborted, as born human
beings with severe handicaps they have to be protected and respected
like all other human beings, too (1995, 159).
c. The Modified Standard Argument

However, it seems appropriate to modify the standard argument and to
use a more sophisticated version. Replace the notion 'human being'
with 'human life form.' The new practical syllogism is:

1. The killing of human life forms is prohibited.
2. A fetus is a human life form.
3. The killing of fetuses is prohibited.

The objection against the first premise of the standard argument still
holds for the new more sophisticated version. But, the second modified
premise is much stronger than the previous one because one has to
determine what a human life form really is. Is a fetus a human life
form? But, even if the fetus is a human life form, it does not
necessarily follow that it should be protected by that fact,
simpliciter. The fetus may be a human life form but it hardly seems to
be a person (in the ordinary sense of the notion) and thus has no
corresponding basic right to live. However, as already stated, this
kind of talk seems to lead astray because the criteria for personhood
may be suitable for born people but not also appropriate for fetuses,
embryos, or unicellular zygotes, like some biological (human being),
psychological (self-consciousness), rational (ability to reasoning),
social (sympathy/love), or legal (being a human life form with rights)
criteria may indicate (for example, Jane English 1984). Jane English
persuasively argues in "Abortion and the Concept of a Person" that
even if the fetus is a person, abortion may be justifiable in many
cases, and if the fetus is no person, the killing of fetuses may be
wrong in many cases.
2. Personhood

What does it mean to claim that a human life form is a person? This is
an important issue since the ascription of rights is at stake. I
previously stated that it is unsound to say that a fetus is a person
or has personhood since it lacks, at least, rationality and
self-consciousness. It follows that not every human being is also a
person according to the legal sense and thus also lacks moral rights
(extreme case). The fetus is by virtue of his genetic code a human
life form but this does not mean that this would be sufficient to
grant it legal and moral rights. Nothing follows from being a human
life form by virtue of one's genes, especially not that one is able to
derive legal or moral rights from this very fact (for example,
speciesism). Is a human person exclusively defined by her membership
of the species Homo sapiens sapiens and thus should be protected? To
accept this line of argumentation would entail the commitment of the
existence of normative empirical features. It seems premature to
derive the prohibition to kill a life form from the bare fact of its
genetic feature, also in the case of a human life form, unless one
argues that human beings do have a basic interest to protect their
offspring. Is a human life form a moral entity? This seems to be a
good approach. The argument runs as follows: It seems plausible to
claim that human beings create values and if they have a basic
interest to protect their offspring the people may establish a certain
morality by which they can argue, for example, to prohibit having
abortions. The moral judgment can be enforced through legal norms (see
below). To be more precise about the assumption of the existence or
non-existence of normative, empirical features: Critics of the view to
tie the right to live and the biological category of being a human
being claim that the protagonists make the serious is-ought failure.
But, why is it unsound to take the bare fact of being a member of the
biological species Homo sapiens as a solid basis for granting the
right to live? The linkage seems only justified when there are sound
factual reasons. If there are none, the whole line of reasoning would
'hang in the air' so that one could also easily argue for the right to
live for cats and dogs. Only factual relevant features may be
important for the linkage. But what could these relevant features look
like? Jane English presents in her article "Abortion and the Concept
of a Person" several features of personhood which characterise the
human person. Her notion of personhood can be grouped into five
sectors (English 1984, pp. 152): (i) the biological sector (being a
human being, having extremities, eating and sleeping), (ii) the
psychological sector (perception, emotions, wishes and interests,
ability to communicate, ability to make use of tools,
self-consciousness), (iii) the rational sector (reasoning, ability to
make generalizations, to make plans, learning from experience), (iv)
the social sector (to belong to different groups, other people,
sympathy and love), and (v) the legal sector (to be a legal addressee,
ability to make contracts, to be a citizen). According to English, it
is not necessary for a human life form to comply with all five sectors
and different aspects to count as a person. A fetus lies right in the
penumbra where the concept of personhood is hard to apply. There is no
core of necessary and sufficient features that could be ascribed to a
human life form in order to be sure that these features constitute a
person (English 1984, 153). Mary Anne Warren claims that a human life
form should qualify as a person when, at least, some of the following
aspects (especially i-iii) are at stake: (i) consciousness and the
ability to feel pain, (ii) reasoning, (iii) a self-motivated activity,
(iv) ability to communicate, and (v) the existence of a self-concept
(for example, individual, racial) and self-consciousness (Warren 1984,
110-113). Warren argues that the fetus is no person since it lacks the
criteria of personhood and, thus, an abortion is justified. The aim is
not to give an airtight definition of the concept of personhood. The
main question is whether a fetus could qualify as a person. The
following can be stated: The fetus is a human offspring but is not a
legal, social, and rational person in the ordinary sense of the
notions. Some aspects of the psychological sector for example, the
ability to feel and perceive can be ascribed to the fetus but not to
the embryo, conceptus, or the (unicellular) zygote. It seems
implausible to say that a fetus (or embryo, conceptus, zygote) is a
person, unless one additionally claims that the genetic code of the
fetus is a sufficient condition. However, this does not mean, in the
end, that one could always justify an abortion. It only shows that the
fetus could hardly be seen as a human person. It is hard to keep the
legal and moral aspects of the conflict of abortion apart. There are
overlaps which are due to the nature of things since legal
considerations are based on the ethical realm. This can also be seen
according to the notion 'person.' What a person is is not a legal
question but a question which is to be decided within a specific
ethics. If one defines the notion 'person' along some criteria, then
the question of which criteria are suitable or not will be discussed
with regard to a specific moral approach (for example, Kantianism,
utilitarianism, virtue ethics). The relevant criteria, in turn, may
come from different areas like the psychological, rational, or social
sphere. If the criteria are settled, this influences the legal area
because the ascription of legal rights – especially the right to live
in the abortion debate – is tied to persons respectively to the
concept of personhood.
3. Moral Aspects of the Abortion Conflict

The main question with regard to the moral sphere is about the right
developmental point of the fetus (or the embryo, conceptus, zygote) to
decide which break may morally justify an abortion or not. Especially
the proponents of the moderate view and the extreme liberal view claim
that there is such a break. The main arguments in the debate will be
evaluated in the following. Before we will analyze the arguments, it
is necessary to say something about moral rights.
a. Moral Rights

Some authors claim that the talk of 'moral rights' and 'moral
obligations' is an old never-ending tale. There are no 'moral rights'
or 'moral obligations' per se; at least, in the sense that there are
also moral rights and moral obligations apart from legal rights and
legal obligations. There is no higher ethical authority which may
enforce a specific moral demand. Rights and obligations rest on law.
According to ethics, one should better say "moral agreements" (for
example, Gauthier). The proponents claim that moral agreements do have
a similar status to legal rights and legal obligations but stress that
no person has an enforceable demand to have her moral rights prevail
over others. The suitability is the essential aspect of the
metaphysics of rights and obligations. Only the formal constraint
establishes rights and obligations within a given society (for
example, Hobbes); the informal constraint within a given society –
though it may be stronger – is not able to do so. Without a court of
first instance there are no rights and obligations. Only by the method
of juridification of moral agreements is one able to establish
specific moral rights and specific moral obligations. Those authors
claim that there are no absolute moral rights and moral obligations
which are universally valid; moral agreements are always subjective
and relative. Hence, there are also no (absolute) moral rights which
the fetus (embryo, conceptus, or zygote) may call for. The only
solution may be that the survival of the fetus rests on the will of
the human beings in a given moral society. According to their view, it
is only plausible to argue that an abortion is morally reprehensible
if the people in a given society do have a common interest not to
abort and make a moral agreement which is enforced by law.
b. At Birth

Proponents of the liberal view contend that the morally significant
break in the biological development of the fetus is at birth. This
means that it is morally permitted to have an abortion before birth
and morally prohibited to kill the offspring after birth. The
objection against this view is simple because there seems to be no
morally relevant difference between a short time (say five minutes)
before birth and after it. Factually, the only biological difference
is the physical separation of the fetus from the mother. But it seems
unsound to interpret this as the morally significant difference; the
bare evidence with regard to the visibility of the offspring and the
physical separation (that is, the offspring is no longer dependent on
the woman's body) seems insufficient.
c. Viability

Proponents of the moderate view often claim that the viability
criterion is a hot candidate for a morally significant break because
the dependence of the nonviable fetus on the pregnant woman gives her
the right to decide about having an abortion. The aspect of dependence
is insufficient in order to determine the viability as a possible
break. Take the following counter-example: A son and his aged mother
who is nonviable without the intensive care of her son; the son has no
right to let his mother die by virtue of her given dependence.
However, one may object that there is a difference between 'needing
someone to care for you' and 'needing to live off a particular
person's body.' Furthermore, one may stress that the nonviable and the
viable fetus both are potential human adults. But as we will see below
the argument of potentiality is flawed since it is unclear how actual
rights could be derived from the bare potentiality of having such
rights at a later time. Hence, both types of fetuses cannot claim for
a right. There is also another objection that cannot be rebutted: It
is about the viability of the fetus regarding the particular level of
medical technology. On the one hand, there is a temporal relativity
according to medical technology. The understanding of what constitutes
the viability of the fetus has developed over time according to the
technical level of embryology in the last centuries and decades.
Today, artificial viability allows physicians to rescue many premature
infants who would have died in an earlier time. On the other hand,
there is a local relativity according to the medical supply in
different countries (and also within each country) which determines
whether a premature infant will be rescued. The medical supply may
vary greatly. Consequently, it seems inappropriate to claim that
viability as such should be regarded as a significant break by being a
general moral justification against abortions.
d. First Movement

The first movement of the fetus is sometimes regarded as a significant
break because the proponents stress its deeper meaning which usually
rests on religious or non-religious considerations. In former times,
the Catholic Church maintained that the first movement of the fetus
shows the breathing of life into the human body (animation) that
separates the fetus from animals. This line of thinking is out-of-date
and also the Catholic Church no longer uses this argument. Another
point is that the first movement of the fetus that women experience is
irrelevant since the real first movement of the fetus is much earlier.
Ultrasonic testing shows that the real first movement of the fetus is
somewhere between the 6th and 9th week. But even if one considers the
real first movement problems may arise. The physical ability to move
is morally irrelevant. One counter-example: What about an adult human
being who is quadriplegic and is unable to move? It seems out of the
question to kill such people and to justify the killing by claiming
that people who are disabled and simply lack the ability to move are,
therewith, at other people's disposal.
e. Consciousness and the Ability to Feel Pain

In general, proponents of moderate views believe that consciousness
and the ability to feel pain will develop after about six months. But
the first brain activities are discernable after the 7th week so that
it is possible to conclude that the fetus may feel pain after this
date. In this respect, the ability to suffer is decisive for
acknowledging a morally significant break. One may object to this
claim that the proponents of this view redefine the empirical feature
of 'the ability to suffer' as a normative feature (is-ought-problem).
It is logically unsound to conclude from the bare fact that the fetus
feels pain that it is morally reprehensible or morally prohibited per
se to abort the fetus.
f. Unicellular Zygote

Proponents of the extreme conservative view claim that the morally
significant break in the biological development of the fetus is given
with the unicellular human zygote. They argue that the unicellular
zygote is a human person, and thus it is prohibited to have an
abortion because one kills a human being (for example, Schwarz). The
extreme conservative proponents argue that the biological development
of the fetus to become a human being is an incremental process which
leaves no room for a morally significant break (liberals deny this
line of thinking). If there is no morally significant break, then the
fetus has the same high status of a newborn, or the newborn has the
same low status of the fetus. To many opponents of the 'extreme'
conservative position, it seems questionable to claim that a
unicellular zygote is a person. At best one may maintain that the
zygote will potentially develop to become a human being. But the
potentiality argument is flawed since it is impossible to derive
current rights from the potential ability of having rights at a later
time. Opponents (for example, Gert) also object to any attempt to base
conclusions on religious considerations that they believe cannot stand
up to rational criticism. For these reasons, they argue that the
conservative view should be rejected.
g. Thomson and the Argument of The Sickly Violinist

Judith Jarvis Thomson presents an interesting case in her landmark
article A Defense of Abortion (1971) in order to show that, even if
the fetus has a right to live, one is still able to justify an
abortion for reasons of a woman's right to live/integrity/privacy.
Thomson's famous example is that of the sickly violinist: You awaken
one morning to find that you have been kidnapped by a society of music
lovers in order to help a violinist who is unable to live on his own
by virtue of his ill-health. He has been attached to your kidneys
because you alone have the only blood type to keep him alive. You are
faced with a moral dilemma because the violinist has a right to live
by being a member of the human race; there seems to be no possibility
to unplug him without violating this right and thus killing him.
However, if you leave him attached to you, you are unable to move for
months, although you did not give him the right to use your body in
such a way (Thomson 1984, 174-175). First, Thomson claims that the
right to live does not include the right to be given the means
necessary for survival. If the right to live entails the right to
those means, one is not justified in preventing the violinist from the
on-going use of one's kidneys. The right to the on-going use of the
kidneys necessarily implies that the violinist's right to his means
for survival always trumps the right to another person's body. Thomson
refuses this and claims that "the fact that for continued life that
violinist needs the continued use of your kidneys does not establish
that he has a right to be given the continued use of your kidneys"
(Thomson 1984, 179). She argues that everybody has a right of how his
own body is used. That is, the violinist has no right to use another
person's body without her permission. Therefore, one is morally
justified in not giving the violinist the use of one's own kidneys.
Second, Thomson contends that the right to live does not include the
right not to be killed. If the violinist has the right not to be
killed, then another person is not justified in removing the plug from
her kidneys although the violinist has no right to their use.
According to Thomson, the violinist has no right to another person's
body and hence one cannot be unjust in unplugging him: "You surely are
not being unjust to him, for you gave him no right to use your
kidneys, and no one else can have given him any such right" (Thomson
1984, 180). If one is not unjust in unplugging oneself from him, and
he has no right to the use of another person's body, then it cannot be
wrong, although the result of the action is that the violinist will be
killed.
4. Legal Aspects of the Abortion Conflict

What is the legal status of the fetus (embryo, conceptus, and zygote)?
Before the question should be answered, one should pay some attention
to the issue of the genesis of a legal system. Which ontological
status do legal rights have? Where do they come from? Usually we
accept the idea that legal rights do not 'fall from the blue sky' but
are made by human beings. Other conceptions which had been provided in
the history of human kind are: (i) rights rest on god's will, (ii)
rights rest on the strongest person, or (iii) rights rest on a
specific human feature like a person's wisdom or age. However, let us
take the following description for granted: There is a legal community
in which the members are legal entities with (legal) claims and legal
addressees with (legal) obligations. If someone refuses the
addressee's legal obligation within such a system, the legal entity
has the right to call the legal instance in order to let his right be
enforced. The main question is whether the fetus (or the embryo,
conceptus, zygote) is a legal person with a basic right to live or not
and, furthermore, whether there will be a conflict of legal norms,
that is a conflict between the fetus' right to live and the right of
self-determination of the pregnant woman (principle of autonomy). Is
the fetus a legal entity or not?
a. The Account of Quasi-Rights

It was previously stated that the fetus as such is no person and that
it seems unsound to claim that fetuses are persons in the ordinary
sense of the notion. If rights are tied to the notion of personhood,
then it seems appropriate to say that fetuses do not have any legal
rights. One can object that animals of higher consciousness (or even
plants, see Korsgaard 1996, 156) have some 'rights' or quasi-rights
because it is prohibited to kill them without good reason (killing
great apes and dolphins for fun is prohibited in most countries).
Their 'right' not to be killed is based on the people's will and their
basic interest not to kill higher developed animals for fun. But, it
would be wrong to assume that those animals are legal entities with
'full' rights, or that they have only 'half' rights. Thus, it seems
reasonable to say that animals have 'quasi-rights.' There is a
parallel between the so-called right of the fetus and the quasi-rights
of some animals: both are not persons in the normal sense of the
notion but it would cause us great discomfort to offer them no
protection and to deliver them to the vagaries of the people.
According to this line of argument, it seems sound to claim that
fetuses also have quasi-rights. It does not follow that the
quasi-rights of the fetuses and the quasi-rights of the animals are
identical; people would normally stress that the quasi-rights of
fetuses are of more importance than that of animals. However, there
are some basic rights of the pregnant woman, for example, the right of
self-determination, the right of privacy, the right of physical
integrity, and the right to live. On the other hand, there is the
existential quasi-right of the fetus, that is, the quasi-right to
live. If the presumption is right that legal rights are tied to the
notion of personhood and that there is a difference between rights and
quasi-rights, then it seems right that the fetus has no legal right
but 'just' a quasi-right to live. If this is the case, what about the
relation between the existential quasi-right of the fetus and the
basic legal rights of the pregnant woman? The answer seems obvious:
quasi-rights cannot trump full legal rights. The fetus has a different
legal status that is based on a different moral status (see above). On
this view there is no legal conflict of rights.
b. The Argument of Potentiality

Another important point in the debate about the ascription of legal
rights to the fetus is the topic of potential rights. Joel Feinberg
discusses this point in his famous article "Potentiality, Development,
and Rights" (1984, 145-151) and claims that the thesis that actual
rights can be derived from the potential ability of having such rights
is logically flawed because one is only able to derive potential
rights from a potential ability of having rights. Feinberg maintains
that there may be cases where it is illegal or wrong to have an
abortion even when the fetus does not have any rights or is not yet a
moral person. To illustrate his main argument – that rights do not
rest on the potential ability of having them – Feinberg considers
Stanley Benn's argument which I slightly modified:

If person X is President of the USA and thus is Commander in Chief
of the army, then the person X had the potential ability to become the
President of the USA and Commander in Chief of the army in the years
before his rule. But, it does not follow that: The person X has the
authority to command the army as potential President of the USA.

Thus, it seems incorrect to derive actual rights from the bare
potential ability to have legal rights at a later time. It should be
added that Benn – despite his criticism on the argument of potential
rights – also claims that there are valid considerations which do not
refer to the talk of rights and may provide plausible reasons against
infanticide and late abortions even when fetuses and newborns are
lawless beings with no personhood.
5. A Pragmatic Account

There is always a chance that women get pregnant when they have sex
with their (heterosexual) partners. There is no 100% certainty not to
get pregnant under 'normal circumstances;' there is always a very
small chance even by using contraception to get pregnant. However,
what does the sphere of decisions look like? A pregnancy is either
deliberate or not. If the woman gets deliberately pregnant, then both
partners (respectively the pregnant woman) may decide to have a baby
or to have an abortion. In the case of having an abortion there may be
good reasons for having an abortion with regard to serious health
problems, for example, a (serious) disabled fetus or the endangerment
of the woman's life. Less good reasons seem to be: vacation, career
prospects, or financial and social grievances. If the pregnancy is not
deliberate, it is either self-caused in the sense that the partners
knew about the consequences of sexual intercourses and the
contraception malfunctioned or it is not self-caused in the sense of
being forced to have sex (rape). In both cases the fetus may be
aborted or not. The interesting question concerns the reasons given
for the justification of having an abortion. There are at least two
different kinds of reasons or justifications: The first group will be
called 'first order reasons;' the second 'second order reasons.' First
order reasons are reasons of justifications which may plausibly
justify an abortion, for example, (i) rape, (ii) endangerment of the
woman's life, and (iii) a serious mentally or physically disabled
fetus. Second order reasons are reasons of justifications which are,
in comparison to first order reasons, less suitable in providing a
strong justification for abortion, for example, (i) a journey, (ii)
career prospects, (iii) by virtue of financial or social grievances.
a. First Order Reasons
i. Rape

It would be cruel and callous to force the pregnant woman who had been
raped to give birth to a child. Judith Jarvis Thomson maintains in her
article "A Defense of Abortion" that the right to live does not
include the right to make use of a foreign body even if this means
having the fetus aborted (Thomson 1984, pp. 174 and pp. 177). Both the
fetus and the raped woman are 'innocent,' but this does not change
'the fact' that the fetus has any rights. It seems obvious in this
case that the raped woman has a right to abort. Forcing her not to
abort is to remind her of the rape day-by-day which would be a serious
mental strain and should not be enforced by law or morally condemned.
However, this assumption would be premature from John Noonan's
viewpoint according to his article "An Almost Absolute Value in
History" (Noonan 1970, 51-59). He claims that "the fetus as human [is]
a neighbor; his life [has] parity with one's own […] [which] could be
put in humanistic as well as theological terms: do not injure your
fellow man without reasons. In these terms, once the humanity of the
fetus is perceived, abortion is never right except in self-defense.
When life must be taken to save life, reason alone cannot say that a
mother must prefer a child's life to her own. With this exception, now
of great rarity, abortion violates the rational humanist tenet of the
equality of human lives." Hence, the woman has no right to abort the
fetus even if she had been raped and got pregnant against her will.
This is the consequence of Noonan's claim since he only permits having
an abortion in self-defense while Thomson argues that women, in
general, have a right to abort the fetus when the fetus is conceived
as an intruder (for example, due to rape). But, it remains unclear
what Noonan means by 'self-defense.' In the end of his article he
states that "self-sacrifice carried to the point of death seemed in
extreme situations not without meaning. In the less extreme cases,
preference for one's own interests to the life of another seemed to
express cruelty or selfishness irreconcilable with the demands of
love" (Noonan 1970). On this view, even in the standard case of
self-defense — for example, either the woman's life or the life of the
fetus — the pregnant woman's death would not be inappropriate and in
less extreme cases the raped woman would express cruelty or
selfishness when she aborts the fetus — a judgment not all people
would agree with.
ii. Endangerment of the Woman's Life

Furthermore, there is no good reason to proceed with a pregnancy when
the woman's life is in serious danger. Potential life should not be
more valued then actual life. Of course, it is desirable to do
everything possible to rescue both but it should be clear that the
woman's life 'counts more' in this situation. To force her at the risk
of her life means to force her to give up her right of self-defense
and her right to live. There seems to be no good reason to suspend her
basic right of self-defense.
iii. Serious Mentally or Physically Disabled Fetuses

It is hard to say when exactly a fetus is seriously mentally or
physically disabled because this hot issue raises the vital question
of whether the future life of the disabled fetus is regarded as worth
living (problem of relativity). Hence, there are simple cases and, of
course, borderline cases which lie in the penumbra and are hard to
evaluate. Among the simple cases take the following example: Imagine a
human torso lacking arms and legs that will never develop mental
abilities like self-consciousness, the ability to communicate, or the
ability to reason. It seems quite obvious to some people that such a
life is not worth living. But what about the high number of borderline
cases? Either parents are not entitled to have a healthy and strong
offspring, nor are the offspring entitled to become healthy and
strong. Society should not force people to give birth to seriously
disabled fetuses or morally worse to force mothers who are willing to
give birth to a disabled fetus to have an abortion (for example, Nazi
Germany). It seems clear that a rather small handicap of the fetus is
not a good reason to abort it. Often radical groups of disabled
persons claim that, if other people hold the view that it is all right
to abort fetuses with (serious) genetic handicaps, the same people
therewith deny the basic right to live of disabled adults with serious
handicaps (see Singer debate). This objection is unreasonable since
fetuses in contrast to adult human beings have no basic interest to
continue to live their lives. Disabled fetuses may be aborted like
other fetuses, disabled (adult) human persons have to be respected
like other people.
b. Second Order Reasons
i. A Journey to Europe

With regard to the reasons of justification according to the second
group, there is a specific view which is based on the argument that it
is the decision of the woman to have an abortion or not. There is a
related view that rests on the assumption of the pregnant woman who
claims that the fetus is a part of her body like a limb so that she
has the right to do what ever she wants to do with the fetus. The
argument is wrong. The fetus is certainly not a simple part of the
pregnant woman but, rather, a dependent organism that relies on the
woman. The following example, the journey to Europe from North
America, is based on the feminist argument but it is somewhat
different in stressing another point in the line of argumentation: A
young woman is pregnant in the 7th month and decides to make a journey
to Europe for a sight-seeing tour. Her pregnancy is an obstacle to
this and she decides to have an abortion. She justifies her decision
by claiming that it will be possible for her to get pregnant whenever
she wants but she is only able to make the journey now by virtue of
her present career prospects. What can be said of her decision? Most
authors may feel a deep discomfort not to morally condemn the action
of the woman or not to reproach her for her decision for different
reasons. But, there seems only two possible answers which may count as
a valid basis for morally blaming the woman for her decision: First,
if the young woman lives in a moral community where all members hold
the view that it is immoral to have an abortion with regard to the
reason given, then her action may be morally reprehensible.
Furthermore, if the (moral) agreement is enforced by law, the woman
also violated the particular law for which she has to take charge of.
Second, one could also blame her for not showing compassion for her
potential child. People may think that she is a callous person since
she prefers to make the journey to Europe instead of giving birth to
her almost born child (7th month). If the appeal to her mercy fails,
one will certainly be touched by her 'strange' and 'inappropriate'
action. However, the community would likely put some informal pressure
on the pregnant woman to influence her decision not to have an
abortion. But some people may still contend that this social pressure
will not change anything about the fact that the fetus has no basic
right to live while claiming that the woman's decision is elusive.
ii. Financial and Social Reasons

A woman got pregnant (not deliberately) and wants to have an abortion
by virtue of her bad financial and social background because she fears
that she will be unable to offer the child an appropriate life
perspective. In this case, the community should do everything possible
to assist the woman if she wants to give birth to her child. Or, some
may argue, that society should offer to take care of her child in
special homes with other children or to look for other families who
are willing to house another child. According to this line of
thinking, people may claim that the financial or social background
should not be decisive for having an abortion if there is a true
chance for help.
c. First Order Reasons vs. Second Order Reasons

There is a difference between the first order reasons and the second
order reasons. We already saw that the first order reasons are able to
justify an abortion while the second order reasons are less able to do
so. That is because people think that the second order reasons are
weaker than the reasons of the first group. It seems that the human
ability to show compassion for the fetus is responsible for our
willingness to limit the woman's basic right of autonomy where her
reasons are too elusive. However, one may state that there are no
strong compulsive reasons which could morally condemn the whole
practice of abortion. Some people may not unconvincingly argue that
moral agreements and legal rights are due to human beings so that
reasons for or against abortion are always subjective and relative.
According to this view, one is only able to contend the 'trueness' or
'wrongness' of a particular action in a limited way. Of course, there
are other people who argue for the opposite (for example, Kantians,
Catholic Church). One reason why people have strong feelings about the
conflict of abortion is that human beings do have strong intuitive
feelings, for example, to feel compassion for fetuses as helpless and
most vulnerable human entities. But moral intuitionism falls short by
being a valid and objective basis for moral rights. In the end, it is
a question of a particular moral approach whether one regards an
abortion as morally justifiable or not. But not every approach is
justified. There is no anything goes

.
6. Public Policy and Abortion

One of the most difficult issues is how to make a sound policy that
meets the needs of most people in a given society without focussing on
the extreme conservative view, or the extreme liberal view, or the
many moderate views on the conflict of abortion. The point is simple,
one cannot wait until the philosophical debate is settled, for maybe
there is no one solution available. But, in fact, the people in a
society must know what the policy is; that is, they have to know when
and under what circumstances abortion is permitted or altogether
prohibited. What are the reasons for a given policy? Do they rest on
religious beliefs or do they depend on cultural claims? Whose
religious beliefs and whose cultural claims? Those beliefs and claims
of most people or of the dominant group in a given society ? What
about the problem of minority rights? Should they be respected or be
refused? These are hard questions; no one is able to give a definite
response yet. But, of course, the problem of abortion has to be
'solved,' at least, with regard to practical matters. This means that
a good policy does not rest on extreme views but tries to cover as
many points of views, although being aware of the fact that one is not
able to please every person in society. This would be an impossible
task. It seems that one should adopt a moderate view rather than the
proposed extreme views. This is not because the moderate view is
'correct' but because one needs a broad consensus for a sound policy.
The hardliners in the public debate on the conflict of abortion, be
they proponents or opponents, may not be aware of the fact that
neither view is sustainable for most people. A sound way for
governments with regard to a reasonable policy could be the acceptance
of a more or less neutral stance that may function as a proper guide
for law. But, in fact, the decisive claim of a 'neutral stance' is, in
turn, questionable. All ethical theories try to present a proper
account of a so-called neutral stance but there is hardly any theory
that could claim to be sustainable with regard to other approaches.
However, the key seems to be, again, to accept a middle way to cover
most points of views. In the end, a formation of a policy seeks for a
sound compromise people could live with. But this is not the end of
the story. One should always try to find better ways in coping with
hard ethical problems. The conflict of abortion is of that kind and
there is no evidence to assume otherwise.
7. Clinical Ethics Consultation and Abortion

The vital issue of how one chooses whether or not to have an abortion
is of utmost importance since people, in particular women, want to
have a proper 'guideline' that can support them in their process of
ethical decision-making. According to pregnant women, the most crucial
point seems not to be whether abortion is morally legitimate or not
but, rather, how one should deliberate in the particular case. In
fact, observations regularly show that women will nearly have the same
number of abortions in contexts in which it is legal or not. Gert is
right in claiming that "the law can allow behavior that some people
regard as morally unacceptable, such as early abortion, and it can
prohibit behavior that some people regard as morally acceptable, such
as late abortion. No one thinks that what the law decides about
abortion settles the moral issue" (Gert 2004, 138). But what follows
from that? What aspects should one consider and how should one decide
in a particular case? It would be best to consult a neutral person who
has special knowledge and experiences in medicine and medical ethics
(for example, clinical ethics consultation). Most people are usually
not faced with hard conflicts of abortion in their daily lives and get
simply swamped by it; they are unable to determine and evaluate all
moral aspects of the given case and to foresee the relevant
consequences of the possible actions (for example, especially with
regard to very young women who get pregnant by mistake). They need
professional help without being dominated by the person in order to
clarify their own (ethical) stance. However, the conflict of abortion
as such may not be solvable, in the end, but the experienced
professional is able to provide persons with feasible solutions for
the particular case.
8. References and Further Reading

* Boonin, David (2002), A Defense of Abortion Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
* Boylan, Michael (2002), "The Abortion Debate in the 21st
Century" in Medical Ethics, ed. Michael Boylan. Upper Saddle River,
NJ: Prentice Hall.
* Chadwick, Ruth, Kuhse, Helga, Landman, Willem et al. (2007), The
Bioethics Reader. Editor's Choice Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
* English, Jane (1984), "Abortion and the Concept of a Person,"
in: The Problem of Abortion, 151-161.
* Feinberg, Joel (1984), "Potentiality, Development, and Right,"
in: The Problem of Abortion, 145-150.
* Feinberg, Joel (1984), The Problem of Abortion, Belmont: Wadsworth.
* Gauthier, David (1986), Morals by Agreement, Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
* Gert, Bernard (2004), Common Morality. Deciding What to Do,
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
* Gillespie, Norman (1984), "Abortion and Human Rights," in: The
Problem of Abortion, 94-102.
* Gordon, John-S. (2005), "Die moralischen und rechtlichen
Dimensionen der Abtreibungsproblematik," in: Conjectura, 43-62.
* Hoerster, Norbert (1995), Abtreibung im säkularen Staat,
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
* Hobbes, Thomas (1996), Leviathan, Ed. Richard Tuck Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
* Korsgaard, Christine (1996), The Sources of Normativity,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
* Noonan, John T. (1970), "An Almost Absolute Value in History,"
in: The Morality of Abortion: Legal and Historical Perspectives,
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 51-59.
* Noonan, John T. (1970), The Morality of Abortion: Legal and
Historical Perspectives, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
* Schwarz, Stephen (1990), Moral Questions of Abortion, Chicago:
Loyola University Press.
* Singer, Peter (1993), Practical Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
* Sumner, Wayne (1980), Abortion and Moral Theory, Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
* Thomson, Judith J. (1984), "A Defense of Abortion," in: The
Problem of Abortion, 173-188.
* Tooley, Michael (1983), Abortion and Infanticide, Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
* Warren, Mary A. (1984), "On the Moral and Legal Status of
Abortion," in: The Problem of Abortion, 102-119.
* Warren, Mary A. (1997), "Abortion," in: A Companion to Ethics,
Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 303-314.